

Witness Name: Richard Phillip Francis

Statement No.: WITN11210100

Dated: 17th October 2024

POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY

FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF RICHARD FRANCIS

I, RICHARD PHILLIP FRANCIS, will say as follows...

INTRODUCTION

1. I am a former employee of Post Office Limited and held the position of Operations Director from January 2005 through to March 2008 when I left the business.
2. This witness statement is made to assist the Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry (the "**Inquiry**") with the matters set out in the Rule 9 Request dated 15th August 2024 (the "**Request**"). This statement is in relation to Phases 5 & 6 of the Inquiry.

BACKGROUND

3. I have been asked to set out a summary of my career prior to joining POL. After leaving school at the age of 16 I immediately joined a clerical training

program at the South-Eastern Electricity board where in parallel to internal training programs I studied for an ONC in Business Studies. In approximately 1981 I moved to the Computing function within the Electricity Board to train as a Computer Programmer.

4. Over the years that followed I continued a computing/technology based career leading to a number of IT Director & CIO roles within Pepsi Cola International, TI/Smiths Group & Safeway up until Safeway was bought by Morrisons.
5. Upon leaving Safeway I carried out a few small consulting/advisory roles before being approached for the role at POL.
6. With regards to my role at POL, I was recruited into as Operations Director in January 2005 as a direct report to David Mills, the CEO. The role of Operations Director did not exist at the time and the plan, as it was originally laid out to me, was to take over some of the functions under the control of Dave Miller who was the Chief Operating Officer (COO). This was to take place during the period of time before David Miller was due to retire in mid 2006.
7. It is difficult to recall the exact timings of the functional transitions, but the first function was IT under the interim leadership of David X Smith. My recollection for starting with IT was that it was my core background together with the fact that POL was already in a negotiation process with Fujitsu to replace the legacy Horizon solution that had been used since 1999.
8. The second of the functions to move across was the Supply Chain which consisted of Cash in Transit, Cash Centres and distribution of materials to the Post Office Network. This function was led by Keith Rann. As stated previously, I am unsure of the exact timing, but I would believe it to be during the first quarter

or shortly afterwards. Within a similar timeframe I took over the Property function which was under the Leadership of Clive Bradley

9. Towards the end of 2005 I inherited the Security Function which was led by Tony Marsh who had a dual reporting line with Royal Mail Group (RMG). This function was taken over by John Scott in early 2007 following Tony Marsh's appointment to RMG Group Head of Security.
10. In 2006 there was a change of CEO from David Mills to Alan Cook which , at some point during that year, which led to a switch towards a program based approach aimed at significant cost reduction to meet business sustainability targets. At this point I added a program called Operational Efficiency which was led by Neil Ennis.
11. One final point of note is that that at some point in 2005, I cannot recall exactly when, but I would imagine around quarter 3 I decided that to increase focus on both the Change and Service Delivery, David X Smith would become the Head of Change & IS (IT) and a new appointment of Andy McLean to become the Head of Service Delivery. Andy's role was to cover not only IT services, but all other aspects of Operations performance (e.g. Contact Centres, Supply Chain etc.)
12. As previously stated, I left POL in March 2008, I had decided to leave at the end of 2007 but in discussions with Alan Cook we landed on a date that was mutually convenient to both POL and myself.
13. As I had worked for several large organisations over the years it was my intention to follow a path of independent consulting and advisory for a small number of companies. This is what I am still doing today.

ROLE AS DIRECTOR

14. When I joined POL in 2005 this was my first appointment to a Limited company board and, as such, it was very much a 'learning on the job' process. I do not recall any specific training or instructions given to me at that time but as I was joining an established group, I would have followed the lead given by my peers.

14.1. Personally, I was not aware of criminal prosecutions that were being carried out by POL. From my recollection there were no notifications of intended or actual prosecutions that were presented to the board at any point in time.

14.2. Personally, I was not aware of any civil litigations that were being carried out by POL. From my recollection there were no notifications of civil litigation that were presented to the board at any point in time.

14.3. IT, as per any of the functions of the business, would have major activities reviewed at a board level (i.e. the proposal to move to the new Horizon Solution (HNG-X)). In the event of high-profile failures, I would expect the board to understand the implications. The only example of one of these issues was around network resilience due to poor performance from the network suppliers and limited back up capability. I cannot recall if these issues existed before my arrival but they were eventually resolved as can be seen in the POL Board papers. Business as usual activities for IT would be managed within the IT function and the Service Delivery functions alongside the delivery partner Fujitsu.

