1	Friday, 21 October 2022	1		desperately seeking) they are very likely to choose
2	(10.00 am)	2		an option which is not in our best interests."
3	PAUL RICH	3		Do you know who that direction was to: "if we
4	Questioned by MR BLAKE (continued)	4		don't give them the direction"? Who would you be
5	SIR WYN WILLIAMS: I can hear what goes on when the usher	5		directing?
6	makes her provisional announcements but I didn't hear	6	Α.	I don't think it's for me to direct them. I think this
7	the fire alarm. There we are.	7		is me them coming to me because I'm part of the
8	MR BLAKE: Mr Rich is ready.	8		Evaluation Board in my role as partnership developm
9	Yesterday we spoke about the evaluation board and	9		person, then working to Mr Peaple, and they're sayin
10	ComPEC and MaPEC. I'm going start today in early 1996	10		I think I explained yesterday we allowed the group IT
11	and can we look at POL00031278, please. That's an email	11		people and our own IT people access to the supplier
12	to you of 10 January 1996. Can we look at the top half	12		the bids were evolving so that although they werer
13	of that page, please.	13		part of the formal procurement process and, therefor
14	There is a meeting with Cardlink. Basil Shall,	14		didn't form part of the value assessment factor group
15	and Wendy Powney met with Cardlink. Who are they?	15		because they weren't at sufficient arm's length to do
16	A. They are the I think they're IT people and I think	16		that, whereas I think John Meagher and, I think that
17	they're POCL IT people. I know Wendy well because	17		must be Jeremy Foulkes, are. I think they are part o
18	eventually she worked for me but not at this time.	18		that team.
19	Q. That says:	19		I think what he was doing was asking me to
20	" it became quite clear that our requirements	20		co-ordinate within the business the relevant experts
21	process is lacking in 3 major areas:	21		that field to try to clarify some of the reconciliation
22	"Reconciliation/Role of TIP	22		cash accounting interface, the TMS. I can't rememb
23	"Office Balance/Cash accounting process.	23		what TMS stands. Role of TIP is transaction information
24	"Interfaces with the TMS	24		processing.
25	"If we don't give them direction (which they are	25		I think I can't remember the date. This is
1	January '96. I think you'll find in the bundles notes	1		service specification requirement really was, the SSF
2	from or to me from relevant financial experts within the	2		as they became known, which were fed in both from
3	business around those reconciliation and accounting	3		ourselves and from DSS and Benefits Agency to the
4	issues. So I was sort of promulgating the actions so	4		I don't know if it was five suppliers or three suppliers
5	that his concerns would be addressed.	5		at that stage.
6	Q. Absolutely. So when we look at the bottom of this page	6	Q.	If we look at the bottom right-hand corner and those
7	it seems as though the affected area seems to be	7		bullet points, the top one is:
8	commercial. So you're looking at it from a commercial	8		"POCL will have to rely on the [Benefits Ageno
9	perspective at that stage, in relation to those issues,	9		or the service provider for accurate information for
10	rather than technical; is that right or have	10		settlement."
11	I misunderstood?	11		That was a concern. So it seems as though w
12	A. Yes, I don't think that's quite right. This is a memo	12		POCL would like is to control the end-to-end process
13	to me, isn't it, if you just go back to the top of it.	13		that a fair
14	Q. It is.	14	Α.	They would certainly need to be able to assure it and
15	A. So it's not from me. So:	15		accurately because, of course, those processes and
16	"An early commercial 'must have' supported by	16		information flows from the system would have not on
17	Charterhouse did not control there end-to-end client	17		told the relevant client, like the Benefits Agency
18	product.	18		whether or not their service had been provided and
19	"This was to ensure could not cut POCL out of	19		settled but also would have told our own accounts te
20	the transaction."	20		that it had been in parallel.
21	Yes, I understand. Charterhouse were reviewing	21		I think the I think I remember that both you
22	the overall financial security and probity of the whole	22		see it says "Copy to Ian Gair, Tim Brown, Kevin
23	thing for us. There are other documents that relate to	23		Corrigan/Byron for comment", Tim Brown was one of
		0.4		assistant finance directors at the time and he would
24 25	them, I think, in ComPEC and MaPEC papers, with their input, and I think this is really more about what the	24 25		assistant finance directors at the time and he would have assured it and I think I remember that the chief

	an option which is not in our best interests."
	Do you know who that direction was to: "if we
	don't give them the direction"? Who would you be
	directing?
Α.	I don't think it's for me to direct them. I think this
	is me them coming to me because I'm part of the
	Evaluation Board in my role as partnership development
	person, then working to Mr Peaple, and they're saying
	I think I explained yesterday we allowed the group IT
	people and our own IT people access to the suppliers as
	the bids were evolving so that although they weren't
	part of the formal procurement process and, therefore,
	didn't form part of the value assessment factor group
	because they weren't at sufficient arm's length to do
	that, whereas I think John Meagher and, I think that
	must be Jeremy Foulkes, are. I think they are part of
	that team.
	I think what he was doing was asking me to
	co-ordinate within the business the relevant experts in
	that field to try to clarify some of the reconciliation
	cash accounting interface, the TMS. I can't remember
	what TMS stands. Role of TIP is transaction information
	processing.
	I think I can't remember the date. This is
	2
	service specification requirement really was, the SSRs
	as they became known, which were fed in both from
	ourselves and from DSS and Benefits Agency to the
	I don't know if it was five suppliers or three suppliers
	at that stage.
Q.	If we look at the bottom right-hand corner and those two
	bullet points, the top one is:
	"POCL will have to rely on the [Benefits Agency]
	or the service provider for accurate information for
	settlement."
	That was a concern. So it seems as though what
	POCL would like is to control the end-to-end process; is
	that a fair
Α.	They would certainly need to be able to assure it and
	accurately because, of course, those processes and the
	information flows from the system would have not only
	told the relevant client, like the Benefits Agency
	whether or not their service had been provided and
	settled but also would have told our own accounts team
	that it had been in parallel.
	I think the I think I remember that both you
	see it says "Copy to Ian Gair, Tim Brown, Kevin
	Corrigan/Byron for comment", Tim Brown was one of the
	assistant finance directors at the time and he would
	have assured it and I think I remember that the chief
	4

1		auditor, Peter Dent, also had input in the one of the
2		documents I've read.
3	Q.	If we move on to February of that year, 1996, can we
4		look at POL00028288, please. This is a meeting note
5		from the Evaluation Board. We can see there that the
6		chair is Bob Peaple and I think you're listed as one of
7		the attendees?
8	Α.	Yes, as I said yesterday, yes.
9	Q.	There are representatives, as you said yesterday,
10		I think, from the Benefits Agency, as well, who attend
11		that meeting?
12	Α.	Yes, and the Social Security Agency for Northern Ireland
13		and DITA is the Department I think that's the
14		Department of Social Security's IT people.
15	Q.	Thank you. Yesterday we heard from John Roberts who
16		received updates about the Evaluation Board but these
17		are the actual Evaluation Board's own minutes. Can we
18		look at page 3 of these minutes, please, and, focusing
19		in on the bottom half of the page, that's 2.7 and 2.8.
20		I'm going to read those. 2.7:
21		"With respect to the certificate for Pathway, the
22		Evaluation Board expressed severe reservations about the
23		number of significant risks against the Pathway
24		proposal. It questioned whether the cumulative effect
25		would not lead to potentially late delivery and/or
		5

1	Α.	No, it's not a ringing endorsement, I agree with that,
2		but it was a statement we relied upon at the Evaluation
3		Board, noting the risks, among others, that are in
4		paragraph 2.7. It was and as I also explained
5		yesterday, I think, that when this eventually went to
6		MaPEC Major Projects Expenditure, for the main Post
7		Office Board, the paper would have had to have group IT
8		technical concurrence
9	Q.	Absolutely.
10	Α.	and they said it is acceptable even if it's not
11		ideal.
12	Q.	In terms of the three potential options, Pathway was the
13		least technically strong of the three?
14	Α.	Yes, I think I know what you're referring to because it
15		said the evaluation came third in I can't remember
16		how many, but each one cleared the hurdle and each one
17		had their own issues, is the truth. So you had to apply
18		an overall judgement about the evaluation not only on
19		its technical merits, which had to be acceptable and
20		know the risks you were going into in trying to manage
21		those, but also the other aspects from the other issues
22		around operational management, contractual and PFI
23		compliance.
24	Q.	Also highlighted in the section I've just read are
25		concerns about the dependence on Escher as a small 7

1		operational problems, and as such was cause for Pathway
2		to be excluded from the [Invitation to Tender].
3		Particular concerns were expressed about the card
4		technology with shortcomings in the associated
5		management of fraud and about the dependence on Escher
6		as a small company subcontracted to Pathway."
7		Who was Tony Johnson?
8	Α.	He was in the I can't remember. I was thinking about
9		this the other day. I can't remember which organisation
10		he came from but he was part of the demonstrator team
11		within the assessment team, the one run by Andrew Stott.
12	Q.	So:
13		"[Mr Johnson] explained that these issues had
14		indeed been given much consideration by the Demonstrator
15		team. It had concluded that the Pathway solution was
16		not fundamentally flawed and that from a strictly
17		technical view point the hurdle had been cleared."
18	Α.	Yes.
19	Q.	"In its overall decision, the Evaluation Board might
20		wish to take into account the cumulative effect of any
21		contractual issues with those from the requirements
22		area."
23		So not fundamentally flawed, that's a phrase that
24		we heard yesterday as well. That's not a ringing
25		endorsement of the system, is it?
		6

1		company
2	Α.	Yes.
3	Q.	and also concerns about the card technology at that
4		stage.
5	Α.	Yes. The card technology was I read forgive me if
6		I've got his name wrong Mr Cipione's technical
7		I was given access to his witness statement a couple of
8		days ago. You have to remember what the technology was
9		like at that point. You know, it was a very different
10		world then. So ICL was relying on magnetic stripe
11		technology for this.
12		We looked at and considered something that came up
13		from them, which was a card that included an integrated
14		circuit, known these days more as a smartcard and, at
15		that time in this country, that was very new technology,
16		more expensive, quite risky of itself, gave Benefits
17		Agency some concerns about the security aspects
18		associated with having those cards for benefit
19		encashment. So we decided that would be more risky.
20		As for the dependence on Escher, yes, I understand
21		that as well. We knew that they had a proprietary bit
22		of software called Riposte and it hadn't been proven at
23		scale because the demonstrator was, I think, an office
24		in Ireland, basically, if I remember rightly.
25		But then
		8

1	Q.	I think it may have been in the United States.
2	Α.	Okay, I thought they went to see something that they
3		trialled in An Post but I may misremember, forgive me.
4	Q.	No, no, I think you may be right.
5	Α.	I think they are an American company, I think.
6	Q.	Absolutely.
7	Α.	We knew that risk and we weren't shy about telling ICL
8		Pathway about that risk and they would have to address
9		it if they were going to go forward and, hence, why we
10		put the mitigating stuff around the risk later on.
11	Q.	Can we look at 2.10, so that's over the page. Derek
12		Selwood: who is Derek Selwood, sorry? Are you able to
13		assist?
14	Α.	He's, again, part of the assessment team.
15	Q.	"Derek Selwood confirmed that risks and issues against
16		service providers would be taken into account in the
17		evaluation and selection process. The risks against
18		Pathway would incur a substantial cost penalty given
19		their number and severity. The issues identified during
20		the Demonstrator would affect the Value Factor
21		assessment, and it would be for the Evaluation Board to
22		give due weight to that in reaching its decision."
23		Now, sometimes a proposal might just make the cut
24		but everybody in the room knows that, ultimately, the
25		penalties will mean that it's ruled out. How did you 9
4		

1		I think this was about when and where EPOS would
2		be down the track, in terms of its releases. As I said,
3		we put in the requirements that it had to be the
4		solution had to be able to replicate existing processes
5		but we knew that it would need to migrate to better
6		automated processes later on. We were trying to give
7		priority to the DSS service, the benefit encashment
8		service.
9	Q.	Absolutely. That's the very point that I make, that at
10		that stage the non-Benefits Agency part was very much in
11		its early thinking when it comes to something like
12	Α.	I think we'd fleshed it out but we also realised that it
13		might change over time, depending on what other clients
14		might want to be taken on, for example. There were
15		competitive pressures from competitors, which the
16		Federation of SubPostmasters weren't slow to tell us
17		about, from people who were later on, you've seen it
18		in other documents, were putting out a competitor was
19		putting out an automated payment terminal for bill
20		payments, which the subpostmasters were waiting for
21		Horizon to do.
22	Q.	But EPOS itself was pretty fundamental to the
23		non-Benefits Agency part of Horizon?
24	Α.	Yes, and the join-up with the back office systems.
25	Q.	It seems that in early 1996, at least, it was only very 11

1		feel at that time? Did you have any feelings about
2		Pathway?
3	Α.	I knew there were some risks with it, as there were with
4		others. It was very difficult, really, at that time, to
5		go out and say, "Oh, look, here's this system somewhere
6		else that's been done before", because there was nothing
7		like it and there was certainly nothing like it done
8		under a private finance initiative. So we were all,
9		I think it's fair to say, learning because you couldn't
10		say IBM couldn't show us or Cardlink couldn't show
11		us "Here's something we've done extensively like this in
12		the States and also transferred the risk of a large part
13		of fraud at the same time".
14		So you had to do that but I don't think it was
15		with reluctance that we chose them. We were looking to
16		try to secure an automation provider for both us and for
17		the Government.
18	Q.	While we're on this document, can we just look at
19		paragraph 2.12 below.
20	Α.	Yes.
21	Q.	I don't need to read out the paragraph there but it
22		suggests there was some confusion over the requirements
23		for EPOS at that stage. Do you remember that?
24	Α.	I'm trying to remember, sorry. I'm just reading the
25		material. <i>(Pause)</i>
		10

1		much in its early stages and there was, according to
2		this minute, some confusion over what was required. Do
3		you agree with that?
4	Α.	I don't remember it, is the truth, but that's what it
5	7.0	says here so I take it as read.
6	Q.	Can we move on to a board paper. It's POL00031237. In
7	ч.	fact, this document starts as a board paper but can we
8		go to page 9.
9	Α.	Can you just tell me what date that is, please?
10	Q.	The document on page 9 will assist, actually.
11	Α.	Thank you. Oh, yes I remember this now. Thank you.
12	Q.	I'm just looking for the date. The date of the
13	Α.	No, I understand. This (unclear: simultaneous speakers)
14		the Evaluation Board more or less immediately while
15		once the recommendation had been made and mandates were
16		being sought.
17	Q.	So this is a minute from Bob Peaple to the Project
18		Steering Committee?
19	Α.	Yes. Yes, we knew it as the Joint Steering Committee,
20		so I'm not quite sure about that but fine, okay.
21	Q.	Paragraph 1 sets out the "Purpose". So:
22		"The purpose of this minute is to inform you of
23		the substance of the meeting of the Evaluation Board
24		which I chaired yesterday to consider the report of the
25		evaluation team on the re-tenders submitted by Tom, Dick 12

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Ireland.

1		and Harry."
2		We went over this yesterday with Mr Roberts.
3		I think you heard Mr Roberts' evidence?
4	Α.	Some of it, not all of it.
5	Q.	So Harry was Cardlink, Tom was IBM and Dick was Pathway.
6		Can we look at paragraph 10, please.
7	Α.	Peter Mathison is the chief executive of the Benefits
8		Agency, by the way, he's not a Post Office person.
9	Q.	Thank you. I don't need to read paragraph 10 but
10		essentially there were some wrinkles and they needed to
11		issue an invitation to re-tender on 16 April; do you
12		remember that?
13	Α.	I can remember there was some iteration. I don't
14		remember the detail I'm afraid.
15	Q.	That's fine. Can we look at paragraph 13, which is over
16		the page and could we focus in on that paragraph,
17		please.
18		That addresses the technical aspects and, as you
19		said earlier, on a technical level, all three satisfied
20		the minimum levels; is that right?
21	Α.	Yes.
22	Q.	Can we look at paragraph 16, that's over the page. It
23		was ICL that was closest to the risk transfer sought; do
24		you remember that?
25	Α.	ICL, as far as I can remember, were the only ones that
		13
1		by a DSS person to give the client reassurance and
2		because they had skills, supplementing that with
3		external contractors who had technical skills where
4		necessary and then create I don't know what BA and
5		DSS had their own project team, I think, also because
6		I used to meet my equivalent, as it were, on what became
7		the PDA board, but we also set up teams within Post
8		Office in parallel to check what the PDA was doing and
9		if there were any commercial or contractual issues.
10		I say that about the commercial contractual issues
11		because, clearly, the contract hadn't been let then and
12		there was still this to come and then we had to have
13		we had to finalise our agreements with Benefits Agency
14		on the back of that because that was a back-to-back
15		arrangement. But we also had to cope with the nature of

5		hisk at a pound for pound, and i timik I may have
4		these numbers wrong, so forgive me, but it will be right
5		in the order of magnitude. I think Pathway were
6		prepared to put up about 200 million of risk transfer.
7	Q.	You're absolutely right. If we go to paragraph 30 to 32
8		on page 15, please. Would it be possible to highlight
9		this? Thank you very much.
10		Essentially, Pathway (Dick) was closest to what
11		sponsors had sought to obtain, particularly in terms of
12		the risk transfer; is that right?
13	Α.	Sorry, that was a question? Yes, yes, it was. Sorry.
14	Q.	Paragraph 33:
15		"The Board recognised that an award to Dick would
16		imply a need for a proactive management stance by
17		sponsors."
18		What did you understand by that?
19	Α.	Well, any set of risks needs managing and it means that
20		both sponsors had the need to put forward a suitable
21		method of managing those risks. The way we decided to
22		do that was, as I said yesterday, to create this
23		programme delivery authority, jointly staffed by BA and
24		POCL people in the same building, working together
25		which was an interesting cultural dynamic headed up
		14
1		the managing director of POCL, and the chief executive,
2		I think, of the Benefits Agency being supplied with
3		information. So if there were issues to resolve, that
4		programme steering committee was meant to resolve them.
5	Q.	So there are lots of committees.
6	Α.	There are.
7	Q.	We've heard about lots of committees. Who within the
8		Post Office would have been responsible for taking
9		forward the proactive management stance?
10	Α.	Well, the managing director essentially would have been
11		mandated by the board. He delegated quite a lot of that
12		to me to do things. He would have also taken
13		a proactive stance, as I did, with the person running
14		the programme delivery authority.
15	Q.	So that's Stuart Sweetman as managing director
16	Α.	He was by then, yes, I think.
17	Q.	yourself, and then somebody within
		-

met that hurdle. I think Cardlink was eliminated on

risk at a pound for pound, and I think -- I may have

other factors and then IBM were only prepared to take

Q. If you are looking for who is responsible for taking
forward that proactive management stance, who was that
then? Was that the programme delivery authority or was
it a particular individual?

the private finance initiative in that, in what

proactive management meant.

arrangement. But we also had to cope with the nature of

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A. Well, the programme delivery authority on behalf of the
 two sponsors, and that reported to a Project Steering
 Committee, confusingly here, that's why I differentiated
 before, which consisted of the chief executive of ICL,

25 Q. Can we go back to the document that we were just on but 16

ably, I may say -- Alec Wylie, who was the chief

executive of Social Security Agency for Northern

A. Peter Crahan was the programme director, having taken over from Andrew Stott, I can't remember the exact date.

He was another DSS person. George McCorkell in the

Benefits Agency, and the PDA board was chaired by --

The Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry

1	look at page 1, which is the note for the board.	1
2	Paragraph 11 on the second page, I won't read it	2
3	but it sets out the financial evaluation 11 and	3
4	below and then can we go to the next page, and	4
5	paragraph 14 is the "Non-financial evaluation". One of	5
6	the headings there is "non-financial characteristics"	6
7	and it says:	7
8	"this reviewed suppliers' performance against	8
9	a number of characteristics, including customer	9
10	acceptability, reliability and support, managing	10
11	capability, etc. All three suppliers exceeded the	11
12	acceptable level with the differences between them not	12
13	significant for the purpose of discrimination."	13
14	I think that's consistent with what you told us	14
15	earlier about the three?	15
16	A. Yes.	16
17	Q. There isn't mention there, at least, of concerns about,	17
18	for example, the dependence on Escher or the card	18
19	technology issue?	19
20	A. No, hadn't they been mentioned earlier or in the note?	20
21	Q. In fact, it mentions it slightly further down, so	21
22	paragraph 15 that we can see there, "The Programme	22
23	Evaluation Board recommended Pathway", and that was	23
24	endorsed by the Joint Steering Committee.	24
25	Then it's paragraph 18, I think, that is the part 17	25
1	responsibility for some of the technical assurance	1
2	function?	2
3	A. We would have placed people from within the Post Office	3
4	IT function either from within Post Office Counters or	4
5	from group IT into the PDA and, at the same time, they	5
6	would have been assuring the board themselves through	6
7	the group IT director or to whom he reported at board	7
8	level, executive board level that	8
9	MR BLAKE: Can I just pause you there?	9
10	I am being told that the transcript has stopped.	10
11	We may need to pause for a minute or two just while that	11
12	is rectified.	12
13	Perhaps we can take a short break. I know it's	13
14	very early already but, seeing as this might take a few	14
15	minutes, that could be our mid-morning break because we	15
16	have a lot to do today.	16
17	SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Whatever suits best, Mr Blake.	17
18	MR BLAKE: Can we have a ten-minute break now?	18
19	SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes.	19
20	MR BLAKE: Thank you very much.	20
21	(10.32 am)	21
22	(A short break)	22
23	(10.41 am)	23
24	MR BLAKE: Thank you, Chair, we can see you now.	24
25	I won't go back to that document but I think the 19	25

2		of this particular note for the board that addresses the other technical risks in a little bit more detail.
5		Could we have a look at paragraph 18?
-	A .	Yes, I see, okay.
)	Q.	"Some technical risks were identified with all
-		suppliers, and in some areas, Dick was considered to
		have higher technical risks that Tom and Harry. However
3		these risks are manageable through;
)		"a strong technical assurance function, with
0		support from the Post Office IT Directorate,
1		"rigorous testing at development, trial and
2		roll-out stages,
3		"ensuring supplier contingency plans,
4		"a proactive technical management plan."
5		Is that the proactive management stance that we
6		talked about earlier that Bob Peaple was referring to?
7	Α.	Essentially. I think I just fleshed it out a little bit
8		more in what we actually did, rather than what we
9		thought was needed to do, as it were, and it also,
0		depended on the strength of the people we both put in to
1		that programme delivery authority when we staffed it.
2		But I think for the last, certainly, points 2 and
3		3, I think that's evidenced in all the bundles I've
4		read, so far.
5	Q.	So the Post Office IT Directorate were going to take 18
		bottom line, from what we just heard this morning is
2		bottom line, from what we just heard this morning is that Pathway got through the process but it was very
2 3		
2 3 4		that Pathway got through the process but it was very
2 3 1 5	А.	that Pathway got through the process but it was very clear that they needed close management; is that a fair
2 3 4 5	А.	that Pathway got through the process but it was very clear that they needed close management; is that a fair summary?
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Q. Can I just take you to your witness statement. It's WITN04030100 and it's page 16 that I'd like to look at? 20

1	•	This is my witness statement?	1		given a prepar apportunity to inspect. Would you agree
1 2	A. Q.	This is my witness statement? Yes.	1 2		given a proper opportunity to inspect. Would you agree with that?
3	Q. A.		3	Δ	I said it was a learning process and, certainly, one of
4		It's paragraph 47. You say there:	4	Α.	the things we knew, but we learnt more systematically,
5	α.	"Some post offices were not easily suitable for IT	5		if I can use that word, was that of our 19,600 post
6		infrastructure, as they did not have the necessary space	6		offices they're not a heterogeneous set. You know, you
7		or equipment. Moreover, Pathway underestimated the	7		had Crown offices with 20 counter positions and a front
8		amount of new software development needed from its	8		room in the Orkneys. I think what Pathway
9		subcontractors, eg Escher. A further issue was that the	9		underestimated, reasonably, was the amount of the
10		BA/DSS [CAPS] which was to feed data to Pathway's card	10		network that wasn't covered by ISDN. For those of
10		systems, was not ready"	10		a certain age, that's a sort of predecessor to
12		That sounds very much like the problems that were	12		broadband, I suppose, on which their system relied for
12		raised at the Evaluation Board pre-Invitation to Tender	12		messaging and, therefore and typically in the
13		that we saw first thing this morning, don't they?	13		smallest offices, of course, or in the most rural ones
14	•	Some of them. One of the three but not the other two.	14		where BT, at that time, or Energis hadn't done.
16		There's the issue with Escher and also the card	15		So they didn't know that until they surveyed and
10	Q.		10		we wouldn't have been able to tell them that in this
18	•	system concerns about the card system. No, I don't think that says I'm sorry, Mr Blake,	18		
	А.				statement of service requirement and, of course, the
19 20	0	I don't think that says concerns about the	19		ergonomics as well about counter space and, hence, why
20		It's the next page, sorry.	20		we always insisted that both customer acceptability and
21		Ah yes, I see. Thank you. Sorry.	21		how long transactions would take in case it affected
22	Q.	That paragraph begins by talking about the	22		our quality of service, queueing time, for example, in
23		infrastructure. Keith Todd may, in due course, say that	23		bigger offices, and user acceptability, in terms of
24		Post Office couldn't reasonably have believed that their	24		agents or staff being able to use this, both physically
25		premises were fit for automation and that ICL weren't 21	25		and in terms of software were always included. 22
1		I think that's probably why, when we first	1	Q.	Is that something that thought was given to during the
1 2		I think that's probably why, when we first realised we wouldn't be able to achieve post contract	1 2	Q.	Is that something that thought was given to during the earlier stages: the evaluation stage, the Invitation to
				Q.	
2		realised we wouldn't be able to achieve post contract	2		earlier stages: the evaluation stage, the Invitation to
2 3		realised we wouldn't be able to achieve post contract what we set out to, there was something called	2 3		earlier stages: the evaluation stage, the Invitation to Tender stage?
2 3 4		realised we wouldn't be able to achieve post contract what we set out to, there was something called a no-fault re-plan because the other thing that was	2 3 4		earlier stages: the evaluation stage, the Invitation to Tender stage? I think did we give it enough thought? That's a good
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2 3 4 5 6	Q.	realised we wouldn't be able to achieve post contract what we set out to, there was something called a no-fault re-plan because the other thing that was mentioned in there I don't know if you're going to ask me about that was the DSS issue.	2 3 4 5		earlier stages: the evaluation stage, the Invitation to Tender stage? I think did we give it enough thought? That's a good question. Certainly, they had to demonstrate capability. You know, it wasn't like going to
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	A. Q.	realised we wouldn't be able to achieve post contract what we set out to, there was something called a no-fault re-plan because the other thing that was mentioned in there I don't know if you're going to ask me about that was the DSS issue. Yes, I'll come to the no-fault re-plan shortly. You also highlight in your statement that Pathway had underestimated the training time required. That's true. You said, in terms of infrastructure, their underestimation may have been reasonable. Was it reasonable in respect of training time? We thought they should have known that it would take as Mr Cipione said, we were acquiring a system not a piece of software and that system is about people and the human interface with that. That was always at the heart of our business, unlikely as it may sound now. But the training that they set out, which they did which they were contracted for, for part of that system, which they subcontracted to a company called Peritas, from memory, probably wasn't as extensive	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	A.	earlier stages: the evaluation stage, the Invitation to Tender stage? I think did we give it enough thought? That's a good question. Certainly, they had to demonstrate capability. You know, it wasn't like going to a Microsoft and saying "I'll have that computer". It was buying a whole system with all that went with it, including putting it in because we were an unautomated business of 19,600 offices with 70,000 people involved and it doesn't take a genius to work out that that culture change is going to happen overnight without professional training. I've read other documents later on, after my time, when roll-out began, where I've only seen those since you've sent me the Inquiry sent me the bundles as I wouldn't have been there I've seen that, even in late '99, one of our senior managers was writing to Pathway saying "The training is still inadequate". Moving to February '97 to spring '98, as a member of the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	A. Q.	realised we wouldn't be able to achieve post contract what we set out to, there was something called a no-fault re-plan because the other thing that was mentioned in there I don't know if you're going to ask me about that was the DSS issue. Yes, I'll come to the no-fault re-plan shortly. You also highlight in your statement that Pathway had underestimated the training time required. That's true. You said, in terms of infrastructure, their underestimation may have been reasonable. Was it reasonable in respect of training time? We thought they should have known that it would take as Mr Cipione said, we were acquiring a system not a piece of software and that system is about people and the human interface with that. That was always at the heart of our business, unlikely as it may sound now. But the training that they set out, which they did which they were contracted for, for part of that system, which they subcontracted to a company called	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	A.	earlier stages: the evaluation stage, the Invitation to Tender stage? I think did we give it enough thought? That's a good question. Certainly, they had to demonstrate capability. You know, it wasn't like going to a Microsoft and saying "I'll have that computer". It was buying a whole system with all that went with it, including putting it in because we were an unautomated business of 19,600 offices with 70,000 people involved and it doesn't take a genius to work out that that culture change is going to happen overnight without professional training. I've read other documents later on, after my time, when roll-out began, where I've only seen those since you've sent me the Inquiry sent me the bundles as I wouldn't have been there I've seen that, even in late '99, one of our senior managers was writing to Pathway saying "The training is still inadequate". Moving to February '97 to spring '98, as a member of the PDA board, you received testing reports and something
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	A. Q.	realised we wouldn't be able to achieve post contract what we set out to, there was something called a no-fault re-plan because the other thing that was mentioned in there I don't know if you're going to ask me about that was the DSS issue. Yes, I'll come to the no-fault re-plan shortly. You also highlight in your statement that Pathway had underestimated the training time required. That's true. You said, in terms of infrastructure, their underestimation may have been reasonable. Was it reasonable in respect of training time? We thought they should have known that it would take as Mr Cipione said, we were acquiring a system not a piece of software and that system is about people and the human interface with that. That was always at the heart of our business, unlikely as it may sound now. But the training that they set out, which they did which they were contracted for, for part of that system, which they subcontracted to a company called Peritas, from memory, probably wasn't as extensive enough and, certainly, we pushed back hard at that once	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	A. Q.	earlier stages: the evaluation stage, the Invitation to Tender stage? I think did we give it enough thought? That's a good question. Certainly, they had to demonstrate capability. You know, it wasn't like going to a Microsoft and saying "I'll have that computer". It was buying a whole system with all that went with it, including putting it in because we were an unautomated business of 19,600 offices with 70,000 people involved and it doesn't take a genius to work out that that culture change is going to happen overnight without professional training. I've read other documents later on, after my time, when roll-out began, where I've only seen those since you've sent me the Inquiry sent me the bundles as I wouldn't have been there I've seen that, even in late '99, one of our senior managers was writing to Pathway saying "The training is still inadequate". Moving to February '97 to spring '98, as a member of the PDA board, you received testing reports and something called technical concurrencies. Can you briefly describe what technical concurrencies were?

