

Witness Name: David Sibbick

Statement No: 1

Exhibits: WITN0335\_01/01 –  
WITN0335\_01/13

Date: 26.08.2022

## POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY

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### FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF DAVID SIBBICK

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I, David Sibbick, will say as follows:

1. I make this statement in response to the Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry's rule 9 request dated 25 May 2022. It is made in 'Question & Answer' format reflecting the questions in the request.
2. At the time of making this statement, I am 80 years' old and retired.

***Question 1. Please set out a brief professional background.***

3. I started my career in the Civil Service in or around 1960. My first post was as an Executive Officer dealing with human resources matters in the Post Office when it was still a Government department. At the time it was incorporated as Post Office Limited ('POL'), I moved into a post at an equivalent level dealing with various forms of radio communications' licensing in the newly created Ministry of Post and Telecommunications ('MPT'). I was later appointed Private Secretary to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry. The MPT was subsequently absorbed into the Department of Trade and Industry ('DTI'). I spent the rest of my Civil Service career in DTI or various iterations of it, dealing with a variety of policy areas

including postal services, radio communications, and international trade and regulation.

4. Of particular note is that in the mid-1970s I served as Secretary to a major Committee of Inquiry under the chairmanship of Sir Charles Carter into the future of the Post Office. A key recommendation of our Committee was that the postal and telecommunications businesses of the Post Office should be separated and run as entirely separate businesses. This recommendation was subsequently implemented by Margaret Thatcher's Government.
  
5. In July 1989, at the time Sir Nicholas Ridley was appointed Secretary of State for Trade and Industry ('**SSTI**'), I was promoted to the position of Director of Posts. In this role I was responsible (jointly with Her Majesty's Treasury ('**HMT**')) for monitoring the Government's interest in POL in its ownership capacity. My day-to-day responsibilities included briefing ministers, preparing parliamentary debate briefings, preparing for parliamentary questions, dealing with ministerial correspondence from the public, and maintaining relationships with various stakeholders including other Government departments and postal unions such as the National Federation of SubPostmasters ('**NFSP**') and the Communication Workers Union ('**CWU**'). I also represented the UK's postal interests on an international level – for example, I led the UK delegation to the Universal Postal Union's<sup>1</sup> International Postal Congress in 1994 and chaired the European Postal Regulators Committee between 1991 and 1994. I remained in this post until my retirement from the Civil Service toward the end of 2000.

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<sup>1</sup> A United Nations agency coordinating postal policies amongst member nations.

6. Following my retirement from the Civil Service I was recruited to the position of Regulatory Director at DX Delivery Services which dealt primarily with the overnight delivery of legal mail. From 2005 I continued to provide regulatory advice to DX for a further 3 years, but on a part-time and consultancy basis. During this time I also served (first) as Secretary and (subsequently) as Chairman of the Mail Competition Forum, a trade association representing the interests of the private sector mail operators. In 2011, I permanently retired from paid employment.

***Question 2. Please set out the background to your involvement in the Horizon project.***

7. I was aware from early on in my term as Director of Posts of the long-running sore between the Benefits Agency ('BA') and Post Office Counters Limited ('POCL'). Each believed the other to be taking unfair advantage of what was in effect a captive situation. Years later I recall a senior official in the Department of Social Security ('DSS') telling me that there was scarcely an official in the senior echelons of that department who did not bear the scars of involvement in the BA/POCL squabbles at some point in their career.
8. But BA had a very specific grievance. Up until that point, although benefit claimants could opt to receive their payments through automated credit transfer ('ACT'), a large majority opted instead to receive their payments in cash at a post office counter. This latter option was administered through a pension or other benefit book and this (essentially paper-based) system was open to widespread fraud, the cost of which had to be borne by BA. This highly – from BA's viewpoint

