

Witness Name: David John Courtley

Statement No.: WITN03530100

Dated: 16 May 2023

## POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY

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### FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF *DAVID JOHN COURTLEY*

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I, *MR DAVID JOHN COURTLEY*, will say as follows:

#### **INTRODUCTION**

1. I was previously employed by the ICL group and Fujitsu Services Limited ("**Fujitsu**") as Chief Operating Officer ("**COO**") from July 2001 to April 2004, and as Chief Executive Officer ("**CEO**") from April 2004 to December 2008. I currently manage an independent IT consulting business. I am not involved in the Horizon project at present and have had no involvement in it since I left Fujitsu in 2008.
2. This witness statement is made to assist the Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry (the "**Inquiry**") with the questions put to me in a Rule 9 Request dated 24 February 2023 (the "**Request**"). It is based on my direct knowledge of relevant matters. I was assisted in preparing this statement by Morrison Foerster, who represent Fujitsu in the Inquiry.
3. The topics in the Request relate to matters that took place at least 15 years ago. I have tried to remember relevant events and information so as to assist the Inquiry as far as possible but have not always been able to do so.

## **BACKGROUND**

4. My professional background prior to joining Fujitsu was mostly in various managerial roles in the IT services industry.
5. I graduated from the University of London in 1978 with a Bachelor of Science in Mathematics. I began my career at SD-Scicon, undertaking mathematical analysis and programming in areas such as operational research. I subsequently moved into various managerial roles at SD-Scicon. SD-Scicon was later acquired by Electronic Data Systems (EDS), a global outsourcing company. I went on to various senior management roles there, including as Head of their Defence Division and their Public Sector Division. Immediately prior to joining Fujitsu, I was CEO of a Human Resources outsourcing joint venture between BT and Accenture, called E-PeopleServe.

## **MY ROLES AT FUJITSU**

6. As noted above, I joined Fujitsu in 2001 as COO, and became CEO in 2004. I had substantially similar responsibilities in these two roles, but the main change when I became CEO was that the heads of certain key functions, (e.g. Finance, Human Resources, Commercial, Legal) reported to me, when they had not in my previous role as COO.
7. In both roles, I had responsibility for Fujitsu's activities in the UK, Continental Europe, Scandinavia and Africa. This primarily entailed ensuring Fujitsu delivered for its customers across those markets, was profitable doing so, and had good strategy to sustain and develop business with both existing and new customers. I was particularly

involved in developing the company's approach to Sales and Marketing and identifying new ways for the company to win outsourcing and other business with UK government organisations, UK private sector customers, customers in Europe and Scandinavia, and some global organisations. I was also involved in restructuring parts of the business, conducting certain acquisitions across the markets Fujitsu operated in to increase the company's capability, and was involved in managing performance and delivery issues on a number of large accounts. Fujitsu also had difficulties and challenges in parts of Continental Europe, including France (which was loss-making), and I regularly visited these local operations outside the UK to discuss the business and plans with the relevant country managers. I also worked on managing and improving Fujitsu's relationship with its shareholder, which improved over time. I believe that, during my time as COO and CEO, there were over 20,000 employees or contractors in the business. Some of these issues that fell within my responsibilities are referred to in document Fujitsu Services Holding Plc Minutes of Meetings of the Fujitsu Services Management Committee of the Board of Directors dated 20 August 2002 (FUJ00003534) and other board documents.

8. While I was COO and CEO, Fujitsu's business in the UK was divided into multiple divisions, each led by a divisional director. These directors reported to me regarding the work ongoing in each division. When I joined Fujitsu, the Post Office Account (which included the team delivering the Horizon project) sat within the Large Projects Division. By 2004, the divisions were restructured, so as to make each division more responsible for its own sales and financial performance. Following that restructure, the Post Office Account came under the UK Commercial Business Division, which was

subsequently renamed the Private Sector Division. I have been assisted in recollecting these details by reviewing various Fujitsu organisation charts from the relevant times (specifically: FUJ00151237, FUJ00115869, FUJ00115875 , FUJ00115890 ).

