1 Friday, 26 July 2024 2 (9.45 am) 3 MR STEVENS: Good morning, sir. Can you see and hear me? 4 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, thank you. 5 MR STEVENS: Sir, we are hearing from Allan Leighton today 6 and, as you will remember, but for the benefit of those 7 watching, Mr Leighton gave oral evidence to this Inquiry 8 on 17 April of this year and, on that occasion, 9 Mr Leighton confirmed the accuracy of his witness 10 statement, subject to one minor correction. The Unique 11 Reference Number for that statement is WITN04380100. 12 The statement and the transcript of Mr Leighton's oral 13 evidence is available on the Inquiry's website. 14 We weren't able to conclude his oral evidence on 15 17 April and I stress that was through no fault of his, 16 and Mr Leighton has agreed to the Inquiry's request to 17 re-attend to answer further questions today. 18 With that in mind, sir, unless you wish to say 19 anything I would ask that Mr Leighton be sworn in? 20 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: No, that's fine. 21 ALLAN LESLIE LEIGHTON (re-sworn) 22 Questioned by MR STEVENS 23 MR STEVENS: Thank you, Mr Leighton. Thank you for 24 attending the Inquiry again to complete your oral 25 evidence. I want to start by recapping on some of your 1 1 oral evidence from the last hearing and so if we could 2 please bring up the transcript of that, it's 3 INQ00001131. While that's coming up, I will say that 4 I will use two pages references when referring to the 5 transcript, one the A4-page reference for the purposes 6 of our document management system and then the internal 7 page reference as well. 8 So if we could first, please, turn to page 32, 9 that's A4-page 32, and at internal page 126, we see 10 there your evidence begins, your oral evidence. Please 11 can we look at A4-page 35 and at internal page 138, 12 line 22, this follows a question I asked about Post 13 Office Limited issues. I asked: 14 "With hindsight, should added to that list be 15 prosecutions of subpostmasters and oversight of 16 prosecutions of subpostmasters?" 17 If we could go down the page, please, to page 139, 18 we don't need to read the whole of it but part of your 19 answer was: 20 "Non-execs are called non-execs because they don't 21 execute; executives are called executives because they 22 do execute." 23 That's at line 11, sorry. 24 Then carrying on from line 13: 25 "So our role, I think, really is to make sure the 2 1 structures are in place to enable any issue in the 2 business to be raised up the organisation. And, 3 therefore, you've got -- you have the, you know, the 4 Executive Management Team who are responsible do that. 5 You've got all the meeting structures from the POL Board 6 to the Royal Mail Board to the Audit and Risk Committee, 7 to the subcommittees of all those organisations, to the 8 Management Boards of those organisations that move all 9 the time and, over time", and then you go on to talk 10 about Have Your Say. 11 Do you remember giving that evidence? 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. Could we please then turn to page 38, A4-page 38, and 14 then internal page 152, please, at the bottom, line 7. 15 I asked: 16 "What is the Non-Executive Director or Non-Executive 17 Chairman's role in respect of risk management?" 18 Your answer says: 19 "To make sure that the processes are in place that 20 enable that to happen, in terms of risk management, 21 Audit and Risk Committee obviously are a big part of 22 that, but also a lot of risk doesn't just come through 23 the Audit and Risk Committee, it comes from the 24 day-to-day interface you have with people. So the most 25 important thing is to have some set processes, to make 3 1 it clear where the responsibility lies and, again, 2 I think you can see, certainly in the Royal Mail pieces 3 of the report and accounts, that there were -- you know, 4 risk management was built up from the bottom of the 5 organisation." 6 Again, do you recall giving that evidence? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. So I think, summarising your evidence, is that 9 a non-executive had responsibility to see that 10 appropriate reporting structures were in place in the 11 group or business? 12 A. That's right. 13 Q. Would that include a responsibility to see that there is 14 appropriate oversight of the group's operations? 15 A. Absolutely. 16 Q. Can we turn, please, to page 40. I should say 17 A4-page 40. Then at internal page 159, line 13, 18 I asked: 19 "Well, when was the first time that you were aware 20 that subpostmasters were prosecuted for those offences 21 by a Royal Mail Group --" 22 I think I was going to say "company". You answered: 23 "When I joined the organisation". 24 At internal 160, line 3, it says: 25 "Were you aware that the decision of whether to 4 1 prosecute someone or a subpostmaster, was made by 2 a Royal Mail Group company?" 3 You answered: 4 "Yeah." 5 Then at line 7: 6 "Were you aware that the prosecution was conducted 7 by a Royal Mail Group company?" 8 You answered: 9 "Yes." 10 Again, do you recall giving that evidence? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. Page 41, please -- thank you -- and down to internal 13 page 163. At line 6 I asked: 14 "So you were aware of the prosecutions. Were you 15 aware that prosecutions of subpostmasters relied on data 16 generated by the Horizon IT system? 17 "Answer: I'm not acutely aware of it but it would 18 be obvious that it would be because, obviously, that was 19 the EPOS system of the branches. 