14.4. Preparation of Management and Statutory accounts was a role of

the finance function, and the position of POL's finances would be regularly presented to the board, particularly considering potential solvency issues. The systems that were in use for this were supported within the IT organisation and its partners.

14.5. I do not recall any specific conversations on the Race Relations Act at the POL board (the Act referred to here is 2010, which is after I left the business, but the principal remains the same). I do recall a clear focus on Diversity and Diversity awareness / training which was operated at the RMG level. This seemed to be appropriate as all activities and actions would be groupwide and not just POL.

15. In order to address the question where various responsibilities laid within the group my views are as follows:

15.1. The monitoring of the Horizon system was a joint responsibility of Fujitsu (the support partner) and the IT/Service Delivery function.

15.2. With regards to the responsibilities for Criminal Prosecutions and Civil Proceedings, my understanding of this process was that the audit function (part of Network or Finance – I cannot recall which) could identify shortfalls as part of their standard audit processes and in combination with the contract managers decide if they needed further investigation from the investigations team. I could assume that at this point there would be reference back into Fujitsu for data analysis, where necessary. Any move towards prosecution would then have to be taken with RMG legal team as there was not a POL legal structure during my time at POL. I do not know if this has become learned understanding from the inquiry, but I do not remember it being any different.

15.3. Personally, I was never asked to review any cases and I was never asked to authorise or request any prosecutions either as an individual or at a POL board level.

16. With respect to oversight and reporting lines:

16.1. At no point during my time with POL did I have any personal involvement or oversight of the Group Legal Department nor did I have any involvement or oversight of the RMH, RMG IT department.

16.2. The POL IT department reported into me from January 2005 to March 2008 via The Head of IT, David X Smith.

16.3. I had no personal involvement in the oversight of the RMH, RMG problem management teams.

16.4. The POL problem management team, although I do not recognise the name, would have been part of the Service Delivery/IT functions together with Fujitsu. These internal teams would have ultimately reported into me via the heads of those internal functions and their own organisational layers.

16.5. I had no personal involvement in the oversight of the RMH or RMG security teams. The POL security team reported into me from the end of 2005 with a dual reporting line into RMG.

16.6. I had no personal involvement in the oversight of the investigation and prosecution of SPMs for the recovery of alleged shortfalls. As previously stated in response 15.2 there was a range of functions involved in these decisions with the ultimate responsibility sitting in the RMG legal function.

16.7. I had no personal involvement in the oversight of the of SPMs for the recovery of alleged shortfalls including civil proceedings. As previously stated in response 15.2 there was a range of functions involved in these decisions. In my mind I have no recollection of a delineation between prosecutions and civil proceedings, but this may be a reflection on my lack of involvement.

17. I do not recall ever being shown, reviewed or asked to comment on any of the guidelines and practices followed by POL, RMH and/or RMG when pursuing a civil action against an SPM.

18. The audit process was not something that I have ever had visibility of. I suspect this would be because it was managed within a different directorate (i.e. Finance or Network), and it was never raised as a discussion.

19. My understanding is that the contract management team would be responsible for suspending or terminating SPMs' contracts. I had no visibility into this as it was part of the network function.

20. I do not recall ever being shown, reviewed or asked to comment on any of the practices and policies adopted by POL, RMG and / or RMG in investigating, alleged offences, bringing prosecutions or the process of disclosing documents. I do not recall ever hearing a conversation around document disclosure.

21. With regards to the extent to which I passed on information about concerns as to the reliability of data produced by the Horizon IT System. These concerns were never raised to me in my timeframe at POL and therefore this would not have happened.

22. During my time at POL, I did not receive any information about the lack of

reliability of the Horizon IT system and therefore this information would also not have been shared with the POL board or Royal Mail.

23. I have been asked to reflect on a number of aspects of how the POL, RMH & RMG boards operated but as I was not a regular attendee to the RMG or RMH boards I can only really comment on the POL board from early 2005 to early 2008. There is one exception to this when I attended small part of the RMH board in April 2006 to seek approval for the next stage of investment for the development of the Horizon HNG-X solution (RMG00000033). I believe that the reason for this was that the amount was too great for the POL board to approve alone. As a result of just one partial meeting, I do not have a view on how those boards operated.