- unsatisfactory situation led BA at some point in the early 1990s to demand from Government the right to insist that all benefits should henceforth be paid by ACT.
9. The flip side to this argument was that the income which individual post offices earned from BA, supplemented by income from conducting other Government business, together with the trade generated on the private side of many post offices, meant that without the 'footfall' generated by the existing BA payment method, potentially many thousands of post offices up and down the country would become uneconomic and forced to close.
10. As described in the Annex to Briefing for Ministerial Meeting on Horizon dated 9 September 1998 (WITN0335\_01/1), a leak of BA's demand to Government led to a very substantial 'save our post offices' protest campaign (probably orchestrated by the NFSP) that had Ministers scurrying for some form of compromise. Thus, in 1993 was Horizon born. This £1 billion and hugely ambitious project (in terms of size, if nothing else), set up under the auspices of the Government's much vaunted Private Finance Initiative ('PFI'), envisaged a tripartite partnership of BA, POCL and ICL Pathway Limited ('ICL') to develop a system that would put electronic terminals capable of reading a plastic card with magnetic stripe into every post office. This card – the benefits payment card ('BPC') – would replace the existing paper-based payment system and drastically reduce the scope for fraud – a key BA objective.
11. It is perhaps worth noting here, in view of what followed later, that the BPC would be a 'dumb' card, with little or no development potential, in sharp contrast to a 'smart' card with far greater flexibility and development potential. And no less significantly, the Horizon platform had been designed around the BPC with the

batch transmission of data overnight from post office terminals to BA. I believe that when experts subsequently examined the system in 1998, they accepted that much of the development work around the BPC had been completed and appeared to be broadly acceptable. So moving away from the BPC would mean not only scrapping the work done on the BPC itself, but also reconfiguring the remainder of Horizon to work in an online environment.

12. However the BA, POCL and ICL 'marriage à trois' seems to have been in difficulty almost from the outset, with each of the parties blaming one or both of the others for lack of progress. Certainly by the Autumn of 1997, both BA and POCL had placed ICL in breach of contract, because the project was by that time running some two years late and substantially over budget. BA's position remained as it had been throughout, that the only safe and cost-effective way to deliver benefit payments was through ACT. At this point DSS views were largely in sympathy with BA, and HMT sympathies (at least as seen from within DTI) also veered in that direction.

13. DTI came to the party with two quite distinct but in the event complementary concerns. Firstly, a substantial collapse of the network of post offices would create an immense problem of political management, not to mention the untold misery and hardship caused to a generation of subpostmasters whose livelihoods (and in many cases, pensions) would have been decimated at a stroke, and local communities deprived of a much-valued facility. Secondly, there was DTI's sponsorship of the electronics sector. The failure of Horizon – and with it the probable collapse of ICL – would be seen as a massive blow to the sector and to the Government's promotion of PFI, and the effect on Fujitsu would severely damage future prospects of inward investment from Japan and elsewhere.

14. Finally, as background, at the time of the Horizon review, there was a second major review running simultaneously and falling within the purview of a separate team in DTI. This was known as the 'Post Office Review' that was set up to give effect to the Blair Government's commitment (made in opposition) to examine the scope for granting POL greater commercial freedom whilst remaining in the public sector. Clearly the future of POCL as a significant arm of the POL was dependent on securing a satisfactory outcome on Horizon, and to this effect I periodically contributed to briefings prepared by the Post Office Review team within DTI.

***Question 3. Please consider BEIS0000127, BEIS0000128, BEIS0000129, BEIS0000130, BEIS0000131, BEIS0000135, BEIS0000136, BEIS0000137, BEIS0000138, BEIS0000139, BEIS0000140, BEIS0000141, BEIS0000142, BEIS0000157, BEIS0000158, BEIS0000159, BEIS0000161, BEIS0000162, BEIS0000174, BEIS0000187, BEIS0000188, BEIS0000189, BEIS0000283, BEIS0000284, BEIS0000318, BEIS0000341, BEIS0000422, BEIS0000431, BEIS0000432.***

***Question 3a. Please explain the problems faced by the Horizon project between the Spring and Autumn of 1998.***

15. By the beginning of the period between Spring and Autumn 1998, the Horizon project was running some two years late and substantially over budget. Under pressure from Ministers in DSS, and concerned at the fraud savings foregone, the Government had asked DTI and DSS officials under HMT leadership to review the

project. This group of officials was called the 'Horizon Working Group' ('**HWG 1998**')<sup>2</sup>.

