

Witness Name: Lynne Sagar
Statement No.: WITN09040100
Dated: 5th April 2023

POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY

FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF LYNNE SAGAR (née FALLOWFIELD)

I, **LYNNE SAGAR (née FALLOWFIELD)**, will say as follows...

INTRODUCTION

1. I am a former employee of Post Office Limited and held the position of Service Continuity Support and subsequently Problem Manager from May 2005 to April 2007.
2. This witness statement is made to assist the Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry (the "**Inquiry**") with the matters set out in the Rule 9 Request dated 6th March 2023 (the "**Request**").

Background

3. The Inquiry has asked me to set out briefly my professional background. In 1989, after completing my 'A' levels I joined the Royal Mail Group/Royal Mail Parcels (subsequently Parcelforce Worldwide) with most of the roles being administrative within the Commercial departments.

4. I transferred to Post Office Ltd in November 2002 and joined the Performance Support Team in Chesterfield, with the main task to support Sub postmasters with transactional errors. Prior to joining the Service Continuity Team in May 2005, I held various roles within the Network Business Support Centre (NBSC) including Customer Relations Officer and External Helpline Quality Assurance Officer.
5. Upon leaving the Service Continuity Team I moved to the Service Delivery team and held the role as a Telephony Service Manager, the role entailed working as part of a team to manage the outsourced suppliers of the Post Office HomePhone and Broadband service, and the Customer Service and Complaint line of business. I subsequently moved within the Service Delivery team, where I held the role of a Service Delivery Manager (Mails) until leaving the Post Office in August 2016. This role entailed working as part of a team to manage operational and service level agreements and identify any service improvements for the contract between Royal Mail Group and the Post Office.
6. Upon leaving the Post Office I gained employment in October 2016 at an elastomer & polymer manufacturing company (Aerospace & Defence). Working within the Commercial and Customer Service department I have held roles as a Program Co-ordinator and Customer Services Manager.

Problem Management

7. I have been asked to explain my responsibilities as a Problem Manager. I do not remember in detail the role as it was approximately 18 years ago. From what I can remember the main role was to manage the day-to-day relationship

with Fujitsu Services to ensure branch availability. This included investigating and resolving on-line issues within branches which could include hardware or network issues.

8. I have been asked to describe any training that I received for my role as a Problem Manager. Given the length of time that has elapsed, it is difficult for me to recall any formal training. To the best of my knowledge, it is most likely the training I would have received for the role would have been side by side training with other incumbent team members.
9. I have been asked who I would have worked with during my role as a Problem Manager, again due to the length of time that has elapsed I cannot recall in any detail my time as a Problem Manager. The role was reactive in nature and as a team we would have worked with the following teams:
 - a. Network Business Support Centre
 - b. Area teams as required.
 - c. Fujitsu Service Managers
 - d. Sub postmasters

Callendar Square

10. I have been asked to describe my views of the robustness of the Horizon IT System prior to becoming aware of the Callendar Square bug. Given the length of time that has elapsed, I do not recall the Callendar Square bug or the specific incident. I can see from document POL00081928 I was aware at the time and to the best of my knowledge would have involved all appropriate teams such as Fujitsu Services to resolve the incident. I do not ever recall having any doubts regarding the robustness of the Horizon IT system.

11. I have been asked when I first became aware of the Callendar Square bug.
As mentioned in my comments above I do not have any recollection of that specific incident.
12. I have been asked following the awareness of the Callendar Square bug how many branches did I think were affected and how many branches could possibly be affected. Given the length of time that has elapsed, I have no recollection of the Callendar Square bug or the specific incident.
13. I have been asked to describe what steps I or the Post Office would have taken to obtain further information regarding the Callendar Square bug and if it affected any other branches. To the best of my knowledge the process would have been to engage Fujitsu Services and work with the Service Managers to identify any potential issues affecting the specific branch and identifying any other branches affected by the same issue, whether by calls in to the Horizon Service desk or the NBSC.
14. I have been asked whether my understanding of how many branches were or could possibly have been affected by the Callendar Square bug has changed over time. As I have no recollection of the specific incident, I was not aware the subject of this Inquiry was connected to any incident raised during my time in the Problem Management team until the witness statement request was received.
15. I have been asked if I was the Problem Manager responsible for the Callendar Square bug following its identification. I can see from the email trail in document POL00081928 I was named as a contact point by Gary Blackburn, but I cannot confirm that I was the overall Problem Manager for the incident.