1	Q.	I only need a very brief explanation.	1
2	Α.	Technical concurrencies meant is this stuff fit for	2
3		purpose and is it working as we think it should or it is	3
4		likely to work as we think it should and is it capable	2
5		of working as we think it should? Certainly, as I've	Ę
6		described before, the Post Office Board was relying on	6
7		technical concurrence from our own people, from the	7
8		group IT people downwards, in order to assure it's	8
9		approval of the business case.	ç
10	Q.	You, explained in your statement at paragraph 54 and 55	1
11		that there were delays in spring '97 and into 1998. One	1
12		of those reasons was an underestimation by Pathway of	1
13		the effort and time needed to develop the services and	1
14		the other was an issue with Escher.	1
15	Α.	Yes.	1
16	Q.	The Escher point again, something that we've heard a lot	1
17		about this morning, mentioned that pre-ITT stage.	1
18	Α.	Yes. It becomes a running sore is the truth. I know	1
19		there were it wasn't like ICL were ignoring it. You	1
20		know, they were trying to fix it and they were putting	2
21		more and more people, technical people, onto it.	2
22		I think the National Audit Office report says this	2
23		as well, as well as PA, that ICL thought there'd be more	2
24		systems integration than systems development involved.	2
25		You know, they thought they could take pieces of the 25	2
1		You can test some things, model office testing and	1
2		end testing, as it's called, or user acceptability	2
3		testing, all three of those, but until you actually put	3
4		it in action in a safe environment, if I can put it that	2
5		way, so you can tell with real customers and real agents	5
6		using it, you need to understand what the result of that	6
7		was.	7
8	Q.	You talk in your statement it's paragraph 57 about	8
9		the causes of delay and roll-out being the same as the	ę
10		causes of the no-fault re-plan.	1
11	Α.	Yes.	1
12	Q.	Very briefly, what were those causes, so far as you saw	1
13		them?	1
14	Α.	Inability to demonstrate to us completely to the Post	1
15		Office, that it was able to work well in offices before	1
16		rolling it out, an inability, from the DSS point of	1
17		view, to securely do the benefit encashment service as	1
18		far as they were concerned. That was their end testing.	1
19		Two other points, just in support. Complexities	1
20		around the installation of the network and the	2
21		ergonomics that I mentioned earlier but ICL were more	2
22		aware of that by then, so by the time after the '96	2
23		re-fault plan, when the new master plan was there's	2
24		a document that describes it in March '97, which was	2
25		done for all parties as a re-plan, and then there was	2
		27	

1		jigsaw and slot them in but when they tried to slot them
2		in and then tried to scale them up, it needed systems
3		development as well as integration skills, particularly
4		around complex business rules like the DSS.
5	Q.	In terms of Pathway's underestimation of the effort and
6		time that was needed, was this proactive management
7		stance implemented at that stage? Do you think that ICL
8		were being effectively managed?
9	Α.	I think we were scrutinising them and I think if we
0		hadn't have done we would have been tempted to say,
1		"Okay, that's all right, go ahead then" and we never did
2		that. Personally and you have got evidence in the
3		bundles, I would never compromise quality for speed, and
4		I think I can we can demonstrate that by the number
5		of replans, both in terms of roll-out to offices and to
6		what was in the various releases that there were
7		following the Benefits Agency one, where we kept
8		staggering them and simplifying them to give it its best
9		chance.
20		But we wanted to try to fix before rolling out and
1		that was why the approach was taken about an initial Go
2		Live of one office and then of ten offices and then
3		a 200-type roll-out before any acceptance of the system
4		or roll-out, in order to be able to test because some of
:5		the things you can't test unless it operates. 26
1		disappointment after that because ICL failed to deliver
2		again to time.
.		But there was also the DSS issue of whether their

2		again to time.
3		But there was also the DSS issue of whether their
1		own systems were fit for purpose and had been
5		progressing as quickly as ICL believed to feed the
6		system. I think Keith Todd, in a letter, called said
7		to Peter Mathison said that he believed DSS had
3		"misrepresented" the state of the CAP systems.
9	Q.	You talk about disappointment. I'm going to move to the
0		summer of 1997. Can we look at POL00039669. Now, this
1		is a new document, in the sense that it has only very
2		recently been shown to you, so if you need more time to
3		look at this document, please do let me know.
4	Α.	Can I have a look? It hasn't come up on the screen.
5	Q.	You are going to need more time than that!
6		It should be familiar now and it's only one
7		sentence that I'd like to take you to.
8	Α.	You gave me this at 2.00 yesterday.
9	Q.	Indeed.
0	Α.	Sir, I haven't fully reflected on it, I have to tell
1		you, Chair, I'm sorry about that, but I read it
2		overnight.
3	Q.	It's the part just below "On Pathway" that I wanted to
4		draw your attention to. This is a letter to you from
5		Stuart Sweetman.
		28

1	Α.	Yes, it's an internal memo because I was going on	1
2	0	holiday, yes.	2
3 4	Q.	,	3 4
4 5		"The technical release slippage is a cause of major concern for the [Benefits Agency], not so much for	4 5
6		its direct impact but because it is a 'very poor' signal	6
7		of ICL's capability, so soon after a re-plan."	7
8		Am I right to say it sounds as though you are	8
9		quite concerned by that stage?	9
10	Α.	I'm concerned and certainly DSS are. I think this is	10
11		the time at which we asked I think you will see in	11
12		Peter Copping, later on today we asked PA to come in	12
13		and do an independent review of where we were to see	13
14		in mid-'97, to check because, you know, one slippage on	14
15		a no-fault re-plan, soon after contract letting, as we	15
16		are all learning is one thing but then for ICL not to be	16
17		able to do what they said they would do at that point	17
18		three months later is another.	18
19	Q.	Why would you raise it with Stuart Sweetman?	19
20	Α.	Because Stuart needed to know because he was part of the	20
21		programme steering committee. You know, I said earlier	21
22		that major issues would have had to be resolved and	22
23		I would have always kept the managing director, to whom	23
24		I was a direct report, appraised of the situation	24
25		because he may well have been dealing with other 29	25
		23	
1		the work of the subpostmaster.	1
2	Α.	Yes, and I'm pleased that we were doing the work to try	2
3	7.0	to assure that and absolutely check it out.	3
4	Q.		4
5	Α.	I was concerned I would have been concerned about all	5
6		aspects of the programme that hadn't been running to	6
7		time.	7
8	Q.	Can we go to page 3	8
9	Α.	I think in paragraph 2 above it shows you that we were	9
10		prepared to move some we weren't prepared, sorry, to	10
11		accept some of the planning squeezing in of new	11
12		functionality without it being properly tested first.	12
13	Q.	Paragraph 3, the first bullet point, it says:	13
14		"Assuring that the new Accounting, Settlement and	14
15		Reconciliation end-to-end process works. This is a POCL	15
16		'must have' and yet is not clear how POCL is going to	16
17		know before the go-ahead is given that the new process	17
18		will work."	18
19		Again, that must have been quite a concern at that	19
20		stage.	20
21 22	Α.	It was a concern and if you note the timing of this,	21
22 23	0	which is It's 6 May 1997	22
23 24	Q. A .	It's 6 May 1997. If you note the timing of this, there was a PDA report	23 24
24 25	А.	which I thought was sorry a PA report, which	24 25
20		31	20

	The going to take you to one more document of the same
	period. This is 6 May, so a few days later. It's
	POL00039668. I apologise, this is, again, another one
	of those documents that you have only recently seen.
Α.	It's not on my screen, sorry, Mr Blake. Ah yes.
Q.	It's from you to Min Burdett. Who's Min Burdett?
Α.	Min Burdett is someone within the technical assurance
	team. She's a technician working to Mena Rego you
	see Mena there and Mena was direct report to me, not as
	part of the PDA but within Post Office Counters. Mena
	had obviously asked her to have a look at the latest PDA
	documents that Pathway had put forward as part of their
	proposal to re-plan.
Q.	
-	please. It says there:
	"The main concern that POCL has is that it is not
	clear whether the right tests are in place (either as
	part of DIT or in the subsequent Model Office)to ensure
	the integrity of the new Benefit accounting, settlement
	and reconciliation process."
Α.	Yes.
Q.	Settlement and reconciliation process, obviously, we
	know is quite important, quite fundamental, in terms of
	30
	I thought was fair game, but one of the documents you
	gave me yesterday showed my reaction to a draft which
	said it had some gaps. But it was fair game for much of
	it. Then it also was about the time I know you
	questioned I saw that you questioned John Roberts
	yesterday about the lessons learnt exercise he had
	asked, which was July, I think, so two months after
	this, and, you know, I gave him that, as he called it,
	this, and, you know, I gave him that, as he called it, I think, a warts and all.
Q.	I think, a warts and all.
Q. A .	I think, a warts and all. Absolutely. Shall we turn to that? That's POL00028953.
Q. A. Q.	I think, a warts and all.
Q.	I think, a warts and all. Absolutely. Shall we turn to that? That's POL00028953. We haven't scripted this, have we? So that's good. This is your covering letter.
	I think, a warts and all. Absolutely. Shall we turn to that? That's POL00028953. We haven't scripted this, have we? So that's good. This is your covering letter. This covering letter to my colleagues on the Counter
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Q. A.	I think, a warts and all. Absolutely. Shall we turn to that? That's POL00028953. We haven't scripted this, have we? So that's good. This is your covering letter. This covering letter to my colleagues on the Counter Executive Committee because it was important that they knew about it because it involved actions across the team. Can we look at page 7, please. Can we look at the left-hand side of page 7.
Q. A.	I think, a warts and all. Absolutely. Shall we turn to that? That's POL00028953. We haven't scripted this, have we? So that's good. This is your covering letter. This covering letter to my colleagues on the Counter Executive Committee because it was important that they knew about it because it involved actions across the team. Can we look at page 7, please. Can we look at the

stakeholders like politicians, ministers and people like

Q. I'm going to take you to one more document of the same

John Roberts, actually, as well.

1		page before then. It's internal page 5. It's certainly	1		the right-hand side.
2		page 7 of my document.	2	Α.	Yes.
3	Α.	Is this the what's the "Key Improvement Lessons" it's	3	Q.	"end-to-end testing procedures will need to be
4		under	4		transferred from the PDA, and supplemented as release
5	Q.	"We need a better idea of connections to our other new	5		planning migrates back to POCL after the system is
6		systems", I think this is something you spoke about	6		accepted
7		earlier.	7		"a process for live trial acceptance is being
8	Α.	Yes.	8		devised to ensure collective ownership across POCL
9	Q.	Is the concern that's being raised there that there	9		functions."
10		weren't proper systems in place for POCL to understand	10		So that's your name on the right-hand side.
11		why Horizon might not be working properly?	11	Α.	Yes. I mean, it is also "after the system is accepted"
12	Α.	I think that what became clear in this candid report	12		on the penultimate point which, of course, it hadn't
13		from me was that I said it's a learning exercise for us	13		been and wasn't until late '99.
14		in becoming an automated organisation. I think I say	14	Q.	Is that penultimate point saying that, once the PDA has
15		that somewhere in here, and one of those things was that	15		finished its work, that end-to-end testing will need to
16		we had a number of projects in train that weren't to do	16		be assured at the Post Office end?
17		with Horizon, either existing systems or back office	17	Α.	Yes, for the Post Office systems, not for the DSS
18		systems, that were going through their own change and	18		systems
19		what we didn't have in one place was something to join	19	Q.	Yes.
20		those all up and plug Horizon into it, if I can put it	20	Α.	which is the other part of the end-to-end for some
21		simply like that.	21		services, obviously.
22		So the sadly, I can see that most of the	22	Q.	The final bullet point, live trial acceptance, the
23		actions fall to me.	23		processes were going to be Post Office processes.
24	Q.	Absolutely. Can we look at the top document that's	24	Α.	Yes, and, as it says there, "to ensure collective
25		shown on screen and it's the bottom two bullet points on	25		ownership across POCL functions".
		33			34
1	Q.	Now, your name is on the right-hand side.	1		it's internal 7 but it's my page 9 and we have there, on
2	Α.	Yes.	2		the left-hand corner this is again something I raised
3	Q.	Does that mean that you were responsible for taking	3		with Mr Roberts robustness is being raised as
4		those forward?	4		an issue there.
5	Α.	I was responsible at you see it says "Paul (ATSG)"?	5		On the right-hand side:
6	Q.	Yes.	6		"Collective nerve needed to ensure no compromised
7	Α.	That's the automation transformation steering group,	7		on quality for sake of speed and to retain programme
8		another fantastic name. I think it became known as	8		focus."
9		harnessing technology in post offices later on but it	9		That's something that you have told us about
10		was basically I was asked by Stuart to set that up	10		already today.
11		and bring together the project managers of these various	11	Α.	Yes.
12		technical projects, to be able to talk to each other and	12	Q.	Was there some pressure then? Why would this need to be
13		create a milestoned plan that ensured they joined up.	13		said?
14		I mean, at this time we were in the early stages of	14	Α.	Because I think remember I'm talking both to this
15		year 2000, for example.	15		is a report, essentially, for the John Roberts Counter
16	Q.	So as things went forward, who would have been taking	16		Automation Steering Group and I've copied it to my
17		that forward?	17		Counter Executive Committee colleagues and, therefore,
18	Α.	After I'd left in early '99, that would have fallen	18		all the main players within the Post Office or within
19		within the remit, I imagine I can't be certain about	19		Post Office Counters are recipients of this and I just
20		this, you'd need to ask of Dave Miller, I would have	20		wanted us to be clear between us that we remained
01		thought.	21		committed to not being expedient for the sake of speed,
21		2	22		given the delays.
22	Q.	Can we			
22 23	Q. A.	Dave Smith was the programme manager, the guy who	23	Q.	Were there some who just wanted it to happen quickly?
22 23 24		Dave Smith was the programme manager, the guy who apparently got up that interesting slide yesterday.	23 24	Q. A .	Were there some who just wanted it to happen quickly? No, I don't think so. Not within the Post Office, no.
22 23		Dave Smith was the programme manager, the guy who	23		Were there some who just wanted it to happen quickly?

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1		within Post Office and Post Office Counters, there were
2		other stakeholders to manage as well, including
3		Government ministers who'd have been shown timetables
4		before. You referred me yesterday to the Benefits
5		Agency POCL memorandum of understanding, which pre-dated
6		the awarding of the contract and, within that, there was
7		an ambition to have completed the roll-out, as far as
8		DSS were concerned, by the end of '99 and we were
9		nowhere near that.
10	Q.	So were the external pressures to speed up?
11	Α.	Or to take a different approach. I mean, I think I said
12		elsewhere, and it may be at the bottom, I can't
13		remember, at the bottom of this document.
14	Q.	Perhaps we can look at internal page 8. It's page 10
15		here.
16	Α.	"DSS political issues", and as my note to Stuart
17		as I was flying off to Germany that day said, after
18		I'd met George McCorkell for dinner the night, my
19		Benefit Agency equivalent, I think the slippage after
20		the re-plan had dented confidence within DSS, and you
21		have to you asked me about our relationship with the
22		Benefits Agency yesterday. Probably more DSS than BA,
23		not quite the same thing now. Different culture than us
24		and much more command and control, much less open.
25		You can see from the style of this document this 37

		5 5
2		technical problems. I'm going to take you to a document
3		POL00028311. That's a programme delivery authority
4		board meeting, 21 August 1997. Can we go to page 4.
5		That's paragraph 2.1.4.6. It says there in the third
6		sentence:
7		"POCL also had problems with testing especially
8		Electronic Point of Sale System Pathway reported
9		that their testing strategy was under review and agreed
10		to pay particular attention to EPOSS."
11	Α.	Good. I notice it is Mr Coombs direction and Mr Coombs
12		was someone that Pathway brought in to strengthen their
13		technical team. He was the ICL technical director at
14		the time and I think he was parachuted in to Pathway.
15	Q.	Can we go over the page to paragraph 2.3. There you
16		highlight that more emphasis was being placed on live
17		trial and quality rather than speed. So that's again
18		the very point that you made in the earlier document.
19		Again, there seems to be a looming pressure coming from
20		somewhere for speed. Would you agree with that?
21	Α.	Not from us. I mean, you know, we had what we thought

Q. During that summer there was still some significant

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were a set of committed timetables after a re-plan in
March '97 and they were slipping. What do you do about
that, is the question, you know, and so we had another
re-plan and we questioned severely from the documents,

1		is a very open document. It underpins our we had
2		something called Business Excellence, Total Quality
3		culture where no denial was a characteristic and putting
4		the customer first was a characteristic at that time.
5		DSS wouldn't have thought like that.
6		They always, I think, had the ACT option in the
7		background and their systems, which not me but the NAO
8		said weren't ready for purpose at the beginning of
9		the were getting more fit for purpose.
10	Q.	The threat of termination that's mentioned on that
11		document, though, that must have had some impact on
12		getting the job done quickly?
13	Α.	Well, clearly we agreed. There's documents that we
14		agreed with the Benefits Agency through the programme
15		delivery authority and its lawyers to put a breach
16		notice in November '97, I think, from memory, so after
17		this, but also committed to keep working on the
18		programme while that was put forward.
19		You heard John yesterday say we had a difference
20		of opinion about whether to follow that up later on with
21		a cure notice, a 13-week cure notice. There will be
22		lawyers here that know better than me what a cure notice
23		is, I'm afraid, but I think it's essentially putting
24		them on notice that, unless they didn't get fund this
25		in 13 weeks, there would be termination.

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some of which you've just seen, about whether Pathway's proposals to catch up in terms of release software were really credible. We wouldn't have agreed to something that was intrinsically risky technically, as far as we were concerned, before it was bottomed out.

DSS, as I said, had promised their business case, as I understood it, belatedly, from documents I've seen and from the NAO report to remind myself -- had predicated to the Treasury something like 15 million a month on fraud savings, as the basis of their business case, in order to -- once it had been rolled out and once it was working. So, clearly, they had -- I mean, the delays were hurting every party financially.

There was no winner here. ICL weren't getting paid because the PFI structures. We were having our competitive position damaged. We were disappointing subpostmasters and our staff whom we said "This is coming".

But so there wasn't, you know, severe pressure to get this done but we had to, as I say, hold our collective nerve to ensure that what we put out was good enough. Q. But there's document after document saying "We need to emphasise quality rather than speed", and, I just

wondered, somebody must have been asking for speed 40

1		rather than quality?	1
2	Α.	As I said, I'm trying, to be honest, really honest and	2
3		candid and to the best of my recollection. There was	3
4		undoubtedly pressure on Benefits Agency from DSS and	4
5		I would imagine the Treasury. I don't know I'm	5
6		speculating on that. They were pretty close, DSS and	6
7		Treasury. They were a big-spending department so they	7
8		would be.	8
9		You know, they would have been saying, "What's	9
10		going on here? Why can't we do ACT instead?"	10
11	Q.	You mention the PA Consulting report and that was in	11
12		October 1997. I'm going to spend a little bit of time	12
13		on that.	13
14	Α.	I thought it was a bit earlier than that, I'm sorry.	14
15	Q.	The report itself was October 1997 and that's actually	15
16		one of the questions that I'm going to begin with which	16
17		is did you input into the report before it was	17
18		published?	18
19	Α.	I did, because Peter came round and saw most parties	19
20		from within the because he was commissioned by the	20
21		PDA from Alec Wylie, so all parties involved. I think	21
22		you reminded me, actually, from the document I saw last	22
23		night thank you about my initial reaction to it	23
24		was that one of my queries was I don't think he talked	24
25		to enough people within Post Office Counters to get	25
		41	
1	Α.	There you go.	1
2	Q.	So if we look at that document, it's the last page of	2
3		that document and it's a letter from you to Peter	3
4		Copping.	4
5	Α.	Yes.	5
6	Q.	This is it seems like an important point. So you're	6
7		saying there	7

- A. What date is this please, Mr Blake?
- 9 Q. It's 8 September 1997 so shortly before publication. 10 Publication was in October.
 - A. I see. Thank you.

11 12 Q. "Two points do occur: first, on the basic technical 13 question of whether there's a basic ICL Pathway design 14 flaw or not ... combined with the sheer scale of what 15 we're trying to do, makes the programme inherently 16 unstable. The report is silent on this explicitly at the moment, though it implies the design is feasible. 17 18 I wonder if people who worked on the initial technical 19 evaluation (including, if I recall correctly, a PA 20 consultant) could help [me] here?" 21 So this seems to be you drilling down on precisely 22 the issue that we were addressing yesterday, that 23 because you were focusing on "fundamentally flawed" --24 A. We wanted to know because, as I said, we had 25 a culture -- I don't know what it's like today in Post 43

1		a fully rounded view on people like who were involved in
2		the automation steering or the finance people, although
3		we asked him to do it. But you'd ask Peter about that
4		yourself.
5	Q.	You said at paragraph 63 of your witness statement that
6		PA Consulting report of October 1997 found no
7		fundamental technical issues with the system. That
8		sounds a little bit like the comment we heard yesterday,
9		"not fundamentally flawed". Did you have lesser
10		concerns?
11	Α.	Well, it's a load of lessons that were emerging and
12		I tried to dispose in that July report for all parties.
13		You know, I could only take I could observe what was
14		happening with other people and give my opinion on it.
15		I could only action what I thought was necessary within
16		Post Office or recommend action.
17	Q.	Can we look at POL00090015.
18	Α.	But you are right that we did rely on quite that it
19		was it could work. It wasn't technically
20		intrinsically flawed.
21	Q.	Absolutely. This is precisely a document that I'm going
22		to take you to. Again this is one of those new
23		documents
24	Α.	This is the one I was referring to.
25	Q.	Yes.
		42

1		Office Limited but we had a culture of "no denial".
2		We wanted to know. If you didn't know, what could you
3		do about it?
4	Q.	"Instability" is perhaps would you agree it would be
5		a better test than "fundamentally flawed", if you are
6		agreeing a system?
7	Α.	I mean, I think my language was a bit, you know,
8		imprecise there. "Unstable" could mean a number of
9		things, couldn't it, and I can't remember exactly what
10		I meant there. I didn't know if it meant "undoable" or
11		"it might fall over"; it could mean either of those
12		things.
13	Q.	I think "fundamentally flawed" you would understand to
14		be doesn't really work, whereas
15	Α.	Yes, "fundamentally flawed" it's the "inherently"
16		bit. You know, "inherently" implies that or to me at
17		any rate that it will be difficult to fix and it
18		might be something structural and systematic. If there
19		are technical issues and flaws that can be addressed and
20		tested, that's a different matter.
21	Q.	Would it be fair to say that you're asking there, is it
22		unreliable even if it works?
23	Α.	I don't think I had that in mind when I wrote it, is the
24		truth.
25	Q.	Were those questions that were being asked at the time? 44

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1	А.	I'm trying to remember honestly. We certainly will	1		in that.
2		have "unreliable" will have been really manifested	2	Q.	So your understanding of "fundamentally flawed" would
3		during a live trial if it was unreliable or not and we	3		include whether something
4		hadn't gone into live trial other than a few offices at	4	Α.	Whether it was reliable to work, you know, because if it
5		that stage. So it would have been difficult to know.	5		was fundamentally flawed it wouldn't.
6		CF my earlier answer about; some testing you can't do	6	Q.	Let's look at the report itself. That is at
7		until you actually you can do all the testing It's	7		POL00028092. Can we look at page 7, please. So
8		like playing a football match; you can do all the	8		although, as you said, the finding is that the system
9		training but you have to actually be in a match to see	9		isn't fundamentally flawed there were at least some
10		if it works.	10		concerns both in relation to POCL and in relation to
11	Q.	So it's the acceptance and the testing live trial	11		Pathway at that stage that were raised by PA Consulting;
12		Live trial had to come before acceptance. That was a	12		would you agree with that?
13		very fundamental stuff and the issues that came out of	13	Α.	Yes, we did. All three organisations got some lessons
14		live trial or around live trial in the other forms of	14		to learn.
15		testing would have been logged and then addressed to	15	Q.	If we look at those three bullet points at the top
16		Pathway and the seriousness of them, either something	16		Yes.
17		that make it unreliable or the instance of them, you	17		and actually can we look at the top half of the page
18		know, the frequency of them, would have been would	18	ά.	including the paragraph that begins, "our key concern".
19		have determined their seriousness and their	19		So there are some concerns raised in those bullet points
20		prioritisation to get fixed before moving on, to my	20		and then it goes on to say:
21		mind.	21		"Our key concern is that the skills required for
22	Q	Do you think you got an answer to that point on whether	22		many of the new senior posts are, in our opinion, not
23	ч.	it was inherently unstable?	23		those we would have expected to find as part of POCL
20	Δ	I think the October one, report that came out, said it	20		core competencies"
25	Α.	wasn't fundamentally flawed and I took that as including	25		So there are concerns there, it seems, about
20		45	20		46
1		a lack of skills within the Post Office; is that right?	1		thinking about EPOSS and again in October 1997 there
2	Α.	Lack of those skills particularly true as it says to	2		were concerns about there being much still to do in
3		implementation, management and contract and service.	3		relation to EPOSS?
4		I wouldn't have agreed with him about contract	4	Α.	I agree with that. There was still much to do and it's
5		management. I think contract management, he's talking	5		not a defence or an excuse, it's not what I'm here for
6		about a technical contract and how you manage that.	6		but the prioritisation on the benefits service, which
7		Service management, I would have agreed because, I said	7		could have put a whole system in jeopardy, or the whole
8		earlier on, we were learning to be an automated	8		project in jeopardy, we seemed to think we should get
9		organisation and an automated organisation needs	9		that right before moving on. We understood it needed to
10		a central service management function typically. We	10		be done and we did put extra resource on.
11		knew that: we were trying to address it. It was	11	Q.	Can we look at page 8 and it's M3.4 on that page. The
12		complicated by the fact that the PFI contract was let	12		report then goes on to talk about concerns with Pathway
13		out, so some of that service management, as Mr Cipione	13		and it's over the page that I would like to look at and
14		points out, was contracted to Pathway to provide, in	14		it's the first paragraph:
15		terms of helpdesk, support desk, system desk, incident	15		"Much of our review at Pathway has focused on th
16		log-in, all that stuff, but you still needed someone to	16		robustness of the technical solution since this has
17		be able to manage that provider.	17		become a significant concern for the sponsors and
18	Q	The third of those bullet points, they concern EPOSS:	18		Pathway. Whilst we have been able to obtain
19	ч.	"In the longer term there's the issue of	19		satisfactory answers to all our questions, in particular
20		developing the POCL requirements for EPOSS and the	20		regarding the way security requirements will be
20		supporting computer applications. We understand there	20		incorporated and on scalability and performance, there
21		is much still to do here, which will require additional	21		must continue to be reservations in all these areas
23		resource."	22		until the final design is baselined and then realised.
23 24		EPOSS we heard about earlier this morning	23 24		It is also important to note the dependency for
24 25		didn't we at an early stage there hadn't been enough	24 25		technical success on Escher which is a small,
20		47	20		10

47

it's the first paragraph:
"Much of our review at Pathway has focused on the
robustness of the technical solution since this has
become a significant concern for the sponsors and
Pathway. Whilst we have been able to obtain
satisfactory answers to all our questions, in particular
regarding the way security requirements will be
incorporated and on scalability and performance, there
must continue to be reservations in all these areas
until the final design is baselined and then realised.

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1		Boston-based software house and the source of the	1	
2		Riposte messaging software which is at the heart of the	2	
3		system."	3	
4		Now, again that's something we spoke about earlier	4	
5		that was	5	
6	Α.		6	Α.
7		dependent on Escher and what were they doing about it to	7	Q.
8		put it right. I've been trying to remember that	8	Α.
9		actually. I honestly can't recall what extra resources	9	-
10		or what actions Fujitsu took or Pathway took to	10	Q.
11		I can't remember if they brought Escher in or bought	11	
12		them out or got them in but they certainly put extra	12	
13	~	technical resource to manage them.	13	Α.
14	Q.	Can we look at your statement which describes replans	14	
15		that took place around this time. It's WITN04030100.	15	
16	A .	Paragraph, please?	16	~
17		Paragraph 68, page 24.	17	Q.
18	A.	Thank you.	18	Α.
19	Q.	0	19	
20		"This was my understanding of the technical	20	
21 22		difficulties with Horizon at the time but I would also add that those Post Offices to whom the service had been	21 22	
22			22	
23 24		rolled out largely reported that it was going ok. They	23 24	
		did not raise many technical difficulties and indeed		
25		many post offices who did not yet have access to the 49	25	
1		given all this, would you want us to roll it out	1	
2		further?" With a resounding yes.	2	
3		So that isn't to say we were complacent.	3	0
4		I wouldn't want to give that impression. We weren't.	4	Q.
5		But the whole purpose of doing the live trial was, as	5	
6		I said earlier, was to try to get those experiences from	6	A .
7		those who were actually using the system and get some	7	Q.
8	~	feedback into that.	8	
9	Q.	Could I ask for the witness statement to be brought back	9	Α.
10 11		on screen on the same page if possible. Thank you very	10 11	
12		much. Can we look at paragraph 69. There you say: " the natural forum to raise these difficulties	11	
12			12	
13		would have been at the meetings between the NFSP and the network director."	13	
14		Who was the network director? Was that Jonathan	14	
16		Evans?	15	
17	Α.	Yes, it was.	10	
18	-	-	18	0
	Q.	<i>y</i>		Q.
19 20	۸	by the NFSP at that stage; is that right?	19 20	۸
20 21	Α.	The NFSP, as John said yesterday, certainly weren't in	20 21	A .
21		the Post Office's pocket. They were vociferous if they	21 22	Q.
22 23		thought there was an issue and if there had been	22	Α.
23 24		substantive well I imagine, I'm speculating I imagine if there had been substantive complaints by	23 24	А.
24 25		those subpostmasters who had used the system because of	24 25	
20		those subpostmasters who had used the system because of 51	20	

1		system were saying that they wanted it."
2		Now, a reading of that paragraph might be that it
3		contains quite a few caveats in it. At that stage it
4		would own have been a small number of post offices who
5		had Horizon installed I think less than 200.
6	Α.	Yes, about 205-215.
7	Q.	There was also limited functionality at that stage.
8	Α.	Limited functionality, yes. Both of those are true.
9		I tried to express that. Forgive me if I didn't.
10	Q.	If some subpostmasters were having some technical
11		difficulties at that stage, when it was still a small
12		project, would that have been a concern?
13	Α.	Yes, but my memory of that is that the nature of the
14		technical difficulties weren't the ones that were being
15		experienced, apparently, during roll-out, around the
16		lack of balancing and that sort of stuff.
17	Q.	So what was your understanding of
18	Α.	I think it was things like screens freezing
19		occasionally. I might be wrong, there might be one or
20		two. I can't be certain but I do know that I can
21		remember Dave you will have, to ask Dave Miller
22		Dave Miller having a meeting with many of the
23		subpostmasters who were in the trials or going round
24		there and asking them the direct question I think
25		it's in one of the Federation documents saying "So
		50
1		these sort of issues. I'm sure they would have been
2		alerted to it and they would have been not slow in
3		coming forward with those.
4	Q.	But the number of post offices at that stage was very
5		small.
6	Α.	As I was saying, yes.
7	Q.	What did you see as the role of the NFSP in that regard
8		then?
9	Α.	Clearly they they were with us bringing together
10		subpostmasters to get their reaction. I think the
11		meeting I alluded to before, which I read about when
12		Dave Miller went, I think there was an NFSP executive
13		member there for that. The NFSP have been involved
14		early on in the genesis of the Horizon project against
15		threat of ACT and therefore the threat to the national
16		network. They clearly would have been representing
17		their members there, fiercely, to ministers.
18	Q.	Do you think the NFSP were given much of a role at that
19		stage?
20	Α.	Given?
21	Q.	Well, did they have much of a role, much of a say, in
22		what was going on?
23	Α.	They were kept informed. They went to meetings with
24		Pathway, I think, during the bidding process. I think
25		all three bidders set out stalls at a National
		52