9. The Post Office Account was led by an account manager, who reported to the director of the relevant division. The relevant division director would then be responsible to me regarding the activities of the Post Office Account (as well as all other accounts falling within his or her division). For completeness, I note that for a brief period of several months in 2001/2002, while the director position for the Large Projects Division was vacant, there would have been a direct reporting line from the accounts in that division to me as COO.
10. As is apparent from the various board documents the Inquiry has drawn to my attention, during my tenure, the Post Office Account was one of several significant accounts for Fujitsu. Given the wide-ranging nature of Fujitsu's business and my responsibilities across it, I was not routinely involved in the day-to-day aspects of the Post Office Account.
11. I primarily received information about the Post Office Account from (i) monthly meetings with the director of the relevant division (which were also attended by the division leadership team) and (ii) account reviews, which were held periodically for all major accounts and were attended by Fujitsu's Chief Financial Officer, the division director, the account manager and the account leadership team.
  - a. Monthly Division Meetings. The scope of what was reported during monthly division meetings was generally quite wide. They would cover key issues for the division such as the financial results and financial forecasts, staffing

levels, the division's sales pipeline, as well as the relationship with key customers. Technical issues arising on individual accounts would not generally be discussed unless there had been a major technical incident or problem that had placed a customer relationship at serious risk.

- b. Account Reviews. Account reviews were an opportunity for me, and others in the senior leadership team, to interact directly with the account management team for major accounts. I do not recall how frequently they occurred, and they may not have been at precise regular intervals. I recall that we would usually discuss the account's progress to key milestones, it's financials, the relationship with the customer, as well as any major incidents that may have occurred. These meetings were intended to be a proactive exercise to focus on major accounts. My expectation was that these meetings provided comprehensive updates on an account's progress, covering commercial issues as well any major development issues and risks. An example of the issues covered during such a meeting with the Post Office Account can be seen at document Fujitsu Account Plan, Account Review, Post Office and Royal Mail Group dated 31 January 2007 (FUJ00116308).

12. I also would have received ad hoc updates or briefings about the Post Office Account, particularly if there had been a major incident. However, my recollection is that my primary regular sources of information about the account were the forums mentioned above.

**PROBLEMS ON THE HORIZON PROJECT PRIOR TO AUGUST 2001**

13. The Inquiry has referred me to a document, which is an ISC Paper for the Large Projects Division from around September 2001 (FUJ00115991). It has asked what the “*major problems*” with the Pathway project referred to in that document were and why they were seen as “*behind*” Fujitsu at the time.
14. My understanding on reviewing the document is that the phrase “*major problems*” was used to refer to (i) the tensions experienced between Fujitsu and Post Office Limited (“**Post Office**”) while the Horizon project still incorporated a “benefit card” element and (ii) the difficulties encountered during the initial rollout of Horizon in 2000, including delays and defects with the system. I was aware that there were difficulties in the initial years of the Horizon project as many of the senior team I worked with were in the business at that time. However, as I was not working for Fujitsu then, I am not able to describe those difficulties any more specifically. Naturally, as the Department of Social Services had left the Horizon project in mid-1999 and rollout had largely been completed by the time I was COO, those issues would have been behind Fujitsu by September 2001 when document FUJ00115991 was prepared (while the document is not dated, see email from Tony Oppenheim to myself dated 2 September 2001 (FUJ00115990) which records when the document was sent to me).

**HORIZON SERVICE DISRUPTION IN Q1/Q2 2004**

15. The Inquiry has drawn my attention to a number of service outages in Q1/Q2 2004 that impacted some Post Office branches’ ability to trade. Based on document Update

Report for Event 574 dated 6 July 2004 (FUJ00116220) and Post Office Account, CS Staff Briefing dated 6 May 2004 (FUJ00116221), related outages also appear to have begun in 2003. I have no clear recollection of these outages. I note that FUJ00116220 states that the Post Office Account presented a corrective action plan to me and others from the Post Office in October 2003, though I do not specifically recall it.

16. Based on the documents I have reviewed; I believe these outages were mostly due to network or infrastructure performance issues and failures. For example, FUJ00116221 notes there were “VPN issues” and FUJ00116220 primarily refers to network issues in giving an account of the outages.

17. I believe the outages may have been due to issues at some of the network suppliers the Post Office Account was using at the time, and this is supported by the references to Energis in FUJ00116220, who were a network supplier Fujitsu used on Horizon at the time. However, given this incident was nearly 20 years ago, that is only a vague recollection, and deficiencies in Fujitsu’s operations and processes could also have contributed to the outages.