23.1. The POL board had a collegiate style under the leadership of Sir Mike Hodgkinson and David Mills. The discussions were open with a feeling that any subject could be raised or challenged.

23.2. Following the arrival of Alan Cook and a number of new directors being appointed, the POL board felt less of a joined up group and more a set of directors with their own functions.

23.3. As a result of the inquiry providing me with the Board minutes from February 2005 through to January 2008, I am in a better position to answer the question relating to regular reporting to the POL board other than relying purely on memory. (POL00021487, POL00032147, POL00021490, POL00021491, POL00021493, POL00294385, POL00032210, POL00021494 and POL00021496). By the end of this period of time (2007) there would be regular reports from the Chief Executive/Managing Director, Finance Director covering functional

performance and activities as well as a large number of solvency related papers, Sales & Marketing reports, Banking reports and Operations Reports. The intention of these reports was to share knowledge of the major activities within the functions. From reviewing these papers, it shows that my reporting focus for at least the first 16 months was on the development of the commercial proposition for HNG-X. As the directorate expanded in line with my comments in points 6 through 11, it is clear that a number of these areas are brought into the discussion starting with the Cash in Transit business.

23.4. In my opinion there were varying levels of IT knowledge around the board table. David Mills had a deeper understanding than most due to his history in HSBC, however, I would have had the deepest technical understanding.

23.5. From memory, if a director was absent for any reason, then a substitute from the directorate would attend the POL board meeting based upon the subjects that needed to be discussed. I cannot see any board papers for meetings that I did not attend therefore it is difficult to say who, if anyone, would have attended on my behalf.

24. During the period from when I joined POL at the beginning of 2005 through to when I left in early 2008, I never had a conversation about risks and / or compliance issues that could arise from the a) the prosecution of SPMs for theft or false accounting and b) the pursuit of civil litigation against SPMs to recover alleged shortfalls in branch accounts. I was not a member of the Risk & Compliance committee.

25. With regards to my views on the extent that the RMH, RMG & POL boards

discussed the Horizon IT system, including BEDs or potential issues with integrity, my immediate memory was that none of these subjects were ever discussed at the POL board during my time in the business. This has been confirmed by reading the POL Board papers shared with me as part of this inquiry. (POL00021487, POL00032147, POL00021490, POL00021491, POL00021493, POL00032210, POL00021494 and POL00021496).

KNOWLEDGE OF HORIZON

26. I have been asked to describe my knowledge of the Horizon IT System following the national rollout addressing several areas. I have assumed this question relates to the original Horizon system that was rolled out in 1999 (6 years before I joined in 2005) as I had left POL over two years before the implementation of the replacement HNG-X solution in 2010.

26.1. BEDs is specific terminology that I have only become aware of during the inquiry. I was never taken through a list of 'BEDs' during my time at POL.

26.2. I had no concerns with the integrity of the Horizon IT system. This question was never raised with me during my time at POL.

26.3. I had no knowledge of Fujitsu's ability to insert, edit or delete transaction data or data in branch accounts without the knowledge or consent of SPMs. This was never a discussion item during my time at POL.

26.4. Despite meeting several SPMs either in their branches or meetings with the NFSP there was never a conversation about BEDs or

the integrity of the Horizon IT System.

27. I have been asked to provide details of any discussions on the issues in question 15 of the Request to identify any person that I passed on information regarding BEDs.

28. As stated in my inquiry response paragraph 26.1, I have never had a conversation around BEDs in the Horizon system and therefore I would not have been in possession of any information to pass on.

29. I have been asked to consider POL00028984 (emails relating to the Callendar Square bug), POL00083163 (17th November 2005 email regarding Marine Drive Appeal Case) and POL00081928 (5 December 2006 email regarding Horizon info – Callender Square) and respond to :

29.1. My knowledge of the Callender Square bug and how it developed

29.2. My working relationship with Shaun Turner, Lynne Fallowfield, Gary Blackburn and Brian Trotter

29.3. Explain to what extent, if at all, was I aware of the case of Post Office vs. Castleton

30. I have read the emails to see if there was any information to help but before the inquiry I do not believe that I had any knowledge of the Callendar Square bug or how it developed. I do not recognise the names of Shaun Turner, Lynne Fallowfield, Gary Blackburn and Brian Trotter and I do not believe that I had a working relationship with them even if they sat within the Operations function. They were not one of my direct reports or even direct reports to them. Before the inquiry I do not believe that I had any knowledge of the case of Post Office vs. Castleton.