1		Federation of SubPostmasters conference to show these	1
2		sort of things. We hadn't gone and we didn't think	2
3		about that until I was in the process of setting up Post	3
4		Office Counters Limited we didn't think about putting	4
5		them on the board, for example, or giving them	5
6		a non-exec role. I think that would have been a step	6
7		too far for us at that point.	7
8	Q.	Can we look at POL00028137, please. Now, this is a very	8
9		early meeting, so some years before the period that I'm	9
10		talking about?	10
11	Α.	Yes, this is in the very genesis. This is just	11
12		before just to give context to this, the MOU you	12
13		showed me yesterday which was '95 there were earlier	13
14		non-legally non-legal versions of that to which this	14
15		was a contributor.	15
16	Q.	Can we look at the penultimate paragraph of that and the	16
17		final sentence of that penultimate paragraph:	17
18		"NFSP involvement would be kept to a minimum."	18
19		Do you think that there was an attempt to keep	19
20		NFSP involvement to a minimum?	20
21	Α.	No. I don't. I'm surprised about that. Did I write	21
22		those notes?	22
23	Q.	That's a minute of the	23
24	Α.		24
25		no, that's not true. I was going to say he was the guy	25
		53	
1		considering a suspension of the Congo 4 roll-out or	1
1 2		considering a suspension of the Congo 4 roll-out or regression from ICL Pathway services."	1 2
2	A.	regression from ICL Pathway services."	2
2 3	A.	regression from ICL Pathway services." Do you remember the Congo 4 roll-out?	2 3
2 3 4	A.	regression from ICL Pathway services." Do you remember the Congo 4 roll-out? I will probably get this wrong. My memory is failing me	2 3 4
2 3 4 5	A.	regression from ICL Pathway services." Do you remember the Congo 4 roll-out? I will probably get this wrong. My memory is failing me now from however long ago. Congo I can't	2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5 6	A.	regression from ICL Pathway services." Do you remember the Congo 4 roll-out? I will probably get this wrong. My memory is failing me now from however long ago. Congo I can't I wouldn't be able to give you the detail of what	2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6 7	A.	regression from ICL Pathway services." Do you remember the Congo 4 roll-out? I will probably get this wrong. My memory is failing me now from however long ago. Congo I can't I wouldn't be able to give you the detail of what Congo 4 roll-out. There was Congo 4, Congo 5,	2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	A.	regression from ICL Pathway services." Do you remember the Congo 4 roll-out? I will probably get this wrong. My memory is failing me now from however long ago. Congo I can't I wouldn't be able to give you the detail of what Congo 4 roll-out. There was Congo 4, Congo 5, Congo 4 plus, we knew it also as 1C which I think it	2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	Α.	regression from ICL Pathway services." Do you remember the Congo 4 roll-out? I will probably get this wrong. My memory is failing me now from however long ago. Congo I can't I wouldn't be able to give you the detail of what Congo 4 roll-out. There was Congo 4, Congo 5, Congo 4 plus, we knew it also as 1C which I think it said before but I think these were releases relating to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	A. Q.	regression from ICL Pathway services." Do you remember the Congo 4 roll-out? I will probably get this wrong. My memory is failing me now from however long ago. Congo I can't I wouldn't be able to give you the detail of what Congo 4 roll-out. There was Congo 4, Congo 5, Congo 4 plus, we knew it also as 1C which I think it said before but I think these were releases relating to other functionality other than the benefit encashment service.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11		regression from ICL Pathway services." Do you remember the Congo 4 roll-out? I will probably get this wrong. My memory is failing me now from however long ago. Congo I can't I wouldn't be able to give you the detail of what Congo 4 roll-out. There was Congo 4, Congo 5, Congo 4 plus, we knew it also as 1C which I think it said before but I think these were releases relating to other functionality other than the benefit encashment service.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12		regression from ICL Pathway services." Do you remember the Congo 4 roll-out? I will probably get this wrong. My memory is failing me now from however long ago. Congo I can't I wouldn't be able to give you the detail of what Congo 4 roll-out. There was Congo 4, Congo 5, Congo 4 plus, we knew it also as 1C which I think it said before but I think these were releases relating to other functionality other than the benefit encashment service. At the bottom of that page it makes clear that there are	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13		regression from ICL Pathway services." Do you remember the Congo 4 roll-out? I will probably get this wrong. My memory is failing me now from however long ago. Congo I can't I wouldn't be able to give you the detail of what Congo 4 roll-out. There was Congo 4, Congo 5, Congo 4 plus, we knew it also as 1C which I think it said before but I think these were releases relating to other functionality other than the benefit encashment service. At the bottom of that page it makes clear that there are no matters that need escalating for consideration of	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14		regression from ICL Pathway services." Do you remember the Congo 4 roll-out? I will probably get this wrong. My memory is failing me now from however long ago. Congo I can't I wouldn't be able to give you the detail of what Congo 4 roll-out. There was Congo 4, Congo 5, Congo 4 plus, we knew it also as 1C which I think it said before but I think these were releases relating to other functionality other than the benefit encashment service. At the bottom of that page it makes clear that there are no matters that need escalating for consideration of a suspending of the Congo 4 roll-out but it's	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15		regression from ICL Pathway services." Do you remember the Congo 4 roll-out? I will probably get this wrong. My memory is failing me now from however long ago. Congo I can't I wouldn't be able to give you the detail of what Congo 4 roll-out. There was Congo 4, Congo 5, Congo 4 plus, we knew it also as 1C which I think it said before but I think these were releases relating to other functionality other than the benefit encashment service. At the bottom of that page it makes clear that there are no matters that need escalating for consideration of a suspending of the Congo 4 roll-out but it's paragraph 3.2.1 that I'd like you to look at and that's	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
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1		who dealt with the Fed but probably wasn't at that
2		point. No, I don't we did engage with the Federation
3		around those issues but there were boundaries. You
4		know, there had to be boundaries. They were a trade
5		organisation representing people and we took them
6		seriously because they were our people too.
7	Q.	Do you think some people took a view that they shouldn't
8		be getting involved in the technical side of things?
9	Α.	Well, I don't think they had technical capability but
10		certainly we were keen to include subpostmasters and
11		tell the Federation about the user testing.
12	Q.	I'm going to move on to November 1997 and that's a month
13		after the PA Consulting report. Can we look at
14		POL00028599. This is an interim business continuity
15		status report for the period 20 to 26 November 1997 and
16		you were a recipient of this report.
17	Α.	Was this one of the new ones, Mr Blake, or one of the
18		old ones?
19	Q.	l believe it's an old one.
20	Q. A.	Okay, fair enough.
20 21		
21 22	Q.	I'm only going to take you to a paragraph of it. Can we
		look at page 2, paragraph 1, halfway down that paragraph
23		it says:
24		"The primary purpose is to identify any issues
25		(actual or potential) that might give rise to 54
1		wasn't significantly involved in this kind of level of
2		detail, individual branch level of detail but this is
3		something that would have been brought to your attention
4		at the time, that level of detail?
5	Α.	What date was this, please?
6	Q.	It is November 1997.
7	Α.	'97, okay. Yes, it would have been then, yes.
8	Q.	What do you understand by that paragraph?
9	Α.	I understand that there seemed to be an issue, as it
10		says, not being able to "poll" that ICL would need to
11		fix.
12	Q.	Can we go over the page please to 3.4.1. Can we look
13		at 3.4.1 thank you very much:
14		"One of the new PMSR reports introduced at the
15		beginning of release 1c, does not appear to be working
16		correctly. It did not pick up the Bath Road duplicate
17		payment and report it as an unmatched encashment.
18		Pathway have stated that they will seek an urgent fix to
19		this."
20		Can we look at the paragraph below the two
21		paragraphs below:
22		"Another concern is that one of the transactions
23		involved in this incident didn't come through to ABED
23 24		and wasn't reported on the CBoS report. Pathway aim to
25		address this as part of the fix being applied to the 56

1		above.	1		I'm afraid.
2		"This has a double impact on transaction	2	Q.	The paragraph below:
3		processing:	3		"The above has been registered with Operational
4		"[first] it creates an error against cash account.	4		Service Management, but there is a growing concern given
5		"[Second] settlement with BA is based on an	5		the limited functionality and few on-line offices."
6		incorrect sum Pathway are looking to manually amend	6	Α.	Yes.
7		the CBoS report as an interim measure. This has an	7	Q.	So in that period were you concerned about errors during
8		impact on POCL accounting."	8		the "limited functionality and few on-line office"
9		Pausing there, do you understand that second	9		period?
10		bullet?	10	Α.	I don't remember it as as I said earlier as
11	Α.	I don't know what a CBoS report is, honestly I don't.	11		a large issue or a big material issue that was being
12		Were you aware that Pathway was able to manually amend	12		brought to our attention all the time. Clearly this is
13		certain things in branch in the branch accounts?	13		an example. It's an operational service management
14	Α.	Well, from this not that I remember but from this,	14		report which goes to me and others as part of the PDA
15		it's in black and white, so I must have read it at the	15		board and when the PDA board met we would have asked
16		time. But I don't remember that and I don't and it	16		what had been done about it and decided. I don't think
17		would have been with Pathway and the PDA to fix.	17		it's like it's not sent to me to action, as it were,
18	Q.	It says, "This has an impact on POCL accounting"; do you	18		myself.
19		know what that meant there?	19	Q.	Did somebody in particular action that?
20	Α.	Well, presumably the accounting would have been had	20	Α.	Can you show me who the
21		to have been adjusted to correct the error.	21	Q.	Can we look at the first page
22	Q.	So if there's a manual amendment it would have an impact	22	Α.	Because I don't remember this report. Yes, it would
23		on Post Office accounting?	23		have been yes it would have been the person who
24	Α.	Yes. I don't know if it says, "Pathway are looking	24		would have been tasked with fixing it with ICL would
25		to amend". I don't know if they did, so I can't comment	25		have been Peter Crahan. He's the guy in charge of the
		57			58
1		PDA at this point bearing in mind the PDA existed and	1	۸	on the delivery including the technical matters. He
1		PDA at this point bearing in mind the PDA existed and	1	A.	on the delivery, including the technical matters. He
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	A. Q. A.	Horizon programme or it hadn't been moved yet to Horizon or it was in the process of doing, so I think (<i>unclear</i>). I'm going to move on to 1998, the spring to autumn of 1998. Can you briefly tell us how your role changed in that period? In the spring/autumn '98? Yes. I think after 1997 did you leave the PDA board? No. I think what happened was the PDA board the PDA started to dissolve and that was part of the recommendations, as John said yesterday we brought more things back in-house. There was still a residual PDA dealing with contractual matters and that sort of things, where there was a joint contract, but we brought a lot of it back into a new Horizon programme director which was Dave Miller. So my role changed, really, to more like a commercial strategic, rather than delivery. Of course I needed to be kept appraised of where we were because clearly things are iterative to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	Q. A. Q.	would have been resourced up. We resourced him up. He would have reported directly on those matters to the managing director. And your role at that stage, you saw as more strategic? More strategic commercial I suppose if there had been major contract re-negotiations that came out but everything, then of course, was in hiatus during, as John I hadn't heard him use that expression before, "the year lost" in '98 when the Benefits Agency and DSS basically called time and the Treasury working group was set up et cetera, et cetera. So Dave Miller was trying to keep the programme going, with his Benefits Agency, under a guy called Vince Gaskell, who was on there, was doing that for the Benefits Agency, if you like, and we were more involved, really, in trying to cope with the various reports, consultancies and people sent to us by the Treasury working group and give what we thought was good advice. Can we look at POL00038828, please and this is moving to March 1998, March and April.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	A. Q. A.	Horizon programme or it hadn't been moved yet to Horizon or it was in the process of doing, so I think (<i>unclear</i>). I'm going to move on to 1998, the spring to autumn of 1998. Can you briefly tell us how your role changed in that period? In the spring/autumn '98? Yes. I think after 1997 did you leave the PDA board? No. I think what happened was the PDA board the PDA started to dissolve and that was part of the recommendations, as John said yesterday we brought more things back in-house. There was still a residual PDA dealing with contractual matters and that sort of things, where there was a joint contract, but we brought a lot of it back into a new Horizon programme director which was Dave Miller. So my role changed, really, to more like a commercial strategic, rather than delivery. Of course I needed to be kept appraised of where we were because clearly things are iterative to some extent.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	Q. A. Q. A.	would have been resourced up. We resourced him up. He would have reported directly on those matters to the managing director. And your role at that stage, you saw as more strategic? More strategic commercial I suppose if there had been major contract re-negotiations that came out but everything, then of course, was in hiatus during, as John I hadn't heard him use that expression before, "the year lost" in '98 when the Benefits Agency and DSS basically called time and the Treasury working group was set up et cetera, et cetera. So Dave Miller was trying to keep the programme going, with his Benefits Agency, under a guy called Vince Gaskell, who was on there, was doing that for the Benefits Agency, if you like, and we were more involved, really, in trying to cope with the various reports, consultancies and people sent to us by the Treasury working group and give what we thought was good advice. Can we look at POL00038828, please and this is moving to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	A. Q. A. Q.	 Horizon programme or it hadn't been moved yet to Horizon or it was in the process of doing, so I think (<i>unclear</i>). I'm going to move on to 1998, the spring to autumn of 1998. Can you briefly tell us how your role changed in that period? In the spring/autumn '98? Yes. I think after 1997 did you leave the PDA board? No. I think what happened was the PDA board the PDA started to dissolve and that was part of the recommendations, as John said yesterday we brought more things back in-house. There was still a residual PDA dealing with contractual matters and that sort of things, where there was a joint contract, but we brought a lot of it back into a new Horizon programme director which was Dave Miller. So my role changed, really, to more like a commercial strategic, rather than delivery. Of course I needed to be kept appraised of where we were because clearly things are iterative to some extent. So at that stage was David Miller more focused on the 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Q. A. Q. A.	 would have been resourced up. We resourced him up. He would have reported directly on those matters to the managing director. And your role at that stage, you saw as more strategic? More strategic commercial I suppose if there had been major contract re-negotiations that came out but everything, then of course, was in hiatus during, as John I hadn't heard him use that expression before, "the year lost" in '98 when the Benefits Agency and DSS basically called time and the Treasury working group was set up et cetera, et cetera. So Dave Miller was trying to keep the programme going, with his Benefits Agency, under a guy called Vince Gaskell, who was on there, was doing that for the Benefits Agency, if you like, and we were more involved, really, in trying to cope with the various reports, consultancies and people sent to us by the Treasury working group and give what we thought was good advice. Can we look at POL00038828, please and this is moving to March 1998, March and April. Ah yes. This was the first Bird & Bird report.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	A. Q. A. Q. A.	Horizon programme or it hadn't been moved yet to Horizon or it was in the process of doing, so I think (<i>unclear</i>). I'm going to move on to 1998, the spring to autumn of 1998. Can you briefly tell us how your role changed in that period? In the spring/autumn '98? Yes. I think after 1997 did you leave the PDA board? No. I think what happened was the PDA board the PDA started to dissolve and that was part of the recommendations, as John said yesterday we brought more things back in-house. There was still a residual PDA dealing with contractual matters and that sort of things, where there was a joint contract, but we brought a lot of it back into a new Horizon programme director which was Dave Miller. So my role changed, really, to more like a commercial strategic, rather than delivery. Of course I needed to be kept appraised of where we were because clearly things are iterative to some extent. So at that stage was David Miller more focused on the technical matters and you were	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	Q. A. Q. Q.	 would have been resourced up. We resourced him up. He would have reported directly on those matters to the managing director. And your role at that stage, you saw as more strategic? More strategic commercial I suppose if there had been major contract re-negotiations that came out but everything, then of course, was in hiatus during, as John I hadn't heard him use that expression before, "the year lost" in '98 when the Benefits Agency and DSS basically called time and the Treasury working group was set up et cetera, et cetera. So Dave Miller was trying to keep the programme going, with his Benefits Agency, under a guy called Vince Gaskell, who was on there, was doing that for the Benefits Agency, if you like, and we were more involved, really, in trying to cope with the various reports, consultancies and people sent to us by the Treasury working group and give what we thought was good advice. Can we look at POL00038828, please and this is moving to March 1998, March and April. Ah yes. This was the first Bird & Bird report.

(15) Pages 57 - 60

1		"Dave" so it's confused me. I don't therefore.	1		at:
2	0	Can we look at page 5 in paragraph 310. Again is this	2		"The Pathway systems interface to BA and POCL
3	α.	the same I don't if this is same handwriting or if	3		systems. Some of these are new systems, being developed
4		this is handwriting that you recognise at all?	4		in parallel with Pathway, others are being modified to
5	Α.		5		include the Interfaces. There have been a number of
6		annotations on it which looked similar to this.	6		issues with the interface systems, particularly with the
7	Q.	You don't need to be a handwriting expert. If it's not	7		BA CAPS programme and the POCL reference data system."
8		yours, then that's sufficient.	8		Does it say if may say "infer culpability" or
9	Α.	I don't know Dave would have had a number, you	9		something on the right-hand side, but again if it's not
10		know, people working for him and I imagine it's one of	10		your
11		those.	11	Α.	Honestly, I couldn't tell you who that was.
12	Q.	So there are some concerns set out there; I'm going to	12		Were you aware of POCL reference data issues at that
13		very briefly summarise them. There were some concerns	13		stage?
14		about paperwork things or agreements to agree,	14	Α.	I know we had to get our reference data more systematic
15		contracting authority responsibilities et cetera. The	15		in order to be able to cope with an automated world.
16		second bullet point security controls, security	16		I wasn't aware of, at that time I don't remember at
17		requirements. The third paragraph, training	17		any rate reference data issues being a particular
18		requirements and solutions. That seems to be crossed	18		interface problem at that time. I've read subsequent
19		out, I'm not sure if you are able to assist as to why	19		reports that you have sent me, or the Inquiry sent me
20		that would be crossed out?	20		rather, sorry, that talks about reference data issues
21	Α.	No.	21	Q.	Would you have received these Bird & Bird documents?
22	Q.	The fourth, problems with the Post Office estate,	22	Α.	I think I would have received this Bird & Bird document
23		availability of ISDN connections.	23		at that time. I think I referred to it in my witness
24	Α.	I've mentioned some of those before haven't it?	24		statement, so I might have done. It's confusing because
25	Q.	Yes. Then it's the next paragraph that I'd like to look	25		this is Project Mentors and they did a separate one, out
		61			62
1		of the blue really, at the and of 100 as well	1		although it was difficult to quantify how the system
1	0	of the blue really, at the end of '99 as well.	1		although it was difficult to quantify how the system
2		So who were Project Mentors, very briefly?	2		would work until after it had been installed and was
2 3	Q. A.	So who were Project Mentors, very briefly? I think they were a consultancy, an IT consultancy or	2 3		would work until after it had been installed and was operational."
2 3 4		So who were Project Mentors, very briefly? I think they were a consultancy, an IT consultancy or claim they were. I think they were run by	2 3 4		would work until after it had been installed and was operational." That all sounds quite serious at that stage,
2 3 4 5	Α.	So who were Project Mentors, very briefly? I think they were a consultancy, an IT consultancy or claim they were. I think they were run by a professor	2 3 4 5	Δ	would work until after it had been installed and was operational." That all sounds quite serious at that stage, doesn't it, especially in relation to EPOSS?
2 3 4 5 6	Α.	So who were Project Mentors, very briefly? I think they were a consultancy, an IT consultancy or claim they were. I think they were run by a professor We may see that	2 3 4 5 6	А.	would work until after it had been installed and was operational." That all sounds quite serious at that stage, doesn't it, especially in relation to EPOSS? Yes, I mean, that doesn't say, though, that we would
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1		high levels of error. So that is a cause for concern.	1
2	Q.	If we look back at the first page	2
3	Α.	I mean, clearly, that wasn't acceptable.	3
4	Q.	sorry, the second page. The attendees of that	4
5		meeting: John Roberts was Chairman of that committee.	5
6	Α.	He was.	6
7	Q.	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	7
8		information to the board level?	8
9	Α.	You need to ask John that.	9
10	Q.	5 1	10
11		details would have been raised at board level?	11
12	Α.	I would have respected John's judgement about what he	12
13		took or didn't take to the board. This was, as he said	13
14		yesterday, an extra piece of governance on the board	14
15		that he included, he and his some of his colleagues,	15
16		the executive colleagues, Richard Close is the finance	16
17		director, Jerry Cope is the group strategy director,	17
18		Stuart Sweetman, the managing director for counters and	18
19		me and Dave from within Counters in order to more	19
20	-	closely monitor the project.	20
21	Q.	I think you have said that acceptance criteria would be	21
22		an important factor in dealing with those kinds of	22
23		problems.	23
24	A.	Yes.	24
25	Q.	Who would you see as responsible for that? 65	25
1		Now, you weren't part of that group. I think it was	1
1 2		Now, you weren't part of that group. I think it was Jonathan Evans.	1 2
	А.		
2	A.	Jonathan Evans.	2
2 3	A. Q.	Jonathan Evans. Jonathan Evans, Jonathan represented Counters although I	2 3
2 3 4	_	Jonathan Evans. Jonathan Evans, Jonathan represented Counters although I gave inputs to it. Do you think that the Post Office provided enough technical expertise to those kinds of groups?	2 3 4
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8	Q.	Jonathan Evans. Jonathan Evans, Jonathan represented Counters although I gave inputs to it. Do you think that the Post Office provided enough technical expertise to those kinds of groups?	2 3 4 5 6
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	Q. A. Q.	Jonathan Evans. Jonathan Evans, Jonathan represented Counters although I gave inputs to it. Do you think that the Post Office provided enough technical expertise to those kinds of groups? Well, there was a panel of technical experts working for the Treasury working group, alongside KPMG, who were doing the overall evaluation, and they came and talked to various people within the business. So it was really responding to them, rather than being us saying "Here's our technical people, could you do it?" They were asking us a lot of questions about the impact of cancellation or termination of the contract, in part or in full, and, as you heard from John yesterday, the variations to that theme got wilder and wilder and more and more radical at times. We heard earlier about the PA report which said that there was at least some lack of expertise within the Post Office when it came to those technical matters. Do you agree with that? I think we needed to improve our core competence in that. I would agree with that. You could never say you	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

1	Α.	Well, the acceptance criteria, from what I've read
2		recently, ICL was proposing different acceptance
3		criteria towards the end of '98/'99, as I understand it,
4		and that was then that would have fallen to Dave
5		Miller primarily to deal with at that point, not me, so
6		I can't comment on those and didn't comment on those and
7		those acceptance criteria, which would have then folded
8		in, in the second half of '99, after the ministerial
9		decision would have led, I imagine, to the acceptance
10		criteria being modified, as part of the re-negotiation
11		of the heads of terms between ICL and Post Office.
12		I don't know who had signatory authority within the Post
13		Office for that, I'm afraid.
14	Q.	You don't know who had signatory authority but who would
15		you have expected to have taken responsibility
16	Α.	For the acceptance criteria?
17	Q.	for the acceptance criteria?
18	Α.	I would have imagined Dave with taking legal advice and
19		surrounding himself with people from who had
20		experience of the programme and taking IT advice and
21		others. I'm sure he would have done this, I trust Dave
22		would have.
23	Q.	That's David Miller?
24	Α.	David Miller, yes.
25	Q.	I'm going to move on to the Treasury working group. 66
1 2		expertise to manage the programme, given the PFI nature of it.
3	Q.	Do you think Jonathan Evans going into that Treasury
4		working group had enough understanding of the technical
5		details?
6	Α.	He would have come back and asked us about that or had
7		provided briefings if he needed to but he was there
8		primarily around well, he's a good guy but also he
9		was the network director and a lot of the modelling
10		being done was on the impact on the network.
11	Q.	Do you think that those with technical expertise were
12		given enough say on whether the Post Office should
13		remain committed to that project at that time?
14	Α.	Ah, I see. I don't know. John answered yesterday,
15		I think, that we talked about the options and Jonathan
16		did a working group about re-tendering, if necessary,
17		and that sounds easy, but isn't. You know, given the
18		situation, you had to postulate different scenarios and,
19		indeed, I think there's a report in the bundle where we
20		
		asked as well as asking for an external view we
21		asked as well as asking for an external view, we asked for a peer review run by our own finance director
21 22		asked for a peer review run by our own finance director,
22		asked for a peer review run by our own finance director, who was pretty fiercely independent, to say if Benefits
		asked for a peer review run by our own finance director,

with the project.

2 3 4 5 6		POL00028649. It's a document of 8 July 1998. Can you	_		
4 5			2		put any of the losses that might result on that on to
5		just tell us who was Mena Rego?	3		Post Office rather than ICL.
	Α.	Mena was one of my direct reports and she was working	4		I mean, I think the background to this, which
6		on she was the Horizon development manager, I think	5		I must just mention, if I may, this was 8 July '98, so
		her title was. She had a commercial background and	6		this is going into the Treasury working group and you
7		a general management	7		will know that the KPMG report, eventually published,
8	Q.	The penultimate paragraph there	8		showed that the clear best value for money was to
9	Α.	Oh, this is deep pink, yes.	9		continue with the benefit payment card but on
10	Q.	" we have to get the message across very clearly to	10		an extended roll-out. The only loser in that scenario
11		officials/Ministers that we are not a pawn in the game	11		was Benefits Agency and, therefore, they resisted it
12		between DSS desire to exit and Treasury/DTI desire to	12		tooth and nail.
13		prop up ICL and that if BA cease the payment Card we	13	Q.	Did the Post Office come up with a credible alternative
14		reserve our right to make our own decision on	14	-	strategy to the payment card?
15		continuation/extension of the contract or termination	15	Δ.	We talked and considered and agreed that we would
16		and this would depend on our satisfaction on the	16	7.1	migrate to a smartcard, which you will recall was in our
17		2 points above."	17		minds at the outset and, indeed, even appears in the
18	۵	Can you remind what the two points above were?	18		1995 MOU as the system would be able to migrate to it.
10	-	Yes, absolutely. Can we just have a quick look.	10		But it depends what you do with that smartcard and it
20	Q.	Yes, I see.	20		depends on the rate of business you lose at the same
	A.	-	20 21		
21 22	Q.	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	21		time. You have to think about our post offices and our
22	А.	You haven't met Mena but she's a very direct person and	22		customers here.
		it's probably not the language I would use. But we			If, as John said yesterday, it wasn't just
24		can't what she was trying to say there is that the	24		a technical decision it was a rounded decision, at
25		Post Office and POCL couldn't be the fall guy for DSS's 69	25		'98/'99 less than 25 per cent of DSS claimants chose to 70
1		have their payments made by ACT so, even when it was	1		that would have had to be in place then, as now, for
2		available to them, they were still choosing to come to	2		that network to survive was that a universal banking
3		post offices. We were determined that that customer	3		product would have had to be developed. One suggestion
4		choice should remain in one way or another.	4		from within the Treasury was the Post Office could
5		So the credible alternative we tried to put up,	5		become a bank to do that, which was unacceptable because
6		under one of the option 2 variants, when DSS had dug	6		of all the regulatory risks. We sort of sold our bank
7		their heels in with Treasury backing, to some extent,	7		off ten years earlier with Girobank privatisation.
8		saying they wanted to terminate their part of the deal,	8		We would have had to make enabling arrangements
9		was that we were prepared to go to a smartcard that	9		with banks to do that and the government would have had
10		would enable banking services in some way, shape or	10		to do that because the banks wouldn't have been rushing
11		form, provided that BA continued its managed transition	11		to take on a lot of unbanked people who they wouldn't
12		on ACT over a number of years and continue to pay Post	12		have seen.
13		Office and, therefore, we could pay subpostmasters and	13		We had a plan also to provide what we called
14		our people some amount for that card.	14		network banking services, which we then went on to
15	Q.		15		develop for banks as they closed branches to come and do
16	ά.	a simpler plan, though?	16		stuff.
17	Α.		17		That would have also required an automated
18			18		network. It would have required further releases to
10	۹.	government reports I don't need to take you to them	19		enable things like debit cards to be done, probably
20		because you won't have seen them at the time but they	20		an ATM-type network. So it wasn't a quick fix, is what
20		were critical of the Post Office's lack of a robust	20 21		I would say.
22			21	0	Can we look at POL00028644, and that's a letter to you
22	۸	business plan at that stage? I don't disagree with that. I mean, I take issue	22	પ્ર.	from David Sibbick who was the Director of Posts at the
23 24	д.	with that. It's very easy for people who don't run	23 24		DTI at the time.
24 25			24 25	Α.	
		things to make up comment on those things. The enablers 71	20	А.	72

1	Q.	That's August 1998.
2	Α.	Yes.
3	Q.	At the bottom of that first page, he's asking if
4		Benefits Payment Card were dropped, what technology
5		would the Post Office want and could simpler technology
6		be used? It seems there that the Post Office are being
7		given an off-ramp to the Horizon project if they wanted
8		it.
9	Α.	He's asking for a scenario and we gave him that and
10		I think it's in the bundle.
11	Q.	Did the Post Office ever come up with a simpler system
12		as an alternative?
13	Α.	I'd like to know what he meant by that. Such as? You
14		know, what is the simpler system we had a simple
15		system that was called payment method paper-based
16		payment methods, and that clearly was unacceptable and
17		not modern. The type of technology to enable us to be
18		competitive in the future would have had to should
19		build on the infrastructure that was being developed and
20		being rolled out at that point and included the option
21		then to upgrade it to more of a banking-type solution.
22	Q.	I think a witness has said that, effectively, a tank was
23		built when all you needed was a car, or something along
24		those lines.
25	Α.	Did they?
		73
1		coincidentally came at the same time as DSS were
2		considering whether they withdraw or not, and we thought
3		he was in conflict. We had advice from because we
4		didn't agree on the way forward and we had advice from
5		Slaughters to Treasury solicitors and to our own
6		solicitor that I can remember the partner at
7		Slaughters giving a very clear indication that Hamish
8		would have been in conflict.
9	Q.	So was your concern with Bird & Bird and the Project
10		Mentors you just described were you concerned that

- 10 Mentors you just described -- were you concerned that they were adopting a DSS line? 11 A. The second -- I'll be honest about this and if 12 13 I misremember you will have to forgive me, and you can
- 14 ask Sarah Brown, but I don't remember commissioning --15 jointly commissioning the second Bird & Bird report 16 which, when I saw it, was, I think, on New Year's Eve was sent to George McCorkell with me as a copy, which 17 I then passed on to Dave Miller, because clearly it was 18 19 technical issue, where they claimed there was 20 insufficient requirements analysis of the Benefits 21 Agency solution, which was a fundamental point.
- 22 But I thought it was interesting that they never 23 raised that in their report a year before. 24 Q. We'll get to that document shortly. Just in relation to
- this document, did you suggest an alternative spokesman? 25 75

1	Q.	What would your position on that be?
2	Α.	Well, if we'd have started again without the benefits
3		card at that time and re-tendered we would have
4		obviously had a different type of specification, at that
5		point, that would have taken advantage of the latest
6		technology, without all the work that had been done on
7		very infrastructure to start with. It wouldn't have
8		taken away some of the earlier ones.
9		It was also a quite serious point about timing,
10		which the Treasury tried to ignore, which was there
11		were serious procurement law issues.
12	Q.	I'm going to take you to a document very briefly, it's
13		POL00038842. It's again about a meeting that took place
14		with David Sibbick and it's a question that I'm asked to
15		ask you and I will just ask it very quickly. It relates
16		to paragraph 2. It seems as though, from paragraph 2,
17		there's a proposal from the DTI for a joint spokesperson
18		and it says "This was rejected by Paul Rich". Do you
19		remember that and, if so
20	Α.	I do remember it. I remember the background to it.
21	Q.	Are you briefly able to explain?
22	Α.	Hamish Sandison was the Bird & Bird lawyer who had acted
23		for the BA and POCL in the PDA and he had for
24		example, we think he had commissioned that last Project
25		Mentors report in '99, which remarkably and 74