18. I note that on page 18 of FUJ00116221 and at pages 1 and 2 of FUJ00116220, there are a number of criticisms of Fujitsu listed. While I do not remember this outage in detail, the criticisms listed there accord with my recollection about the Post Office’s view of Fujitsu at that time, and the criticisms were not considered unfounded by Fujitsu at the time. In particular, I recall that, at the time, Post Office regarded us as a reactive supplier rather than a proactive one – meaning that Fujitsu tended to react to problems as they arose rather than planning for them in advance and suggesting contingencies.

19. As a result of certain of these outages, a red alert was raised in March 2004. The red alert process in Fujitsu was designed to ensure that a severe performance issue was recognised and taken seriously at all levels in the company and that the best technical and other resources were mobilised as a priority to ensure the problem was addressed as soon as possible. For example, FUJ00116221 refers to individuals from Fujitsu in Japan joining the red alert team. A red alert could be declared by either Fujitsu itself or a customer. It appears from document Minutes of a meeting of the Fujitsu Services Management Committee of the Board of Directors of the Companies dated 9 June 2004 (FUJ00003575) that, in this case, Fujitsu declared the red alert in recognition of the seriousness of the outages.
20. FUJ00116221 notes that I received daily updates about this issue during the red alert, and a range of measures were put in place to resolve the issues. While I expect I did receive such updates, I do not recall them or the specific measures listed in the document that were taken to resolve the red alert. While I may have been briefed on the measures taken, it is unlikely I would have been personally involved in defining them.
21. My role was to support the Post Office Account in resolving the red alert, including by ensuring appropriate resources were allocated and deployed from across the business, monitoring the account's progress towards resolution, and ensuring work on solutions for the red alert were appropriately prioritised by others in the business or by external suppliers. This role particularly involved helping to unblock difficulties the account was facing in resolving the red alert, where those were escalated to me.



## **HNG-X CONTRACT**

### **The formulation of Fujitsu's bid**

22. During my tenure at Fujitsu, the company employed a bid review process that provided governance for any ongoing bids throughout the entire life cycle of a bid (i.e. from the decision whether to bid at all, to an eventual contract award). This was known as the Customer Solution Life Cycle ("**CSLC**"). Fujitsu's Business Assurance unit monitored compliance with the CSLC.

23. I generally attended key meetings which occurred under the CSLC process. This included a "sign on" meeting, which reviewed potential bid proposals to determine if the company would bid, and a "sign off" meeting where completed bids were reviewed and approved. I would not have been involved in the day-to-day running of bid teams. My primary interest was to review bids so as to ensure that (i) the relevant proposal was within Fujitsu's capability and resources to deliver, (ii) estimates (e.g. as to time and costs) had been appropriately reviewed and tested within the organisation, and (iii) that the pricing was appropriate.

24. Having reviewed an email from Business Assurance to Justine Colley, Paul Lush & Others (FUJ00116138), I recall that Steve Muchow had primary responsibility for the HNG-X bid. I would have met him and others on the bid team at the meetings described above, though I cannot now recall those meetings in detail.

25. My primary role in connection with the bid for the HNG-X project was to engage with senior stakeholders at the Post Office to (i) assure them of Fujitsu's commitment to Horizon, and (ii) discuss how we could improve the relationship between Fujitsu and the Post Office, specifically how Fujitsu could become more of a business partner to

Post Office (rather than just an engineering supplier) and how Fujitsu could be more proactive, rather than reactive.

26. Having reviewed document ICL Horizon Contract Renewal Bid Directive dated 21 February 2002 (FUJ00116126), I recall that I met Alan Barrie, who had a senior commercial role at the Post Office, in February 2002 to discuss the bid. I attached copy email, FUJ00151236 confirming the meeting. This meeting was primarily for me to assure Alan that the Post Office would remain a priority for Fujitsu, that Fujitsu would continue to “put its best foot forward”, and to discuss the relationship he wanted to have as stated above. I do not recall us discussing any technical details about the HNG-X project. I may have attended other meetings with Post Office employees, but I do not recall those.

27. I have been asked specifically about the role of financial and costs considerations in Fujitsu’s strategy to obtain an extension of the Horizon contract in 2005.