HORIZON NEXT GENERATION

31. I was not directly involved in the actual technical development of the Horizon Next Generation solution as this was wholly managed within the IT function and Fujitsu. I would not have expected to be involved during the development lifecycle, and I do not believe that the system would have reached the testing phase before I left in early 2008. I was directly involved in setting up the framework for the negotiation process for the new system through to the point where approval was gained from the POL Board and the RMH board to proceed.

32. Towards the end of my time within the Post Office I had a monthly meeting with the Program lead for the development of the HNG-X solution (Mark Burley). The purpose of this meeting was twofold. Firstly, to understand the progress of the development versus the original plans, from memory this was way before any testing cycles were started. The second reason was that Mark had been identified by David X Smith as a high performer within his function and this gave me an opportunity to meet with him first hand. This would have been the opportunity to raise significant issues, but I believe that these monthly meetings would have been too early in the development lifecycle.

33. With regards to my relationship and interactions with Fujitsu, I had several conversations with Fujitsu sales/account management employees during the negotiations phase, around my expectations of what they should be able to bring to the table in terms of a better cost position. This had been a recommended approach from the Gartner Group. During the Business as usual (BAU) phase of the operations, the Fujitsu relationships would have

been managed within the IT function or the Service Delivery functions directly. I do not recall ever having conversations with Fujitsu around systems performance or capability. Towards the very end of my time with POL I was asked by Mark Burley to go to the Fujitsu facilities in Bracknell to address their development team as the development programs are generally long and hard work. The goal was to explain how important this was to POL and thank them for their contributions to date.

34. Reflecting on the circumstances in which I would have expected issues related to the Horizon IT System to be escalated to me by my own teams or by Fujitsu, I would have expected to hear about any catastrophic failures that would have an effect across large parts of the branch network which would inhibit trading. In addition, as I suspect the inquiry is more interested in matters relates to potential integrity concerns, I would have expected an immediate escalation if identified issues of false information been discovered within the Horizon IT System. The reason for this would have been to inform the POL Board along with any other potential stakeholders. This did not happen during my tenure. I would not have expected escalation of 'day to day' issues as the IT and Service Delivery functions, along with Fujitsu would be managing them directly.

35. The circumstances when I would have escalated issues relating to the Horizon IT system (e.g. BEDs) to the POL board are reflected in paragraph 35. As these situations never arose this did not happen.

36. Answering slightly outside of the Horizon IT system itself, I have referred to challenges with parts of the IT network to the branches which result in the branch being offline and unable to trade. This led to the network resilience

program which was reported to the board as identified within the POL board papers and the Operations Reports (POL00021491, POL00032147, POL00032210, POL00095512, POL00095521, POL00294385)

37. I have been asked to consider the POL Executive Committee minutes 13th July 2005 (POL00137216), pages 9 & 10 to respond to the following:

37.1. In relation to the cost reduction exercises; to set out which areas of the business were predicted to be exposed to increased risk

37.2. To explain why these increased risks were acceptable

37.3. To explain why the SPMs may perceive the plan to be a 'mere deterioration of service'

37.4. To explain how Fujitsu were expected to provide an improved service at a lower cost to POL

38. I will respond to each of these questions within one answer as I believe there is a misinterpretation of what the minutes are reporting. The primary goal was the delivery of the Horizon Next Generation platform at a reduced cost meeting the expectations of POL but also to meet the externally benchmarked assessment by the Gartner group which anticipated that a 30% cost reduction was achievable. Within the minutes it states from point (viii) onwards that in the event of Fujitsu not meeting the expectations, that there are alternative approaches that could be taken from network desegregation (different levels of service to certain branches), lowering the client performance, network segmentation or even a PFI approach all of which would come with potential to introduce risks to a perceived degradation of service. The minute relating to the EC's position is that the risks could be acceptable but only if case by case they were calculated and

approved individually by the EC with associated communications plans. In the event, Fujitsu eventually met the cost reduction expectations, and as a result, I do not believe any of these alternative paths were followed during my tenure.

39. Addressing the challenge to how Fujitsu were expected to provide a better service at a reduced cost, this is a peculiar feature of the technology industry, especially over multi-year outsourced contracts for services (e.g.)