16. I have been asked to explain how the incident was managed following its discovery by the Post Office. To the best of my knowledge the incident would have been raised to Fujitsu Services, to either a Service Manager or the Horizon System Helpdesk for investigation. Updates to this open incident would have been fed back periodically including any fixes required to all involved stakeholders. I do not recall any specific details.
17. I have been asked who would have been responsible for disseminating knowledge of the existence, nature and extent of the incident. As I have no recollection of the processes and procedures or the specific incident due to the time that has elapsed, I can only provide assumptions based on general ways of working that any stakeholder in the incident would have been updated during the progression of the investigation either by the Problem Management team, NBSC or Horizon System Helpdesk. For any individual branch incidents, the stakeholders would include but not limited to the NBSC, Area teams, Sub postmasters. For any incidents that affected the entire Post Office network, for example any major incident that prevented any transactions, this would have included a more senior circulation. I do not recall specific names or job titles within the Senior circulation list but to the best of my knowledge would have been within the hierarchy of my team.
18. As I have no recollection of the specific incident, I cannot comment who was or would have been informed of the incident. I can see from the email trail in document POL00081928, Gary Blackburn, who to the best of my knowledge was either my manager or a senior team member, as well as Service Managers from Fujitsu were involved and would have been kept updated.

19. As I have no recollection of the specific incident, I cannot comment who was or would have been informed of the incident or any timescales. As answered in point 17 above any identified stakeholders at the time would have been kept updated at appropriate intervals during the investigation dependant on the severity.
20. I have been asked whether any of the following groups were not provided information on the Callendar Square bug and, if so, why: those within Post Office responsible for audit; those within Post Office responsible for investigating and / or prosecuting sub-postmasters or other employees; the NBSC; those within Post Office responsible for training others; contract advisors / managers; senior management within Post Office; the Post Office Board; and sub-postmasters and those working within Crown Office branches. As I have no recollection of the specific incident, I cannot comment who was not informed of the incident.
21. As I have no recollection of the specific incident, I cannot comment what additional investigations would have taken place.
22. As I have no recollection of the specific incident, I cannot comment on the steps taken to ensure the incident was rectified.
23. I have been asked whether my views on the robustness of the Horizon IT System changed following the discovery of the Callendar Square bug. Given the length of time that has elapsed, I do not recall the Callendar Square bug or the specific incident. To the best of my knowledge, I do not recall having any doubts regarding the robustness of the Horizon IT system up until my leaving Post Office Limited in 2016.

24. I have been asked if I would have done anything differently in relation to this incident knowing what we know now. With the benefit of hindsight, as with anything, I am sure certain things would have been done differently but it is difficult to respond to this in specifics as I have fairly limited recollection to particular incidents in my time in the Problem Management team.

25. I have been asked if I have any recollection to having a conversation with Mandy Talbot regarding the Callendar Square bug as outlined in document POL00070131. Due to the length of time that has elapsed, no I do not recall a conversation with Mandy Talbot.

26. I have been asked if I was involved in the civil proceedings referred to in document POL00070133. To the best of my knowledge, I was not involved in these proceedings.

27. I have been asked what was done in respect of problem management of the Callendar Square bug by December 2006 or thereafter. As I have no recollection of the specific incident, I cannot comment what additional activities were undertaken.

OTHER BUGS, ERRORS, AND DEFECTS WITHIN THE HORIZON IT SYSTEM

28. I have been asked which if any of the bugs described in the Technical Appendix in document POL00022841 (paragraphs 128-140 and 152-418) Given the length of time that has elapsed and as I had left the Problem Management team in April 2007, I do not recall any of the other bugs, errors or defects listed.

29. As I have no recollection of any other bugs, errors or defects and left the Problem Management Team in April 2007, I am unable to answer to the how

and when these bugs were identified and what steps were taken to rectify them.

30. I have been asked to describe my current views on the Horizon system. I left Post Office Limited in 2016 and up until the news reports and subsequent Television programme was not aware of the impact and actions taken against sub postmasters. My view regarding Horizon Online is that I hope that better safeguards have been put in place to identify issues sooner.

31. I have nothing further to bring to the Chair's attention.

Statement of Truth

I believe the content of this statement to be true.

Signed: _____

Dated: **05.04.2023**

GRO

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<u>No.</u>	<u>URN</u>	<u>Document Description</u>	<u>Control Number</u>
<u>1</u>	POL00022841	Technical Appendix to Judgment (NO 6) "Horizon Issues"	POL-0019320
<u>2</u>	POL00070131	Email from and Lynne Fallowfield to Mandy Talbot, copied to Gary Blackburn, Sandra Mackay, Shaun Turner and Stephen Dilley, re: Callendar Square URGENT, with chain	POL-0066694
<u>3</u>	POL00070133	Email from Mandy Talbot to Steve Parker re: Callendar Square URGENT, with chain	POL-0066696
<u>4</u>	POL00081928	Emails between Nicola Sherry, Mandy Talbot, Stephen Dillley, Keith Baines and Clare Wardle re Callendar Square & Lee Castleton	POL-0078491