16. It is worth noting that on a project of Horizon's complexity and scale, technical issues were so far out of the expertise of Ministers and officials that experts were needed to report on them. For this reason the HWG 1998 in turn commissioned an expert group under the chairmanship of Adrian Montague ('**Expert Group**') to report on the project's technical viability. Ministers and officials were effectively reliant on these experts to inform us of technical issues, and in effect these would only be escalated to a political level if they were 'killer' issues that might affect decision-making on Horizon.

17. The resulting report – the Review of the Benefits Agency/Post Office Counters Automation Project by the HWG 1998 (WITN0335\_01/2) referring to the BA/POCL Automation Programme Review Report by the Expert Group (WITN0335\_01/3) – was put to Ministers on 22 July 1998. It concluded that the project was technically viable, and likely to be robust and acceptably 'future proof' as is said in my submission to SSTI on 30 July 1998 (WITN0335\_01/4). I also recall that KPMG reached a similar view at a later stage<sup>3</sup>.

***Question 3b. What did you understand about technical difficulties with Horizon at this time?***

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<sup>2</sup> This working group was distinct from the 'Horizon Working Group' addressed in Question 11 below that was created in 1999 and initially chaired by Ian McCartney, which shared a similar name but performed a different function. For ease of reference, the later 'Horizon Working Group' will be referred to as '**HWG 1999**'.

<sup>3</sup> See for example the summary of key findings of Horizon Working Group report and KPMG report dated 6 November 1998 (WITN0335\_01/5) which states on page 3: 'KPMG have confirmed that Option 2 is technically and commercially feasible.'

18. The report of the Expert Group identified a considerable number of possible, probable and forecast technical issues that would need to be addressed as the project moved forward. However, having carefully considered all of these, their overall conclusion was that, as noted at paragraph 17 above, the project was technically viable and likely to be robust and acceptably future proof. The Horizon Group endorsed this conclusion in their report to Ministers of July 1998, and I also recall that KPMG reached a similar view at a late stage.

19. In other words, so far as DTI ministers were concerned, there were no 'killer' difficulties that could be cited as a reason to cancel Horizon or impede satisfactory completion. I was personally not aware of any additional technical difficulties at this time.

***Question 3c. Was there agreement between Government departments as to the future of Horizon? If not, what were the respective positions as you recall them?***

20. The report of the Expert Group concluded that there might be a further nine-month delay to the project, and suggested three main families of options: continue with the project provided satisfactory terms could be negotiated with ICL (Option 1); continue with the Horizon infrastructure but without the BPC (Option 2); and cancel the project (Option 3).

21. Whilst DTI remained firmly in favour of Option 1, DSS argued strongly for Option 2, to allow an earlier move to ACT, whilst parallel provision of 'front end' banking services would be established. DSS envisaged BA migrating to ACT over three years from October 2001, and in consequence POCL would need to establish banking facilities by that date.



**Question 4. Please consider BEIS0000104.**

**Question 4a. Please explain the purpose behind the Horizon Project Review Group.**

**Question 4b. Did the Group consider issues concerning technical difficulties with Horizon?**

**Question 4c. If so, was it successful in doing so? Please explain the reasons for your answer.**

22. I have very little recollection of the work of this Horizon Project Review Group. It clearly started out with somewhat grandiose ideas, and I suspect that what may have happened was that Ministers (or more senior officials) decided that what was needed was a higher-powered group with a sharper focus and this became the HWG 1998, supported by an Expert Group to address the more technical issues (please see my answer to Question 3a above).