28. In relation to Fujitsu’s financial considerations, the objective was to aim for a reasonable level of profit on all accounts, and for new business it was competing for. While I was at Fujitsu, we generally aimed for a defined “hurdle rate” of profit. The “hurdle rate” did not represent a hard and fast rule, but rather was a norm, based on our understanding of market norms, to guide bid teams. The Post Office Account was one of a number of large accounts while I was at Fujitsu. Its financial performance was important to the company, alongside the performance of all accounts.

29. Having reviewed FUJ00116138 and FUJ00116126, I was reminded that reducing IT costs was a significant factor to the Post Office in the bid for the contract extension. Slide 4 of FUJ00116138 states that Post Office’s IT costs were running at 16% of their

revenue. In that context, it appears to me that reducing IT costs would have been an entirely natural and normal goal for the Post Office to have been looking at. My recollection is that, even though costs were important, they did not dominate over other priorities on service or design.

30. I have been asked what other proposals or ideas Fujitsu considered as part of its pitch to Post Office. While I was not directly involved in discussions about potential new products, I believe Fujitsu may have discussed and considered various financial services products that, at the time, we believed Post Office might be interested in considering offering. However, I am unsure if this occurred during the bid or after the contract for HNG-X was agreed.

#### **The negotiations for the contractual extension in 2005**

31. I have been referred by the Inquiry to document Fujitsu Services Management Committee Major Accounts Report dated May 2005 (FUJ00003673) and specifically asked what “cost savings” are referred to on page 3 of that document. I do not recall what particular cost savings were identified.

32. I have also been referred by the Inquiry to document Fujitsu Services Management Committee Major Accounts Reported dated August 2005 (FUJ00003676) and Fujitsu Services Management Committee Major Accounts dated November 2005 (FUJ00003587). I have been specifically asked about the effect of Post Office’s proposed ownership direction on the proposal for HNG-X. While I recall this proposed change of ownership direction within the Royal Mail Group, I do not recall the specific impact it had on HNG-X. FUJ00003676 indicates that Fujitsu was considering an alternative proposal given Post Office’s investment constraints. The same document

explains that this involved “leverag[ing] the counter assets and only tak[ing] on tech. refresh when absolutely necessary”. I surmise from reviewing the document that this was a proposal to continue using existing hardware at the post office branch counter for longer, and to update any new hardware less regularly. I do not recall if this proposal was eventually accepted, or the impact it may have had on HNG-X.

### **Conclusion of the HNG-X Contract**

33. Having reviewed the documents put to me by the Inquiry, I can see that the contract to secure the extension of Fujitsu’s role on Horizon and the development of HNG-X was signed around August 2006.

34. In document Major Account Review, Actions dated 7 March 2006 (FUJ00116310), there is a reference to Post Office wanting to wait until 3 months after the contract had been signed for external publicity of the agreement. That would have been their prerogative as the customer. A “no publication” requirement was not an uncommon request or requirement from customers. Many customers simply do not allow their suppliers to publicise new contracts. This document notes that Post Office’s “reasons are valid”, though I do not recall the specific reasons Post Office gave at the time.

35. I understand from document Fujitsu Services Holding PLC, Letter of Comfort for Post Office Ltd (FUJ00003648) and Fujitsu Services Limited Written Resolutions of the Directors (FUJ00003649) that around the time the HNG-X contract was concluded, Fujitsu Services Holdings PLC (Fujitsu’s parent company) issued a letter of comfort (the “**Comfort Letter**”) to extend the provisions of an existing Deed of Guarantee dated 31 December 2002 (the “**Existing Guarantee**”) to the new HNG-X contract. The

Existing Guarantee document Varied and Restated Codified Agreement between Post Office and Fujitsu (FUJ00000074) appears to guarantee Fujitsu's performance under the Horizon contract that was in place at that time. I do not recall the specific commercial reasons why the Existing Guarantee was given to begin with. However, the purpose of the Comfort Letter was to ensure that the Existing Guarantee would remain in place to support the new contract arrangements. Failing to extend the guarantee would have sent the wrong message to Post Office that the wider Fujitsu group was no longer backing the Horizon project.

#### **CHALLENGES WITH THE DELIVERY OF HNG-X**

36. My recollection is that the main issue during the development of HNG-X was that development took longer to complete than estimated and hence there were delays compared to the original timetable. There may also have been some changes to the requirements, which would have affected the timescales. While such delays were not desirable, I also believe the delays were handled in an acceptable manner with Post Office, as I do not recall them leading to a serious deterioration in our relationship with Post Office at the time.

