

Witness Name: Ian David Trundell

Statement No.: WITN03890100

Dated: 15TH FEBRUARY
2023

POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY

FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF IAN DAVID TRUNDELL

I, Ian David Trundell will say as follows:

Background

1. I went to Huddersfield polytechnic to complete an HND in computer studies.
2. I've undertaken the standard professional background rising through programmer, analyst, team leader, project manager then architect and enterprise architect. I lost my CV so this is from my poor memory.
 - a. From 1984- 1987 I worked as a programmer / analyst at Sheffield insulations Ltd.
 - b. From 1987 - 2003 I was a Programmer / analyst at Royal Mail.

- c. I recollect that in 2003 IT staff were Outsourced to business systems which was then split into developers going to Xansa (operations staff went to CSC). Xansa was taken over by Steria.
- d. From 2005 to 2018 I worked at Post Office Ltd.
- e. From 2005 to 2010 I worked as a solution architect there.
- f. In 2010 I worked as an enterprise architect.
- g. In 2018 I took medical retirement following my stroke in 2017.

3. Since joining the Post Office I've completed a number of qualifications including ISEB in project management, ToGAF, Prince2 and others but I have no material to confirm the courses.

Background to your involvement with the Horizon IT Project.

4. I was working in Xansa on a number of projects when I was aware of an opportunity to join the Horizon S90 project in 2005 as an architect. The project was just about to start and I took the lead in the solution assurance and design. This involved working closely with the Fujitsu Design team of Allan Hodgkinson and Duncan Macdonald as well as the Post Office team.

Horizon S90

5. The Horizon system consisted of capabilities that allowed Post Office to introduce new products with minimal input from Fujitsu. This was a series

of constructs that were called datatypes (APADC - Automated payments advanced data capture) and kept costs of introducing transactions to a minimum and the speed was relatively quick.

6. The one shortfall in APADC was that there was no capability to interact with internal or external databases; S90 introduced a new datatype to allow this called Generic online. Also introduced was a data store and framework called APOP - Automated Payments Outpayments. This allowed positive and negative payments.

7. The first product that was introduced was Postal Orders. The Postal Order automation would treat the postal orders like cheques and move away from the legacy solution. POs allowed a product to be purchased, money given to clerk, and then cashed, money given to customer.

8. APOP had two tables called Primary and History. All interactions with APOP could be configured to record history. This would be useful for each product introduced as the history could be queried using the APOP Admin enquiry function used by the APOP Admin team in Chesterfield.

9. At the heart of APOP was a data table, schema, that could be configured for each product. There were 15 Alpha fields, 3 date fields, 3 numeric fields as well as a unique identifier called a Voucher id. For postal orders alpha1 was used for payee name. The APOP solution was configurable and gave PO transaction designers the capability to

introduce products with minimal costs from Fujitsu (testing and implementation were two costs).

10. The APOP solution was secure and only key support staff could interrogate the database. Postal Orders could be up to £250 and the database recorded the unique number from the MICR line and barcode on the cheque. The solution had a secure method to interact in batch with the clearing bank, COOP. This allowed people to deposit postal orders into their bank. The Administration team would interact with the secure printers (Smith and Ouzman) to bulk print postal orders. The printed Postal Orders were worthless until activated on APOP via secure bulk load or branch sale.

11. APOP's rules-based engine allowed the lifecycle to be defined e.g. not existing, sold, cashed, archived. Where there are scenarios that are exceptions, these can be defined and reported on e.g. sell to sell. Where someone tries to cash twice this can raise an exception and reported on.

12. Once introduced APOP supported the products such as Stock Ordering, bureau pre order, etc with minimal input from Fujitsu.

13. As the S90 solution allowed interaction with third party and post office data stores there needed to be a capability that ensured the elements were kept in sync.

14. The generic online datatype allowed external databases to be referenced, an example of which was MoneyGram. Money could be sent

from Post Office to receiving locations around the world. Without documenting the whole solution, a new datatype recorded each planned interaction with a third party. In the event of a break in communications, for example, it would be possible to enter a recovery process to determine how to proceed. This may have required a sub postmaster to call NBSC and liaise with MoneyGram to determine if their database was updated. The transaction may then be completed or cancelled etc.

15. The process was used for all transactions that had two data stores that needed to be kept in sync.

16. I was engaged in the role of solution architect to assist in the review of Fujitsu solutions e.g. APOP and to design Post Office solutions e.g. APOP integration with COOP bank etc.