**Question 5. Please consider BEIS0000284, BEIS0000318, BEIS0000283.**

**Question 5a. How would you describe the Government's relationship with ICL between the Spring and Autumn of 1998?**

23. I knew from my informal discussions with ICL that they were aware that DTI was for the most part batting in their corner within Government – for which they were grateful – whilst DSS had a different agenda. They were of course equally aware that once a Government line had been agreed, then publicly DTI would be fully committed to it. ICL would cooperate fully in attempts to find a satisfactory solution, but it had to be one that made commercial sense for them.

**Question 6. Please consider BEIS0000101, BEIS0000103, BEIS0000177, BEIS0000178, BEIS0000179, BEIS0000180, BEIS0000181, BEIS0000393, BEIS0000394, BEIS0000395, BEIS0000396, BEIS0000400, BEIS0000404, BEIS0000408, BEIS0000413, BEIS0000417, BEIS0000418, BEIS0000419.**

**Question 6a. Please explain the position in respect of the adoption of Horizon as at November and December 1998.**

24. As October 1998 turned into November, and November into December, the familiar arguments for and against proceeding with one option or another, though dressed up in increasingly complex financial projections, ebbed and flowed. Even a letter dated 10 December 1998 from SSTI Peter Mandelson to Chief Secretary of HMT Stephen Byers (WITN0335\_01/6) and copied to the Prime Minister failed to open up a crack in the logjam. And ICL seemed to suddenly have acquired the knack of irritating everyone. Invitation after invitation from officials to Ministers to take decisions went unanswered. My submission dated 22 December 1998 to SSTI (WITN0335\_01/7) and the draft letter it covered from SSTI to the Prime Minister (WITN0335\_01/8) give some flavour of that frustration.

**Question 6b. What did you understand of technical difficulties at this time?**

25. I was not aware of any technical difficulties at this time, nor do I recall them playing any significant part in the events of November and December 1998.

**Question 6c. Was there agreement between Government departments as to the future of Horizon? If not, what were the respective positions as you recall them?**

26. The positions of DSS and DTI remained substantially unchanged at this time. The position of HMT appeared more open to the argument that a wholesale move of

benefits recipients to compulsory ACT was unlikely to be achievable in practice and would in any case leave the Government with a range of extremely difficult political issues.

**Question 7. Please consider BEIS0000166, BEIS0000167, BEIS0000218, BEIS0000358, BEIS0000359, BEIS0000360, BEIS0000361, BEIS0000362, BEIS0000363, BEIS0000364, BEIS0000365, BEIS0000366, BEIS0000367, BEIS0000368, BEIS0000369, BEIS0000371, BEIS0000373, BEIS0000375, BEIS0000376, BEIS0000377, BEIS0000378, BEIS0000379, BEIS0000380, BEIS0000381, BEIS0000382, BEIS0000383, BEIS0000384, BEIS0000385, BEIS0000386, BEIS0000388, BEIS0000389, BEIS0000390, BEIS0000391, BEIS0000392, BEIS0000393, BEIS0000441.**

**Question 7a. Please explain the position in respect of the adoption of Horizon between January and April 1999.**

27. Perhaps the most significant development between January and April 1999 was the intervention of No 10 Downing Street ('No 10') on two occasions making clear that the Prime Minister (Tony Blair) was not looking for an outcome that involved walking away from Horizon or ICL. The first occasion was in January 1999 by way of correspondence from the Prime Minister's Principal Private Secretary, Jeremy Heywood<sup>4</sup>. The second occasion was in March 1999 by way of another letter from Jeremy Heywood<sup>5</sup>. No 10's involvement was immediately decisive in effectively

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<sup>4</sup> This letter is referred to in the first paragraph of a draft letter from SSTI to the Prime Minister circulated by email on 20 January 1999 (WITN0335\_01/9) (WITN0335\_01/10), which dates the letter as 14 January 1999. At the time of making this statement I understand that a copy of the letter is not available (nor is the advice prompting it).