20 "Question: On an operational level, who or which 21 team did you think was responsible for investigating 22 suspected theft, fraud or false accounting on the part 23 of subpostmasters? 24 "Answer: Again, I can't recall exactly but I would 25 say it was in that sort of Security/Legal area of the 5 1 business. 2 "Question: So we have the Security Team. Where did 3 you think the Security Team sat in the reporting line 4 within the group? 5 "Answer: Again, I can't -- I don't know exactly 6 because I haven't seen the organograms but I think my 7 recollection is that they worked into the Legal teams 8 and that they all worked into the Company Secretary. 9 "Question: So the Legal Team, where did the Legal 10 Team sit? 11 "Answer: Again, I'm not 100 per cent sure but 12 I think it reported into the company secretary. 13 "Question: The company secretary of which company? 14 "Answer: Of Royal Mail Group. 15 "Question: So Legal was a group function? 16 "Answer: I'm pretty -- yes, I think so, yeah." 17 Again, do you recall giving that evidence? 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. Then, actually, line 16 as well, please, of internal 20 page 164. 21 "Question: Again, at the operational level, who did 22 you think was responsible for the decision as to whether 23 or not to prosecute a subpostmaster?" 24 "Answer: I would have -- again, I'm not -- I have 25 to say within the Legal Team. 6 1 "Question: So within Group in Legal? 2 "Answer: Yes. 3 "Question: Who did you think was responsible for 4 the conduct of those prosecutions? Would that be legal 5 again? 6 "Answer: Yes, I think so." 7 I think it's fair to say that those were all matters 8 that you -- your evidence is you knew those at the time 9 you were chairing; is that right? 10 A. Sorry, could you repeat that? 11 Q. Is your evidence that you knew those matters, which 12 we've just gone through, at the time you were Chairman? 13 A. Largely, yes. 14 Q. When you say "largely", what matters do you think you 15 weren't aware of when you were Chairman? 16 A. I mean, some of the detail, I would think, I was -- I'd 17 need to go back over things but, largely, I would have 18 been aware of all those things when I was Chairman. 19 Q. Can we look, please, at A4-page 42 and then internal 20 page 165, line 1. It says: 21 "Were these matters actively on your mind at the 22 time when you were running the company? 23 "Answer: Not at all. 24 "Question: Why not? 25 "Answer: Because, obviously, there were many other 7 1 things that were being addressed both --", and you go on 2 to say what those were. 3 Just to clarify this, what is you're saying is that 4 you knew, as you say, largely the overview of what I've 5 just been through but it's not something that you 6 actively thought about when you were Chairman as to how 7 the process worked? 8 A. Absolutely. 9 Q. We then turned in your evidence to look at the oversight 10 of prosecutions at the group level. I don't need to go 11 through the entire transcript for that. I'll take you 12 to one part. It's A4-page 44, please and internal 13 page 73, at line 25. I asked: 14 "Let's take it in charges. You say that Jonathan 15 Evans, the Company Secretary, that's the line of report 16 for Legal? 17 "Answer: That's what I think. I'm not 100 per 18 cent, as I said to you. 19 "Question: You said earlier you thought the 20 decision to prosecute and the investigation of offences, 21 responsibility for that lay with Legal -- 22 "Answer: Yes. 23 "Question: -- at Group level? 24 "Answer: Yes. 25 "Question: We see that the Audit and Risk Committee 8 1 of the Royal Mail Holdings Group are exercising 2 oversight of the prosecution of offences affecting Royal 3 Mail, yes? 4 "Answer: Yes, but their oversight is on the Royal 5 Mail and POL and Parcels. The Royal Mail Audit 6 Committee's oversight is across all of the elements of 7 the business. 8 "Question: Yes, so that's my question. Why, in 9 those circumstances, was the Audit and Risk Committee 10 not exercising the same type of oversight as we see here 11 in respect of prosecution of crime that was affecting 12 Post Office Limited? 13 "Answer: That I don't know." 14 Is it fair to summarise your evidence as this: that 15 the Royal Mail Board in practice did not exercise 16 oversight of the prosecutions of subpostmasters? 17 A. That's correct. 18 Q. You couldn't give us an answer to why that was at the 19 last time? 20 A. That's correct. 21 Q. Can you give us an answer today? 22 A. No, I mean, I -- it's the same thing. Obviously, at the 23 Audit Committee, as you saw, some of these issues were 24 discussed. But it seems it would largely be a cost of 25 to Royal Mail, and so at no stage really was there any 9 1 information coming up the organisation that this was 2 an issue, or the issue that it was. And therefore, 3 I think that is why it was never really picked up at the 4 Audit Committee. 5 Q. Can we look at Post Office Limited's oversight of 6 prosecutions and turn to your statement, please, 7 at page 23, paragraph 44. So you're discussing 8 oversight of legal departments for various other 9 departments, you'll see from the first line. 10 Midway down you say: 11 "I do not recall any discussion during Board 12 meetings of the prosecutions that [Post Office] was 13 pursuing against those [subpostmasters]." 14 Is that relating to all boards, Post Office Limited 15 and Royal Mail Holdings? 16 A. Absolutely. 