1	Α.	I can't remember.
2	Q.	Moving on to late 1998, we're in autumn but let's move
3		to November, it's POL00028421.
4		Mr Rich, I should ask are you okay to continue?
5	Α.	It depends for how long because, I'm afraid, I'm of that
6		age.
7	Q.	I have about I imagine I'm going to finish at half
8		past or thereabouts?
9	Α.	I don't know if there will be follow-up questions
10		though.
11	Q.	It's unlikely. There maybe a very short follow-up from
12		Mr Stein.
13	Α.	If we can say I'll be fine until about 20 to/quarter
14		to.
15	Q.	Let's see how we do and if we need a short break,
16		perhaps we can have a short break?
17	SIR	WYN WILLIAMS: Mr Rich, I want to repeat that. At any
18		moment when you feel the need for a break, you say so
19		and we'll have one.
20	Α.	That's very kind thank you. I'd rather not lose the
21		flow if I can help it.
22		That's an unfortunate phrase, sorry!
23	MR	BLAKE: So the document in front of us is from David
24		Miller about Horizon testing
25	Α.	Yes, I remember that one, yes. 76

1	Q.	and it's the first substantive paragraph that I want
2		to ask you about. He highlights there that:
3		"My present assessment is that there are some
4		significant problems with the way Horizon passes
5		information through to TIP. These relate to the
6		provision of balanced outlet cash accounts and the
7		processing of the ensuing information via TIP. Whilst
8		we allocated some extra time during the Corbett review
9		to sort out any outstanding issues we need to be aware
10		of a potential threat to 14 December date."
11	Α.	
12		there will be a potential threat to the 14 December
13	_	date, rather than saying we're going ahead with them.
14	Q.	
15		in November 1998. Let's look at POL00028320. This is
16		the "Transformation Steering Group Progress Report to
17		23 November 1998" and can we look at page 6. There's
18		what is called "Red Light Issues", which
19	Α.	This is another document that I only saw at 2.00
20	~	yesterday.
21	Q.	
22	Α.	This is the most substantive one, or one of the most
23		substantive ones, so my this is the annotations that
24		I said I didn't recognise. So I don't know who's
25		writing this. It also said, I think at the beginning of 77
1		TIP and Reference Data personnel. Remedial action is
2		now underway. The point must be made that we will not
3		enter the final phase of testing until we are content
4		that we have a robust set of code."
5	Q.	So somebody's written that at the bottom?
6	Α.	I think that's Dave Miller's number 2.
7	Q.	Who was that?
8	Α.	Could have been one of two people. My guess is
9		there's a lady called Janet Topham at the time.
10	Q.	That paragraph on the Horizon system, though, that
11		background 23 November 1998, I'm going to now look at
12		POL00038829 and I think this is the controversial
13		document, perhaps, that you were talking about from Bird
14		& Bird?
15	Α.	Yes.
16	Q.	Can you assist us with that handwritten note or
17	Α.	That handwritten note is from Mena's secretary.
18	Q.	"Dave" being?
19	Α.	Miller.
20	Q.	Thank you. Can we look at the report itself,
21		paragraph 1
22		Sorry, there are a few different versions of this
23		document.
24	MR	BLAKE: Sir, perhaps we could take a five-minute break
25		now for everybody's convenience and we can go back on in
		79

1		it, that the meeting didn't take place.
2	Q.	So is this a document that you think you would have
3		received at the time?
4	Α.	I can't tell. I would have received it if it was going
5		ahead because I would have been chairing the meeting.
6	Q.	If we look at the first paragraph, and that's the only
7		paragraph I want to take you to, "Red Light Issues,
8		Horizon System":
9		"There are major concerns about the test results
10		emanating from Model Office and End to End.
11		"The results indicate that cash accounts and
12		transaction data delivered to POCL's downstream systems
13		lack accounting integrity, all of which raises serious
14		doubt about Pathway's ability to enter into the next
15		phase of Model Office and End to End testing without
16		some form of remedial action."
17	Α.	That's basically reflecting what Dave Miller said
18		before, isn't it?
19	Q.	I was going to say, even if you didn't necessarily see
20		this at the time, were those issues that you would have
21		been aware of?
22	Α.	Yes, because Dave told us. What does whoever wrote it,
23		said about it, may I just
24	Q.	If we could scroll down and highlight that?
25	Α.	"Remedial analysis has taken place [following] meeting 78
		10

1	five minutes. Thank you very much.
2	A. Thank you.
3	(12.17 pm)
4	(A short break)
5	(12.22 pm)
6	MR BLAKE: Thank you very much, sir, we are back and I have
7	found the relevant page, page 3 of that document.
8	POL00038829. This is a letter from Bird & Bird,
9	December 1998, can we look at that first paragraph,
10	please. It's difficult to read:
11	"As you will see, [Andrew Davies'] team have
12	documented a further specific failure by ICL Pathway to
13	follow good industry practice in meeting the
14	Authorities' requirements."
15	Can we go to page 5. There's a letter there to
16	yourself and George McCorkell and Pat Kelsey from Bird &
17	Bird, and that first paragraph summarises the view of
18	Andrew Davies of Project Mentors. Can we just have
19	a look at that first paragraph, sorry. The quote there
20	is quoted from Andrew's letter:
21	" 'deeply concerned that their findings show
22	a serious problem with the way in which ICL Pathway have
23	developed the system. The impact of this is likely to
24	be that there will be failures to meet essential user
25	requirements, causing the need for extensive rework 80

1		before the system can be accepted and, potentially,	1	
2		operational problems if the system is rolled out."	2	
3		That's quite a concerning statement, isn't it?	3	Α.
4	Α.	It's his opinion, yes.	4	Q.
5	Q.	The impression that it gives is that there are real	5	
6		concerns about Horizon at the time.	6	
7	Α.	But if you look at no, not but. I think this is	7	
8		commissioned on the way, if I'm correct, the benefit	8	
9		encashment service was developed and the focus was on	9	
10		that, and the claim then by Mr Davies was that the same	10	
11		must apply to all other components. I think it also	11	
12		l'm not a you know, l'm not a technical person, l'm	12	
13		not an IT expert and wouldn't ever aspire to be but	13	
14		I think it completely ignores the fact it was procured	14	
15		under private finance.	15	
16	Q.	Can we go to page 6, which is the letter from Project	16	
17		Mentors to Hamish Sandison and over the page to page 7,	17	
18		and it's the second paragraph there. He says:	18	
19		"Our experience of systems where requirements have	19	
20		not been analysed satisfactorily is that the system	20	
21		fails to meet the users' needs. An effective acceptance	21	
22		test will identify many such failings necessitating	22	
23		considerable rework. The result is a significant	23	
24		extension of time and cost required to complete the	24	
25		system and roll-out it out. The alternative is to allow 81	25	
			4	
1		since the RAD experiment was abandoned, we have doubts	1	
2		whether any proper requirements analysis has been	2	
3 4		performed."	3 4	
4 5		On the same page. Can we go to page 14, it's 2.4.3. Sorry, that's the part we just read. Then over	4 5	
6		the page again. You have addressed this in your witness	6	
7		statement and you say that you were only copied in to	7	
8		this document and that you would have passed it to	8	
9		others.	9	
10	Α.	Yes.	9 10	
11	Q .		10	Q.
12	α.	"My recollection is that POCL did not necessarily	12	Q.
13		agree with the report as proving the system was	13	
14		fundamentally, technically flawed."	14	Α.
15		So, again, that's the use of the term	15	7.0
16		"fundamentally flawed". Were these issues raised here	16	
17		serious issues?	17	Q.
18	Α.	Clearly, they were serious seriously phrased.	18	Α.
19		I passed this on to Dave Miller at the time because he	19	Q.
20		was clearly in the process. As I said, this is December	20	
21		'98 when he was considering whether or not to authorise	21	
22		the further release. As this says, it doesn't actually	22	Α.
23		analyse the EPOSS system. It talks about things had	23	Q.
24		started to go on the EPOSS system, it talks about rapid	24	Α.
25		application development in the past, which ICL did want	25	Q.
		83		

		unacceptable processing in the operational environment,
		with unpredictable and potentially damaging results."
	Α.	Is there a question?
	Q.	I'm going to move on to show you the substantive report.
		That's at page 8. Can we go to page 11. Can we look at
		paragraph 1.3, "Scope", the second paragraph:
		"We have to date only considered the [Benefits
		Payment System]. Further work has recently started to
		perform a similar assessment of the approach adopted for
)		other elements of the system, such as EPOSS.
		Nevertheless our findings are, in our view, sufficiently
2		serious to bring into question the whole of Pathway's
5		design process."
Ļ		Moving on to page 14, paragraph 2.3.4. Again, at
ō		the bottom:
) -		"Of particular concern is the EPOSS system [that's
		the second paragraph]. We are informed that at
3		a relatively early stage Pathway wanted the Authorities,
)		principally POCL, to be involved with the design of this
)		element. The plan was to use the Rapid Application
,		Development methodology to design the system. This approach was started, but discontinued after some
-		months, when the Pathway staff member involved left the
, L		project. The suggestion to use RAD leads us to believe
5		that more traditional methods have not been used, and
		82
		to use RAD, it's called and we didn't particularly
		want them to do that unless it had quality of outputs to
		do so.
		As I said before and I stick to that, the previous
		Project Mentors report a year or so earlier on the whole
		thing seemed not to address the issue of insufficient
		requirements analysis at all, which I find surprising,
		and I just note that it came out as the DSS were
`		considering praying in aid whether or not to continue with the benefit card or not.
)	0	Coming in a year later, presumably that's even more
,	Q.	concerning because you are further down the line and
-		these issues are being experienced?
Ĺ	Α.	But yes, but if it was a fundamental design flaw
5		because of insufficient requirements analysis by ICL,
5		that would have been apparent earlier on
,	Q.	Now that
}	Α.	logically.
)	Q.	Now that they have found these issues, whose
)		responsibility within the Post Office would it have been

- responsibility within the Post Office would it have been to take those forward?
- To consider it?
- Yes.
- Dave Miller.
- You said earlier that, at this stage, I think you were

1		dealing with strategic matters and David Miller was	1
2		dealing with the more technical matters?	2
3	Α.	He was dealing with delivery. I was in my last as	3
4		I said earlier on, I was appointed to a role completely	4
5 6		outside of the Post Office Network when the entire group reorganised itself, as a managing director of a new unit	5 6
7		in March.	7
8	Q.		8
9	α.	this to their attention?	9
10	Α.	Maybe Stuart Sweetman. I don't know.	10
11	Q.	Do you think it was sufficiently serious to bring to the	11
12		managing director's attention?	12
13	Α.	You need to ask Dave that.	13
14	Q.	If you had received it at the time, would you have	14
15		brought it to the managing director's attention?	15
16	Α.	Depends in what context. As I said, I would have	16
17		probably talked at length to the person authoring the	17
18		report first to understand it because, as I said, I had	18
19		reservations on it and I seriously don't remember	19
20		commissioning, even though, no doubt, we'd have paid	20
21		half of it.	21
22	Q.	Do you think that by the end of 1998 and the beginning	22
23		of 1999 technical issues were being taken seriously	23
24		enough within the Post Office?	24
25	Α.	They would have been taken seriously. I maintain, as	25
		85	
1	0	Yes. What was your involvement in this particular	1
2	α.	document?	2
3	Α.	Well, there was an earlier we called these peer	3
4		reviews. There was an earlier one done in '97 by the	4
5		strategy director of Post Office. This was done by the	5
6		finance director sorry, Post Office Counters,	6
7		I should say and we asked him, as a contingency, to	7
8		look at, as I said earlier, whether or not without me	8
9		getting I mean, he'd have talked to me and given	9
10		input but without me trying to influence his decision or	10
11		his analysis, in any way, shape or form, really, to give	11
12		an opinion on what the best way forward for POCL would	12
13		have been if this scenario occurred.	13
14	Q.	Can we look at page 2, paragraph 2.5 and 2.6:	14
15		"Even on the basis of protecting benefit payments,	15
16		the go/no go decision is finely balanced, with neither	16
17		option being fully satisfactory for POCL. Proceeding	17
18		means full commitment to an automation route and	18
19		a partner, neither of which are ideal in the context of	19
20		realising the new Counters vision. But not proceeding	20
21		would so delay the building of automated capability, and	21
22		undermine the business' credibility internally and	22
23		externally, as to put the vision at significant risk of	23
24 25		becoming undeliverable."	24
25	Α.	I think I said earlier it was the least worst option. 87	25

I		I said, we would not have been expedient for the sake of
2		speed or trying to shoehorn a solution that suited us
3		strategically if we didn't think it could work. We
ļ		relied on you'd have seen Dave Miller's notes to us.
5		So we knew it, "no denial", as I said. I know I'm
6		sounding like I'm in denial about this report. It's the
7		first time probably today but I'm irritated by it.
3		We then you will, no doubt well, maybe you
)		won't, there's another document that Dave Miller wrote
0		in April to Vince Gaskell. That's POL00028407, where he
1		says the team following these issues, the team now
2		believe they're ready to be able to roll out, and
3		I would have relied on Dave's judgement about that,
4		standing from afar. As I said, I was in the process
5		I had a new job but I was hanging on for a couple of
6		months because the ministerial decision didn't come
7		until May, so I was still giving input at that point.
8		Then the next I saw was something in a note from
9		Keith Hardie, where I was a copy amongst many others, as
0		I said in my witness statement, that the Post Office was
1		beginning to roll-out Horizon. That's POL00028463.
2	Q.	Let's stay in January 1999 for now and just look at
3		POL00031230. This was a report by Post Office's POCL's
4		finance director.
5	Α.	This is the one I mentioned earlier.
		86
I	Q.	"Several senior managers, close to the project, but no
2		principal negotiators, whose judgement I respect,
3		express significant reservations about the risks of
ł		proceeding. These centre of their continuing doubt
5		about the ability of ICL to deliver a satisfactory
6		product; the absence of transparency in the PFI
7		contract; the risk that ICL's financial fragility will
3		endure throughout the project, with the possibility of
)		repeated claims on The Post Office for extra
~		

6		product; the absence of transparency in the PFI
7		contract; the risk that ICL's financial fragility will
8		endure throughout the project, with the possibility of
9		repeated claims on The Post Office for extra
0		contributions (which, by then having no alternative, it
1		will be unable to resist); and doubts about POCL's own
2		ability to give it the focus essential for success."
3	Α.	Yes, none of that is new news, though, is it, really?
4		I mean, the track record demonstrates that.
5	Q.	Over the page, the decision is:
6		"On balance, I agree that it remains right to
7		press ahead with Horizon, despite the extra costs
8		involved."
9		Did the commercial importance of seeing Horizon
20		through at that stage outweigh the kinds of technical
21		concerns that we've talked about this morning?
22	Α.	No. I mean, as I said, the decision was in a round and
3		a business decision always is surrounded by both
24		technical, commercial, operational and financial
25		aspects. That's a matter of judgement for general 88

1		managers but we would not I don't believe well,	1
2		I find it really hard to believe that anyone from that	2
3		culture, at that time, would have compromised quality	3
4		knowingly, in order to be expedient to suit strategic or	4
5		financial matters.	5
6	Q.	I'm only going to ask about a couple more documents.	6
7		The first is a return to your witness statement,	7
8		WITN04030100 and it's page 33, paragraph 94.	8
9	Α.	Yes. 94? Okay.	9
10	Q.	Yes, I'm just going to can we bring that on the	10
11		screen? Thanks.	11
12		So what you have said there is you were less	12
13		involved in the Horizon project as 1999 proceeded and,	13
14		by May 1999, you were no longer involved?	14
15	Α.	At that time, yes.	15
16	Q.	Can we look at POL00021469.	16
17	Α.	You are going to show me a document where I was, okay.	17
18	Q.	Well, it's a board meeting.	18
19	Α.	Is this the one in 2000?	19
20	Q.	Yes.	20
21	Α.	That's me going, though, in my new role as MD customer	21
22		management and the board asking I'm an attendee,	22
23		aren't I, along with other people like, I don't know,	23
24		someone else from yeah, Basil Larkins, the managing	24
25		director of Network Banking. You see, we all had 89	25

1		development of Horizon and things had moved on. Were
2		you aware, at least at that time, that things had moved
3		on to commercial exploitation?
4	Α.	Yes. I mean, I'd have been away from Post Office
5		Counters Limited entirely, or the three business units
6		that it had been split into by then, including Post
7		Office Network, which Dave Miller was the managing
8		director of, and he would have you know, we'd have
9		met from time to time and he'd have said, "Well, we're
10		now rolled out to 4,000 offices". But clearly at that
11		point, I certainly was completely unaware of any
12		material accounting or balancing-type issues at that
13		point and, therefore, my brief was, as part of my new
14		job, to have a team looking at Government Gateway
15		opportunities.
16	Q.	Who, if anybody, would you have passed on your knowledge
17		to about those technical issues that you gathered
18	Α.	Oh, Dave Miller, obviously. We had that large overlap,
19		didn't we, and there would have been quite a lot of
20		continuity in the team from the team that were brought
21		back from the PDA in to work for Dave. I mean, clearly
22		Stuart Sweetman. You'll be talking to Stuart, I think,
23		later on. Stuart was still the group MD for those
24		matters that included Post Office Network and Network
25		Banking so he will have had a rounded view about

1		different titles then because we are one of the
2		17 managing directors under it.
3		Basil was the Network Banking person. I was the
4		managing director of customer management and, within
5		that customer management, there was a peripheral
6		well, not peripheral, but a smaller part of the job was
7		to look at the opportunities for electronic government
8		with the Post Office in general, including perhaps at
9		counters.
10	Q.	You would have been present for the whole meeting there?
11	Α.	l doubt it.
12	Q.	Would you have stayed for the part that addresses
13		Horizon?
14	Α.	I doubt it. I mean, the normal way I don't know.
15		I can't remember but the normal way of board meetings,
16		if you weren't a board member, was that you attended for
17		the item in question that you were asked to present.
18		Later on, when I was doing the six-month job as
19		the acting MD and I attended board meetings, I would
20		have been present at those board meetings. But that's
21		later than that.
22	Q.	Can we look at page 7, the bottom of page 7. I think
23		this is a document that we went through yesterday and
24		I'm not going to spend any time on it but this is the
25		part where discussions turned to the commercial 90
		90

1		Horizon.
2	Q.	If there were concerns about Horizon at that stage so
3		March 2000 who do you think would have or should have
4		raised them at the board level?
5	Α.	Well, I imagine the way it works, certainly when I was
6		managing director of customer management, Stuart was
7		also my group MD then, who sat on the executive board
8		alongside John, you know, as the chief executive, and we
9		would have had regular contacts on how the big issues in
10		my patch were going and if Stuart thought they had been
11		serious enough or if I'd have proposed that I wanted
12		board support, I would have expected the channel to go
13		through him.
14	Q.	Finally from me, I think you have asked to very briefly
15		address the Chair in respect of your overall
16		reflections.
17	Α.	Yes, Chair. All I wanted to say was, really in line
18		with my witness statement, that I fully respect this
19		Inquiry and really hope that you get to the bottom of
20		it. I have been reflecting hard ever since I've been
21		asked to come here as a witness, back in May, with all
22		the documents and I want to express my own sadness about
23		the impact this has put on so many lives.
24		In some of the stuff I've seen, either through the
25		press or through recent documents that I've seen from 92

 and packat, in many pathed and socked by how or preserved these properts or these packates the nature of the whore of whow treated and into completely be filled and its not a cutture i personally recognise in the time of the object of what must have been happening at the time of the governance that allowed it. Thank you very much, the Rich. Thank you very much, the Rich and the set the process. Thank you very much, the Rich and the set the process. Thank you very much, the Rich and the set the process. Thank you very much, the Rich and the set the process. Thank you very much, the Rich and the very the set the s				
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4 terms of the ethos of Wata must have been happening at that time or the governance that allowed it. 5 5 bo that all wanted to say. 6 7 C. Thank you very much, MR Rch. 7 7 Ve just been given one very brief quasition that 8 file that, therefore, Thinks as learning to compare the capital projects that were properties that the exploy. And the base and PL provident terms that properties that yere properties that the same properties that the couputs and test them? 10 have, said, Numer PL you don't do that, wait for the outputs and test them? 11 subports that the suppler only got paid on the properties that the suppler only got paid on the table to output the attitude to be provident were the properties. 11 subports that the suppler only got paid on the table to output the attitude to a properties that the suppler project. 12 Index mark that the suppler only got paid on the table to output the attitude to a properties. 13 a unpost masker, with the Federation actually, with a minister assumption to the table to output the attitude to properties. 14 subpost masker, with the Federation to the supple to neight to output the supple to neight to that the supple to neight to that the suppl				
5 that time or the governance that allowed it. 5 experience because the nature of this PF project was 6 0. Thank you very much. M. Rich. 7 7 0. Thank you very much. M. Rich. 7 8 Ne just been given one very brief question that 8 9 Ne just been given one very brief question that 8 10 have, throughout your evidence, referred to the 10 11 builds to go in and assure courselve of the datals of the datas of				
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	20 21 22 23	ignores the fact that it was under a PFI. Does that mean that the burden of governance running and general	22 23	A. I'm only reading what I've read in the media and in the judgment that was that was in the opening counsel's
	20 21 22 23 24	ignores the fact that it was under a PFI. Does that mean that the burden of governance running and general maintenance of the Horizon System was placed upon	22 23 24	A. I'm only reading what I've read in the media and in the judgment that was that was in the opening counsel's statement, that it would seem I don't know. I mean,

1		would seem that it was ill-advised in going ahead. The	1		manager who would have been in control of that.
2		investigative processes seemed to be ones that I didn't	2		You say that they were done at arm's length. What does
3		recognise from my days. Certainly, non-disclosure would	3		that mean to the disclosure process of bugs and errors
4		have been a real issue to me with any investigative	4		within the Horizon System? Were those bugs and errors
5		processes around fraud. The governance processes, I'll	5		brought to the attention of the arm's length body
6		leave that to Post Office Limited and perhaps UKGI	6		dealing with the investigation of subpostmasters and, if
7		because I can't see how a board would have knowingly	7		so, how?
8		knowingly not noticed that 700 people had been	8		I don't know because, at the time I was there, I don't
9		prosecuted cumulatively, roughly.	9		think there were bugs and errors I don't know.
10	Q	Regarding you mention in your statement and just now of	10		I absolutely don't I can't be absolutely certain but,
11	ά.	the investigative processes, and also mention of	11		by the time I left in this period, in this phase, in
12		governance, whilst you were at the Post Office and	12		March '99 I don't think you might correct me
13		dealing with matters up until, I think, 2002, where you	13		I don't think in the live trial offices there were any
14		moved over to the RM group more generally until 2005,	13		prosecutions brought.
14		what control was put in place in relation to the	14		Well, I could correct you. There were bugs and errors
16		investigative processes as regards subpostmasters,	16		in place
10		mistresses and managers?	10		No, I didn't say that. I didn't say that. I didn't say
17	۸		18		there weren't bugs and errors. I said bugs and errors
10	Α.		10		that led to investigation and prosecution.
19 20		continually until 2002, just to be clear on the records.	19 20		Mr Rich, my question was in relation to what controls
		The investigative processes were largely as John	20 21		
21 22		described yesterday, really. You know, the	21		were put in place to make sure that bugs and errors were
		investigative processes were done separately and at	22		brought to the attention of the investigation processes.
23		arm's length but if there'd have been a high a sudden			What can you help regarding that?
24		hiatus or peak of them I'm sure it would have been	24		Well, we wouldn't have during that time if there were
25		brought to the attention through the relevant senior 97	25		bugs and investigations that we thought had technical 98
1		issues related to them, which was the point of the live	1		afternoon and, therefore, (b) if it helps to have
2		trial, as I said, and therefore needed fixing, we	2		a shorter lunchtime we should do so.
3		wouldn't have put those to the investigation department.	3	MR	BLAKE: Excellent. Thank you very much, sir. We'll come
4	Q.	How did the investigation department get to learn about	4		back at 1.50.
5		bugs, problems, issues with the Horizon System?	5	SIR	WYN WILLIAMS: Fine. See you all then.
6	Α.	l don't know.	6	(12.5	55 pm)
7	Q.	What's the system?	7		(Luncheon Adjournment)
8	Α.	l don't know.	8	(1.50) pm)
9	Q.	Who's in charge of it?	9		HODGE: Good afternoon, sir, can you see and hear me? We
10	Α.	l don't know.	10		can't hear you. You appear to be on mute.
11	Q.	Who should have been in charge of it?	11	SIR	WYN WILLIAMS: Well, I didn't think I was on mute. Am
12	Α.	l don't know. I can't help you.	12		I on mute now?
13	MF	R STEIN: Thank you. Thank you, sir.	13	MS I	HODGE: No we can hear you perfectly, thank you.
14		R WYN WILLIAMS: That concludes the questioning, I take	14		WYN WILLIAMS: Fine. Our next witness is Mr Copping.
15		it, and, assuming that's the case, thank you very much,	15		PETER JAMES COPPING (sworn)
16		Mr Rich, for making a detailed written statement and	16		Questioned by MS HODGE
17		also for coming to give oral evidence. I'm grateful to	17	MS I	HODGE: Please give your full name.
18		you.	18		Peter James Copping.
19	Α.	Thank you. Thank you for the opportunity.	19		You should have in front of you a witness statement,
20		R BLAKE: Thank you, sir. It's now lunchtime. Could we	20		dated 2 September of this year.
21		come back at would it cause anybody inconvenience,	21		Yes.
22		including yourself, if we came back slightly earlier,	22		Could I ask you please to turn to page 18 of your
23		perhaps at 1.50?	23		statement. Do you see your signature there at the end
24	SIF	R WYN WILLIAMS: No, I was going to suggest that we (a)	23		of the statement?
25	51	make a determined attempt to finish Mr Copping this	25		Yes.
_0		99	20		100

the attention of the investigation processes. you help regarding that? ouldn't have during that time if there were
nvestigations that we thought had technical 98
and, therefore, (b) if it helps to have
inchtime we should do so.
xcellent. Thank you very much, sir. We'll come i0.
IAMS: Fine. See you all then.
(Luncheon Adjournment)
Good afternoon, sir, can you see and hear me? We
you. You appear to be on mute.
IAMS: Well, I didn't think I was on mute. Am now?
No we can hear you perfectly, thank you.
IAMS: Fine. Our next witness is Mr Copping.
PETER JAMES COPPING (sworn)
Questioned by MS HODGE
Please give your full name.
es Copping.
have in front of you a witness statement,
ptember of this year.
you please to turn to page 18 of your
Do you see your signature there at the end ement?
100
(25) Pages 97 - 100

1	Q.	Is the content of the statement true to the best of your
2		knowledge and belief?
3	Α.	Yes.
4	Q.	Mr Copping, your statement and its exhibits are now in
5		evidence before the Inquiry. I would like to begin by
6		asking you a few questions about your professional
7		background. You qualified as a chartered engineer and
8		a Fellow of the Institute of Engineering and Technology;
9		is that correct?
10	Α.	That's correct.
11	Q.	What competencies were you required to demonstrate to
12		qualify as a chartered engineer?
13	Α.	It's a long process but, in essence, you have to display
14		technical competencies, managerial competencies, in
15		quite a wide range of topics.
16	Q.	You've explained that you worked in the electronics and
17		telecommunications industry for approximately ten years
18		before joining PA Consulting; is that right?
19	Α.	That's correct.
20	Q.	PA Consulting being a management information and
21		technology consultancy?
22	Α.	That's correct.
23	Q.	You joined that organisation in 1976?
24	A.	Yes.
25	Q.	Before being appointed a director of PA Consulting in 101
1	0	I'd like to, if I can, briefly explore what you
2	ά.	understood at the time about the broader context of the
3		review that you were asked to undertake. Why had that
4		review been commissioned?
5	Α.	Sorry, could you repeat that?
6	Q.	Why had your review, in the summer of '97, to your
7		understanding, been commissioned?
8	Α.	Primarily because of delays to the project.
9	Q.	What had arisen as a result of those delays?
10	Α.	There were concerns about the possibility of future
11		delays, there were concerns about Pathway's ability to
12		deliver and there were concerns about Post Office
13		readiness to accept Horizon.
14	Q.	In your statement you describe the purpose of the review
15		as being to identify the reasons for the delay to the
16		project and to recommend actions to de-risk the project
17		to bring it back on track; is that correct?
18	Α.	That's correct.
19	Q.	You were also required, were you not, to make
20		an assessment of the programme's future delivery
21		capability?
22	Α.	That's correct.
22	Π.	

 Q. That assessment involved examining not only management and resourcing issues but also the technical aspects of the project, which had a bearing on the programme's

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(26) Pages 101 - 104

1 1990, you worked on a variety of telecommunications and 2 information technology projects; is that right? 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. Did these projects require you, at any stage, to 5 undertake software design and development? 6 A. Personally, no, but I did lead teams that were doing 7 that. 8 Q. How would you characterise your area of expertise in 9 engineering? 10 A. Broadly speaking, I would characterise it as in the 11 telecommunications area, networking and IT. 12 Q. You first became involved in Horizon when you were 13 commissioned in the summer of 1997 to leader of the 14 PA Consulting of what was known at the time as the 15 Benefits Agency and Post Office Counters programme; is 16 that correct? A. That's correct. 17 18 Q. Had you ever previously worked on a project of the scale 19 and complexity of Horizon? 20 A. Not quite the same. I certainly worked on large 21 projects of similar scale in the mobile 22 telecommunications area in particular. 23 Q. Did you have any prior experience of working on an IT 24 system developed by ICL? 25 A. No. 102

1		ability to deliver its end-to-end delivery obligations?
2	Α.	That's correct.
3	Q.	You've explained in your statement your review focused
4		on four principal areas. These were the business
5		objectives of each stakeholder; the contractual
6		arrangements between the parties; thirdly, the programme
7		management processes; and, finally, the technical
8		infrastructure proposed for Horizon by ICL Pathway. Is
9		that right?
10	Α.	Yes.
11	Q.	You use a term "technical infrastructure" in your
12		statement. Can you explain what you mean by that?
13	Α.	Essentially, that is the hardware platform on which the
14		software services reside from the counter back into
15		various back-end systems.
16	Q.	Are you suggesting, therefore, that you were only asked
17		to consider the hardware, as opposed to the software?
18	Α.	No, no.
19	Q.	Elsewhere in the documents we see the term "technical
20		architecture" used. So far as you're concerned, are
21		they one and the same: architecture and infrastructure?
22	Α.	The architecture defines the various layers in the
23		system that worked together to make up the
24		infrastructure.
25	Q.	So slightly different nuances then?
		104

A. Yes.

1	Α.		1
2	Q.	Do you recall how far the project had progressed at the	2
3		point at which you undertook your review in the summer	3
4		of 1997?	4
5	Α.	When we started work there was a I think we were	5
6		presented with a programme rework which was titled	6
7		"Version 3", and I think all of our work was based on	7
8 9	0	that particular document. It might assist if we bring that up. That's	8 9
9 10	Q.	POL00028186, please. Is this the document to which you	9 10
10		were referring?	10
12	Α.	Yes.	12
13	Q.	The "Programme Delivery Authority Master Plan	13
14	ч.	Version 3"	10
15	Α.	Yes.	15
16	Q.	dated 8 April 1997. Could we turn to page 8, please.	16
17		You see there a number of strategic milestones in the	17
18		project. Can you see that in front of you?	18
19	Α.	Yes.	19
20	Q.	The first of which was the initial Go Live implemented	20
21		in one post office on 23 September '96 and then rolled	21
22		out to ten post offices on 23 October '96?	22
23	Α.	Yes.	23
24	Q.	That was followed by the roll-out of Pathway	24
25		infrastructure on 7 March '97, so we see next to B1?	25
		105	
1		Service, and APS, the Automated Payment Service?	1
2	Α.	My goodness, I really don't remember.	2
3	Q.	In your statement you explained you adopted two	3
4		principal methods of assessment, the first conducting	4
5		a series of in-depth interviews and follow up	5
6		investigative meetings with senior figures in each of	6
7		the stakeholders, those being the Programme Delivery	7
8		Authority, Post Office Counters, the Benefits Agency,	8
9		Pathway and ICL; is that right?	9
10	Α.	That's correct.	10
11	Q.	The other aspect of your review or your assessment was	11
12		a document review essentially; is that right?	12
13	Α.	Yes.	13
14	Q.	In that you reviewed a significant amount of	14
15		documentation relating to technology status and plans	15
16 17	٨	for Horizon?	16 17
17 10	A.	Yes.	17
18 19	Q.	If we could start by addressing the second of these	18 19
		methods, your document review, could you please describe	
20 21		the types of technical documentation to which you were granted access to ICL Pathway?	20 21
21 22	Α.	First of all, we would have started with a demonstration	21
22	~ .	of the model office system. We would have taken	22
23 24		presentations from ICL on the software status, status of	23
25		development, the overall architecture, the way the	25
-		107	

А.	res.
Q.	And B2, the release of what became known as software
	release 1b, which, as we can see, implemented OBCS
	functionality. Can you describe what OBCS was?
Α.	It was order book CS, something. I don't remember.
Q.	The control service?
Α.	Control service, that's right, yes.
Q.	Were you aware of what its function was?
A.	This was the service that was used to confirm that the
	person in the Post Office was entitled to the benefit
	that was on the order book, as I understood it at the
	time.
Q.	We can see a further date of 30 June '97 about midway
α.	down the page and that was the planned release of
	Pathway Release 1c, which was due to contain further
	OBCS so the order book control service and BPS,
	which was the Benefit Payment Service, functionality.
	We know, however, that milestone had been missed
	because, at the point at which you conducted your
	review, development work on Release 1c was ongoing. Is
	that consistent with your recollection?
Α.	That is correct.
Q.	What did you understand at the time about the state of
ч.	development of the Post Office counters functionality,
	by which I mean EPOSS, the Electronic Point of Sales
	106
	system was supposed to work and their view of the
_	current issues in the program.
Q.	What you've just described there, it sounds mostly like
	a practical demonstration and oral presentations, rather
	than an analysis or a review of documents. Did you
	carry out such an analysis?
Α.	Yes, there were analyses undertaken by members of the
	team on technical documentation, mostly in the software
_	area, also with Escher.
Q.	So it was other members of your team, employees of
	PA Consulting, who looked at the more technical aspects?
Α.	Yes.
Q.	Do you recall what, if anything, they told you about the
	completeness or quality of the design documentation that
	was shown to them?
Α.	Sorry, I don't recall that level of detail, I'm afraid.
Q.	If we turn back to your first method of assessment to
	which you referred in your statement, the interviews
	which you conducted, you described carrying out more
	than 30 face-to-face meetings and interviews; is that
	right?
	5
Α.	Yes.
Q.	Yes. Do you recall the names of those whom you interviewed?
	Yes.