37. Having reviewed email from Alert Management Centre dated 20 March 2007 attaching weekly report (FUJ00151238) and its attachment All Open Problems (FUJ00151239), I note that the HNG-X project was on amber alert during 2007. While I recall receiving

regular emails of this nature (which summarised open alerts around the company), I do not recall this specific amber alert or any details about it.

38. The Inquiry has drawn my attention to document Fujitsu Services Management Committee Major Accounts dated November 2007 (FUJ00003702) which refers to challenges on the HNG-X project in terms of “timeline and cost”. I do not recall what these challenges were specifically, except for the issues around delays to the project which I have mentioned above.

39. The same document also refers to “perception issues with the client”. Having read the document, my recollection is that these particular perception issues did not relate to the Horizon project. Rather, they related to a separate, relatively small stand-alone project we undertook for the Royal Mail Group to install video screens at Royal Mail sites to facilitate management communications. This project was run by the Post Office Account. It did not go particularly well. I recall there were reliability issues with some of the equipment.

40. I have also considered document Fujitsu Services Management Committee Major Accounts dated February 2008 (FUJ00003708), which refers to (i) Post Office introducing a number of changes which were putting timelines and target completion dates at risk and (ii) service issues that occurred with the existing Horizon system in December 2007. Having reviewed document Fujitsu Services Management Committee Major Accounts Report dated May 2008 (FUJ00003707), I am reminded that Post Office did eventually accept that their new requests would have timing and

cost implications. However, I do not remember the specific changes they proposed or the service issues in December 2007.

41. The Inquiry has asked whether, in my view, HNG-X was fit for purpose when it was signed off and rolled out. I understand that the HNG-X rollout took place in 2010, after I had left Fujitsu. As such, I am not in a position to comment on that question.

42. Overall, reflecting on my involvement in the HNG-X project, my view is that the time estimates we gave to deliver HNG-X should have been longer given the overrun that occurred, so perhaps these should have been reviewed again at an early stage which possibly may have identified the potential overrun risks. The delays were disappointing as they had financial implications for both Post Office and Fujitsu, and they also meant that Fujitsu had failed to meet Post Office's expectations.

### **OPERATION OF HORIZON**

43. I have been asked what difficulties I recall occurred during the operation of Horizon up to 2007. I recall there generally were issues with outages occurring too frequently. Having reviewed document Fujitsu Services Management Committee Major Projects Report dated February 2005 (FUJ00117424), I recall there were a number of Horizon outages due to hardware failures on EMC disc arrays. This was a problem that occurred on the Post Office Account and also on other accounts. According to FUJ00117424, these issues in live service meant a red alert was raised on the Post Office Account by around February 2005.

44. I have been asked whether I would have done anything differently in relation to Horizon. It is difficult to say, given the length of time the programme went on for and

the relatively limited nature of my involvement in the day-to-day operations of the programme. I did believe at the time that the project was undertaken diligently and professionally by a capable and knowledgeable team. Given the significance of the project, it was always a priority for me to ensure that the Post Office Account was led by a capable and experienced manager who was well-respected by Post Office and within Fujitsu.

45. However, despite the acceptance and testing regimes that occurred for the Horizon system, it seems clear, based on what I know now, that there were still serious errors in the software and more could have been done to identify these and their impacts. We could, for example, have undertaken additional technical and architectural reviews of the system and its operation, either using our own technical resources from outside the project, or by suggesting an independent third party review.

46. I have been asked about the mechanisms available for Fujitsu to receive feedback on how well Horizon was functioning. In my experience, as COO and CEO, I would primarily receive feedback about Horizon (and the wider relationship with Post Office) through management meetings and account reviews, occasional meetings with senior Post Office employees, the red alert process, or reports on the Post Office's customer satisfaction (which I cover in greater detail below). I expect the Post Office Account, through their day-to-day interactions, would have had a number of other methods of getting feedback on how Horizon was functioning, including, for example, the Helpdesk or any tools they had to monitor live service. However, I do not have any specific knowledge of these.



47. I have been asked by the Inquiry to provide a view on the point in time that Horizon became “robust”. I do not recall the term “robust” being ordinarily used in the context of evaluating the Horizon project, or any IT project, while I was at Fujitsu. I do not believe it bears any special meaning in the IT context. The term “robust” is undefined in the Request, and in the context of a large-scale IT project, it could have different meanings.