17 Q. Does it also apply to any subcommittees of the Boards of 18 either company that you sat on? 19 A. As far as I know, yes. 20 Q. Do you recall having any discussion with any other 21 member of the Post Office Executive Team about 22 prosecutions? 23 A. None at all. 24 Q. Do you recall having any such discussion with any other 25 Post Office Non-Executive Director? 10 1 A. None at all. 2 Q. So during your time as Chairman, is it the case that you 3 did not discuss prosecutions of subpostmasters with 4 anyone? 5 A. As far as I can recall, yes. 6 Q. If we could please look back at your statement, page 23, 7 paragraph 45. You say: 8 "As a general matter, my role as Chairman and 9 [Non-Executive Director of Royal Mail Holdings] was one 10 which involved overseeing and advising on the strategic 11 objectives of [Royal Mail Holdings]." 12 Pausing there, you were also a Non-Executive 13 Director of Post Office Limited? 14 A. Absolutely. 15 Q. "Where issues were raised to Board level, I would seek 16 to take an active role in discussing and probing the 17 best course of action. Since the litigation was taking 18 place within [Post Office], as with other companies with 19 whom I have worked over the years, I would have expected 20 the Board of [Post Office] to be kept up-to-date with 21 key litigation ongoing in the company." 22 What did you mean by "Since the litigation was 23 taking place within Post Office Limited"? 24 A. That the -- that that's where the interface was. 25 Basically, POL was in charge of the subpostmasters. 11 1 Obviously, they're working with Royal Mail Group, who 2 were doing the legal activity, but I'd have expected 3 both -- it to come to the Board of POL and, if 4 necessary, to the Board of the Royal Mail, if there were 5 significant issues in litigation, including litigation 6 against subpostmasters and/or any issues that resolve -- 7 that were a cause of that. 8 Q. Do you accept that oversight of the legal function in 9 Royal Mail Group was to the Royal Mail Group Board? 10 A. It was through the Royal Mail Group Board, yes. But, 11 also, had an interface with the POL Board because POL 12 operationally managed that piece of the business. So 13 I'd see it as a joint responsibility. 14 Q. You say that you would have expected the Board of Post 15 Office Limited to be kept up to date with key litigation 16 ongoing in the company, and you go on to say: 17 "Usually this would include litigation which 18 impacted, or had the potential to impact, the strategic 19 objectives of the company. I would not have expected to 20 have been briefed on all litigation, but rather those 21 deemed by the Executive Team to be high cost or have the 22 potential to impact the strategic objectives of the 23 company. Within the business, the responsibility for 24 conducting and overseeing litigation is, in my 25 experience, the responsibility of the company's legal 12 1 function." 2 When you say "high cost", are you referring to the 3 legal costs, the risk of -- so what's at stake in the 4 litigation, the amount that's at stake in the 5 litigation, or both? 6 A. Both, and impact that it may have on the business, in 7 a negative sense, from either a revenue or a cost 8 perspective. 9 Q. When you say "the potential to impact the strategic 10 objectives of the company", what did you mean by that? 11 A. Well, any -- I mean exactly that. If there is anything 12 that would affect the strategic impact -- have 13 a strategic impact on the company, from wherever it came 14 from, then I'd expect the Board to be aware of that. 15 And, again, if you look at this particular tragedy, 16 clearly, if there were issues with Horizon in a systemic 17 way, that would not just have a cost impact on the 18 business. It would have a strategic impact on the 19 business, because you would question why we were rolling 20 that system out because it was the backbone of 21 everything that was happening in the Post Office. So 22 Horizon was a major strategic activity within the Group. 23 Q. Just looking at the prosecutorial function: reduced to 24 its simplest, this meant that Royal Mail and Post Office 25 would take people to court and, in certain 13 1 circumstances, that would lead to sentences of 2 imprisonment; do you agree with that? 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. You would have known, when you were Chairman, the very 5 serious consequences of a criminal conviction against 6 a subpostmaster? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. You would have known of the very serious consequences of 9 a term of imprisonment against a subpostmaster? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. In those circumstances, would you agree that the 12 exercise of the prosecutorial function should have been 13 at the forefront of the Board of Directors' minds? 14 A. I'm not sure that it should be at the forefront of the 15 Board's mind but it would -- certainly should have been 16 in scope. But I go to the same issue, which we come to 17 all the time here: the issue was that there was nothing 18 coming to the Board from any direction that suggested 19 there was any -- the scale of the activity or some 20 systemic issue in Horizon that was causing that. 21 Q. Leaving Horizon to one side, when one of the operations 22 of the company had the potential to lead to terms of 23 imprisonment for members of the Group's workforce, or 24 past members of the workforce, wasn't it incumbent on 25 the Board take proactive steps to satisfy itself that 14 1 the prosecutorial process was fair and lawful? 