<sup>5</sup> Letter from 10 Downing Street to HMT Treasury dated 1 March 1999 (WITN0335\_01/11).

removing from any further discussion the option of walking away from ICL or Horizon.

28. Despite this, the four-month period ended with no agreement on a way forward. As seen in my submission to SSTI dated 16 April 1999 (WITN0335\_01/12), DTI concluded that Option B (Horizon with a smartcard) was too expensive, whilst Option A (Horizon with the BPC) was not deliverable, not for technical reasons but because of the dysfunctional relationship between the contracting parties.

***Question 7b. What did you understand of technical difficulties at this time?***

29. I was not aware of any technical difficulties at this time, nor do I recall them playing any significant part in the events between January and April 1999.

***Question 7c. Was there agreement between Government departments as to the future of Horizon? If not, what were the respective positions as you recall them?***

30. DSS and BA maintained their view that the BPC represented a technological dead-end; DTI maintained its view which at least in principle was now aligned with that of No 10; and both POCL and ICL in different ways had difficulty in finding numbers that would work for them.

***Question 8. Please consider BEIS0000190, BEIS0000241, BEIS0000250, BEIS0000275, BEIS0000342, BEIS0000343, BEIS0000345, BEIS0000352, BEIS0000355, BEIS0000439, BEIS0000440.***

***Question 8a. Please explain the position in respect of the adoption of Horizon between May to July 1999.***

31. During this period the plethora of options that had sprung up like mushrooms in the preceding months were swept away by a bilateral agreement between POCL and ICL, lubricated in POCL's case by £480 million contribution from HMT, to take forward the Horizon platform on an ongoing commercial development basis. BA got its commitment to a glide path to ACT, and it would be for POCL and ICL to ensure that the roll out of Horizon to all post offices was completed in time, together with agreements with commercial banks, to retain and attract both existing and new ACT customers. Both the HWG 1998 plus its Expert Group, and the more recent iteration made up of postal trade union representatives (the HWG 1999)<sup>6</sup>, would continue to support the ongoing Horizon project.

***Question 8b. What did you understand of technical difficulties at this time?***

32. I was not aware of any technical difficulties at this time, nor do I recall them playing any significant part in the events between May and July 1999.

***Question 8c. Was there agreement between Government departments as to the future of Horizon? If not, what were the respective positions as you recall them?***

33. In the end, not everyone got exactly what they wanted, but perhaps most got a deal that they thought they could at least live with. DSS secured their commitment to a start date for moving their benefit recipients to ACT. DTI avoided the loss of a major player in the electronics sector, the risk of future investment prospects, and damage to the PFI brand. HMT, which also would have wanted to avoid damage to the PFI brand, were also able to resolve a very difficult issue which may have left the Government in an embarrassing position.

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<sup>6</sup> Please see answers to questions 3 above and 11 below.

**Question 9. Please consider BEIS0000278, BEIS0000313, BEIS0000314, BEIS0000315, BEIS0000331, BEIS0000334, BEIS0000336, BEIS0000337, in addition to those already identified.**

**Question 9a. To what extent did the financial impact of not proceeding with Horizon play a role in its adoption?**

**Question 9b. To what extent did wider concerns of international relations and the economy play a part in the adoption of Horizon?**

34. The financial impact on the network of post offices and the subpostmasters who earn their living within it, the blow to the UK electronics sector and more widely, the damage to Fujitsu and the likely negative impact on inward investment from Japan and more widely, and the damage to the image of the UK's PFI initiative no doubt played a significant part in the thinking of those who fought against attempts to terminate the Horizon project.

**Question 10. To what extent do you consider that your responses to the above impacted on the focus on the technical abilities/robustness of Horizon prior to agreement with ICL?**

35. Issues concerning the technical abilities/robustness of Horizon were taken care of by the HWG 1998 and in particular the Expert Group which supported it. Since none were reported to Ministers at this time, their focus remained on these wider issues.