48. In my opinion, whether a system is “robust” primarily depends on the customer’s expectation of the IT system. In my view, as long as there were outages, Horizon could not be said to be a fully or entirely “robust” system, as it would periodically not have been available. Based on my recollections and my review of documents while preparing this statement, throughout the time I was at Fujitsu, the system had fragilities due to its scale and the limitations of the network technology and infrastructure at the time. The extent of any outage (in terms of duration and number of branches affected), would affect how serious the issue was, but any unplanned disruption was problematic.

49. I cannot say exactly when Horizon became a robust system, but I have sought to explain what I consider to be a robust system.

### **Secondments**

50. My recollection is that secondments to customers were not common at Fujitsu. If they were done, they would usually be to fill a technical skills gap at the customer, in circumstances where the relevant individuals had to be within the customer’s organisation (rather than external contractors).

51. The Inquiry has drawn my attention to document Fujitsu Services Management Committee Major Accounts dated August 2006 (FUJ00003688), which mentions 15 Fujitsu employees who were seconded to Post Office. I do not recall the details around this particular secondment, including whether it was a formal secondment where the individuals seconded were legally employed by Post Office. I believe this secondment may have been a long running one that started before I joined Fujitsu, but I do not recall with certainty.

52. I believe there were a few secondments of Fujitsu employees to the Post Office while I was at Fujitsu, but I do not recall the exact number. I am not aware of the detailed terms of these secondments. I expect this would have mainly fallen under the purview of the Post Office Account.

### **Customer Satisfaction**

53. Customer Satisfaction was measured periodically using a well-defined process known as the Customer Satisfaction Interview Programme (“**CSIP**”). The relevant interviews were undertaken independently of the account team by an external provider. This process involved a number of customer representatives being asked to respond to a detailed survey, providing narrative responses and numerical scores on Fujitsu’s performance. I recall routinely receiving CSIP reports from major accounts, including the Post Office Account. An example of a CSIP report that I received on the Horizon project is document Fujitsu Services Customer Satisfaction Interview Programme 2007 (FUJ00151241).

54. In relation to the Horizon project, the customer who would have been involved in the CSIP would have been Post Office and the respondents selected for interview would

have been senior individuals at Post Office who worked directly with Fujitsu on Horizon. The CSIP would not have interviewed end-users of the Horizon system.

55. Having reviewed document Fujitsu Services Management Committee Major Accounts dated August 2007 (FUJ00003705), I note that the customer satisfaction score was at a high of 9 in August 2007. I do not recall why the customer satisfaction score was particularly high at that time.

56. However, I would note that I, and others in the senior executive team, would not be misled by high scores in CSIP interviews. We recognised that scores did not always tell the full story regarding customer satisfaction. We would need to consider the respondent's statements in the report, the actual performance of the account, and any other feedback provided by the customer.

## **REFLECTIONS**

57. I have been asked by the Inquiry who I think is responsible for the Post Office scandal.

I can only approach that question from a position of limited information and knowledge. While I am aware many sub-postmasters were wrongfully prosecuted and convicted in reliance on data from the Horizon system, the information I have on the scandal is limited and informed mostly by recent press reports. As such, I do not believe I am in a position to properly form an informed view on who bears responsibility for the scandal.

58. Notwithstanding my observations in the paragraph above, and so as to assist the Inquiry as far as possible, I will attempt to respond to the question that has been put to me as best as I can. It appears to me that, based on the limited information I am

aware of currently, there must have been failings (i) at the Post Office, which actually prosecuted sub-postmasters wrongly, and (ii) at Fujitsu, which designed the system that supplied the data used in court cases. I am aware, from the public reports about the overturning of various sub-postmasters' convictions, that the data that was used to support prosecutions and other cases against sub-postmasters was flawed. While no major IT system can be entirely free of bugs or errors, the data used to prosecute or bring cases against sub-postmasters should have been comprehensively checked for reliability and accuracy. It appears now that may not have been properly done by the individuals who were involved with and had responsibility for cases against sub-postmasters at the time.

59. I am really very sorry personally about what has happened to so many people, and for the part I and the company I worked for in a senior role had in this.