2 A. I think the role of the Board in this would be to ensure 3 that there were practices and policies and procedures in 4 place, and that those were taking place, and then would 5 expect to hear where that was not the case. 6 Q. So is your evidence that the role of the Board is to set 7 up the process, firstly? 8 Yes, I think? 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. Secondly, to see that that process is being followed 11 through? 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. And, presumably as part of that, it's important that 14 people in the management chain know who is responsible 15 for what? 16 A. Absolutely, and not just in the management chain: in all 17 of the functions that were interfacing in that activity. 18 Q. Is it the Board's responsibility to satisfy itself that 19 people in the management chain and elsewhere, as you 20 describe, knew the remit of their responsibility? 21 A. Absolutely. 22 Q. I want to look at what was considered by the Post Office 23 Board and/or subcommittees. Could we please start with 24 POL00021483. It's a meeting of the Post Office Limited 25 Board of Directors on 20 August 2003, and we see on the 15 1 "Present" side, three up from the bottom, you're listed 2 as being present. 3 Could we turn, please, to page 8. Under "POLB03/69" 4 it refers to Tony Marsh, who "presented a security paper 5 to the Board on behalf of David Miller". If you just 6 have a quick skim of that and let me know when you want 7 to go over the page. I don't need to read it on to the 8 transcript. 9 A. Okay to move on? 10 Q. Go to the next page, please. That appears to be 11 relating to the security of sub post offices rather than 12 the investigation and prosecution of crime. Is that 13 your recollection of the meeting, if you have one? 14 A. Well, it was a long time ago, so I can't recall but way 15 I'd read it, I'd say that that's -- when you read it, 16 that's what it is. 17 Q. Can we please look at POL00021485. That's a year and 18 a bit on in the chronology, 13 October 2004. We see, 19 again, three from the bottom of the "Present" list, you 20 are present, and it says, "For POLB04/86 -- 04/97". 21 I assume that means, where the references are in between 22 that number, you're present for the meeting; when it's 23 outside of that number range you aren't there? 24 A. Yeah, I can't recall that. 25 Q. We see it's up to 97 on the right side. 16 1 A. Yeah. 2 Q. Can we go to page 13, please, so "POLB04/108". So it 3 appears that you wouldn't have been there at this 4 meeting. Would you have read the minutes of the meeting 5 at a later date? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. It says "Human Resources" and "The Board noted the 8 report": 9 "The Board agreed that in situations where fraud had 10 been perpetrated against the Company, the appropriate 11 Civil Orders would be used immediately and in advance of 12 any criminal proceedings. This would help recovery 13 efforts by ensuring that the assets of those involved in 14 criminal activity were quickly secured. David Miller 15 would verify the current procedures and report back to 16 the Board." 17 Given this is under the Human Resources section, can 18 you assist us with whether this is looking at alleged 19 fraud against the Post Office by its workforce? 20 A. I can't -- I mean, I can't recall that, no. 21 Q. Do you recall this issue being raised or discussed with 22 other members of the Board? 23 A. I've no -- obviously it's a long time ago, so I don't 24 actually recall this. If you ask me to read it, 25 I would -- it's difficult to -- it's difficult to tell 17 1 exactly who it's talking about. 2 Q. You weren't aware, around this time, though, of the 3 Board considering the process of prosecutions, is that 4 right? 5 A. Sorry, I don't -- 6 Q. So with your -- any conversations you remember with 7 non-executives, it's right that you weren't aware of, or 8 told about, any discussion at Board level about the 9 process of prosecutions? 10 A. About the process of prosecutions? 11 Q. Yes. 12 A. No, I thought you asked a question whether we knew about 13 numbers of prosecutions. Obviously, this talks about 14 the process of prosecutions. 15 Q. Let me rephrase it. I asked you earlier if you were 16 ever involved in discussions about prosecutions with 17 members of the Board, Non-Executive Directors. My 18 question is: are you aware of any discussion at Board 19 level about oversight of prosecutions that occurred when 20 you were not there? 21 A. No. I mean, this is -- I don't think this is about 22 oversight of prosecutions. This is about, when I read 23 this, what happens when there is a recovery required. 24 Q. You mentioned numbers of prosecutions before. What were 25 you going to say about that and your knowledge of -- 18 1 A. Just that we had no idea of the numbers of prosecutions 2 that were taking place. That was never raised up. 3 Q. What was your understanding of the numbers of 4 prosecutions that were taking place at the time? 5 A. I had no understanding of the amount of prosecutions 6 taking place at the time. 7 Q. Did you at any point ask how many people the Post Office 8 was prosecuting? 9 A. Not in that set of circumstances. There were 10 discussions at Royal Mail Group about the broader number 11 of prosecutions taking place across the group but, to my 12 recall, never a discussion about the number of 13 prosecutions actually taking place in POL itself. 14 Q. Could we look, please, at -- actually, no, before we do: 15 why did you not ask for numbers of prosecutions in 16 relation to Post Office Limited itself and/or 17 prosecutions against subpostmasters? 