**Question 11. Please consider BEIS0000231, BEIS0000239, BEIS0000250, BEIS0000345, BEIS0000346, BEIS0000347, BEIS0000348, BEIS0000352, BEIS0000353, BEIS0000354.**

**Question 11a. What was the purpose of the Horizon Working Group?**

36. Confusingly, there were two Horizon Working Groups. The first group (HWG 1998) was set up by Ministers to provide advice on the ongoing Horizon project at a time when there were substantial interdepartmental differences of opinion on the way forward (please see my answer to Question 3a above). This group was chaired by HMT officials, including Steve Robson at the more critical junctures, and was supported by an Expert Group chaired by Adrian Montague.

37. The second group (HWG 1999) was set up under the chairmanship of Ian McCartney, and its membership included the Managing Director of POCL and one of his senior managers, and the General Secretaries of the NFSP, CWU, and the Communication Managers Association. The purpose of this group was twofold. First, it was a channel to keep these key stakeholders informed of ongoing political issues related to Horizon<sup>7</sup>. Second, it was a valuable source of practical hands-on experience from those whose job it would be to operate the system when it was eventually rolled out.

**Question 11b. What role did consideration of the technical abilities/robustness of Horizon play in this Group?**

38. I do not recall any such discussions.

**Question 12. Please consider BEIS0000349, BEIS0000350, BEIS0000347.**

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<sup>7</sup> For example, any issues with the roll-out as it developed – see the steering brief dated 8 October 1999 for fifth HWG 1999 meeting (WITN0335\_01/13).

**Question 12a. What do you recall of the NFSP's position insofar as any concerns about the technical abilities/robustness of Horizon to have been prior to its roll out?**

39. A reliable and easy to use Horizon system was of massive importance to the NFSP and its members, and one whose roll-out was completed in time for the benefit payments transfer to ACT, since their livelihoods depended on it. However, once the roll-out started, I had little further involvement in it until the time I left the Civil Service, and I do not recall the NFSP ever raising technical issues with me.

**Question 13. Please consider BEIS0000236.**

**Question 13a. What understanding did you have of the technical issues referred to at paragraph 5 of this submission?**

**Question 13b. What do you recall of the Government's and civil service's knowledge of and position on these technical issues?**

40. The technical issues referred to were the changes that needed to be made to the Horizon infrastructure to adapt it for its new role which was no longer to be centred around the BPC. This was not to imply that there were technical problems, but rather that there was some – perhaps quite a lot of – further development work still needed.

**Question 14. Please consider BEIS0000119.**

**Question 14a. What understanding did you have of the two technical issues that existed as at August 1999?**



41. I understood that there were the two minor 'technical blips' as described in the document. My recollection is that these were rapidly resolved by ICL, and after thorough testing by POCL, the Horizon system was formally accepted by POCL.

***Question 14b. What do you recall of the Government's and civil service's knowledge of and position on these technical issues?***

42. The issue and its subsequent resolution were very properly reported to Government since it could potentially have delayed acceptance of Horizon by POCL with a knock-on effect on the roll-out of the system. In the event, there was no delay. Essentially however, this was purely an operational issue and resolved in an operational context.

***Question 15. Please consider BEIS0000436.***

***Question 15a. Please explain what the purpose of the Performance and Innovation Unit was.***

43. My understanding of the Performance and Innovation Unit was that it had been set up as a kind of Prime Minister's Department able to look at issues that spanned a number of Government departments. I recall a number of discussions with them, mainly explaining as background for them POL, POCL's place within it, the work we had been doing on Horizon and how that fitted into the wider Post Office Review which had been running in parallel.

***Question 15b. Do you recall any discussion with the Performance and Innovation Unit as to technical issues with Horizon? If so, please set this out.***

44. I do not recall discussing any technical issues with them.

**Question 16. Please consider BEIS0000229, BEIS0000264, BEIS0000265, BEIS0000311, BEIS0000312.**

**Question 16a. What understanding did you have of the technical and help desk problems that existed as at October and November 1999?**

45. Please see my answer to Questions 14a and 14b above. This is the same issue, though I have no recollection of help desks being included in the list of issues.