Q. Could we possibly bring that back up POL00028092. I say 108

...

1		"bring back up", this is for the first time. Thank you.	1
2		At the conclusion of your review, you prepared	2
3		a written report; is that right?	3
4	Α.	Yes.	4
5	Q.	The third and final version of that is dated 1 October	5
6			6
7	A.	That's correct.	7
8 9	Q. A.	That's the report to which you just referred? Yes.	8 9
9 10	A. Q.	If we could turn to page 48, please, of the report, we	9 10
10	Q.	can see here Appendix A, a list of those whom either you	10
12		or your colleagues interviewed in connection with this	12
13		review; is that right?	12
14	Α.	I probably met most of the people on that list myself at	14
15		some stage, either in individual meetings or group	15
16		meetings with ICL Pathway particularly.	16
17	Q.	You've explained in your statement that some of the	17
18		in-depth technical interviews were attended by	18
19		specialists employed by PA Consulting; is that right?	19
20	Α.	Yes.	20
21	Q.	Why did you consider it necessary to bring in	21
22		specialists to conduct those technical interviews?	22
23	Α.	It's a way of working to ensure that we cover the ground	23
24		appropriately.	24
25	Q.	5 5 7	25
		109	
1		Concern has been increasing with failures in test and by	1
2		regular requests by Pathway for exclusions to key	2
3		releases, mainly concerned with security features."	3
4		Is that consistent with your recollection?	4
5	Α.	, , ,	5
6		one, I think, for Pathway because I would say there were	6
7		so many moving parts. My recollection is that the	7
8		security requirement was made increasingly more	8
9		demanding as it became aware of the risks and the risk	9
10	0	transfer arrangements in the PFI contract to ICL.	10
11	Q.	Could we please turn back to page 8 of the report, where	11
12 12		we see a part of your management summary. In relation to Pathway, at M3.4 excuse me, if we can scroll down	12
13 14		3 7	13 14
14		a little bit you've, observed here, in the bottom paragraph:	14
16		"We believe the current status of the Programme is	16
17		surrounded by considerable contractual ambiguity,	10
18		Pathway are, in essence, proceeding on an 'own risk'	18
19		basis to deliver Release 1c with a 'known problems	19
20		register' and its proposal is to address the 'known	20
21		problems' in Release 2."	20
22		Were you shown a copy of the known problems	22
23		register?	23
24	Α.	I'm sure we were.	24
25	Q.	What did you understand the purpose of the register to	25
		111	

		with the more technical aspects of the project?
2	Α.	Did I?
5	Q.	Did you have the necessary expertise to deal with the
Ļ		more technical aspects of the project?
5	Α.	On the networking and architectural issues, yes, but on
;		the software aspects and, particularly in regard of
,		Escher and the processes ICL were using for development,
3		no.
)	Q.	You were therefore reliant upon your colleagues?
0	Α.	Correct.
1	Q.	In your report, you identify a number of concerns about
2	-	technical issues with Horizon, which were raised by
3		senior figures in the Benefits Agency, in Post Office
4		Counters and Pathway. Do you recall the nature of those
5		concerns?
6	Α.	In the report?
7	Q.	Yes.
8	Q.	I'd have to read the report again.
9	Q .	If it assists, at page 28, please. Thank you.
0	Q.	At the bottom of page 28 there's a paragraph 3.3.5
1		entitled "Technical issues". It records:
2		"Concerns have been expressed to us about the
3		ability of the solution to meet the security
3 4		requirements, whether it is scalable to support a 40,000
+ 5		terminal network and what performance will result.
5		110
		be?
2	Α.	This would have been issues that were expected to take
5		longer to resolve than the plan allowed and, therefore,
-		they'd be deferred into a subsequent release.
5	Q.	When you say "issues", what types of issues did you
5		understand?
,	Α.	Development releases, essentially, that would take
5		longer to work through.
)	Q.	Are we talking about problems in the software, bugs and
0		errors and defects, things of that nature?
1	Α.	Not necessarily problems. More likely
2		an underestimation of the effort and time required
3		against what I recall was, in some instances a moving
4		requirement over time, and I would put the security
5		requirement into that category, for example.
6	Q.	So your understanding, essentially, was these were
7		generic problems with the software release, rather than
8		specific issues that had been identified?
9	Α.	I think that's a fair description, yes.
0	Q.	In your report, you identified another significant
1		concern on the part not only of the sponsors but also of
2		Pathway, which related to the robustness of the
3		technical architecture; is that fair?

with the more technical aspects of the project?

- 4 A. Yes.
 - Q. Can you describe the nature of the concerns which were 112

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1		articulated to you?
2	Α.	At the time we did our review, my recollection is that
3		Pathway's approach to testing was to test individual
4		components and then fit them together and retest and it
5		was at that stage that I think we detected there were
6		certain concerns that, when everything was put together,
7		it might not be as robust as perhaps was expected.
8	Q.	Do you recall whether the concerns expressed to you
9		related to any particular component or whether it was
10		a more general concern about the overall architecture?
11	Α.	There was a particular concern about Escher and, if
12		I recall correctly, Pathway did institute a rework of
13		Escher's software, as a result of the issues they were
14		experiencing there.
15	Q.	What steps did you take to investigate these particular
16		concerns that had been articulated?
17	Α.	We would have pursued them with further investigations
18		of any documentation that was available and further
19		face-to-face interviews.
20	Q.	What conclusions did you ultimately reach at this stage
21		about the robustness of the architecture?
22	Α.	That it would be I think we took the view that the
23		overall system was achievable in development terms. The
24		question was how long it was going to take before it
25		became completely reliable and robust.
		113

1		actually needed to be delivered and, at one point,
2		I recall they proposed to use a rapid application
3		development method, which was becoming just coming
4		into favour around that time, which allowed the
5		developer to work closely with the sponsoring party to
6		explore how an application might work and I think ICL
7		were unsuccessful in pursuing that particular approach
8		because of the reluctance of sponsors to become engaged.
9	Q.	Did you consider the rapid application development
10		technique to be suitable for a project of this scale and
11		complexity?
12	Α.	I couldn't see a reason why it wouldn't be, provided the
13		parties were happy to pursue that particular approach.
14		It's probably worth saying that there were many
15		occasions where we were coming to a view that this was
16		being treated by the sponsors and particularly the
17		Benefits Agency as a supply and build contract rather
18		than a PFI contract where there was a lot of
19		intervention from the sponsors because they weren't
20		necessarily happy, for reasons of their own, with what
21		was going on in the development activity and that in
22		itself caused delays.
23	Q.	Another factor which you identified as causative of
24		delay and which related to the parties' contractual
25		arrangements, concerned ICL's original assessment of the

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3		statement you describe the contractual arrangements
4		between the parties as being a significant cause of
5		initial delays to the programme. Can you explain the
6		basis of that conclusion?
7	Α.	The contract was let under a private finance initiative
8		which is where the risk of delivery is transferred to
9		the supplier and this particular contract was unusual,
10		in that there were differing business objectives between
11		the sponsors, and that created a lot of tension between
12		the parties and I think I've lost the thread of where
13		I was going on that.
14	Q.	That's okay. So I think you've explained that,
15		essentially, much of the detailed specification for the
16		contract hadn't been agreed at the point at which
17	Α.	Well, there were a lot of agreements to agree and
18		I never was really sure why that was allowed to happen
19		and, normally, one would expect, in a PFI contract, that
20		the supplier would be allowed to work up, once the
21		contract has been let, the proposition to deliver for
22		the outline requirement.
23		But because of the agreements to agree
24		arrangement, it took a long time for ICL to work through
25		each individual part of the system to decide what 114

Q. I'd like to turn now to your findings about the causes

of the chronic delays to the programme. In your

1		development work and resources required to deliver the
2		system. What conclusions did you reach in that regard?
3	Α.	Well, ICL told us themselves that they had seriously
4		underestimated the amount of work required, despite
5		quite a long and protracted selection process as
6		I understood it and, again, I think that was partly
7		because of the complexity of the system. I think at
8		this stage no-one really fully understood the
9		implications of the end-to-end arrangements and the
10		necessary interfaces to all of the systems outside of
11		the Horizon project that needed to interface in order to
12		make it all work and I think that, together with the
13		agreements to agree issue, was a key cause for the
14		delays.
15	Q.	I'd like to turn now to the findings you made at this
16		stage about the programme's management capability. In
17		your report you express concerns about the resourcing of
18		the programme and in particular about the level of
19		managerial expertise within Post Office Counters; is
20		that fair?
21	Α.	Yes.
22	Q.	Would it be fair to say you also expressed some
23		criticism of the programme delivery authority?
24	Α.	Yes.
25	Q.	In your report you describe the PDA as focusing almost 116

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1		exclusively on achieving a high quality outcome, even
2		potentially at the expense of timeliness and cost
3		effectiveness.
4	Α.	Yes.
5	Q.	That was one of the concerns you had at the time?
6	Α.	Yes.
7	Q.	Was it your perception that a more pragmatic approach
8		needed to be adopted, with trade-off's being made
9		between the performance of the product on the one hand
10		and the business impact of delays
11	Α.	I think that's fair, yes.
12	Q.	You ultimately concluded that there was no sensible way
13		of de-scoping or radically altering the plan and that it
14		was better to continue than to terminate; is that
15		correct?
16	Α.	Yes.
17	Q.	Did you understand the parties to be contemplating
18		termination at this stage?
19	Α.	There were veiled implications of termination, yes, at
20		that stage for default against the contract by ICL, as
21		l recall it.
22	Q.	On 24 September '97 you presented a summary of your
23		findings to the PDA board
24	Α.	Yes.
25	Q.	which they accepted, I believe
		117
1		Treasury private task-force on private finance. The
2		Treasury private task-force on private finance. The panel, as I understand it, had been established to
2 3		Treasury private task-force on private finance. The panel, as I understand it, had been established to review the deliverability of the Horizon project
2 3 4		Treasury private task-force on private finance. The panel, as I understand it, had been established to review the deliverability of the Horizon project together with the risks associated with the estimated
2 3 4 5		Treasury private task-force on private finance. The panel, as I understand it, had been established to review the deliverability of the Horizon project together with the risks associated with the estimated timescales and cost of the programme. Is that a fair
2 3 4 5 6		Treasury private task-force on private finance. The panel, as I understand it, had been established to review the deliverability of the Horizon project together with the risks associated with the estimated timescales and cost of the programme. Is that a fair characterisation of their function?
2 3 4 5 6 7	A.	Treasury private task-force on private finance. The panel, as I understand it, had been established to review the deliverability of the Horizon project together with the risks associated with the estimated timescales and cost of the programme. Is that a fair characterisation of their function? Yes.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	A. Q.	Treasury private task-force on private finance. The panel, as I understand it, had been established to review the deliverability of the Horizon project together with the risks associated with the estimated timescales and cost of the programme. Is that a fair characterisation of their function? Yes. So this is spring '98. Do you recall the extent of
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	_	Treasury private task-force on private finance. The panel, as I understand it, had been established to review the deliverability of the Horizon project together with the risks associated with the estimated timescales and cost of the programme. Is that a fair characterisation of their function? Yes. So this is spring '98. Do you recall the extent of progress which had been made on the programme by that
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	Q.	Treasury private task-force on private finance. The panel, as I understand it, had been established to review the deliverability of the Horizon project together with the risks associated with the estimated timescales and cost of the programme. Is that a fair characterisation of their function? Yes. So this is spring '98. Do you recall the extent of progress which had been made on the programme by that stage?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	Q. A.	Treasury private task-force on private finance. The panel, as I understand it, had been established to review the deliverability of the Horizon project together with the risks associated with the estimated timescales and cost of the programme. Is that a fair characterisation of their function? Yes. So this is spring '98. Do you recall the extent of progress which had been made on the programme by that stage? No.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	Q.	Treasury private task-force on private finance. The panel, as I understand it, had been established to review the deliverability of the Horizon project together with the risks associated with the estimated timescales and cost of the programme. Is that a fair characterisation of their function? Yes. So this is spring '98. Do you recall the extent of progress which had been made on the programme by that stage? No. I think you might be assisted if I were to refer you to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	Q. A.	Treasury private task-force on private finance. The panel, as I understand it, had been established to review the deliverability of the Horizon project together with the risks associated with the estimated timescales and cost of the programme. Is that a fair characterisation of their function? Yes. So this is spring '98. Do you recall the extent of progress which had been made on the programme by that stage? No. I think you might be assisted if I were to refer you to the written report which was produced by the expert
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	Q. A.	Treasury private task-force on private finance. The panel, as I understand it, had been established to review the deliverability of the Horizon project together with the risks associated with the estimated timescales and cost of the programme. Is that a fair characterisation of their function? Yes. So this is spring '98. Do you recall the extent of progress which had been made on the programme by that stage? No. I think you might be assisted if I were to refer you to the written report which was produced by the expert panel at the conclusion of their review. I think it's
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	Q. A.	Treasury private task-force on private finance. The panel, as I understand it, had been established to review the deliverability of the Horizon project together with the risks associated with the estimated timescales and cost of the programme. Is that a fair characterisation of their function? Yes. So this is spring '98. Do you recall the extent of progress which had been made on the programme by that stage? No. I think you might be assisted if I were to refer you to the written report which was produced by the expert panel at the conclusion of their review. I think it's correct that you weren't the author of that report but
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	Q. A.	Treasury private task-force on private finance. The panel, as I understand it, had been established to review the deliverability of the Horizon project together with the risks associated with the estimated timescales and cost of the programme. Is that a fair characterisation of their function? Yes. So this is spring '98. Do you recall the extent of progress which had been made on the programme by that stage? No. I think you might be assisted if I were to refer you to the written report which was produced by the expert panel at the conclusion of their review. I think it's correct that you weren't the author of that report but your findings contributed or were taken into account
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	Q. A. Q.	Treasury private task-force on private finance. The panel, as I understand it, had been established to review the deliverability of the Horizon project together with the risks associated with the estimated timescales and cost of the programme. Is that a fair characterisation of their function? Yes. So this is spring '98. Do you recall the extent of progress which had been made on the programme by that stage? No. I think you might be assisted if I were to refer you to the written report which was produced by the expert panel at the conclusion of their review. I think it's correct that you weren't the author of that report but your findings contributed or were taken into account when that report was written; is that right?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	Q. A.	Treasury private task-force on private finance. The panel, as I understand it, had been established to review the deliverability of the Horizon project together with the risks associated with the estimated timescales and cost of the programme. Is that a fair characterisation of their function? Yes. So this is spring '98. Do you recall the extent of progress which had been made on the programme by that stage? No. I think you might be assisted if I were to refer you to the written report which was produced by the expert panel at the conclusion of their review. I think it's correct that you weren't the author of that report but your findings contributed or were taken into account when that report was written; is that right? I didn't know that there had been a report written at
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	Q. A. Q.	Treasury private task-force on private finance. The panel, as I understand it, had been established to review the deliverability of the Horizon project together with the risks associated with the estimated timescales and cost of the programme. Is that a fair characterisation of their function? Yes. So this is spring '98. Do you recall the extent of progress which had been made on the programme by that stage? No. I think you might be assisted if I were to refer you to the written report which was produced by the expert panel at the conclusion of their review. I think it's correct that you weren't the author of that report but your findings contributed or were taken into account when that report was written; is that right? I didn't know that there had been a report written at the time but I have now seen it and it certainly concurs
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	Q. A. Q.	Treasury private task-force on private finance. The panel, as I understand it, had been established to review the deliverability of the Horizon project together with the risks associated with the estimated timescales and cost of the programme. Is that a fair characterisation of their function? Yes. So this is spring '98. Do you recall the extent of progress which had been made on the programme by that stage? No. I think you might be assisted if I were to refer you to the written report which was produced by the expert panel at the conclusion of their review. I think it's correct that you weren't the author of that report but your findings contributed or were taken into account when that report was written; is that right? I didn't know that there had been a report written at the time but I have now seen it and it certainly concurs with my understanding of what the Panel was going to say
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	Q. A. Q.	Treasury private task-force on private finance. The panel, as I understand it, had been established to review the deliverability of the Horizon project together with the risks associated with the estimated timescales and cost of the programme. Is that a fair characterisation of their function? Yes. So this is spring '98. Do you recall the extent of progress which had been made on the programme by that stage? No. I think you might be assisted if I were to refer you to the written report which was produced by the expert panel at the conclusion of their review. I think it's correct that you weren't the author of that report but your findings contributed or were taken into account when that report was written; is that right? I didn't know that there had been a report written at the time but I have now seen it and it certainly concurs

1	Α.	Yes.
2	Q.	and the recommendations which you have made to
3		minimise further delays to the programme. I think that
4		was followed up by a meeting, a special meeting, of the
5		PDA board on 2 October '97; do you recall that
6	Α.	Yes.
7	Q.	where it was agreed that you would lead a series of
8		workshops to examine the strategic risks to the
9		programme?
10	Α.	That's right.
11	Q.	As well as the root causes of delay.
12	Α.	Yes, that was essentially to ensure that there was
13		a common agreement on the issues before the parties
14		decided to proceed and investigate what they needed to
15		do.
16	Q.	Did you regard those workshops as a success?
17	Α.	They were, yes.
18	Q.	If I can move on now to the next significant stage of
19		your involvement which came in the spring of 1998, you
20		became involved in the programme again, on this
21		occasion, at the behest of Her Majesty's Treasury; is
22		that right?
23	Α.	Yes.
24	Q.	You were appointed to act as a consultant to an expert
25		panel, chaired by Adrian Montague, the head of the
		118
1	Α.	Yes.
2	Q.	Can we please turn to page 11. At point A, at the top
3		of the page, there's a heading "Current Status of the
4		Programme". Paragraph 21 reads:
5		"The programme has moved on since PA reviewed it
6		towards the end of 1997", and cites the following
7		indicators of progress:
8		"Release 1c a partial solution providing the
9		benefit payment card and [order book control service]
10		has been working satisfactorily in just over 200 offices
11		since November 1997. Pathway has brought in new
12		technical skills and management resources, increasing
13		headcount to around 270 staff and introduced new
14		procedures to support the high level of software
15		development needed;
16		"BA has increased its resources on the programme

"BA has increased its resources on the programme and Release 3.0 of its key feeder systems (CAPS) has been given DSS [the Department of Social Security] Seals of Approval;

"[Post Office Counters Limited] has also increased is resources on the programme, establishing a pilot service management function and a National Implementation organisation, to support Pathway in preparing outlets and training; the Horizon Programme Office [referred to as the HPO] also started work on 120

whom you collaborated in the review.

the report. We can see the composition of the panel

there, Adrian Montague, Bill Robins and Alec Wylie, with

23

24

1		1 April 1998."	1
2		Does that reasonably encapsulate where things had	2
3		got to by spring of '98?	3
4	Α.	It's a good reminder.	4
5	Q.	You were instructed by the panel to undertake a number	5
6		of investigations into issues which you've identified in	6
7		your statement. These were the extent to which Horizon	7
8		was future proofed; whether it had the capability to	8 9
9 10		support the Electronic Point of Sales Service; whether	9 10
10		it could be developed to support simple banking applications; the likely lifetime of the technology; and	10
12		whether the technology was suitable for long-term	11
13		government infrastructure. Does that encapsulate the	12
14		areas?	13
15	Α.	That's correct.	15
16		You have explained that, in carrying out these	16
17	ч.	investigations, you held a series of meetings and one to	10
18		one discussions with ICL	18
19	Α.	Yes.	19
20	Q.	sorry, with ICL Pathway, as it was, and had extensive	20
21		engagement with each of the parties over several weeks.	21
22	Α.	Correct.	22
23	Q.	On this occasion, did you carry out any extensive	23
24		analysis of the underlying documents?	24
25	Α.	No.	25
		121	
1		being asked to enquire about the parties' knowledge of	1
2		technical faults and defects in Horizon during the	
			2
3		review; is that right?	2 3
3 4	A.	0	
	A. Q.	review; is that right?	3
4		review; is that right? Correct.	3 4
4 5		review; is that right? Correct. Albeit you weren't asked, did you yourself make any	3 4 5
4 5 6	Q.	review; is that right? Correct. Albeit you weren't asked, did you yourself make any enquiries into those matters?	3 4 5 6
4 5 6 7	Q. A.	review; is that right? Correct. Albeit you weren't asked, did you yourself make any enquiries into those matters? No.	3 4 5 6 7
4 5 7 8 9 10	Q. A.	review; is that right? Correct. Albeit you weren't asked, did you yourself make any enquiries into those matters? No. Did you not consider the existence of known software problems might be relevant to Pathway's capability to deliver the programme?	3 4 5 6 7 8
4 5 7 8 9 10 11	Q. A.	review; is that right? Correct. Albeit you weren't asked, did you yourself make any enquiries into those matters? No. Did you not consider the existence of known software problems might be relevant to Pathway's capability to deliver the programme? No. We were looking at well, as I understood it, the	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12	Q. A. Q.	review; is that right? Correct. Albeit you weren't asked, did you yourself make any enquiries into those matters? No. Did you not consider the existence of known software problems might be relevant to Pathway's capability to deliver the programme? No. We were looking at well, as I understood it, the panel was looking at the possibility to reconstruct the	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	Q. A. Q.	review; is that right? Correct. Albeit you weren't asked, did you yourself make any enquiries into those matters? No. Did you not consider the existence of known software problems might be relevant to Pathway's capability to deliver the programme? No. We were looking at well, as I understood it, the panel was looking at the possibility to reconstruct the programme in a way that would make it more deliverable	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	Q. A. Q.	review; is that right? Correct. Albeit you weren't asked, did you yourself make any enquiries into those matters? No. Did you not consider the existence of known software problems might be relevant to Pathway's capability to deliver the programme? No. We were looking at well, as I understood it, the panel was looking at the possibility to reconstruct the programme in a way that would make it more deliverable and remove some of the risks that weren't associated	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 13
4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	Q. A. Q.	review; is that right? Correct. Albeit you weren't asked, did you yourself make any enquiries into those matters? No. Did you not consider the existence of known software problems might be relevant to Pathway's capability to deliver the programme? No. We were looking at well, as I understood it, the panel was looking at the possibility to reconstruct the programme in a way that would make it more deliverable and remove some of the risks that weren't associated with the technical issues, on the basis that, if the	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	Q. A. Q.	review; is that right? Correct. Albeit you weren't asked, did you yourself make any enquiries into those matters? No. Did you not consider the existence of known software problems might be relevant to Pathway's capability to deliver the programme? No. We were looking at well, as I understood it, the panel was looking at the possibility to reconstruct the programme in a way that would make it more deliverable and remove some of the risks that weren't associated with the technical issues, on the basis that, if the programme could be reconstructed to achieve that, it was	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	Q. A. Q. A.	review; is that right? Correct. Albeit you weren't asked, did you yourself make any enquiries into those matters? No. Did you not consider the existence of known software problems might be relevant to Pathway's capability to deliver the programme? No. We were looking at well, as I understood it, the panel was looking at the possibility to reconstruct the programme in a way that would make it more deliverable and remove some of the risks that weren't associated with the technical issues, on the basis that, if the programme could be reconstructed to achieve that, it was then a matter of time for ICL to deliver.	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	Q. A. Q.	review; is that right? Correct. Albeit you weren't asked, did you yourself make any enquiries into those matters? No. Did you not consider the existence of known software problems might be relevant to Pathway's capability to deliver the programme? No. We were looking at well, as I understood it, the panel was looking at the possibility to reconstruct the programme in a way that would make it more deliverable and remove some of the risks that weren't associated with the technical issues, on the basis that, if the programme could be reconstructed to achieve that, it was then a matter of time for ICL to deliver. But if there were very serious technical issues, would	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	Q. A. Q. A.	review; is that right? Correct. Albeit you weren't asked, did you yourself make any enquiries into those matters? No. Did you not consider the existence of known software problems might be relevant to Pathway's capability to deliver the programme? No. We were looking at well, as I understood it, the panel was looking at the possibility to reconstruct the programme in a way that would make it more deliverable and remove some of the risks that weren't associated with the technical issues, on the basis that, if the programme could be reconstructed to achieve that, it was then a matter of time for ICL to deliver. But if there were very serious technical issues, would that not be very relevant to whether they would	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	Q. A. Q. A.	review; is that right? Correct. Albeit you weren't asked, did you yourself make any enquiries into those matters? No. Did you not consider the existence of known software problems might be relevant to Pathway's capability to deliver the programme? No. We were looking at well, as I understood it, the panel was looking at the possibility to reconstruct the programme in a way that would make it more deliverable and remove some of the risks that weren't associated with the technical issues, on the basis that, if the programme could be reconstructed to achieve that, it was then a matter of time for ICL to deliver. But if there were very serious technical issues, would that not be very relevant to whether they would ultimately be able to deliver?	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	Q. A. Q. A. Q.	review; is that right? Correct. Albeit you weren't asked, did you yourself make any enquiries into those matters? No. Did you not consider the existence of known software problems might be relevant to Pathway's capability to deliver the programme? No. We were looking at well, as I understood it, the panel was looking at the possibility to reconstruct the programme in a way that would make it more deliverable and remove some of the risks that weren't associated with the technical issues, on the basis that, if the programme could be reconstructed to achieve that, it was then a matter of time for ICL to deliver. But if there were very serious technical issues, would that not be very relevant to whether they would ultimately be able to deliver? I guess it's fair to say it could have been relevant.	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Q. A. Q. A.	review; is that right? Correct. Albeit you weren't asked, did you yourself make any enquiries into those matters? No. Did you not consider the existence of known software problems might be relevant to Pathway's capability to deliver the programme? No. We were looking at well, as I understood it, the panel was looking at the possibility to reconstruct the programme in a way that would make it more deliverable and remove some of the risks that weren't associated with the technical issues, on the basis that, if the programme could be reconstructed to achieve that, it was then a matter of time for ICL to deliver. But if there were very serious technical issues, would that not be very relevant to whether they would ultimately be able to deliver? I guess it's fair to say it could have been relevant. In your statement, you explain that your overall view of	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	Q. A. Q. A. Q. Q.	review; is that right? Correct. Albeit you weren't asked, did you yourself make any enquiries into those matters? No. Did you not consider the existence of known software problems might be relevant to Pathway's capability to deliver the programme? No. We were looking at well, as I understood it, the panel was looking at the possibility to reconstruct the programme in a way that would make it more deliverable and remove some of the risks that weren't associated with the technical issues, on the basis that, if the programme could be reconstructed to achieve that, it was then a matter of time for ICL to deliver. But if there were very serious technical issues, would that not be very relevant to whether they would ultimately be able to deliver? I guess it's fair to say it could have been relevant. In your statement, you explain that your overall view of the Horizon technology was positive	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Q. A. Q. A. Q.	review; is that right? Correct. Albeit you weren't asked, did you yourself make any enquiries into those matters? No. Did you not consider the existence of known software problems might be relevant to Pathway's capability to deliver the programme? No. We were looking at well, as I understood it, the panel was looking at the possibility to reconstruct the programme in a way that would make it more deliverable and remove some of the risks that weren't associated with the technical issues, on the basis that, if the programme could be reconstructed to achieve that, it was then a matter of time for ICL to deliver. But if there were very serious technical issues, would that not be very relevant to whether they would ultimately be able to deliver? I guess it's fair to say it could have been relevant. In your statement, you explain that your overall view of	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

25 Q. -- and that you believe the assessment you made at the 123

1	Q.	Does it follow that your findings then were based, to
2		a very great extent, on the information that you were
3		given by the participants?
4	Α.	Yes, that's correct, together with external research
5		that we would have done as to the state of play in the
6		deployment of EPOSS, simple banking, and so on, and the
7		comparison of that with what the system was capable of
8		doing. If I recall correctly, we said we felt that the
9		system could be developed to support those applications;
10		the only question was how long it was going to take.
11	Q.	So if I can just clarify, I what I understand you to
12		have explained is that, essentially, you weren't looking
13		at the parties' underlying documents, you weren't
14		carrying out analysis of design documentation, and so
15		forth, but you were carrying out some external research,
16		in order to, I suppose, analyse what you were being
17		told?
18	Α.	Yes, we were calibrating the art of the possible against
19		what we were being told by ICL Pathway.
20	Q.	To what extent did your discussions with ICL Pathway
21		touch upon problems that had arisen during the
22		development of the EPOSS application?
23	Α.	Not at all. In fact, I don't think the Montague review
24		looked at issues at that time, problems, at all.
25	Q.	In your statement you say you have no recollection of
		122
1		time was accurate.
2	Α.	Yes.
3	Q.	Would it be fair to say, though, that whether or not
4	ч.	your assessment was accurate would depend on whether you
5		were asking the right questions and you were receiving
6		accurate answers to those questions?
7	Α.	Well, inevitably, but the work that we did was guided by
8		the panel and we were not asked to investigate any
9		technical issues at that time.
10	Q.	If you weren't making enquiry into the parties'
11	-	knowledge of faults and defects, how could you or the
12		panel make an accurate assessment of Pathway's ability
13		to deliver this solution?
14	Α.	I don't think that's a difficult question to answer.
15	Q.	The panel reached a number of conclusions which appear
16		to have been informed by your own investigations and
17		findings and I'd like to explore some of those with you
40		