18 A. Because it was never seen as an issue in the 19 organisation. It was never flagged up as an issue and, 20 frankly, there were so many other things going on, 21 unless it would have been raised, it wouldn't have been 22 picked up. But in -- as you can see, in bits of the 23 Royal Mail Group, or where issues were raised generally, 24 there was a discussion. But this was not a priority at 25 the time, which was a mistake. 19 1 Q. Is that a mistake because it was a reactive approach to 2 the oversight of the process of prosecutions, rather 3 than a proactive approach of the Board satisfying itself 4 that the prosecutions were being conducted fairly? 5 A. I think it's -- I think it was reactive and -- but 6 I think it's the context of it, which is there's, you 7 know, many, many other things happening in the business. 8 This was not seen as an issue, therefore, there were -- 9 you know, there were clearly procedures that should have 10 been taking place. Clearly, there were teams working on 11 this that had the opportunity to flag this up, and it 12 didn't happen, and it didn't happen not just in the 13 organisation; it wasn't flagged up by -- you know, from 14 the National Federation of SubPostmasters. You name it, 15 this was never brought up as a significant issue, and 16 Boards tend to react to significant issues. 17 Q. Can we please look at POL00021486. It's a meeting on 18 15 September 2024 of the Post Office Limited Board. If 19 we go down, we see you're not in attendance but, as 20 you've said before, you would have read the minutes? 21 Can we turn, please, to page 6. 22 When I asked "you would have read the minutes", 23 I think you nodded? 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. Yes. 20 1 A. Sorry. 2 Q. Thank you. We have an entry about the "Risk and 3 Compliance Committee". It says: 4 "Peter Corbett provided a short presentation on to 5 highlight the work of the newly formed Risk and 6 Compliance Committee. The Board noted that ..." 7 If we go over the page, please: 8 "The scope of its activity included audit, 9 compliance and legal issues ..." 10 It says: 11 "Its primary aim was to ensure the service and 12 conformance elements of the business were working 13 together properly." 14 That's (d). 15 Then (e): 16 "The next quarterly meeting would be held on 17 5 January 2005 to discuss Branch Control, Vital Few 18 Controls, Audit Reports, Anti-Money Laundering measures, 19 Crime and Fraud and the work of the Group Audit 20 Committee." 21 Do you remember what your understanding was of the 22 remit of the Risk and Compliance Committee within Post 23 Office Limited at this point? 24 A. No, I can't recall that. 25 Q. Did you ever sit on the Risk and Compliance Committee or 21 1 attend it? 2 A. Not as far as I can recall. 3 Q. Sir Michael Hodgkinson gave evidence to this Inquiry, we 4 don't need to bring up his witness statement, but at 5 paragraph 32, he said: 6 "I introduced a Risk and Compliance Committee 7 because the Board was conscious that it would need to 8 have greater corporate governance measures in place, 9 with the progression into financial market, specifically 10 because of the risk of mis-selling financial products." 11 Can you gainsay what Sir Michael says about the 12 purpose of the Risk and Compliance Committee? 13 A. No. 14 Q. Please could we turn to -- actually, before we do, 15 sorry, would this, the Risk and Compliance Committee, in 16 your view, have been a suitable place for oversight of 17 prosecutions to take place -- when I say "oversight of 18 prosecutions", I mean against subpostmasters by the Post 19 Office? 20 A. I could be a place, yes. 21 Q. In order for that to be an effective committee to 22 oversee such prosecutions, what types of attendees would 23 it require? 24 A. Again, largely the people that are on that list, I would 25 imagine. That's why it would have been set up that way 22 1 with those people. 2 Q. Would it require input from the Legal Department? 3 A. I would imagine so, yes. 4 Q. Could the Risk and Compliance Committee of Post Office 5 Limited effectively oversee prosecutions if it was not 6 able to oversee the Group Legal function? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. Why? 9 A. Because it's about information, and the members of the 10 Post Office Audit and Risk Committee, and the MD, and 11 the Chairman of Post Office Risk Committee, sat on the 12 Royal Mail Board. 13 Q. Could we please look at POL00021490. It's another Post 14 Office Limited Board meeting, 14 December 2005. If we 15 go down, please. We see you have given your apologies. 16 Could we turn to page 14, please. Just scroll down 17 slightly, so we see -- that's perfect, thank you. 18 We have the "Risk and Compliance Committee" heading 19 and it says: 20 "The Board noted the Risk and Compliance Committee 21 minutes of 29 September 2005." 22 Would you have read those committee minutes as part 23 of the Board pack, even though you didn't attend the 24 meeting? 25 A. If they were in the Board pack, yes. 23 1 Q. Because it says "the Board noted the minutes", is it 2 likely those minutes would have been in the Board pack? 3 A. Probably, I don't know. I wouldn't be able to comment. 4 Q. Could we look, please, at POL00021418. We see the 5 minutes of the Risk and Compliance Committee on 6 29 September 2005 -- sorry, just getting my copy -- and 7 members, we have Sir Michael Hodgkinson, Peter 8 Corbett -- that was the Finance Director of Post Office 9 Limited; is that right? 