39.1. Like for like network costs fall on an annual basis

39.2. Increased capability for remote support changes the expensive onsite support model to support that can, on occasion, be performed remotely

39.3. Swapping out some of the outdated hardware which, on a cycle, reaches toward end of life. This reduces the meantime between failure and reduces associated costs.

39.4. Breaking the contract into several components allowed POL to retender individual elements on a more regular basis to potential entrants and Fujitsu. Fujitsu always had the option of matching the cost proposal from a potential new 3rd party which would be beneficial to POL as service continuation is normally a better outcome than a full migration activity.

39.5. None of these elements are related to the core HNG-X system and therefore did not increase application risk. My recollection is that the application was being designed to provide functional equivalence and that rigorous testing cycles that would need to be navigated before implementation, which would be the appropriate mitigation.

39.6. As with all outsource partners, there is an expectation that their internal costs would be higher at the start of the contracts but that they will bring their own professional focus across the lifetime of the contract to bring their own costs down and their margin up. This is the basis of the strive that they sign up to.

40. The inquiry provided me with an internal Fujitsu document (FUJ00003675 (August 2005 Fujitsu internal document major bids - Summary)) which presented me internally to their bid group as a challenging character to work with taking a more demanding, risk-taking, retail centric approach to the project. This was the first time that I had seen this document which is not surprising as it was internal to Fujitsu. One of the reasons that I was hired into POL by David Mills was that I came from a more commercially focused (retail centric) background and this was some of the thinking that Fujitsu were seeing at this stage. I believe that before I joined the contract negotiations had been moving forwards relatively well with the Fujitsu expectation that they would roll forward for several additional years as a matter of course. It was my belief that they thought there was no alternative for POL (confirmed within their document) and, as a result, that did not force them to challenge their commercial thinking. I believe the risk that is being referred to is their internal risk in meeting the 'strive' conditions to bring the costs down over time.

41. As part of the inquiry I was provided with four sets of minutes relating to the Impact Program Board (POL00445451, POL00445491, POL00445718 and POL00445856) which state that I was in attendance, but I cannot recall the content of any of the conversations. I was aware of the IMPACT Program in

so far as it was a finance improvement project for the back office environment but further that that I do not have a deeper recollection. Give that the program had been running for some time, was nearing go-live and was under the leadership of the Finance Director (Peter Corbett) I cannot recall getting deeply involved.

42. As part of the inquiry I was provided with document POL00001203 (21 September 2005 – Horizon Next Generation Plan X) which would appear to be an internal Fujitsu design document and, as such, would definitely not be a document that I would have seen before. As a result, I can only give a speculative answer which is probably not helpful as I am not, and have never been, a systems architect. I note that there is a reference in the document that 'all access by Operations to manage IT systems will be fully audited'. From reading this document I would suggest that Operations refers to an internal Fujitsu operations function as opposed to POL but I must be clear that I am speculating.

GENERAL

43. Commenting on whether on whether I thought there was sufficient IT skills and knowledge on the POL board to effectively understand and escalate reports of BEDs in the Horizon System; during my time I would have said yes. However, as there was never an escalation of BEDs to the POL board, this was not something that I can verify. I would not have expected this level of information to be reaching the board unless there were catastrophic issues that needed to be understood and addressed. Systems operations

and performance is an IT/Service Delivery task that would be managed at that level and not at the board.

44. I have been asked to describe the processes that the SPMs could report BEDs that they have experienced with the Horizon System. I cannot describe this in detail, but if I was to speculate, I would imagine that they would log the call with the appropriate branch support call centre and that this 'ticket' would be picked up and processed by the support organisation. This is standard practice across most business organisations to enable tickets to be raised and analysis to start.
45. I have been asked to summarise my understanding of the processes by which BEDs in the Horizon IT System were reported and recorded by Fujitsu and to set out my reflections on the effectiveness of these processes, but as I have stated previously in my witness statement I had no visibility of the BEDs process and as there was no escalation on any issues I cannot comment on the effectiveness of the process.
46. I have been asked to summarise my understanding of the processes by which BEDs in the Horizon System were reported, recorded and monitored by Fujitsu. In addition to state whether I had any input on the development of these processes but as per previous responses, I had no visibility into the process for raising or managing BEDs with Fujitsu. I had no role in the creating or monitoring of these processes.
47. I have been asked to comment on the process by which Fujitsu would keep me and / or POL informed of any new information relating to BEDs in the Horizon IT System but as I was not personally involved in any BEDs information or review process, this would have sat within the IT/Service

delivery function and would be managed directly with Fujitsu

CONCLUSION

48. I decided to leave POL toward the end of 2007 to pursue a more independent career of smaller consulting style engagements. I had no issues with POL, the POL Board or the MD Alan Cook.