- now, if I may. Could we pull back up POL00028094. Please could we turn to page 12. I think it might be
- internal page 12. Thank you.
 - Forgive me, I think maybe it's page 11. It must be written down wrong. Could we go back one page, please. Thank you.
- We can see at the bottom of this page, heading B, "Solution Design and Fitness for Purpose", and if we 124

²⁷

1		could go to the following page please, page 11, at	1		follow.
2		paragraph 25 this records that:	2	Α.	Yes. Yes, it was quite a different arrangement to the
3		"The main architectural issues are scalability and	3		first review.
4		robustness. We are advised [the panel said] that	4	Q.	At paragraph 29, so on the same page we can see ju
5		a solution of this scale and scope with so many	5		over halfway down thank you:
6		different platforms and products has, as far as PA is	6		"The project is probably the biggest of its kind
7		aware [PA Consulting, I assume], no precedent. We are	7		and many of the component parts, although sourced
8		satisfied that Pathway's approach to design, development	8		industry strength products and companies, are being
9		and performance testing is sufficiently rigorous for	9		towards their current limits and scale. Pathway has
10		such a major undertaking."	10		recognised the risks and has in place the controls we
11		Was that a reflection of the finding that you had	11		would expect to see in a development project of this
12		made that end of your review?	12		scale."
13	Α.	I think it's probably more correct to say that was the	13		Again, was that based on your own findings or
14		panel's conclusion. The lead technical person on the	14		you recollect, was that a conclusion which the panel
15		panel was an MOD man, Bill Robins and I think he	15		reached?
16		probably did more than we did, in terms of investigating	16	Α.	I think that's a conclusion the panel reached.
17		the technical aspects.	17	Q.	Turning then to future proofing, which was one of the
18		I think it's probably fair to say and clarify we	18		aspects you were asked specifically to look at, at
19		weren't a member of the panel. We were there being	19		page 13, please, of POL00028094. At paragraph 33
20		asked to investigate specific aspects, I would imagine,	20		the very first paragraph, it records that:
21		in order to clarify their own view or to concur with	21		"There is good evidence of future proofing at a
22		their own view. In other words, we weren't given free	22		levels. We have been satisfied that all reasonable
23		rein.	23		steps have been taken to ensure robust sources of s
24	Q.	No, your role was to assist, essentially, and to follow	24		and compliance with industry standards in designing
25		the specific investigations that you were asked to 125	25		architecture. Upgrades to software platforms and 126
1		individual components are provided for, should they be	1	Q.	What did you understand to be the areas of disagree
2		necessary."	2		between the parties at this stage on the subject of
3		Bearing in mind this was an aspect that you had	3		acceptance?
4		looked at, as I understand, was that your finding or was	4	Α.	The disagreement was essentially about the specifica
5		this informed by your findings?	5		and criteria for acceptance and, as I recall it, the
6	Α.	That was our finding.	6		basis on which acceptance would be given and wheth
7	Q.	That was your finding. Insofar as you found that there	7		acceptance should be on a model office or a live trial
8		had been compliance with industry standards in designing	8		end-to-end under live conditions. That's essentially
9		the architecture, that was a finding based on your	9		what I recall.
10		external research of what those industry standards ought	10	Q.	To what extent had the earlier concerns that you had
11		to be	11		about the resourcing of the programme in the summe
12		Correct.	12		autumn of '97 been addressed by the time of this rev
13	Q.	and what you had been told by Pathway as to what they	13		in July 1998?
14		were doing?	14	Α.	I think all parties had resourced up and my recollection
15		Yes, correct.	15		is that there was still a concern that POCL were not
16	Q.	The report of the panel states that you carried out	16		ready to accept a system of this complexity, and that
17		a critical path analysis to establish the risk of	17		readiness in terms of preparing the network to live in
18		further delay to the programme; is that right?	18		a very highly structured environment, as opposed to
19	Α.	Yes.	19		a very unstructured environment at the branch using
20	Q.	One of the factors which you identified as being	20		paper; a question about whether they were ready to
21		a likely cause of further delay was the absence of	21		receive a system in terms of the help facilities and
22		an agreement, any agreement, between the parties	22		helpdesk facilities that were outside of the technical
23		concerning the criteria and procedure for acceptance of	23		helpdesk.
24		the system; is that right?	24	Q.	Did you have ongoing concerns about the competend
25	Α.	Correct. 127	25		the expertise of the staff managing the post office 128

1		follow.
2	Α.	Yes. Yes, it was quite a different arrangement to the
3		first review.
1	Q.	At paragraph 29, so on the same page we can see just
5		over halfway down thank you:
6		"The project is probably the biggest of its kind
7		and many of the component parts, although sourced from
3		industry strength products and companies, are being used
9		towards their current limits and scale. Pathway has
0		recognised the risks and has in place the controls we
1		would expect to see in a development project of this
2		scale."
3		Again, was that based on your own findings or, as
4		you recollect, was that a conclusion which the panel
5		reached?
6	Α.	I think that's a conclusion the panel reached.
7	Q.	Turning then to future proofing, which was one of the
8		aspects you were asked specifically to look at, at
9		page 13, please, of POL00028094. At paragraph 33, so
0		the very first paragraph, it records that:
1		"There is good evidence of future proofing at all
2		levels. We have been satisfied that all reasonable
3		steps have been taken to ensure robust sources of supply
4		and compliance with industry standards in designing the
5		architecture. Upgrades to software platforms and
		126
1	Q.	What did you understand to be the areas of disagreement
2		between the parties at this stage on the subject of
3		acceptance?
1	Α.	The disagreement was essentially about the specification
5		and criteria for acceptance and, as I recall it, the
6		basis on which acceptance would be given and whether
7		acceptance should be on a model office or a live trial
3		end-to-end under live conditions. That's essentially
9		what I recall.
0	Q.	To what extent had the earlier concerns that you had
1		about the resourcing of the programme in the summer and
2		autumn of '97 been addressed by the time of this review
3		in July 1998?
4	Α.	I think all parties had resourced up and my recollection
5		is that there was still a concern that POCL were not
6		ready to accept a system of this complexity, and that's
7		readiness in terms of preparing the network to live in
•		reading to the properties the network to not III

- eceive a system in terms of the help facilities and elpdesk facilities that were outside of the technical
- Did you have ongoing concerns about the competence or ne expertise of the staff managing the post office 128

1		counters aspect of the project?
2	Α.	I think there were concerns in terms of the number of
3		people involved and their technical competencies and
4		their understanding of business process transformation
5		that would be necessary to accept the system.
6	Q.	We know from the report that we've seen produced by the
7		expert panel that one of the proposals which they made
8		was the appointment of a neutral trouble shooter to
9		facilitate negotiations between the parties over the
10		future of the project?
11	Α.	Yes.
12	Q.	Is that your recollection?
13	Α.	Yes.
14	Q.	The individual appointed to carry out that role was
15		Graham Corbett, Deputy Chairman of the Monopolies and
16		Mergers Commission; is that correct?
17	Α.	Yes.
18	Q.	You explain in your statement that Mr Corbett was tasked
19		with advising ministers that is ministers in
20		government on whether the framework suggested by the
21		Treasury task-force would provide a commercial basis for
22		continuing and whether the parties could develop
23		a robust implementation plan to complete the project.
24		Is that your recollection?
25	Α.	Yes.
		129
1	Q.	Sorry, the director of the Horizon programme?
2	Α.	Oh, yes of course, yes.
3	Q.	The purpose of the working group sorry, your task was
4		to liaise with the parties as they answered questions
5		posed by Mr Corbett and to provide an assessment of any

- risks arising from the reconstruction; is that right? A. Yes.

7

- 8 Q. We can see an agenda for one of those workshops at POL00090010, please. This is obviously a fax header 9 10 sheet from you, Peter Copping to Peter Crahan, who was 11 a senior figure in the Benefits Agency and Mr David 12 Miller at the Horizon programme office and Mr Mike 13 Coombs at ICL Pathway. On the following page, please, 14 your letter confirming that you've made some proposals 15 for the workshop and on the third page, please, we have
- 16 here a list of a number of issues for resolution. The
- 17 first of these is E2E and model office testing. That's 18 end-to-end; is that right?
- 19 A. Correct.
- 20 Q. And model office testing. You were looking for the 21 Benefits Agency to explain the current concerns about 22 the testing philosophy; is that right?
 - A. Yes.

23

24 Q. Do you recall what the nature of their concerns were at 25 this stage?

1	Q.	Because albeit, as you say, you didn't author the
2		report, you were aware that the expert panel had made
3		a number of recommendations at the conclusion of their
4		report; is that right?
5	Α.	Yes.
6	Q.	That they were not in favour of terminating the project
7		at that stage; is that right?
8	Α.	That was my understanding.
9	Q.	What they proposed had been either a full restructuring
10		or partial restructuring of the programme?
11	Α.	Yes, yes.
12	Q.	So you became involved again in October 1998; is that
13		right?
14	Α.	Yes.
15	Q.	And at this stage, to test this feasibility of that
16		restructuring exercise?
17	Α.	Feasibility in the sense of the programme itself.
18	Q.	You have explained that you were asked to join a working
19		group established by Mr Corbett; is that right?
20	Α.	Yes.
21	Q.	Which was chaired by the director of the Horizon
22		programme office. Do you recall who that was?
23	Α.	No.
24	Q.	Does David Miller sound like the correct
25	Α.	
		130

1 A. No. 2 Q. You were looking to the Horizon programme office to 3 describe the current process as well as the proposals 4 for management of reporting of progress to sponsors, and 5 it was your function, I believe we can see, PA to 6 identify any remaining disagreements, issues, concerns 7 and sensitivities on that subject. 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. So we also see, under topics for discussion, the service 10 management product set. What does that mean? 11 A. This would have been the construct around service 12 management, who did what, where they would reside and so 13 on. 14 Q. The next section is the service management environment 15 and the interim arrangements in place. Can you describe 16 what those were, please. 17 A. I really don't recollect that level of detail I'm 18 afraid. 19 Q. At D we have multi benefit with soft EVP, that's 20 a reference to the security, the extended verification 21 procedure; is that right? 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. I think you are seeking there for Pathway to describe 24 the plans to realise NR2+. Do you recall, in terms of 25 the future software development, what the plans were at 132

1		this stage in relation to the new release?	1		that right?
2		No.	2		Yes.
3		It's called NR2+	3	Q.	Can we please show POL00028098, could we scroll down to
4		I recognise NR2 but I couldn't tell you what was in it.	4		page 32 please. We can see here at the top, "Managemen
5	Q.	Thank you. Then I think there's one more page beginning	5		Summary Key Programme Risks". Is this a table that
6		E if we could zoom in. Thank you very much. Consistent	6		you produced or is it simply summarising your findings?
7		and complete technical design, "BA to list areas where	7		I think it's summarising our findings.
8		assurance is needed". What were the BA's concerns at	8	Q.	So in terms of the risks that you had identified, the
9		this stage about the consistency and completeness of	9		first of those we see under the heading "Critical" is
10		Pathway's technical design?	10		the speed of acceptance process. Can you explain,
11		I'm sorry but I do not recollect.	11		please, the nature of your concern at that stage about
12	Q.	We can see then that the final topics were acceptance	12		the speed of the acceptance process?
13		testing and release authorisation and the Horizon	13	Α.	My recollection is that things on acceptance process
14		programme office. Then, under item 2, the programme	14		got clogged up over disagreements on what the criteria
15		critical path and dependencies. Is this an accurate	15		were and how those criteria should be differences
16		reflection of the types of issues that you were dealing,	16		should be resolved. I really can't recollect any more
17		in the workshops that you were having	17		than that.
18	Α.	Yes, this is essentially a process that we will have	18	Q.	In terms of the impact that this was likely to have on
19		taken the responses through, in order to flesh out areas	19		the programme, it records that:
20		of disagreement which would then be documented for	20		"[A] Failure to complete acceptance in planned
21		someone to go away and work on and decide how to take	21		timescales could cause one or more of the parties to
22		those forward.	22		resort to legal action and program could stop at end of
23	Q.	Your assessment of the programme and project management	23		'98 or before."
24		issues, which were prominent in autumn 1998, are	24		So was the essence of the concern that unless the
25		summarised in an annex to Graham Corbett's report; is 133	25		acceptance process could be agreed and implemented it 134
1		was likely to lead to litigation?	1	Q.	Well, your focus here is on speed of testing and
2	Α.	Correct.	2		acceptance?
3	Q.	What did you understand Pathway's position to be on	3	Α.	If the criteria for acceptance are all agreed and the
4		acceptance at this stage?	4		system is submitted against those criteria and there are
5	Α.	I think they were seeking to base acceptance on	5		no issues, then speed will be fairly quick. I'm not
6		a self-certification process and of course no-one on the	6		sure I'm following your point.
7		sponsor side was particularly happy with that. They	7	Q.	I think my point is this, that you seem here to be
8		also, I recall, were seeking to have acceptance on	8		attributing the significance of the completeness and
9		a model office as opposed to end-to-end acceptance,	9		consistency of the technical design, its overall
10		ie in a live system.	10		significance, to the programme is its likely impact on
11	Q.	I will come back to the point about the model office and	11		testing and the acceptance process. What I'm saying is
12		end-to-end testing shortly but, before I do, just scroll	12		that does it not also have a function in ensuring the
13		down please to the page, I think it will be 33, where we	13		quality of the solution that's being put in place?
14		see what were described as the minor risks recorded.	14	Α.	Yes.
15		I wonder if we could zoom in please. Thank you.	15	Q.	On the fifth point, also a minor risk we have
16		So point 4, risk number 4, under the heading	16		"scalability of Pathway design". Scalability was
17		"Minor" is the "Consistent and complete technical design	17		something that had been regarded as quite a significant
18		for key products". The assessed impact of that on the	18		issue in your earlier reviews in 1997 and 1998. Why is
19		programme is that it's likely to impact mainly on the	19		it here characterised as a minor risk to the programme?
20		speed of testing and the acceptance process.	20	Α.	Well, because, at that stage, I think there was
21		Yes.	21		beginning to be a better understanding of how the system
22	Q.	Did you not consider that the consistency and	22		would be rolled out and scaled up, where scalability
23		completeness of the technical design was relevant to	23		relates to the number of offices connected. So it was
24		assurance of the quality of the programme?	24		seen as less of an issue at this stage of the
25	Α.	I think it amounts to the same thing, doesn't it? 135	25		development. But, of course, there could always be 136

1		issues. If you move from 10,000 to 20,000 offices,	1
2	-	there might suddenly an issue might arise.	2
3	Q.		3
4		completeness of the technical design and the scalability	4
5		of it, were they both not factors that were likely to	5
6		affect, ultimately, the robustness of the system?	6
7	A.	Not necessarily but possibly.	7
8	Q.	There's one topic I would like to deal with, please,	8
9		before we have a short break. This comes back to the	9
10 11		question of acceptance and you've mentioned in your	10 11
12		evidence that you understood Pathway's position to be	11
12		that they were looking for acceptance to take place at the end of model office testing, as opposed to a full	12
13 14		end-to-end test. Shortly after the negotiations that	13
14		were being facilitated by Mr Corbett concluded, you	14
16		wrote to David Miller, the Horizon programme director,	15
17		in order to set out some private thoughts you had about	10
18		how the parties might break the through the potential	17
19		impasse on acceptance; is that right?	10
20	A.	Yes.	20
20	Q.	l wonder please if we could pull up POL0009009. Thank	20
22	α.	you.	22
23		So we can see here your letter of 19 October 1998,	23
24		addressed to Mr David Miller, the director of the	24
25		Horizon Programme, and, as I've just said, your proposal	25
		137	
1		Your paper accentially proposed a new paradigm for	1
1		Your paper essentially proposed a new paradigm for	1
2		acceptance and we can see the essence of that distilled,	2
2 3		acceptance and we can see the essence of that distilled, please, on page 3. At the end of the second paragraph	2 3
2 3 4		acceptance and we can see the essence of that distilled, please, on page 3. At the end of the second paragraph you say:	2 3 4
2 3 4 5		acceptance and we can see the essence of that distilled, please, on page 3. At the end of the second paragraph you say: "Simply put [following your new paradigm],	2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5 6		acceptance and we can see the essence of that distilled, please, on page 3. At the end of the second paragraph you say: "Simply put [following your new paradigm], sponsors would give up termination rights on acceptance	2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6 7		acceptance and we can see the essence of that distilled, please, on page 3. At the end of the second paragraph you say: "Simply put [following your new paradigm], sponsors would give up termination rights on acceptance following [Model Office Testing] in exchange for the	2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7 8		acceptance and we can see the essence of that distilled, please, on page 3. At the end of the second paragraph you say: "Simply put [following your new paradigm], sponsors would give up termination rights on acceptance following [Model Office Testing] in exchange for the option of being able to have more punitive SLAs"	2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	A	acceptance and we can see the essence of that distilled, please, on page 3. At the end of the second paragraph you say: "Simply put [following your new paradigm], sponsors would give up termination rights on acceptance following [Model Office Testing] in exchange for the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	A. Q.	acceptance and we can see the essence of that distilled, please, on page 3. At the end of the second paragraph you say: "Simply put [following your new paradigm], sponsors would give up termination rights on acceptance following [Model Office Testing] in exchange for the option of being able to have more punitive SLAs" Is that service level agreements? Correct.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	A . Q.	acceptance and we can see the essence of that distilled, please, on page 3. At the end of the second paragraph you say: "Simply put [following your new paradigm], sponsors would give up termination rights on acceptance following [Model Office Testing] in exchange for the option of being able to have more punitive SLAs" Is that service level agreements? Correct. " following the start of [National roll-out], should	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10		acceptance and we can see the essence of that distilled, please, on page 3. At the end of the second paragraph you say: "Simply put [following your new paradigm], sponsors would give up termination rights on acceptance following [Model Office Testing] in exchange for the option of being able to have more punitive SLAs" Is that service level agreements? Correct.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12		acceptance and we can see the essence of that distilled, please, on page 3. At the end of the second paragraph you say: "Simply put [following your new paradigm], sponsors would give up termination rights on acceptance following [Model Office Testing] in exchange for the option of being able to have more punitive SLAs" Is that service level agreements? Correct. " following the start of [National roll-out], should the system fail to meet acceptance criteria in Live	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13		acceptance and we can see the essence of that distilled, please, on page 3. At the end of the second paragraph you say: "Simply put [following your new paradigm], sponsors would give up termination rights on acceptance following [Model Office Testing] in exchange for the option of being able to have more punitive SLAs" Is that service level agreements? Correct. " following the start of [National roll-out], should the system fail to meet acceptance criteria in Live Trial. Similar arrangements could be put in place for	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14		acceptance and we can see the essence of that distilled, please, on page 3. At the end of the second paragraph you say: "Simply put [following your new paradigm], sponsors would give up termination rights on acceptance following [Model Office Testing] in exchange for the option of being able to have more punitive SLAs" Is that service level agreements? Correct. " following the start of [National roll-out], should the system fail to meet acceptance criteria in Live Trial. Similar arrangements could be put in place for future releases of functionality/services."	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
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2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16		acceptance and we can see the essence of that distilled, please, on page 3. At the end of the second paragraph you say: "Simply put [following your new paradigm], sponsors would give up termination rights on acceptance following [Model Office Testing] in exchange for the option of being able to have more punitive SLAs" Is that service level agreements? Correct. " following the start of [National roll-out], should the system fail to meet acceptance criteria in Live Trial. Similar arrangements could be put in place for future releases of functionality/services." Would it be fair to say that, boiled down to its core, your proposal envisaged the sponsors forfeiting	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17		acceptance and we can see the essence of that distilled, please, on page 3. At the end of the second paragraph you say: "Simply put [following your new paradigm], sponsors would give up termination rights on acceptance following [Model Office Testing] in exchange for the option of being able to have more punitive SLAs" Is that service level agreements? Correct. " following the start of [National roll-out], should the system fail to meet acceptance criteria in Live Trial. Similar arrangements could be put in place for future releases of functionality/services." Would it be fair to say that, boiled down to its core, your proposal envisaged the sponsors forfeiting their right to reject the system, even if it failed to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18		acceptance and we can see the essence of that distilled, please, on page 3. At the end of the second paragraph you say: "Simply put [following your new paradigm], sponsors would give up termination rights on acceptance following [Model Office Testing] in exchange for the option of being able to have more punitive SLAs" Is that service level agreements? Correct. " following the start of [National roll-out], should the system fail to meet acceptance criteria in Live Trial. Similar arrangements could be put in place for future releases of functionality/services." Would it be fair to say that, boiled down to its core, your proposal envisaged the sponsors forfeiting their right to reject the system, even if it failed to meet the criteria, which the sponsors deemed to be	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	Q.	acceptance and we can see the essence of that distilled, please, on page 3. At the end of the second paragraph you say: "Simply put [following your new paradigm], sponsors would give up termination rights on acceptance following [Model Office Testing] in exchange for the option of being able to have more punitive SLAs" Is that service level agreements? Correct. " following the start of [National roll-out], should the system fail to meet acceptance criteria in Live Trial. Similar arrangements could be put in place for future releases of functionality/services." Would it be fair to say that, boiled down to its core, your proposal envisaged the sponsors forfeiting their right to reject the system, even if it failed to meet the criteria, which the sponsors deemed to be necessary for acceptance?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	Q.	acceptance and we can see the essence of that distilled, please, on page 3. At the end of the second paragraph you say: "Simply put [following your new paradigm], sponsors would give up termination rights on acceptance following [Model Office Testing] in exchange for the option of being able to have more punitive SLAs" Is that service level agreements? Correct. " following the start of [National roll-out], should the system fail to meet acceptance criteria in Live Trial. Similar arrangements could be put in place for future releases of functionality/services." Would it be fair to say that, boiled down to its core, your proposal envisaged the sponsors forfeiting their right to reject the system, even if it failed to meet the criteria, which the sponsors deemed to be necessary for acceptance? Yes, and perhaps I should put this in context. The clues in this letter are it was a private thoughts	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Q.	acceptance and we can see the essence of that distilled, please, on page 3. At the end of the second paragraph you say: "Simply put [following your new paradigm], sponsors would give up termination rights on acceptance following [Model Office Testing] in exchange for the option of being able to have more punitive SLAs" Is that service level agreements? Correct. " following the start of [National roll-out], should the system fail to meet acceptance criteria in Live Trial. Similar arrangements could be put in place for future releases of functionality/services." Would it be fair to say that, boiled down to its core, your proposal envisaged the sponsors forfeiting their right to reject the system, even if it failed to meet the criteria, which the sponsors deemed to be necessary for acceptance? Yes, and perhaps I should put this in context. The clues in this letter are it was a private thoughts letter and, in the last paragraph, "Next steps",	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	Q.	acceptance and we can see the essence of that distilled, please, on page 3. At the end of the second paragraph you say: "Simply put [following your new paradigm], sponsors would give up termination rights on acceptance following [Model Office Testing] in exchange for the option of being able to have more punitive SLAs" Is that service level agreements? Correct. " following the start of [National roll-out], should the system fail to meet acceptance criteria in Live Trial. Similar arrangements could be put in place for future releases of functionality/services." Would it be fair to say that, boiled down to its core, your proposal envisaged the sponsors forfeiting their right to reject the system, even if it failed to meet the criteria, which the sponsors deemed to be necessary for acceptance? Yes, and perhaps I should put this in context. The clues in this letter are it was a private thoughts letter and, in the last paragraph, "Next steps", bluntly, this an unsolicited proposal for more work from	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

		······································
2		acceptance. That letter enclosed a short paper entitled
3		"Acceptance testing: a framework for developing a new
4		paradigm". We can see that on page 2, please.
5		You observe in that paper, under the heading
6		"Problem definition" that:
7		"Sponsors and Pathway have agreed to de-risk the
8		programme by decoupling card roll-out from NR2", which
9		I understand is New Release 2; is that correct?
10	Α.	Yes.
11	Q.	" and to base NRO"
12		Is that national roll-out?
13	Α.	Yes.
14	Q.	" on child benefit and EPOSS only until NR2+ [this is
15		New Release 2 Plus, further functionality] is available
16		when multi-benefit roll-out starts. This new sequence
17		raises a legitimate question whether an alternative
18		acceptance process can be designed that protects the
19		commercial objectives of the parties and which at the
20		same time reflects the status of the revised programme
21		at completion of [Model Office Testing] and at
22		completion of Live Trial. Additionally, the acceptance
23		process for any requirement to be delivered during NRO
24		[National roll-out] would need to be included in any new
25		approach."
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to set out some of your private thoughts on the issue of

	sponsors, this is an approach which would have been
	fraught with risk, would it not?
Α.	Possibly.
Q.	By their very nature, model office tests tended to be
	carried out under optimal circumstances; that's right,
	isn't it?
Α.	Yes.
Q.	Because they didn't accurately replicate the real-life
	environment in which the system would actually operate,
	these tests were very unlikely to identify the full
	breadth of usability and performance issues
Α.	That's correct.
Q.	which would only become apparent, ultimately, in live
	operation of the system
Α.	Yes.
Q.	by which point, the termination rights would have
	been lost?
Α.	Yes.
Q.	So there was a risk in adopting this approach that the
	sponsors might find themselves bound to accept and roll
	out a system that later didn't prove to be fit for the
	purpose for which it was
Α.	Which is why it was rejected.
Q.	Bearing in mind those risks inherent in the approach,
	why did you consider this to be a suitable paradigm for

1	acceptance?
2	A. We were trying to be creative to find a way through the
3	acceptance block.
4 5	Q. Was this reflective of the pragmatism which you felt was
5	earlier lacking in the programme and which had
6 7	contributed to significant delays?
7	A. I don't think we saw it in the broadest light. We saw
8 9	that as a possible opening of a discussion that could help solve the problem. It was a pragmatic approach.
9 10	MS HODGE: Thank you.
10	Sir, that brings me to the end of that topic.
12	I wonder if now would be a convenient time to take
13	a short break?
14	SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes.
15	MS HODGE: We're making good progress.
16	SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Good. So what time shall we start again
17	Ms Hodge?
18	MS HODGE: Shall we resume at 3.10?
19	SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Okay, fine. See you then.
20	(2.55 pm)
21	(A short break)
22	(3.09 pm)
23	MS HODGE: Good afternoon, sir. Can you hear, and see me?
24	SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes.
25	MS HODGE: Thank you. We can hear you.
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1	Post Office Counters. I suspect you won't have seen
2	a copy of this contract at the time.
3	A. Correct.
4	Q. Have you read this document since?
5	A. Yes.
6	Q. We can see, if we turn to the second page, please, at
7	paragraph 2.2 so about a third of the way down the
8	page a reference to the thresholds for acceptance of
9	the CSR. Are you aware of what the CSR was or what it
10	signifies?
11	A. I don't recall what CSR stands for, I'm afraid.
12 13	 Q. I believe it's the Core Systems Release A. Right.
13	 A. Right. Q the name given to the package of software tested
14	during the operational trial and ultimately rolled out.
16	It comprised the EPOSS, Electronic Point of Sales
17	Service, the order book control service, which was still
18	in operation, and the Automated Payment Service. Does
19	that sound broadly correct, in terms of what you
20	understood
21	A. That sounds familiar, yes.
22	Q. What this provision provides, we can see it's framed in
23	the negative. It effectively says:
24	"The thresholds will not be met if in respect of
25	CSR Acceptance there are:
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1		Mr Copping, picking up where we left off, which
2		was the new paradigm for acceptance which you had
3		proposed (which, as you say, did not find favour with
4		sponsors), you've explained in your statement that you
5		continue to have some involvement in the public sector
6		negotiations over the future of Horizon in the early
7		part of 1999; is that right?
8	Α.	Yes.
9	Q.	But the last significant engagement which you had
10		related to the acceptance of the system; is that
11		correct?
12	Α.	Yes.
13	Q.	Contrary to the proposal which you had made which
14		envisaged acceptance at the end of model office testing,
15		we know that what Post Office Counters and Pathway
16		agreed upon cancellation of the Benefits Payment Card
17		was that an operational live trial would take place; is
18		that right?
19	Α.	Yes.
20	Q.	By that stage, however, the thresholds for acceptance
21		had changed. Were you aware of that?
22	A.	Yes.
23	Q.	Could we please show POL00028208. Thank you. This is
24		a copy of "Schedule A11" to the codified agreement,
25		dated 28 July 1999, concluded between ICL Pathway and 142
25		
		142
1		142 "[First condition] one or more high severity
1 2		142 "[First condition] one or more high severity deficiencies as categorised in paragraph 7.1(a) of this
1 2 3		142 "[First condition] one or more high severity deficiencies as categorised in paragraph 7.1(a) of this Schedule ('category (a) faults');
1 2 3 4		142 "[First condition] one or more high severity deficiencies as categorised in paragraph 7.1(a) of this Schedule ('category (a) faults'); "[Alternatively] more than 20 category (b) faults;
1 2 3 4 5		142 "[First condition] one or more high severity deficiencies as categorised in paragraph 7.1(a) of this Schedule ('category (a) faults'); "[Alternatively] more than 20 category (b) faults; "[Finally] more than 10 category (b) faults in
1 2 3 4		142 "[First condition] one or more high severity deficiencies as categorised in paragraph 7.1(a) of this Schedule ('category (a) faults'); "[Alternatively] more than 20 category (b) faults; "[Finally] more than 10 category (b) faults in respect of any one CSR Acceptance Specification."
1 2 3 4 5 6		142 "[First condition] one or more high severity deficiencies as categorised in paragraph 7.1(a) of this Schedule ('category (a) faults'); "[Alternatively] more than 20 category (b) faults; "[Finally] more than 10 category (b) faults in respect of any one CSR Acceptance Specification." Is that broadly consistent with what you
1 2 3 4 5 6 7		142 "[First condition] one or more high severity deficiencies as categorised in paragraph 7.1(a) of this Schedule ('category (a) faults'); "[Alternatively] more than 20 category (b) faults; "[Finally] more than 10 category (b) faults in respect of any one CSR Acceptance Specification." Is that broadly consistent with what you understood at the time to be the overarching criteria
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	A	142 "[First condition] one or more high severity deficiencies as categorised in paragraph 7.1(a) of this Schedule ('category (a) faults'); "[Alternatively] more than 20 category (b) faults; "[Finally] more than 10 category (b) faults in respect of any one CSR Acceptance Specification." Is that broadly consistent with what you
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	A. Q.	142 "[First condition] one or more high severity deficiencies as categorised in paragraph 7.1(a) of this Schedule ('category (a) faults'); "[Alternatively] more than 20 category (b) faults; "[Finally] more than 10 category (b) faults in respect of any one CSR Acceptance Specification." Is that broadly consistent with what you understood at the time to be the overarching criteria that the system had to meet in order to be accepted?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10		142 "[First condition] one or more high severity deficiencies as categorised in paragraph 7.1(a) of this Schedule ('category (a) faults'); "[Alternatively] more than 20 category (b) faults; "[Finally] more than 10 category (b) faults in respect of any one CSR Acceptance Specification." Is that broadly consistent with what you understood at the time to be the overarching criteria that the system had to meet in order to be accepted? Yes, that's correct.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10		142 "[First condition] one or more high severity deficiencies as categorised in paragraph 7.1(a) of this Schedule ('category (a) faults'); "[Alternatively] more than 20 category (b) faults; "[Finally] more than 10 category (b) faults in respect of any one CSR Acceptance Specification." Is that broadly consistent with what you understood at the time to be the overarching criteria that the system had to meet in order to be accepted? Yes, that's correct. So if there was one or more high severity deficiency, it
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	Q.	142 "[First condition] one or more high severity deficiencies as categorised in paragraph 7.1(a) of this Schedule ('category (a) faults'); "[Alternatively] more than 20 category (b) faults; "[Finally] more than 10 category (b) faults in respect of any one CSR Acceptance Specification." Is that broadly consistent with what you understood at the time to be the overarching criteria that the system had to meet in order to be accepted? Yes, that's correct. So if there was one or more high severity deficiency, it wouldn't be eligible for acceptance?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	Q. A.	142 "[First condition] one or more high severity deficiencies as categorised in paragraph 7.1(a) of this Schedule ('category (a) faults'); "[Alternatively] more than 20 category (b) faults; "[Finally] more than 10 category (b) faults in respect of any one CSR Acceptance Specification." Is that broadly consistent with what you understood at the time to be the overarching criteria that the system had to meet in order to be accepted? Yes, that's correct. So if there was one or more high severity deficiency, it wouldn't be eligible for acceptance? Correct.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	Q. A.	142 "[First condition] one or more high severity deficiencies as categorised in paragraph 7.1(a) of this Schedule ('category (a) faults'); "[Alternatively] more than 20 category (b) faults; "[Finally] more than 10 category (b) faults in respect of any one CSR Acceptance Specification." Is that broadly consistent with what you understood at the time to be the overarching criteria that the system had to meet in order to be accepted? Yes, that's correct. So if there was one or more high severity deficiency, it wouldn't be eligible for acceptance? Correct. Likewise, if there were more than 20 of a medium
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	Q. A. Q.	142 "[First condition] one or more high severity deficiencies as categorised in paragraph 7.1(a) of this Schedule ('category (a) faults'); "[Alternatively] more than 20 category (b) faults; "[Finally] more than 10 category (b) faults in respect of any one CSR Acceptance Specification." Is that broadly consistent with what you understood at the time to be the overarching criteria that the system had to meet in order to be accepted? Yes, that's correct. So if there was one or more high severity deficiency, it wouldn't be eligible for acceptance? Correct. Likewise, if there were more than 20 of a medium severity, it wouldn't be eligible?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	Q. A. Q. A.	142 "[First condition] one or more high severity deficiencies as categorised in paragraph 7.1(a) of this Schedule ('category (a) faults'); "[Alternatively] more than 20 category (b) faults; "[Finally] more than 10 category (b) faults in respect of any one CSR Acceptance Specification." Is that broadly consistent with what you understood at the time to be the overarching criteria that the system had to meet in order to be accepted? Yes, that's correct. So if there was one or more high severity deficiency, it wouldn't be eligible for acceptance? Correct. Likewise, if there were more than 20 of a medium severity, it wouldn't be eligible?
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 2 3 4 15 16 17 18	Q. A. Q. A.	142 "[First condition] one or more high severity deficiencies as categorised in paragraph 7.1(a) of this Schedule ('category (a) faults'); "[Alternatively] more than 20 category (b) faults; "[Finally] more than 10 category (b) faults in respect of any one CSR Acceptance Specification." Is that broadly consistent with what you understood at the time to be the overarching criteria that the system had to meet in order to be accepted? Yes, that's correct. So if there was one or more high severity deficiency, it wouldn't be eligible for acceptance? Correct. Likewise, if there were more than 20 of a medium severity, it wouldn't be eligible? Correct. We can see on page 3 at point 5, under the heading "Appointment of Expert", that contract made provision
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 2 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	Q. A. Q. A.	142 "[First condition] one or more high severity deficiencies as categorised in paragraph 7.1(a) of this Schedule ('category (a) faults'); "[Alternatively] more than 20 category (b) faults; "[Finally] more than 10 category (b) faults in respect of any one CSR Acceptance Specification." Is that broadly consistent with what you understood at the time to be the overarching criteria that the system had to meet in order to be accepted? Yes, that's correct. So if there was one or more high severity deficiency, it wouldn't be eligible for acceptance? Correct. Likewise, if there were more than 20 of a medium severity, it wouldn't be eligible? Correct. We can see on page 3 at point 5, under the heading "Appointment of Expert", that contract made provision for you to be appointed as an expert to assist in
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	Q. A. Q. A.	142 "[First condition] one or more high severity deficiencies as categorised in paragraph 7.1(a) of this Schedule ('category (a) faults'); "[Alternatively] more than 20 category (b) faults; "[Finally] more than 10 category (b) faults in respect of any one CSR Acceptance Specification." Is that broadly consistent with what you understood at the time to be the overarching criteria that the system had to meet in order to be accepted? Yes, that's correct. So if there was one or more high severity deficiency, it wouldn't be eligible for acceptance? Correct. Likewise, if there were more than 20 of a medium severity, it wouldn't be eligible? Correct. We can see on page 3 at point 5, under the heading "Appointment of Expert", that contract made provision for you to be appointed as an expert to assist in resolving any disputes relating to CSR acceptance. Is
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 9 20 21	Q. A. Q. Q.	142 "[First condition] one or more high severity deficiencies as categorised in paragraph 7.1(a) of this Schedule ('category (a) faults'); "[Alternatively] more than 20 category (b) faults; "[Finally] more than 10 category (b) faults in respect of any one CSR Acceptance Specification." Is that broadly consistent with what you understood at the time to be the overarching criteria that the system had to meet in order to be accepted? Yes, that's correct. So if there was one or more high severity deficiency, it wouldn't be eligible for acceptance? Correct. Likewise, if there were more than 20 of a medium severity, it wouldn't be eligible? Correct. We can see on page 3 at point 5, under the heading "Appointment of Expert", that contract made provision for you to be appointed as an expert to assist in resolving any disputes relating to CSR acceptance. Is that how you understood your role at the time?