10 A. I think so, yes. 11 Q. Rod Ismay, who the Inquiry has heard evidence from. 12 Will he have been in the branch accounting team at that 13 point? 14 A. Again, I couldn't recall that but ... 15 Q. Alwen Lyons, again, we've heard evidence from at the 16 Inquiry. 17 The Secretary, Michael Dadra; do you recall working 18 with him? 19 A. Sorry, no, I don't. 20 Q. Apologies from Ian Anderson; do you recall working with 21 him? 22 A. No. 23 Q. Alan Cook we know and will come on to. 24 Keith Woollard; do you remember him? 25 A. Not necessarily. Long time ago. 24 1 Q. Are you aware if the Post Office Limited Risk and 2 Compliance Committee had any persons attending with 3 legal experience? 4 A. I couldn't tell from that list. 5 Q. Could we turn, please, to page 6, and, if we go to the 6 bottom of the page, it says: 7 "Post Office Limited has a principle of undertaking 8 criminal prosecutions for all cases where it is in the 9 public interest, but noting that likelihood of recovery 10 and circumstances of the defendants and the victims may 11 be relevant to that decision." 12 Firstly, after reading that, do you recall whether 13 you turned your mind to whether this committee was 14 overseeing criminal prosecutions? 15 A. I wouldn't be able to -- I mean, I wouldn't know if 16 I saw this document. So it's difficult to comment, 17 really. 18 Q. Secondly, the point of: 19 "... but noting that likelihood of recovery and 20 circumstances of the defendants and the victims may be 21 relevant to that decision." 22 The likelihood of recovery as being relevant to the 23 decision of whether a criminal prosecution is in the 24 public interest, is that something that would have 25 struck you as odd when you read it at the time? 25 1 A. Well, I'm not sure I did read it at the time. As 2 I said, I don't recall seeing this document, so I'd only 3 be speculating. To be honest, it's not very clear at 4 all, as a -- 5 Q. Do I take it from this that, to the best of your 6 recollection at the time, you didn't turn your mind to 7 the circumstances in which Post Office Limited would 8 pursue prosecutions? 9 A. No. 10 Q. That can come down. Thank you. 11 Could we look, please, at POL00032210. This is 12 another meeting of the Post Office Limited Board, this 13 time on 20 April 2006. We can see present, second from 14 bottom, you're in attendance. Yes? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. If we can turn to page 2, please, and then at the top 17 there's (c). It says: 18 "The Board noted the minutes of the Post Office 19 Limited Compliance Committee of 22 March 2006. In view 20 of the increasing volume of regulatory issues the Board 21 considered that it would be beneficial for the Committee 22 to recruit additional expertise. The Board agreed that 23 Luke March, Compliance Director Royal Mail Group, should 24 be asked to join the Compliance Committee." 25 Do you recall this discussion or this decision? 26 1 A. No, not at all. 2 Q. Can you assist us, is this a fair reading of what 3 happens here: firstly the Board is noting an increase in 4 volume of regulatory issues, yes? 5 You're nodding. 6 A. Yes, I'm waiting for you to finish, actually. Go on. 7 Q. Regulatory issues, does that mean compliance, for 8 example, with financial services issues; is that how you 9 take that to -- 10 A. It could be a number of different things. "Regulatory" 11 is quite a broad term. 12 Q. It wouldn't be used to describe prosecutions, would it? 13 A. I'm not sure it would. 14 Q. The decision is, in light of that, for the Compliance 15 Director of Royal Mail Group to be asked to join the 16 committee. Can you recall ever a similar decision or 17 discussion being made in respect of someone from Group 18 Legal joining the Compliance Committee? 19 A. No. Although this is actioned to Jonathan Evans, who 20 I think Legal reported to. I think Jonathan Evans is 21 on -- 22 Q. So he's the Company Secretary and your evidence, as 23 before, was the Legal Department -- Group Legal 24 department reported to him. 25 A. I think -- I'm pretty sure it did. So Jonathan would 27 1 be -- you know, he would be the legal representative, 2 I would imagine, in this discussion. 3 Q. My question is slightly different. I think you have 4 answered it, which is: was there a discussion ever at 5 Board level of having someone from Group Legal be put on 6 the Compliance Committee at Post Office level. I think 7 your answer is no, or you don't recall? 8 A. I don't recall but it looks here as if that's what's 9 happened. 10 Q. Sorry, is your evidence that Luke March, as Compliance 11 Director, would be within the Legal function? 12 A. Would be -- no, but this is about regulatory -- I mean, 13 I'm trying to read what you said, but this is about 14 regulatory issues, and Luke March, who I don't recall, 15 but compliance generally is broader regulatory issues. 16 So I think this is -- when I read this, this is about 17 regulatory issues in the broadest sense. Not just about 18 legal issues. 19 Q. No. I suppose I'll narrow my question further: do you 20 recall there ever being a conversation about the General 21 Counsel at group level, or a member of the Royal Mail 22 Group Legal team being asked to sit on the Post Office 23 Limited Compliance Committee? 24 A. Not that I can recall. 25 Q. That can come down. Thank you. 28 1 Is it fair to say that, looking at those Board 2 minutes -- leaving the Compliance Committee to the side 3 because you didn't sit on that, but at the Board 4 minutes -- is it fair to say that the Post Office Board 5 didn't exercise active or real oversight of the 6 prosecutions brought by Post Office Limited? 