**Statement of Truth**

I believe the content of this statement to be true.

Signed:

**GRO**

16th May 2023  
Dated: \_\_\_\_\_

## INDEX TO THE FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF DAVID COURTLEY

Exhibit No.	URN	Document Description	Control No.
1.	FUJ00003534	Minutes of a Meeting of the Fujitsu Services Management Committee of the Boards of Directors of Fujitsu Services Holdings PLC, Fujitsu Services Limited and Fujitsu Services (Investments) Limited (the "Companies") dated 20 August 2002	POINQ0009705F
2.	FUJ00151237	Fujitsu Operational Structure chart (undated)	POINQ0158086F
3.	FUJ00115869	Fujitsu UK Organisation Structure Chart dated April 2004	POINQ0122040F
4.	FUJ00115875	Fujitsu Services Organisation Structure Chart dated 2005	POINQ0122046F
5.	FUJ00115890	Fujitsu Services Organisation Chart	POINQ0122061F
6.	FUJ00116308	Account Review of Post Office & Royal Mail Group dated 31 January 2007	POINQ0122479F
7.	FUJ00115991	Large Projects Division – ISC paper	POINQ0122162F
8.	FUJ00115990	Email chain between David Courtley and Tony Oppenheim with subject "Reviews of the ICL Large Projects (PFIs)" dated 2 September 2001	POINQ0122161F
9.	FUJ00116220	Report titled "Update Report for Event 574" dated 6 July 2004	POINQ0122391F
10.	FUJ00116221	Presentation titled "Post Office Account, CS Staff Briefing" by Martin Riddell dated 6 May 2004	POINQ0122392F
11.	FUJ00003575	Minutes of a Meeting of the Fujitsu Services Management Committee of the Boards of Directors of the Companies dated 9 June 2004	POINQ0009746F
12.	FUJ00116138	Email chain involving FSL Business Assurance and others with subject "Post Office Group BNB Review" dated 11 April 2002	POINQ0122309F
13.	FUJ00116126	Horizon Contract Renewal dated 21 February 2002	POINQ0122297F
14.	FUJ00151236	Email note from the secretary of Alan Barrie, with subject "Dinner with Alan Barrie and Ian Miller (Parity) re future relationship between PO and ICL"	POINQ0158085F

15.	FUJ00003673	Fujitsu Services Management Committee Major Accounts Report dated May 2005	POINQ0009844F
16.	FUJ00003676	Fujitsu Services Management Committee Major Accounts Report dated August 2005	POINQ0009847F
17.	FUJ00003587	Fujitsu Services Management Committee Major Accounts Report dated November 2005	POINQ0009758F
18.	FUJ00116310	Fujitsu Major Account Review dated 7 March 2006	POINQ0122481F
19.	FUJ00003648	Fujitsu Services Holdings PLC Letter of Comfort for Post Office Limited dated August 2006	POINQ0009819F
20.	FUJ00003649	Written Resolutions of the directors of Fujitsu Services Limited dated August 2006	POINQ0009820F
21.	FUJ00000074	An agreement (guarantee) between Post Office Limited and Fujitsu Services (Pathway)Limited dated 28 July 1999	POINQ0006245F
22.	FUJ00151238	Email from Alert Management Centre to Allen Guy and others with subject "Alert Management Summary - 20th March 2007" dated 20 March 2007	POINQ0158087F
23.	FUJ00151239	Attachment to POINQ0158087F (above) titled "All Open Problems" (undated)	POINQ0158088F
24.	FUJ00003702	Fujitsu Services Management Committee Major Accounts Report dated November 2007	POINQ0009873F
25.	FUJ00003708	Fujitsu Services Management Committee Major Accounts Report dated February 2008	POINQ0009879F
26.	FUJ00003707	Fujitsu Services Management Committee Major Accounts Report dated May 2008	POINQ0009878F
27.	FUJ00117424	Fujitsu Services Management Committee Major Projects Report dated February 2005	POINQ0123595F
28.	FUJ00003688	Fujitsu Services Management Committee Major Accounts Report dated August 2006	POINQ0009859F
29.	FUJ00151241	Fujitsu Services Customer Satisfaction Interview Programme dated 14 November 2007	POINQ0158090F
30.	FUJ00003705	Fujitsu Services Management Committee Major Accounts Report dated August 2007	POINQ0009876F