17. I worked closely with the POL security architect to ensure any solution was robust. For example, the separation of concerns (duties) in the bulk file Postal Order loads to ensure one person was not able to load postal orders and encash them. A secure file delivery mechanism was introduced with Smith and Ouzman. For Horizon S90 I was the solution architect. I assured the Fujitsu solution and helped design capability in Horizon. As the solution required a secure file delivery mechanism to enliven bulk postal orders I worked with Smith and Ouzman to propose and implement a secure client. The banking solution to clear the PO cheques required a secure batch file process to extract and transform MICR line details and validate against APOP.

18. I became an enterprise architect to look at the wider POL solutions and ensure there were robust solutions that were used across the Enterprise and avoiding point solutions. I was responsible for assuring the Fujitsu solution as well as designing Post Office capability, e.g. COOP bank interface.

Impact

19. I joined the Post Office projects at S90 and had no engagement in the S80 Impact programme. EPOSS was a solution that existed and I had no engagement in the capability.

Horizon Online

20. During HNGx I was not a tester but due to my solution and transaction knowledge I was seconded to the testing team to help with transactions. I helped the testing team to understand the new capability and supported them during the test planning. I helped the pilot phase by representing the programme in the north east as a project/testing interface. I recall a series of meetings where the testing team demonstrated HNGx to subpostmasters. My memory of the trip to the north east is limited.

21. A group session was held by the training team to share some news about the changes coming in HNGx. I don't recall exact dates but the training team should know. The local branches were invited to attend. The training team will know who was invited. Some transactions were shown. The emulator helped to run the transactions.

22. I was engaged as a solution architect in the Horizon Online project. I worked on the project to review technical solutions proposed by Fujitsu and providing formal feedback on documents.

23. I have been asked to explain what the purpose of the RAG reports / meetings were. They were to review the severity of incidents and allocate a Red, Amber, Green status. Red was high priority, amber medium priority, green was low, minor or cosmetic.

24. I have been asked a number of questions regarding the pilot and rollout of Horizon Online. My memories of pilot and rollout is poor. I cannot recall any specific issues.

25. I have been asked to consider a document titled OCP 25316 [POL00001568]. I have no recollection of this incident.

26. I cannot comment on what the pilot branches were told about (a) the cause of the mismatch and (b) the proposed rectification as I have no memory.

27. I have been asked to consider the Minutes of a Joint Tactical and Strategic Meeting dated 14 March 2013 [POL00029471]. I have no recollection of this incident and the meeting on 14 March 2012. I have been asked to explain what "resilience" means in the context of these minutes. Resilience models include multiple datacentres which could be active-active, or active-passive. I recall the model used on HNGx was

active-passive. In the event that the primary datacentre had an outage the second data centre would be activated. I do not recall other detail.

28. I've reviewed POL00039120 but was not engaged in the definition of any procedures for testing Horizon Online.

- a. I recognise the principle of testing approach but cannot recall any detail for the programme and how they evolved over time.
- b. In my view, the project was run very well by Mark Burley, but I cannot comment on how effective the system was for monitoring and testing Horizon.
- c. I have no view on how Fujitsu complied with its contractual requirements in respect of testing.

29. I've reviewed POL00029487 but have no concrete memories of why in April 2012, the Post Office sought to engage KPMG to complete an architecture review of its IT systems. I don't recall the trigger for the review, but it made sense to have an independent view of the Horizon Online solution.

30. Fujitsu designed the Horizon solution and Post Office assured it. The review was to undertake an assessment that could consider the overall solution and compare to best practices.

I think kit looked at :-

- a. Scalability - will the solution accommodate 30,000 concurrent terminals?

- b. Resilience n+1 arch - if the major components require 4 elements, then 4+1 are required;
- c. Security - does the solution offer a high level of security?
- d. Single points of failure - are there minimal points of failure that have contingency measures?
- e. Architecture - is the solution modern and in line with best/good practice?
- f. Data centre and servers active / passive - are the data centre elements able to fail over entirely to the other data centre?
- g. Constraints - differing connection methods, adsl, vsat, dial up, mobile backup.

31. I cannot recall any detail about the utility of the proposed architecture review by KPMG.

Training

32. I don't recall being involved in training, but I did help to specify the emulated responses for certain transactions where I had the expertise, e.g. MoneyGram, APOP.

- a. I wasn't close to the training to describe the subpostmaster engagement. I did represent the HNGx programme when the training team visited the north east. The trainers were giving a high-level overview of HNGx and I was on site to ensure it went smoothly and provide and liaison with the project team if needed.