49. With hindsight, I have reflected on whether I should have done anything differently during my time at POL. As with any activities that took place between 16 and 19 years ago, there will always be questions as to whether I could have explored further, asked more questions etc. However, in reality to pursue a path for deeper and deeper understanding, as it relates to the inquiry, there would have needed to have been some issues/evidence that were reaching me and/or the POL Board but that is clearly not the case. At the time perhaps I focused more on the major transitions of the cash business, the property functions and the operational efficiency program in the expectation and understanding that the 'business as usual' functions were managing themselves under their own senior leadership structures. This is pure speculation, however.

50. I cannot think of anything additional to add to the inquiry's Terms of Reference at this time.

Statement of Truth

I believe the content of this statement to be true.

Signed: _____ **GRO** _____

Dated: _____ 17th October 2024 _____

Index to First Witness Statement of Richard Francis

No.	URN	Date	Description	Control number
1	RMG00000033	27/04/2006	Minutes: Royal Mail Holdings plc Board of Directors MeeBng Minutes of 27/04/06	VIS00007441
2	POL00021487	23/02/2005	Post Office Limited Board Minutes of 23/02/2005	POL0000020
3	POL00032147	17/08/2005	POL Board MeeBng Minutes	POL-0029082
4	POL00021490	14/12/2005	MeeBng minutes: minutes of the Board meeBng held at Bank of Ireland	POL0000023
5	POL00021491	09/02/2006	MeeBng minutes: Board meeBng minutes held at 148 Old Street in London.	POL0000024
6	POL00021493	28/06/2006	MeeBng Minutes: minutes of Board meeBng held on 28th June 2006.	POL0000026
7	POL00294385	17/05/2006	Post Office Limited (company no. 2154540) Minutes of the meeBng of the Board held at 148 Old Street, London on May 17th 2006	POL-BSFF-0132691
8	POL00032210	20/04/2006	POL - Minutes of the MeeBng of the Board.	POL-0029145
9	POL00021494	27/09/2006	MeeBng minutes: minutes of meeBng of the Board held on 27th September 2006. Purpose of the meeBng was to review the Company's financial posiBon.	POL0000027
10	POL00021496	21/01/2008	MeeBng Minutes: minutes of the Board meeBng held on 21st January 2008.	POL0000029
11	POL00028984	06/03/2006	Email exchanges between Post Office and (Contract & Service Managers) Sandra MacKay, Brian Troaer, Shaun Turner, Gary Blackburn, Stewart Mike, Lynne Fallowfield, re: Callendar Square Bug.	POL-0025466
12	POL00083163	17/11/2005	Email from John H Jones to Stephen Dilley, cc Mandy Talbot and Cath Oglesby, RE: Urgent The Post Office v Lee Castleton (Marine Drive Post Office, Bridlington).	POL-0079726
13	POL00081928	05/12/2006	Emails between Nicola Sherry, Mandy Talbot, Stephen Dillley, Keith Baines and Clare Wardle re Callender Square & Lee Castleton.	POL-0078491
14	POL00095512	01/08/2005	OperaBons funcBonal report POLB(05)72, 2005	POL-0095095
15	POL00095521	01/04/2006	OperaBons funcBonal report POLB06(32b) for 2006	POL-0095104
16	POL00137216	13/07/2005	Post Office ExecuBve Commiaee Minutes	POL-BSFF-0000009

17	FUJ00003675	01/08/2005	Fujitsu Services Major Bids Report, August 2005	POINQ0009846F
18	POL00445451	07/04/2005	IT Directorate IMPACT Programme Board No.17 Minutes.	POL-BSFF-096-0007378
19	POL00445491	10/05/2005	POL Project IMPACT Programme Board Minutes.	POL-BSFF-096-0007418
20	POL00445718	09/08/2005	IMPACT Programme Board Minutes (No.21)	POL-BSFF-096-0007645
21	POL00021487	23/02/2005	Post Office Limited Board Minutes of 23/02/2005	POL0000020
22	POL00032147	17/08/2005	POL Board MeeBng Minutes	POL-0029082