**Question 16b. What did you understand the “importance we attach to achieving on target roll-out” in BEIS0000265 to mean?**

46. The importance attached to the on target roll-out of the Horizon system into all post offices was so that they would have the best opportunity of picking up business from benefit recipients when these were compulsorily transferred to ACT, thus maintaining as much as possible of their traditional footfall.

47. I am absolutely certain that the importance attached to this by Ministers did not cause Horizon to be rolled-out before it was ready. It was a matter for POCL to accept whether it was ready, and I do not believe it would have agreed to acceptance under time pressure if it thought there was a risk that Horizon would not work – it was in their interest for the system to work properly.

**Question 16c. How do you consider this impacted on the technical and help desk problems that had been identified?**

48. I have no reason to believe that it would have had any impact. We were advised that the issues had been resolved and that Horizon had been tested to the satisfaction of the contracting parties. As far as we were concerned, it was the end of the story.

**Question 17. Looking back, do you feel that the Government effectively scrutinised the procurement, pilot, and rollout of Horizon?**

49. Yes. Ministers received the best advice available and took decisions on that basis.

I do not know what more Ministers could have asked for, or what we in DTI could have provided them. It was not the role of Ministers to become deeply involved at an operational level, or for DTI to micromanage POL. I am anyway far from certain that additional scrutiny would have yielded any better result.

**Question 18. Do you feel that you properly informed Ministers of the technical issues relating to Horizon?**


50. Identifying technical issues was the specific task of the HWG 1998 and the Expert Group that reported to it. Were any such issues brought to our attention, I feel very confident that we would have made quite sure that our Ministers knew about them.

**Question 19. Are there any other matters that you consider will assist the Chair?**

51. No.

**Statement of truth**

I believe the content of this statement to be true.

Signed:  .....

Date: 26.08.2022

**Index to First Witness Statement of David Sibbick**

<b><u>No.</u></b>	<b><u>Exhibit Number</u></b>	<b><u>Document Description</u></b>	<b><u>Control Number</u></b>	<b><u>URN</u></b>
1	WITN0335_01/1	Annex to Briefing for Ministerial Meeting on Horizon dated 9 September 1998	BEIS000109	BEIS000129
2	WITN0335_01/2	Review of the Benefits Agency/Post Office Counters Automation Project	VIS00007799	HMT00000034
3	WITN0335_01/3	BA/POCL Automation Programme Review Report	POL-0024576	POL00028094
4	WITN0335_01/4	Submission to SSTI dated 30 July 1998	BEIS0000121	BEIS0000141
5	WITN0335_01/5	Summary of key findings of Horizon Working Group report and KPMG report dated 6 November 1998	BEIS0000161	BEIS0000181
6	WITN0335_01/6	Letter from SSTI Peter Mandelson to Chief Secretary of HMT Stephen Byers dated 10 December 1998	BEIS0000398	BEIS0000418
7	WITN0335_01/7	Submission to SSTI dated 22 December 1998	BEIS0000374	BEIS0000394
8	WITN0335_01/8	Draft letter from SSTI to the Prime Minister	BEIS0000375	BEIS0000395
9	WITN0335_01/9	Email chain dated 20 January 1999	BEIS0000375	BEIS0000166

10	WITN0335_01/10	Draft letter from SSTI to the Prime Minister dated 20 January 1999	BEIS0000147	BEIS0000167
11	WITN0335_01/11	Letter from 10 Downing Street to HMT Treasury dated 1 March 1999	BEIS0000355	BEIS0000375
12	WITN0335_01/12	Submission to SSTI dated 16 April 1999	BEIS0000342	BEIS0000362
13	WITN0335_01/13	Steering brief dated 8 October 1999 for fifth HWG 1999 meeting	BEIS0000211	BEIS0000231