- b. I was not engaged in the training scripts with subpostmasters and I'm not aware of how this may have figured in the system design
- c. I was not directly involved in the definition of the training but was engaged in the specification of some emulated responses. This was taken into account by the training team when defining training scenario.
- d. I have been asked whether, looking back, there is anything I think ought to have been done differently in the provision of training to Horizon users. I'm not sure if there were expert users that were engaged in training, but if not this may have been useful. I've come across Users who know all transactions inside out. They recognise which transactions are required to be run during the different balance periods, and more importantly know where to look when there are discrepancies.
- e. Having such an expert that can represent the challenges faced by a branch as well as understanding what HNGx has to offer would be of benefit to both parties.

Stock adjustments project

33. I have been asked questions about the Stock Adjustments Project. I have no memory of the project scope. I have read the Back Office Efficiency Programme – Stock Adjustments Project Definition Document dated 19 March 2010 [POL00001697] but cannot recall any detail.

34. I have been asked what my involvement in this project was and whether it was implemented. I do not recall. The document is only version 0.1 which suggests a draft. Baseline documents are whole numbers e.g. 1.0.

Design and function of receipts, print-outs and other reports from Horizon

35. This is not something I was close to. The documents explain what a sub postmaster could report on. I have no view as my knowledge and memory is limited/ unreliable.

Bugs, errors and defects

36. I have been asked what role I had in identifying, rectifying or monitoring bugs, errors or defects in the Horizon IT System. Bugs were identified and logged by the Horizon/ Fujitsu testing teams (I think). My recollection is that the joint team would review the issue and allocate a RAG status. The bugs would be monitored and reviewed regularly to ensure they were being progressed and had the correct priority. I was engaged as part of the review team working alongside the testers, security architect.

37. I have considered POL00022840. I was not aware of any issues or problems with the Horizon system, in particular bugs, errors or defects.

38. I'm unaware who received information about issues or problems with the Horizon system, e.g. bugs, errors or defects.

39. I do not recall how the knowledge about issues and problems with the Horizon system was dealt with subpostmasters or Post Office managers or assistants working in Post Office branches.

40. The document POL00001935 is regarding a recovery incident. The terminal had frozen prompting a call to the helpdesk. I do not recall any specifics, but Postal Order values cannot be less than zero.

41. I have considered the document POL00001935, I do not recall this incident or the reason/resolution.

Receipts and Payments Mismatch Bug

42. I have considered FUJ00081584: I have no recollection of this incident or meetings.

Clock time synchronisation

43. I have been asked about clock time synchronisation, and I have considered POL00002192 and POL00002159. I have no memory of the clock issue. Peter Laycock may have knowledge: but I do not recall any detail.

General

44. [GRO]

[GRO]

[GRO] I took [GRO] retirement in 2018 due to my [GRO] and inability to recall any technical detail. I've read the attached material and, due to my [GRO] and the passage at time, I have little memory of the subjects. I've answered where I am certain but do not have the memories of the material.

Statement of Truth

I believe the content of this statement to be true.

Signed: [GRO]

Dated: 15 Feb 2020

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<u>Exhibit No.</u>	<u>URN</u>	<u>Document Description</u>	<u>Control Number</u>
<u>1</u>	POL00001568	OCP 25316	VIS00002582
<u>2</u>	POL00029471	Minutes of a Joint Tactical and Strategic Meeting dated 14 March 2013	POL-0025953
<u>3</u>	POL00039120	Post Office Fujitsu, Approach to Testing for the Horizon Online System - Version 2.0	POL-0035602
<u>4</u>	POL00029487	IT Architecture - E2E Risk/Resilience Review Project Initiation Document v0.8	POL-0025969
<u>5</u>	POL00001697	Back Office Efficiency Programme - Stock Adjustments 25/03/2010	VIS00002711
<u>6</u>	POL00001935	Peak Incident Management System Report dated 02/08/2011	POINQ0087755F
<u>7</u>	FUJ00081584	Receipts/Payments Mismatch issue notes	POINQ0081584
<u>8</u>	POL00002192	Meeting minutes EBT risks and issues dated 20/06/2013	VIS00003206
<u>9</u>	POL00002159	Email from Peter Laycock to Rebecca Barker, Ian Trundell, Willie Hughes & Caroline Hilton re Horizon	VIS00003173

		terminal time offsets dated 24/01/2013	
<u>10</u>	POL00022840	Horizon Issues Judgement, in particular Technical Appendix and Appendix 2	POL-0019319