7 A. No, I don't think that's correct. I think what would 8 happen is the Post Office Board would have oversight of 9 those -- that activity, if the executives on that Board 10 felt and knew that there was a significant issue. 11 Q. So, again, I think your evidence is it's for the 12 executives to raise the problem. Is your evidence that 13 there's no obligation on the Post Office Board 14 proactively to ask about the process of prosecutions? 15 A. Generally they -- they would -- the Board would ask 16 things proactively, if there was an issue or if somebody 17 had seen some data that flagged an issue. 18 Q. Is that the general approach to matters, how a Board 19 operates generally? 20 A. Well, that's a big generalism. No, obviously not. But, 21 in essence, the Board focuses on one of the key 22 strategic issues facing the business and then relies on 23 the management teams within those businesses to manage 24 the pieces in their operational areas against the 25 policies and procedures that are put in place to do 29 1 that, and those things tend to be reported up to the 2 Board on an ad hoc basis, generally driven by an issue 3 being raised that means it needs to be brought to the 4 attention of the Board. It's a top-down and bottom-up 5 approach. 6 Q. I'll come back to the questions I asked earlier about 7 the consequences of the criminal process, of which you 8 were aware. Because of those significant consequences, 9 do you not think a more active or careful or different 10 approach to oversight was required by the Board because 11 of the significant consequences? 12 A. Well, obviously at the time, that was not the case. 13 People did not think that. With hindsight, obviously 14 that would -- I would change my opinion today. But 15 I think the crucial issue here is that the systemic 16 issues of Horizon then impacted the prosecutions of the 17 subpostmasters was not an issue that was ever raised 18 over a long period of time, and a lot of governance 19 comes from intelligence up the organisation. 20 Q. Again, I'm going to deal with Horizon shortly. You said 21 "with hindsight". The risk arising from prosecutions 22 was known and obvious at the time; would you agree? 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. Would you accept that the Post Office Board should have, 25 knowing what it knew, exercised more proactive oversight 30 1 of prosecutions, and it wasn't necessary to have 2 hindsight to do that? 3 A. No, I think that what was missing was the level of 4 prosecutions, and what was missing was the impact that 5 Horizon was having on that. And with those two 6 issues -- those two issues would weigh significantly on 7 whether the Board, you know, spent time on that 8 particular issue. 9 Q. I want to look at some of the evidence given by other 10 senior figures within the Royal Mail Group and Post 11 Office Limited to this Inquiry, and I'll start with 12 Sir Michael Hodgkinson. He was Senior Non-Executive 13 Director of Royal Mail Holdings from 1 January 2003 14 until 31 August 2007 and Chair of Post Office from May 15 2003 to March 2007. I'm not asking you to remember the 16 specific dates but does that broadly sound right to you? 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. You would have worked with him regularly in your role as 19 Chairman? 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. Sorry, could you just speak up a bit, was that -- 22 A. Yes. Sorry, yeah. 23 Q. No need to apologise. From your evidence before, I take 24 it you didn't discuss the oversight of prosecutions of 25 subpostmasters with Sir Michael; is that correct? 31 1 A. Not that I can recall. 2 Q. I think you said, "Not that I can recall"? 3 A. Yeah. 4 Q. Can we please bring up Sir Michael's statement. It is 5 WITN10660100. It came up before I finished the number, 6 very impressive. 7 Can we turn to page 22, please. Paragraph 56, it 8 says: 9 "I have been asked about where the responsibility 10 lay in the Holdings Group for criminal prosecutions and 11 civil proceedings of [subpostmasters] for shortfalls in 12 branch accounts. I cannot recall who would have been 13 responsible within [Post Office Limited], but my 14 assumption is that this would have been dealt with by 15 the [Post Office Limited] Legal Department who would 16 have reported any issues to the CEO or COO." 17 It goes on to say: 18 "I do not recall discussion about the risks and 19 compliance issues arising from the prosecution of 20 [subpostmasters] for theft and false accounting, or the 21 pursuit of civil litigation against [subpostmasters] to 22 recover alleged shortfalls in branch accounts. As far 23 as I was aware, there was a fully functioning Legal Team 24 responsible for these actions." 25 Then if we can bring up on the screen, at the same 32 1 time, please, Sir Michael's evidence to the Inquiry. 2 It's INQ00001128. 3 We'll see this is the transcript of the proceedings 4 on 11 April 2024. If we could go to page 32. That. Is 5 internal page 126 at line 9. Mr Blake is asking 6 questions and says: 7 "Putting those three together, did the Board, so far 8 as you recall, ever receive notice of concerns about 9 prosecutions relating to Horizon or problems with the 10 Horizon system itself? 11 "Answer: I was not made aware of those. 