Q. When you did become involved, how would you characterise your role?

1	Α.	It was explained to me that my role would be essentially
2		to facilitate the parties to come to an agreement.
3		There was a lot of allocation of blame from one party to
4		another about what actually was going on on acceptance
5		and it was explained to me that my role was to ensure
6		the parties worked together to resolve conflict and,
7		through that process, reach an agreement on the level of
8		severity of each incident and a resolution plan.
9		I subsequently found out that, apparently, I had
10		the opportunity to arbitrate but I don't think, to the
11		best of my recollection, that was ever exercised by
12		either party. In other words, I had the option to tell
13	0	them the way it was going to be on particular incidents.
14 15	Q.	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
15 16		about the arrangements that were put in place in the contract?
17	Α.	
18	A . Q.	
19	Q.	we've obtained, that you were first called upon to
20		provide assistance to the parties on completion of the
21		operational live trial. Is that consistent with your
22		recollection?
23	Α.	That resonates.
24	Q.	In preparation for a meeting which appears to have taken
25		place on 16 August 1999, you were sent what was
		145
		145
1		
1 2		The next high severity is in relation to training,
1 2 3		
2		The next high severity is in relation to training, number 218. It's described as the "Training course Cash
2 3		The next high severity is in relation to training, number 218. It's described as the "Training course Cash Account module inadequate". POCL have assessed that as
2 3 4		The next high severity is in relation to training, number 218. It's described as the "Training course Cash Account module inadequate". POCL have assessed that as high, whereas Pathway were treating that as closed at
2 3 4 5		The next high severity is in relation to training, number 218. It's described as the "Training course Cash Account module inadequate". POCL have assessed that as high, whereas Pathway were treating that as closed at this stage.
2 3 4 5 6		The next high severity is in relation to training, number 218. It's described as the "Training course Cash Account module inadequate". POCL have assessed that as high, whereas Pathway were treating that as closed at this stage. Then, thirdly, in the POCL infrastructure
2 3 4 5 6 7		The next high severity is in relation to training, number 218. It's described as the "Training course Cash Account module inadequate". POCL have assessed that as high, whereas Pathway were treating that as closed at this stage. Then, thirdly, in the POCL infrastructure Acceptance Incident number 298, described as "Counter
2 3 4 5 6 7 8		The next high severity is in relation to training, number 218. It's described as the "Training course Cash Account module inadequate". POCL have assessed that as high, whereas Pathway were treating that as closed at this stage. Then, thirdly, in the POCL infrastructure Acceptance Incident number 298, described as "Counter system subject to lockups & screen freezes requiring
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9		The next high severity is in relation to training, number 218. It's described as the "Training course Cash Account module inadequate". POCL have assessed that as high, whereas Pathway were treating that as closed at this stage. Then, thirdly, in the POCL infrastructure Acceptance Incident number 298, described as "Counter system subject to lockups & screen freezes requiring reboots", assessed by Pathway as a low severity incident
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9		The next high severity is in relation to training, number 218. It's described as the "Training course Cash Account module inadequate". POCL have assessed that as high, whereas Pathway were treating that as closed at this stage. Then, thirdly, in the POCL infrastructure Acceptance Incident number 298, described as "Counter system subject to lockups & screen freezes requiring reboots", assessed by Pathway as a low severity incident but by Post Office Counters as high.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10		The next high severity is in relation to training, number 218. It's described as the "Training course Cash Account module inadequate". POCL have assessed that as high, whereas Pathway were treating that as closed at this stage. Then, thirdly, in the POCL infrastructure Acceptance Incident number 298, described as "Counter system subject to lockups & screen freezes requiring reboots", assessed by Pathway as a low severity incident but by Post Office Counters as high. I think there's one in the category of medium to
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15		The next high severity is in relation to training, number 218. It's described as the "Training course Cash Account module inadequate". POCL have assessed that as high, whereas Pathway were treating that as closed at this stage. Then, thirdly, in the POCL infrastructure Acceptance Incident number 298, described as "Counter system subject to lockups & screen freezes requiring reboots", assessed by Pathway as a low severity incident but by Post Office Counters as high. I think there's one in the category of medium to high, which was number 369, also in the POCL infrastructure, "Scanner reliability in relation to [order book control service] transactions". So that was the state of play at the end of the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16		The next high severity is in relation to training, number 218. It's described as the "Training course Cash Account module inadequate". POCL have assessed that as high, whereas Pathway were treating that as closed at this stage. Then, thirdly, in the POCL infrastructure Acceptance Incident number 298, described as "Counter system subject to lockups & screen freezes requiring reboots", assessed by Pathway as a low severity incident but by Post Office Counters as high. I think there's one in the category of medium to high, which was number 369, also in the POCL infrastructure, "Scanner reliability in relation to [order book control service] transactions". So that was the state of play at the end of the operational live trial, so far as you were aware; is
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17		The next high severity is in relation to training, number 218. It's described as the "Training course Cash Account module inadequate". POCL have assessed that as high, whereas Pathway were treating that as closed at this stage. Then, thirdly, in the POCL infrastructure Acceptance Incident number 298, described as "Counter system subject to lockups & screen freezes requiring reboots", assessed by Pathway as a low severity incident but by Post Office Counters as high. I think there's one in the category of medium to high, which was number 369, also in the POCL infrastructure, "Scanner reliability in relation to [order book control service] transactions". So that was the state of play at the end of the operational live trial, so far as you were aware; is that right?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	Α.	The next high severity is in relation to training, number 218. It's described as the "Training course Cash Account module inadequate". POCL have assessed that as high, whereas Pathway were treating that as closed at this stage. Then, thirdly, in the POCL infrastructure Acceptance Incident number 298, described as "Counter system subject to lockups & screen freezes requiring reboots", assessed by Pathway as a low severity incident but by Post Office Counters as high. I think there's one in the category of medium to high, which was number 369, also in the POCL infrastructure, "Scanner reliability in relation to [order book control service] transactions". So that was the state of play at the end of the operational live trial, so far as you were aware; is that right? Yes.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	A. Q.	The next high severity is in relation to training, number 218. It's described as the "Training course Cash Account module inadequate". POCL have assessed that as high, whereas Pathway were treating that as closed at this stage. Then, thirdly, in the POCL infrastructure Acceptance Incident number 298, described as "Counter system subject to lockups & screen freezes requiring reboots", assessed by Pathway as a low severity incident but by Post Office Counters as high. I think there's one in the category of medium to high, which was number 369, also in the POCL infrastructure, "Scanner reliability in relation to [order book control service] transactions". So that was the state of play at the end of the operational live trial, so far as you were aware; is that right? Yes. Do you have any recollection of the meeting that took
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	Q.	The next high severity is in relation to training, number 218. It's described as the "Training course Cash Account module inadequate". POCL have assessed that as high, whereas Pathway were treating that as closed at this stage. Then, thirdly, in the POCL infrastructure Acceptance Incident number 298, described as "Counter system subject to lockups & screen freezes requiring reboots", assessed by Pathway as a low severity incident but by Post Office Counters as high. I think there's one in the category of medium to high, which was number 369, also in the POCL infrastructure, "Scanner reliability in relation to [order book control service] transactions". So that was the state of play at the end of the operational live trial, so far as you were aware; is that right? Yes. Do you have any recollection of the meeting that took place on 16 August 1999?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	Q. A.	The next high severity is in relation to training, number 218. It's described as the "Training course Cash Account module inadequate". POCL have assessed that as high, whereas Pathway were treating that as closed at this stage. Then, thirdly, in the POCL infrastructure Acceptance Incident number 298, described as "Counter system subject to lockups & screen freezes requiring reboots", assessed by Pathway as a low severity incident but by Post Office Counters as high. I think there's one in the category of medium to high, which was number 369, also in the POCL infrastructure, "Scanner reliability in relation to [order book control service] transactions". So that was the state of play at the end of the operational live trial, so far as you were aware; is that right? Yes. Do you have any recollection of the meeting that took place on 16 August 1999? I might need reminding.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Q.	The next high severity is in relation to training, number 218. It's described as the "Training course Cash Account module inadequate". POCL have assessed that as high, whereas Pathway were treating that as closed at this stage. Then, thirdly, in the POCL infrastructure Acceptance Incident number 298, described as "Counter system subject to lockups & screen freezes requiring reboots", assessed by Pathway as a low severity incident but by Post Office Counters as high. I think there's one in the category of medium to high, which was number 369, also in the POCL infrastructure, "Scanner reliability in relation to [order book control service] transactions". So that was the state of play at the end of the operational live trial, so far as you were aware; is that right? Yes. Do you have any recollection of the meeting that took place on 16 August 1999? I might need reminding. I don't think we have any record, written record, of
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	Q. A.	The next high severity is in relation to training, number 218. It's described as the "Training course Cash Account module inadequate". POCL have assessed that as high, whereas Pathway were treating that as closed at this stage. Then, thirdly, in the POCL infrastructure Acceptance Incident number 298, described as "Counter system subject to lockups & screen freezes requiring reboots", assessed by Pathway as a low severity incident but by Post Office Counters as high. I think there's one in the category of medium to high, which was number 369, also in the POCL infrastructure, "Scanner reliability in relation to [order book control service] transactions". So that was the state of play at the end of the operational live trial, so far as you were aware; is that right? Yes. Do you have any recollection of the meeting that took place on 16 August 1999? I might need reminding.

1		described as a "hot list" of Acceptance Incidents; is
2		that right?
3	Α.	Yes.
4	Q.	Please could we pull up POL00028355. This is an email
5		from Tony Houghton, dated 13 August 1999. We can see
6		you named as one of many recipients there, the fourth in
7		the list. Can we turn to the following page, please.
8		Here we have the "Acceptance Incident Hotlist". Could
9		you please explain what you understood the significance
10		of this list to be?
11	Α.	This was a list in which I identified all the incidents
12		that were outstanding, together with those where there
13		was a disagreement on severity and I think, from memory,
14		there were three, possibly four, where POCL and
15		ICL Pathway were in disagreement.
16	Q.	So I think, looking at the list, it appears as though
17		there was disagreement in terms of severity on almost
18		every single
19	Α.	Sorry, I was looking through the lens of the medium to
20		high.
21	Q.	Forgive me. There were three incidents categorised by
22		POCL as high. We can see the first of those in the list
23		being Acceptance Incident number 376, which is described
24		as the "Derived cash account not equal to the electronic
25		cash account".
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meeting. That much is clear from a supplemental
agreement reached between the parties on 20 August 1999.
I wonder if we could please pull up FUJ00000485.
So at the top we can see this described as
a "supplemental agreement" dated 20 August 1999 between
Post Office Counters and ICL Pathway. If we could
please scroll to page 3 thank you under the
heading "It is Agreed as follows", we can see in
relation to "CSR Acceptance", paragraph 1.1:
"The parties agree that CSR Acceptance was not
achieved as at the end of the CSR Operational Trial
Review Period."
If we go on, please, to page 4, there's proposed
here a remedy for the outstanding faults in the system.
It provides:
"With a view to facilitating the obtaining of CSR
Acceptance in the Second CSR Acceptance Test, the
parties agree as follows"
Paragraph 2.1:
"In the period between the date of this Agreement
and 17th September 1999 (the 'Limited Trial Period'),
the parties will set up and conduct a programme of joint
workshops for the purposes of agreeing (to the extent

not already agreed): "resolution plans for the Agreed Category B

1		Faults, the Disputed Category A Faults, the Disputed	1	
2		Category B Faults and (if appropriate) the Unagreed	2	
3		Fault"	3	
4		It goes on to say:	4	
5		"a single timetable for resolution of outstanding	5	
6		category (b) faults", would form part of those	6	A
7		workshops.	7	C
8		I think you recall participating in those	8	Α
9		workshops; is that right?	9	G
10		Yes.	10	
11	Q.	We can see they were chaired by Keith Baines, the late	11	
12		Keith Baines, of Post Office Counters Limited and Tony	12	
13		Oppenheim of ICL Pathway?	13	
14		Yes.	14	A
15	Q.	On page 5 you're referenced again. On this occasion,	15	G
16		were you consulted about your involvement? I assume you	16	
17		were on the 16th.	17	
18		Not that I recall.	18	Α
19	Q.		19	
20		"The parties will involve Peter Copping as Expert	20	G
21		in the activities referred to in this paragraph 2 [to	21	
22		which we've just referred]. There may be occasions on	22	
23		which the Expert is asked to determine an issue as	23	
24		between parties in accordance with the provisions of	24	
25		Schedule A11 but otherwise his role will be as 149	25	
1		what did you understand this particular incident to	1	A
2		entail?	2	
3	Α.	This concerned a post office view that the training for	3	
4		Horizon users was inadequate and I think, in response,	4	
5		Pathway offered a number of initiatives, which involved	5	C
6		half day training for Post Office Counters staff in IT	6	
7		usage, computing, and so on.	7	
8		The underlying issue here, I think, was to do with	8	A
9		the situation that I mentioned earlier, that Pathway	9	G
10		hadn't, in completeness, considered the business	10	
11		transformation that would be necessary to accept the	11	
12		system and, with that, all the process changes that	12	
13		would need to take place at the counter, and my	13	A
14		recollection is that there were extremes of counter	14	
15		configuration from quite a number of counters to	15	
16		a simple remote terminal in an outlying area, and users,	16	
17		if I recall correctly, between 20 and 75 or 85 years	17	
18		old. So there's a tremendous spread of capability that	18	
19		needed to be trained.	19	
20		In my understanding, that was why the Post Office	20	
21		decided this should be categorised as high severity	21	
22		impact.	22	
23	Q.	Do you recall whether the concerns about training were	23	
24		focused on any particular aspect of the training	24	G
25		programme being offered?	25	A
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	actilitator and adviser to the parties in their enorts
	to achieve successful resolution of outstanding issues."
	That seems to tally with what you have described
	earlier as your understanding, that is to say the latter
	part, facilitating agreement.
Α.	I hadn't seen this document at the time.
Q.	But it reflects, as far as you're
Α.	It reflects my understanding.
Q.	You explained in your statement that, prior to each of
ς.	the joint workshops to which this supplementary
	agreement makes reference, you received briefings from
	each of the parties relating to the status of the
	acceptance incidents; is that correct?
	•
A.	Yes. That's something I asked for, if I remember.
Q.	Did the briefings you received include ICL Pathway's
	proposed plans for resolving the outstanding acceptance
	incidents?
Α.	I'm not sure whether all the proposed plans were
	included.
Q.	We'll take a look at some of them shortly. In the hot
	list that we reviewed a short time ago we looked at
	three acceptance incidents that were graded high by Post
	Office Counters. I would like to explore with you now
	what you recall about those.
	If I could begin with Acceptance Incident 218,
	150
Α.	My recollection is that the there were a lot of issues
	around closing of accounts and it was unclear, at that
	stage, whether that was a training issue or a systems
	issue.
Q.	So far as you're aware, this was an incident that was
	resolved to the satisfaction of the Post Office during
	your workshops; is that right?
Α.	Yes.
Q.	I'd like to turn to another incident, this was Al298,
ς.	also categorised by the Post Office as being of high
	severity. Could you describe your understanding of that
	incident, please?
Α.	This was about instability in the system, the symptom
А.	being lockouts at the terminal, crashes in the middle of
	a process, system busy incidents, and so on, and I think
	Pathway took the view that this was pretty normal for
	IT: PCs crash, PCs lock up. The Post Office or POCL
	considered this to have a high impact on the business
	simply because, while the system was down, customers
	couldn't be dealt with and, therefore, it had a high
	impact and so there was a disagreement about the
	severity. I think POCL classified it as high severity;
	severity. I think POCL classified it as high severity; ICL Pathway, I think, as medium.

facilitator and adviser to the parties in their efforts

- Q. Do you recall how this particular incident was resolved?
- A. My recollection is that it wasn't resolved through the

1		series of seven workshops. It was escalated to the	1
2		management resolution meeting towards the end of	2
3	_	probably August/early September.	3
4	Q.	Thank you. We'll return to that final workshop that	4
5		final meeting, sorry, a little later. Before we do, I'd	5
6		like to address with you the third incident categorised	6
7		by Post Office as high severity, and that is incident	7
8		Al376.	8
9		What was the nature of the problem that had been	9
10		identified, so far as you were	10
11	А.	As I understood this, it was about intermittent failures	11
12		in the reconciliation process between the money in the	12
13		till and what the system had recorded and, at the time,	13
14 15		I think it was believed the root cause was about or	14
15 16		lack of integrity in transfers between Post Office and	15
16	0	ICL Pathway systems.	16 17
17 18	Q.	Do you recall where in the system this problem had arisen?	17
19	А.	At the TIP interface, as I understood it.	18
20		Can you explain what you understood TIP to be?	19 20
20	Q. A.		20
21	А.	is responsible for counting and the ICL Pathway	21
23		interface and the database that recorded the	22
23		transactions in the system.	23
25	0	You have described the root cause as being a lack of	25
20	Q.	153	25
1		bring you up to speed for the meeting, to which we've	1
2		referred, on the 16th.	2
2	۸	Yes.	2
4		On page 3, please, we can see, just over halfway down	4
5	Q.	the page, at point 3, the heading "Review of High	5
6		Priority Incidents", the first of these being Acceptance	6
7		Incident 376. "JD", who I believe was John Dicks,	7
8		an employee of ICL Pathway, reported that:	8
9		"Pathway recognise that not all transactions had	9
10		been harvested and sent to TIP. A provisional fix went	10
11		in on 2nd August and this has worked satisfactorily so	18
12		far with the effect that all records had been sent.	12
13		A root cause analysis has been developed, identifying	13
14		8 contributory problems, and all but one has been	14
15		diagnosed and tested in Pathway to date. Pathway cannot	15
16		guarantee however that all problems have been trapped.	16
17		They will need to see evidence from the fix of the	17
18		8 known problems, and will continue to monitor the	18
19		problems for 8 [sic] months to be confident of its	19
20		resolution.	20
21		"The provisional fix and the control procedures	21
22		developed allow Pathway to identify any errors, to patch	22
23		the file, and to notify TIP in advance. Since	23
24		implementation there have been no errors to report and	24
25		hence Pathway contend that this action taken to date and	25
		155	

		integrity in the information passing.
2	Α.	That was my understanding at the time.
3	Q.	Before we go to one of the documents I'd like to show
ŀ		you, do you recall how the problem had come to light,
5		how it had been detected in the system?
6	Α.	Not specifically, I'm afraid, no.
,	Q.	Please could we show POL00028332. This is another email
3		of 13 August 1999 from Andrew Simpkins, addressed to you
)		and to David Rees. Was that a colleague at
0		PA Consulting?
1	Α.	Correct.
2	Q.	It says:
3		"Peter/David
4		"Following the Management Resolution meeting
5		yesterday I attach as agreed by [Post Office Counters]
6		and Pathway the minutes of this meeting and a summary of
7		the incidents that are in dispute.
8		"The minutes will give you an up-to-date position
9		on the high priority incidents in particular.
0		"We propose that the meeting with yourselves does
1		not start until 12.00. It will be in Gavrelle House
2		room 7."
3		If we could please turn to the minutes on the
4		following page, so of course not a meeting that you
5		yourself attended but minutes that were shown to you to 154
		the result they have observed justify the downgrading of
)		this incident."
-		We know, of course, it wasn't ultimately agreed
, L		that that incident be downgraded
r 5	Α.	C C
, }	Q.	hence why the workshops took place. So far as Post
,	ч.	Office Counters were concerned, what did you understand
3		their assessment of the business impact of this incident
)		to be?
0	Α.	An inability on a consistent basis to reconcile Horizon
1		data with cash data.
2	Q.	Would it be fair to say it was an issue of fundamental
3		concern to Post Office Counters?
4	Α.	I would have said so, yes.
5	Q.	The principal purpose of Horizon being to perform
6		an accounting function
7	Α.	Absolutely, yes.
8	Q.	which would enable Post Office Counters to reconcile
9		the transaction performed by its agents at the branch
0		counter with its own records of cash and stock held, as
1		well as the transactions performed on behalf of its
2		clients.
3	Α.	Correct.
4	Q.	If the system wasn't producing accurate cash accounts,
5		which appears to be what this incident was showing did

which appears to be what this incident was showing, did 156

1		this not call into question its very fitness for	1		а
2		purpose?	2		е
3	Α.	Yes.	3		to
4	Q.	Do you recall how ICL Pathway proposed to rectify this	4		is
5		problem?	5		
6	Α.	In broad terms, yes. There were a number of proposals	6		
7		in the resolution plan. I think the most worrying was	7		tł
8		that one of the fixes wouldn't be implemented until the	8		р
9		year 2000, either at the end of '99 or 2000, and it was	9		
10		that that caused the incident to be escalated to the	10		C
11		management meeting at the end of the seven workshops,	11		а
12		not just because the final fix wouldn't be available	12		10
13		until the end of the year but also because regression	13		re
14		testing would therefore take place afterwards and, if	14		W
15		there were further issues to be found, that would not be	15		
16		something that would rest easily with roll-out.	16		ir
17	Q.	If we could take a closer look at what was discussed at	17		lo
18		these workshops, you attended one on 26 August 1999; is	18		V
19		that correct?	19		
20	Α.	If my name's on the agenda, yes.	20		а
21	Q.	Could we show POL00028472, please. This is an email	21		ir
22		from Altea Walker to Graeme Seedall and others. You are	22		s
23		not a recipient of the email but if we could please turn	23		b
24		to page 6, we can see here a minute of the Acceptance	24		tł
25		Workshop this is number 2 held on 26 August 1999	25		
		157			
1		point 5 there's a reference to Pathway proposing	1		tł
2		a three-level data integrity check to be implemented in	2		u
3		December:	3	A.	Y
4		"This needs to be documented as a high level	4	Q.	
5		design including failure state analysis."	5	۹.	a
6		We see there Post Office Counters Limited,	6		A
7		a number of employees identified in brackets, are to be	7		s
8		involved in interactive walk-throughs during the	8	Α.	Ŷ
9		development of the design to report progress and issues	9	Q.	' If
10		to the group.	10	ч.	d
11		At point 6 it records that:	10		to
12		"[Post Office Counters'] position is that roll-out	12		P
13		should not commence until data integrity can be assured.	13		re
14		Ruth Holleran [an employee of Post Office Counters] to	14		
15		consider with the Auditors, and report back to this	15		tł
16		group, whether the current Pathway checks plus,	16		Ir
17		possibly, continuing [Post Office] checks, would be	17		
18		adequate until Pathway's full data integrity checks are	18		re
19		in place."	19		s
20		Finally, at point 8, we see a reference to Pathway	20	Α.	1
20		preparing a rectification plan that will be presented to	20	<i>.</i>	s
22		the group. So this appears to be the state of play as	22	Q.	
23		at 26 August 1999?	23	પ્ર.	s
24	Α.	Yes.	23		ir
25	Q.	I understand you don't have a detailed recollection of	25		b
		159			

nd under the attendees you're listed first, as the xpert, Peter Copping, and the first item that appears o have been discussed is Acceptance Incident 376, the sue of data integrity. At point 1, it records that: "[Post Office Counters] needs to be confident of ne root cause analysis and fixes, both applied and lanned to be applied." The proposal was that a working group of Post Office Counters, comprising a number of employees there nd Pathway, in brackets John Pope, an employee of CL Pathway, were to review the TIP incident status eport and report back progress and issues to the orkshop. Under point 3, we can see Pathway proposed to ntroduce a fix to ensure that the cash account does not se transactions and there's a reference to a PinICL. Vere you aware what a PinICL was? As I understand it, it was a record of in incident, the method by which Pathway recorded cidents in the system. As part of 1 above, that is to ay the root cause analysis and fixes, a review was to e taken to fix and confirm acceptability of the fix to nis group. If we could turn the page, please, we can see at 158 hese events but does that broadly tally with what you nderstood the position to be? 'es Point 8, to which we have just referred, mentions rectification plan that was produced in response to cceptance Incident number 376. I believe you were hown a copy of that plan. es. we could bring that up, please, POL00028466. This ocument is dated 4 September 1999, we see that at the pp, Version 0.3. Under the title it's the "Acceptance Proposal for Acceptance Incident 376", and the abstract ecords: "This document contains ICL Pathway's proposal to he independent Expert in respect of Acceptance ncident 376." Under distribution, you're named as the first to eceive it, "Expert: Peter Copping". Do you recall eeing this document at the time? do. I don't know why they addressed it to me pecifically. we could turn please to page 5, we can see here ummarised Pathway's position in relation to this cident. At paragraph 5.1, they set out the ackground: 160

1		"During the Live Trial and since, incidents have	1		"Important advances have been made since the above
2		occurred that, in [Post Office Counters'] view,	2		incidents occurred, [which are] discussed below under
3		constitute a potential threat to the integrity of their	3		the same numbers"
4		accounts. These can be categorised into three groups.	4		We see here, I think, a list of fixes that have
5		"1. Some outlet transactions were not sent to	5		been applied to address the causes identified at 1, 2, 3
6		TIP:	6		above, the first of these being that:
7		"because the harvester deliberately omitted	7		"All instances of messages written without
8		incomplete records, caused principally by missing modes,	8		harvester-sensitive fields have been fixed, except one
9		and	9		that will be fixed shortly. Accounting integrity has
10		"because, on one occasion, harvesting started	10		been safeguarded by establishing routine examination of
11		before replication between recovering correspondence	11		Event Logs to detect and report daily to TIP any
12		server nodes was complete."	12		harvester exceptions.
13		The second principal cause was that:	13		"The harvester has been enhanced to positively
14		"Not all transactions were [completed] in the	14		check that the full message set for an outlet is present
15		outlet cash account because of end-dating of Item	15		on the correspondence server before initiating
16		Reference Data."	16		harvesting for that outlet."
17		Thirdly that:	17		Secondly:
18		"Some Cash Account records were sent to TIP	18		"The system is being modified so that the
19		because the pointer used by the harvester was not	19		balancing and Cash Account processes can continue if
20		available:	20		an item is end-dated during a period for which there are
21		"because a counter was rebooted before it could	21		transactions."
22		write it; and	22		Thirdly:
23		"on one occasion, because a second balance process	23		"The system has been made robust against
24		was allowed to run."	24		inopportune reboots by writing persistent objects to the
25		Pathway suggested:	25		message store, enabling controlled restart of the office
		161			162
1		balance process after power failure, etc.	1		are the figures recorded as at 5 pm on Friday,
2		"A change has been made to ensure that multiple	2		3 September, presumably 1999, bearing in mind the date
3		balance processes cannot run concurrently. In addition	3		of the document. At the very top we see "Number of
4		a message will be displayed to inform the user that the	4		outlets affected by cash account week".
5		balance process has initiated."	5		The top row appears to record the cash account
6		So here we see Pathway essentially presenting	6		weeks numbered 8 to 27, and the left-hand side column,
7		a picture of three principal causes for the end balances	7		the root causes. Do you agree with that broad analysis
8		having been identified. Would that be a fair	8		of the table?
9		characterisation?	9	Α.	Yes.
10	Α.	Yes.	10	Q.	So I think what we can see here is that there are two
11	Q.		11		root causes, number 9 and 10 so missing mode scales,
12		and the fixes that they have applied?	12		replication recovery that in the weeks 16 to 19 have
13	Α.	Or planned to apply.	13		caused quite a substantial number of outlets to be
14	Q.		14		affected. In relation to 9, there are 22; in relation
15	α.	widespread these cash account discrepancies were at this	15		to 10 there are 37. Following the application of a fix,
16		time.	16		what this appears to record is that no further outlets
17	Α.	In terms of quantity? No.	10		have been affected.
18		Could we please turn to page 8 of this document. It	18		But, in total over that period, we see 80 outlets
	Q.		10		
19 20		appears that this table was appended to ICL Pathway			affected by one of the 12 root causes of this problem;
20		acceptance's proposal. Do you recall being shown a copy	20		is that a fair picture?
21		of it at the time?	21	A.	
22		l've certainly seen that before, yes.	22	Q.	It's not necessarily the case that this equates to
23	Q.	Could we zoom in a little bit, please. Thank you.	23		80 different outlets, I think, because one possible
24		So we can see at the top it is entitled "Incident	24		interpretation of the table is that a single outlet was
25		analysis". At the very bottom it confirms that these 163	25		affected in more than one week but this is quite a high 164

1		figure, is it not?
2	Α.	Absolutely, yes.
3	Q.	Particularly when we bear in mind the relatively small
4		number of outlets that were, in fact, operating the
5		system at the time; is that right?
6	Α.	Yes.
7	Q.	Do you recall how many branches were operating Horizon
8		at this stage?
9	Α.	At this stage, would it be about 200?
10	Q.	I think it was approximately 300, in the region of 299.
11		When viewed in that context, 80 branches being affected
12		by cash account discrepancies is very significant
13		indeed.
14	Α.	Absolutely.
15	Q.	We can also see from this table if we can zoom back
16		in, please in the penultimate row it starts with
17		a question mark "under investigation", which appears to
18		suggest that there were 36 branches affected by cash
19		account discrepancies for which no root cause had been
20		identified.
21	Α.	Correct.
22	Q.	So, at this stage in early September 1999, would it be
23		fair to say cash account balances remained a very
24		serious problem?
25	Α.	Yes.
		165

1	we could turn, please, to page 135 this is a copy of the
2	"Logical design for EPOSS and TIP Reconciliation
3	Controls". It's dated 20 September 1999, Version 0.7.
4	It's quite a lengthy document, I don't intend to take
5	you through all of its detail but if we could turn,
6	please, to page 6 I apologise, it was 135. It's
7	internal page 6. Forgive me, so that should be 141.
8	Under the heading 3, "Overview", there's quite
9	a helpful summary of what the process was intended to
10	entail. It records:
11	"The reconciliation processes will be split into
12	two separate sets of activity. Daily reconciliation
13	tasks and Weekly (or more accurately at the end of each
14	[Cash Accounting Period] CAP) reconciliation tasks.
15	"The daily tasks will ensure that the base
16	transaction data recorded at the counter matches the
17	base transaction data transferred to TIP for that day.
18	At the same time, the transactions will be used to
19	generate total control totals for the Cash Account
20	tables to which the transactions will report at the end
21	of the [Cash Account Period].
22	"At the end of the [Cash Account Period], the
23	daily control totals generated for each Cash Account
24	table will be accumulated and the resulting value
25	calculated for the Payments and Receipts table will be 167

1	Q.	In addition to the fixes that Pathway had identified in
2		their resolution plan, they had also proposed
3		introducing what was called a three-level data integrity
4		check. We can see reference to that at paragraph 5.2 on
5		page 6 of this document, please. At 5.2, the heading
6		"Maturity of plan", says:
7		"The Pathway proposal in this area has now been
8		expanded into the High Level Design document Logical
9		Design for EPOSS/TIP Reconciliation Controls."
10		It goes on to review that was a document being
11		reviewed by the working group in detail. Do you recall
12		seeing a copy of that document?
13	Α.	I think I've seen it somewhere. It might have been just
14		recently, it might have been quite a long time ago.
15	Q.	Before we go to it, can you explain what you understood
16		this three level data integrity check to entail?
17	Α.	I thought you might ask me that and the answer is no.
18		I've seen a very complicated description from ICL
19		Pathway in a letter written by Tony Oppenheim, I think,
20		in the pack.
21	Q.	If we could turn up, please, POL00090428. This contains
22		a copy of the second supplemental agreement concluded
23		between ICL Pathway and Post Office Counters on
24		24 September 1999, so at or around the time that your
25		involvement came to an end. I think that's right. If 166

1	compared with the Cash Account line records generated by
2	the Cash Account production process. If there is
3	a discrepancy in this comparison, then the system will
4	validate each of the accumulated daily control totals
5	with the corresponding Cash Account line records to
6	identify the table which does not reconcile and record
7	an error message in the Riposte message store.
8	"The existing functions in the system which create
9	the outlet stock holding records and the Cash Account
10	Line records will also be amended to accumulate
11	a control total for each set of records which will be
12	written into the message store at the end of each set.
13	These control total records will be harvested and
14	inserted into the TPS Host database. The TPS Host
15	system will compare the Stock Holding records and
16	the Cash Account Line records output to the TIP Cash
17	Account subfile with the control totals received from
18	the OPS system. In the event that the TPS harvester
19	fails to locate either the Stock Holding records or
20	the Cash Account Line records or the control records
21	calculated by the TPS Host system differ from the
22	control totals received from the OPS, then
23	a reconciliation error report will be produced."
24	Does that assist you at all in relation to how
25	this piece of software was intended to function? 168

1	Α.	It resonates and of course the big question is what
2		happens with the error report data?
3	Q.	If I've understood it correctly and that is a big
4		if these new reconciliation controls, I think, were
5		intended to automate a task that Post Office Counters
6		had been performing temporarily in TIP is that
7		right in that they had been seeking to verify whether
8		the base transaction data recorded at the counter was
9		consistent with the transaction data being transferred
10		to TIP?
11	Α.	Yes, I think the aim was to have a completely automatic
12		reconciliation process, which corrected, as a result of
13		the process the checking process. Whether that happened
14		in practice, I can't say.
15	Q.	I think, as you have said, it was a system which was
16		designed to generate a report to verify that the error
17		had taken place
18	Α.	Mmm.
19	Q.	forgive me, to verify that in imbalance had been
20		detected but what the reconciliation control didn't do,
21		did it, was identify the root cause of the discrepancy
22		in the first place?
23	Α.	I think that's right.
24	Q.	As you have explained, you attended a series of
25		workshops, the last of which, I believe, took place on

We can see then under workshop number 5 that Post Office Counters had reviewed identified failure scenarios and some issues with the high level design, which needed clarification. It was proposed that a meeting would take place to discuss Post Office Counters' paper, the EPOSS/TIP reconciliation controls, summarising the failure scenarios and the design issues. A further update at the sixth workshop was that progress was good and that Pathway were to issue a paper for Post Office Counters to review. The final update is at the bottom there for workshop 7. Pathway had issued the high level design --I assume HLD means "high level design" -- paper for Post Office Counters' review and Post Office Counters to provide their written comments to John Pope. So that's essentially where we were with the high level design. Could we go to the next page, please. In relation to whether or not to accept and roll-out out the system, this confirms Pathway's position, as stated previously, was that roll-out should not commence until data integrity should be assured. At workshop number 4, the update was to the effect that Post Office Counters and Pathway needed to develop a contingent approach, possibly including indemnities, suggesting that Keith Baines and Tony Oppenheim would

1		17 September 1999; is that right?
2	Α.	I think so.
3	Q.	Do you recall what progress had been made in relation to
4		resolving IA376 by that stage?
5	Α.	It was still, as I recall it, categorised as high by
6		POCL and medium by ICL.
7	Q.	Please could FUJ00079716 be shown on the screen?
8		We can see your name's recorded under attendees at
9		this meeting on Friday, 17 September 1999. This was the
10		last of the seven workshops that had been arranged.
11	Α.	Correct.
12	Q.	If we could turn to page 6, please, so at the bottom is
13		the heading "AI376 Data Integrity", the substance of
14		which we can see on the following page. If we could
15		scroll down, please. So here is, essentially, an update
16		on where things are in relation to the data integrity
17		checks. It records, as we've seen before, that Pathway
18		were proposing a three-level data integrity check to be
19		implemented in December, with the relevant design
20		documentation to be considered.
21		At the fourth workshop, the update was that Post
22		Office Counters had considered the high level design to
23		be generally good but wanted further checks to be
24		undertaken in relation to failure scenarios and

operating procedures.

meet with the lawyers to initiate that process.
At workshop number 5, Post Office Counters'
position remained that the incident should be classified
high until the data integrity fix was in place. Further
internal meetings were proposed to further confirm the
position.
Workshop number 6, "This will now be part of the
contractual discussions being held" between Post Office
Counters and Pathway.
At workshop number 7, the one that was held on
17 September, it said:
"This issue is now focused on the success criteria
for [national roll-out] resumption."
It confirms at a review in November which may
be an error because, of course, these minutes are dated
September Pathway had previously proposed four weeks'
operation with a less than 1.5 error rate. Keith Baines
and Ruth Holleran proposed an error rate of
0.6 per cent, the current average being 1.2 per cent,
together with six other conditions, five of which were
listed in a paper that "RH" presumably Ruth
Holleran had produced, and the sixth being a further
two-week period of live running of the permanent Cash
Account fix, prior to the actual recommencement of
national roll-out in January.

1		The penultimate paragraph records Tony Oppenheim	1		conditions upon which the system might be accepted?
2		responding as follows: a 0.6 error rate agreed subject	2	Α.	Yes.
3		to this being measured as the average of six weeks from	3	Q.	So what we have, effectively, here is evidence of
4		4 October to mid November, with a maximum of ten working	4		discussions taking place concerning the conditions on
5		days to analyse each TIP fault, comprising a root cause	5		which Post Office Counters might be prepared to accept
6		analysis, diagnosis and agreed resolution and that was	6		the system, notwithstanding that ongoing cash account
7		agreed, except for faults requiring diagnostics.	7		balances were being affected?
8		A further two-week period agreed, subject to the	8	Α.	Yes.
9		agreement of logistics of the plan. On the basis of the	9	Q.	The proposal from Keith Baines and Ruth Holleran,
10		current plan, this condition would lead to a two week	10		employees of Post Office Counters, was that an error
11		delay in the planned date for recommencement of national	11		rate of 0.6 per cent, together with a number of other
12		roll-out and this was agreed:	12		conditions, would be acceptable. Was that your
13		"Re the error rate criterion, the Cash Account	13		understanding at the time?
14		does not reconcile and is attributable to an error in	14	Α.	It resonates with me, yes.
15		the POCL domain. The error rate is to be calculated as	15	Q.	Do you recall the advice that you gave to the parties
16		the ratio if the number of incidents and the total	16		concerning the conditions upon which the system might be
17		number of cash accounts during the six weeks period."	17		accepted in late September 1999?
18		So this is where we were on 17 September. What do	18	Α.	I don't recall giving advice on 376.
19		you understand these discussions to relate to?	19		Were you in favour of Post Office granting conditional
20	Α.	Two things. There was still a problem with 376 and	20		acceptance to the system at this stage?
21		there was some negotiation beginning to start about what	21	Α.	I don't think I indicated that, no.
22		the acceptance criteria might be for that particular	22	Q.	Are you essentially saying that you played no part in
23		incident.	23		facilitating the resolution of this particular incident
24	Q.	You use the term "acceptance criteria". Would it be	24		by this late stage in September?
25		right to refer to it maybe as "conditions", the	25	Α.	
		173			174
1		getting to that position but there was a subsequent	1		would have equated to more than 100 Post Office branches
2		meeting between the two senior people, which continued	2		when spread out to the national level.
3		to debate what those conditions should be and that ended	3	Α.	No, it's quite significant.
4		in an agreement that further staff work was necessary to	4	Q.	Now, I think you say you don't recall having any part in
5		understand the implications of those agreements and	5		the final resolution that was reached. I wonder if we
6		I didn't play a part in that. My understanding was that	6		could look at POL00083907. This is an email from Keith
7		there was some further negotiation which resulted in	7		Baines on 22 September 1999 to a number of employees of
8		an agreement for somewhat different conditions but	8		Post Office Counters, Andrew Simpkins, John Meagher,
9		I don't know what they were.	9		David Miller, David Smith and Ruth Holleran. It
10	Q.	Just dealing, first, with the level of your involvement	10		records the subject of it is "The AB and RAB on
11		with this AI, you were of course present at the meeting	11		Friday". Do you know what that is a reference to?
12		on the 17th, when these conditions were being mooted as	12	Α.	Acceptance Board and Release Acceptance Board.
13		a possible condition for accepting the system and	13	Q.	I think it's the "Acceptance Board" and the "Release
14		rolling it out?	14		Authorisation Board", possibly?
15	Α.	Yes.	15	Α.	Right.
16	Q.	Even if you didn't give specific advice on it, you were	16	Q.	It says:
17		aware that this was what was under discussion by the	17		"John/Andrew
18		parties; that's right?	18		"At this morning's briefing session with Stuart
19	Α.	Yes.	19		Sweetman on the acceptance position, there were some
20	Q.	To accept the system with ongoing cash account	20		discussions about the role and empowerment of the AB and
21		imbalances, did you not consider at the time that this	21		RAB. I have since spoken to Jeff Triggs and obtained
22		represented quite a significant risk to Post Office	22		his view on this and then discussed with David Miller.
23		Counters?	23		The position is as follows:
24	Α.	And I think we discussed that.	24		"Post Office Counters will not be accepting the
25	Q.	Because an error rate of 0.6 per cent in any given week 175	25		service against the existing contract and therefore the 176
					(11) Pages 173 176

The Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry

1		nature of the decision at the acceptance board is	1		wording in the enclosure is that suggested by Pathway
2		different to that originally intended. The board should	2		and recommended by Peter Copping. We were not able to
3		make a recommendation as to whether or not the second	3		agree it yesterday because we don't have the right
4		supplementary agreement which has been negotiated with	4		people available to review it. Can John and Ruth look
5		Pathway over the last few weeks should be signed. The	5		and comment to me? Copied to Jeff Triggs, please."
6		supplementary agreement then states that acceptance is	6		So can we turn to the following page, please. So
7		deemed to have taken place and the various contractual	7		here we have the position reached in negotiations on the
8		consequences of that, such as payment to Pathway, will	8		21st, relating to Acceptance Incident 298. What the
9		follow.	9		previous email suggests is you had some input on the
10		"The same applies to the RAB since the	10		wording of this particular
11		supplementary agreement says that Post Office Counters	11	Α.	On 298
12		Limited has authorised roll-out. The supplementary	12	Q.	Do you recall that?
13		agreement is formally a change control note to the	13		yes.
14		contract and, therefore, can be signed by David	14		That provided that:
15		Miller it doesn't need Stuart's signature. Can you	15		"The occurrence of operational incidents in
16		please make this rather subtle change in the roles of	16		connection with this AI should have been reduced below
17		the meetings apparent in their agendas, please?"	17		a target threshold as measured over the four weeks.
18		That's from Keith at 13.27.	18		Measurement will be based on all outlets installed
19		Can we turn to the next page please. There's	19		before or on 1 October 1999, provided there are at least
20		a further email on the same date at 13.51, the subject	20		750 such outlets."
21		being the "Supplementary Agreement":	21		If we scroll down to the penultimate paragraph:
22		"The enclosed is my understanding of the position	22		"The target to be met is that the rate of
23		we agreed at the end of yesterday's meeting with	23		occurrence measured over the four-week period to
24		Pathway. There is one area not yet agreed namely the	24		mid-November should average no more than one unit per
25		question of how to count incidents under AI298. The	25		counter position per three months."
		177			178
1		So that essentially was the target set for	1		acceptance documentation. That meeting ended with an
2		resolution of AI 298; is that correct?	2		agreement between the two that further staff work would
3		Correct.	3		be necessary in order to understand whether or not there
4	Q.	And on the following page, please, we have Acceptance	4		could be an agreement on 376. I did not take part in
5		Incident 376. This refers to the arrangements for the	5	~	that process and I'm not familiar with the output.
6		integrity control to be implemented by Pathway by	6	Q.	At the point at which you ceased to be involved in
7		31 December 1999 and that those will be as previously	7		Horizon, what was your professional assessment of the
8		required by Post Office Counters, apart from the	8		robustness of the system?
9		following amendments listed below. So is it right to	9	А.	I think my overall assessment was that the Post Office
10		say your evidence is you had no involvement in the	10		had, in accepting the system and this is
11		detail of	11		a benefit-of-hindsight judgement had accepted further
12	Α.	I think this was an agreement that was struck between	12		risk in agreeing to accept the system and release for
13	~	POCL and Pathway without my involvement.	13		roll-out with the proposals from ICL, particularly on
14	Q.	After the workshop on 17 September 1999, do you recall	14		376. We certainly talked about what needed to be put in
15 16		having any further involvement in the Horizon System?	15		place in order to monitor and mitigate any risk arising,
		My involvement ceased after 24 September '99.	16		but I really don't know what happened after I left the
	A.	Forgive me the meeting to which the further	17		project in terms of rick mitigation and further testing
17		Forgive me, the meeting to which the further	17		project in terms of risk mitigation and further testing
17 18	Q.	resolution meeting to which we've referred?	18		of the bug fixes that were being put in place beyond the
17 18 19	Q. A.	resolution meeting to which we've referred? Sorry, I'm not following.	18 19		of the bug fixes that were being put in place beyond the acceptance timescale.
17 18 19 20	Q.	resolution meeting to which we've referred? Sorry, I'm not following. Sorry, my question was whether your involvement ended on	18 19 20	MS	of the bug fixes that were being put in place beyond the acceptance timescale. HODGE: Thank you, Mr Copping. I've no further questions
17 18 19 20 21	Q. A.	resolution meeting to which we've referred? Sorry, I'm not following. Sorry, my question was whether your involvement ended on the 17th but you attended a further meeting as we've	18 19 20 21	MS	of the bug fixes that were being put in place beyond the acceptance timescale. BHODGE: Thank you, Mr Copping. I've no further questions for you. There may be some questions from the
17 18 19 20 21 22	Q. A. Q.	resolution meeting to which we've referred? Sorry, I'm not following. Sorry, my question was whether your involvement ended on the 17th but you attended a further meeting as we've just	18 19 20 21 22	MS	of the bug fixes that were being put in place beyond the acceptance timescale. HODGE: Thank you, Mr Copping. I've no further questions for you. There may be some questions from the representatives of the Core Participants.
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17 18 19 20 21 22	Q. A. Q.	resolution meeting to which we've referred? Sorry, I'm not following. Sorry, my question was whether your involvement ended on the 17th but you attended a further meeting as we've just	18 19 20 21 22		of the bug fixes that were being put in place beyond the acceptance timescale. HODGE: Thank you, Mr Copping. I've no further questions for you. There may be some questions from the representatives of the Core Participants.

	Mr Copping, my name is Sam Stein. I represent	1	Q.	The reason for that is that you are talking about major
2	a number of a large group of subpostmasters,	2		parts of the future planning. That's implementation
3	mistresses and managers.	3		management; that's putting it into place?
4	I'm going to take you to your report that you	4	Α.	Yes.
5	dealt with already with my learned friend at	5	Q.	Contract that's oversight presumably of the
6	POL00028092. Paul, if you're handling thank you very	6		contract to get Horizon working?
7	much if you're handling what we see on the screen,	7	Α.	Yes.
8	could you go to internal pagination on Relativity page 7	8	Q.	And then oversight of the service which is then being
9	of 132 and roughly two-thirds of the way down you will	9		provided by Horizon?
10	see the paragraph, Paul, that starts:	10	Α.	Yes.
11	"Our key concern"	11	Q.	These are core competencies?
12	Could you highlight that paragraph. Thank you.	12	Α.	Yes.
13	Now, Mr Copping, I am just going to remind you of	13	Q.	When subpostmasters and mistresses started to use the
14	what is being said here within this report:	14		Horizon System, they found, as their evidence has set
15	"Our key concern is that the skills required for	15		out, that the training was inadequate, that there were
16	many of the new senior post are, in our opinion, not	16		difficulties with the operation of the Horizon System,
17	those we would have expected to find as part of POCL	17		and, in particular, difficulties with trying to make
18	core competencies. This is especially true in relation	18		sure that they could achieve balance.
19	to implementation management and contract and service	19	Α.	Yes.
20	management. There seems, however, to be no evidence of	20	Q.	Achieving balance in relation to their accounts is an
21	external recruitment activity or robust plans to create	21		important part of their process; do you agree?
22	the competence internally."	22	Α.	Yes.
23	Mr Copping, that seems to foreshadow a fairly bad	23	Q.	If there is insufficient oversight and knowledge of the
24	problem within POCL; do you agree?	24		Horizon System within the Post Office, within POCL, does
25 A	Yes.	25		that mean that these particular difficulties that
	181			182
1	postmasters and mistresses were suffering from might not	1		Post Office side, as opposed to the technical side,
	F			
2	be remedied by the Post Office?			which was ICI 's responsibility, and the need for process
2 3 A	be remedied by the Post Office?	2		which was ICL's responsibility, and the need for process change in order to support new ways of working.
3 A	I don't think I can answer that question. I think at	2 3	0	change in order to support new ways of working.
3 A 4	I don't think I can answer that question. I think at the time we did this review in '97 there was no doubt in	2 3 4	Q.	change in order to support new ways of working. And finally, it's stating perhaps the blindingly obvious
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3 A. 4 5 6	I don't think I can answer that question. I think at the time we did this review in '97 there was no doubt in our minds that the Post Office had a shortfall in competent resources in the areas we discussed. There is	2 3 4 5 6		change in order to support new ways of working. And finally, it's stating perhaps the blindingly obvious but Horizon was a new way of working for the Post Office?
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1	were	taking on, those additional risks that they were	1
2	taking	g on, to be registered in some way perhaps by the	2
3	board	d or by some management level and monitored until	3
4	they v	were satisfied that those risks were no longer	4
5	signif	ficant?	5
6	A. Yes,	and I don't know whether this was put in place.	6
7	What	t would normally happen on a project of that sort	7
8	would	d be a full risk assessment process which is updated	8
9	on a i	regular basis within the programme, and if	9
10	insuff	ficient progress is being made (for example, on bug	10
11	fixes	and regression testing), then those risks would	11
12	begin	n to replicate themselves over time and that, in	12
13	turn,	one would expect would escalate the issue to	13
14	a higł	her level through the organisation. Whether or not	14
15	that v	was put in place, I can't say.	15
16	Q. But th	hat's what you would have expected?	16
17	A. That's	's what I would expect from a management point of	17
18	view,	, yes.	18
19	MS PAGE	E: Thank you.	19
20	SIR WYN	WILLIAMS: Right. Well, I won't repeat my thanks	20
21	but th	hanks again, Mr Copping. And I take it that now is	21
22	the er	end of this session?	22
23	MS HODO	GE: Yes, sir. Thank you that concludes the evidence	23
24	of tod	day.	24
25	SIR WYN	NWILLIAMS: All right. Well, we will meet again on 185	25

Tuesday morning at 10.00. Thank you all very much.

MS HODGE: Thank you.

(4.27 pm)

(Adjourned until 10.00 am on Tuesday, 25 October 2022)

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61/13 63/2	115/15	11/14 20/17	27/5 48/20	
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80/6 92/14	161/2	wanted [15]	92/5 96/3	179/21
93/7 93/8	176/22	26/20 28/23	96/10 97/18	week [8]
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123/18	139/25	50/1 64/7	117/12	172/23
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6/24 8/21	185/25	12/2 12/4	78/17 78/22	127/10
14/19 15/22	Wendy [2]	12/9 14/10	85/16 87/1	127/13
16/10 22/19	1/15 1/17	14/18 15/4	87/12 89/12	127/13
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26/3 27/15	7/5 9/2 13/2	15/16 17/14	94/19 94/21	128/10
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68/8 68/20	21/25 31/10	33/19 38/22	106/2 106/4	135/3
74/2 86/8	33/10 33/16	39/21 39/23	106/8	135/14
87/3 89/1	38/8 40/14	40/21 42/13	106/23	136/11
89/18 90/6	50/14 51/4	42/15 43/8	108/3	141/16
91/9 92/5	51/20 67/1	43/14 43/25		142/15
	71/15 90/16	44/2 44/9	110/25	143/9 143/9
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143/11	183/12	176/2	whether [43]	6/9 7/19
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143/22	185/7	184/22	28/3 30/19	11/20 12/24
144/7 145/4	185/16	where [37]	38/20 40/1	13/15 14/25
145/25	185/17	11/1 15/3	43/13 45/22	15/25 17/1
146/9 150/3	what's [4]	22/15 24/15	46/3 46/4	20/19 21/10
150/24	33/3 41/9	26/17 29/13	68/12 75/2	22/12 23/19
151/1 153/9	99/7 183/20	38/3 59/15	83/2 83/21	23/20 23/21
153/13	Whatever	59/20 68/19	84/9 87/8	27/24 29/11
153/20	[1] 19/17	75/19 81/19	94/20	31/22 31/25
156/7	when [41]	86/10 86/19	110/24	31/25 32/2
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157/17	11/1 11/11	94/8 94/11	121/8 121/9	34/20 37/5
158/18	18/21 23/1	97/13	121/12	38/7 40/1
160/1	24/15 26/1	111/11	123/19	41/16 47/22
164/10	27/23 44/23	114/8	124/3 124/4	48/6 48/25
164/16	50/11 52/11	114/12	128/6	49/2 49/14
166/3	58/15 60/10	115/15	128/20	52/11 53/13
166/15	67/20 71/1	115/18	129/20	53/14 55/8
167/9 169/1	71/6 73/23	118/7 121/2	129/22	58/14 59/17
169/20	75/16 76/18	132/12	138/17	61/5 61/6
170/3	82/23 83/21	133/7	150/18	63/23 64/15
173/18	85/5 90/18	135/13	151/23	66/7 67/18
173/21	92/5 95/19	136/22	152/3	70/4 70/16
174/3 175/3	102/12	142/1	159/16	72/5 72/14
175/9	105/5 112/5	146/12	169/7	74/10 74/10
175/17	113/6	146/14	169/13	74/25 75/16
176/11	119/17	153/17	171/18	75/17 75/21
178/8 180/7	138/16	170/16	177/3	77/18 78/13
180/14	144/24	171/16	179/20	80/22 81/16
180/16	163/11	173/18	180/3 185/6	83/25 84/7
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[106] 91/7	127/20	167/20	1/15 2/3 2/4	99/9
93/17 96/5	128/6 129/7	168/6 168/8	5/10 5/15	whoever [1]
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104/13	133/20	169/12	11/17 15/3	whole [8]
105/3 105/6	133/24	169/15	15/18 15/19	3/22 24/8
105/10	138/8	169/25	16/7 16/22	48/7 48/7
105/20	138/19	170/14	35/16 35/23	51/5 82/12
106/3	139/18	171/4	36/23 42/1	84/5 90/10
106/15	140/1 140/9	172/14	43/18 49/25	whom [7]
106/17	140/13	172/20	50/4 50/23	19/7 29/23
106/19	140/16	174/1 174/5	51/7 51/15	40/17 49/22
106/25	140/22	174/16	51/25 53/24	108/23
107/20	140/23	175/2 175/7	54/1 58/20	109/11
108/18	141/4 141/5	177/4	58/23 60/15	119/25
108/19	142/1 142/2	179/17	62/11 63/2	whose [3]
109/8	142/3 142/9	179/18	63/7 65/25	60/23 84/19
110/12	142/13	179/23	66/12 66/14	88/2
112/22	142/13	179/24	66/14 66/19	why [21]
112/25	143/17	180/6 182/8	67/8 68/22	9/9 15/24
114/8	145/24	184/2	69/3 71/24	22/19 23/1
114/16	146/11	184/19	72/11 72/23	26/21 29/19
115/3 115/4	146/23	184/21	74/22 79/7	33/11 36/12
115/23	147/12	185/8	85/8 91/16	41/10 61/19
115/24	149/22	while [6]	92/3 92/7	103/3 103/6
117/25	149/23	10/18 12/14	98/1 99/11	109/21
118/2	150/10	19/11 38/18	108/11	114/18
118/19	151/5 155/1	63/23	130/22	115/12
119/9	156/18	152/19	131/10	136/18
119/13	156/25	whilst [3]	132/12	140/23
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121/0121/7	160/4 162/2	97/12	who'd [1]	151/20
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wide [1]	154/21	16/7 16/17	21/1 42/5	34/15 42/19
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[1] 163/15	159/21	30/12 35/19	86/20 89/7	74/6 82/8
wilder [2]	162/9 163/4	36/18 36/18	92/18 92/21	86/3 91/21
67/16 67/16	167/11	36/24 37/1	100/14	105/5 105/7
will [67] 4/8	167/15	37/6 37/20	100/19	106/20
9/25 12/10	167/18	41/20 41/25	184/14	108/1 112/8
14/4 29/11	167/20	42/15 47/1	won't [6]	114/20
31/18 34/3	167/24	63/25 65/19	17/2 19/25	114/24
34/15 38/21	167/25	66/12 67/10	71/20 86/9	115/5 115/6
44/17 45/1	168/3	67/19 72/4	143/1	116/1 116/4
45/2 47/22	168/10	84/20 85/24	185/20	116/12
48/20 50/21	168/11	90/4 94/20	wonder [7]	119/21
55/4 56/18	168/13	98/4 116/19	43/18 53/24	120/25
70/7 70/16	168/15	181/14	135/15	124/7
74/15 75/13	168/23	181/24	137/21	133/21
76/9 77/12	172/7	182/24	141/12	139/23
79/2 80/11	176/24	182/24	148/3 176/5	175/4 180/2
80/24 81/22	177/8	183/21	wondered	worked [9]
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33/11 38/17	118/16	157/8	119/24	61/5 65/14
40/12 56/15	131/8	157/12	Y	67/15 68/14
60/11 60/19	133/17	wrinkles [1]	<u> </u>	70/23 77/20
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66/25 67/7	149/7 149/9	write [2]	53/24 89/24	97/21
67/8 68/4	150/10	53/21	year [9] 5/3 35/15 60/10	154/15
68/16 69/4	152/7 153/1	161/22	75/23 84/5	178/3
70/6 102/23	156/6	writing [3]	84/11	yesterday's
109/23	157/11	24/18 77/25	100/20	[1] 177/23
120/10	157/18	162/24	157/9	yet [4]
130/18	169/25	written [13]	157/13	31/16 49/25
131/3 158/9	170/10	79/5 99/16	year 2000	59/2 177/24
166/11	world [3]	109/3	[1] 35/15	you [622]
173/4 182/6	8/10 62/15	119/13	Year's [1]	you'd [3]
183/18	93/18	119/17	75/16	35/20 42/3
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31/15 44/22	worst [2]	147/22	72/7 101/17	3/1 63/11
45/10 92/5	68/24 87/25	162/7	151/17	91/22
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170/21	23/2 24/17	8/6 14/4	7/5 12/24	104/20
171/1 171/8	38/5 40/3	50/19 55/4	13/2 14/22	149/15
171/12	46/5 47/4	124/22	28/18 32/2	150/7 152/5
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