12 "Question: I'd just like to read paragraph 38.1 of 13 your statement which addresses the legal document. It 14 says: 15 "'I do not believe the Board had direct oversight or 16 involvement with the Legal Department and I do not 17 recall the structures of the Legal Team. This was 18 ultimately the responsible of the CEO and COO.' 19 "We saw when we started today the Board composition. 20 It doesn't seem as though there was what you might see 21 nowadays, a General Counsel -- 22 "Answer: Yeah. 23 "Question: -- someone of an equivalent position. 24 "Was there, in your view, any gap in relation to 25 oversight of the Legal Department at the Post Office? 33 1 "Answer: I think there was and I think that was 2 part of the fact that some of the functions remained 3 central. 4 "Question: Can you expand on that, please? 5 "Answer: I think we had a subset of the Royal Mail 6 Legal department. 7 "Question: What was the problem with that? 8 "Answer: I think then it wasn't represented on its 9 own right on the [Post Office] Board. 10 "Question: Did that change at all during your time? 11 "Answer: No." 12 "Question: Was that something you were aware of at 13 the time or is that looking back now? 14 "Answer: I think more looking back." 15 Did you discuss the oversight of the Legal 16 Department, the Royal Mail Group Legal Department, did 17 you discuss that with Sir Michael at any point? 18 A. Not that I can recall. 19 Q. In circumstances where Sir Michael was Chair of the Post 20 Office Limited Board and you were Chair of the Group, 21 and the Legal Department within the Group was providing 22 services to the subsidiary, why did you not discuss 23 oversight with Sir Michael? 24 A. Because we'd have no reason to discuss the oversight. 25 Q. That can come down. Thank you. I'll turn to Adam 34 1 Crozier, please. He was Chief Executive between 2 February 2003 to April 2010; does that sound about 3 right? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. He reported to you; is that right? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. Would you have worked with him closely? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. Again, from your evidence before, I take it that you 10 don't discuss the oversight of prosecutions of 11 subpostmasters with Mr Crozier? 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. Can we look at his witness statement please. It's 14 WITN04390100, page 14, please, paragraph 41.1. We see 15 from 41 it's talking about supervision, it says: 16 "As far as I can recall: 17 "Oversight for criminal prosecutions and civil 18 proceedings brought by [Post Office] would have sat with 19 the [Post Office] Legal Team, and oversight for 20 prosecutions brought on behalf of the rest of the Group 21 would have sat with the Group Legal team." 22 If we can then look at his evidence to the Inquiry; 23 it's INQ00001129. If we turn to page 27, please. 24 A4-page 27, please. Scroll down please, there we see 25 Mr Crozier giving evidence, questioned by Mr Beer. 35 1 If we could turn, please, to page 35, that's 2 A4-page 35. Thank you. If you can go down to internal 3 page 140, we see there's a question that starts -- or 4 a quote, sorry -- at line 9, and then from line 21 it 5 says: 6 "Were you not aware that, in fact, there was no Post 7 Office Legal team, it had no separate legal in-house 8 function and that civil and criminal proceedings were 9 brought by lawyers within the Royal Mail Group Legal 10 Team?" 11 Over the page he goes on to say: 12 "Answer: I was not, no. 13 "Question: So lawyers from within the Group gave 14 advice on prosecutions, they made decisions about 15 prosecutions and within prosecutions, and they conducted 16 the proceedings, not any Post Office lawyers. You 17 didn't know that? 18 "Answer: Was that throughout the whole period or -- 19 "Question: Yes. 20 "Answer: And I -- I'm sorry -- 21 "Question: Throughout the whole of your period. 22 "Answer: My period? 23 "Question: Yes. 24 "Answer: I was not aware of that, no. 25 "Question: Given the facts that I've just 36 1 described, that would mean, is this right, that your 2 Board had a responsibility for the conduct of a team of 3 lawyers within Royal Mail Group who were acting on 4 behalf of the Post Office, rather than the Post Office 5 Board having such a responsibility for them, wouldn't 6 it? 7 "Answer: In part yes, but also, they would be doing 8 that at the behest of the Post Office team who owned 9 Horizon and any issues deriving out of that. 10 "Question: Well, they might be their clients. 11 "Answer: Yes. 12 "Question: Post Office Limited might be their 13 client? 14 "Answer: Yes, sorry, yes. 15 "Question: I'm talking about responsibility for the 16 conduct and work of the lawyers. That fell, if I'm 17 right, to Royal Mail Group to manage and oversee? 18 "Answer: My understanding at the time was that was 19 also under the supervision of the Company Secretary at 20 the Post Office, in conjunction with the Royal Mail, and 21 they used, I thought, a mix of Post Office Legal Team 22 augmented by Royal Mail Legal Team and outside legal 23 people, as well. That was my understanding." 24 Did you discuss with Mr Crozier how the legal teams 25 were structured across the group when you were at Royal 37 1 Mail? 2 A. Not that I can recall. 3 Q. So for that reason, presumably you can't assist us with 4 how Mr Crozier may have come to understand that there 5 was a Post Office Limited Legal Team responsible for 6 prosecutions? 7 A. Not at all. I mean, it may be worth -- it is not 8 unusual to have -- remember, the Royal Mail Group had 9 a number of ancillary companies: Post Office, GLS, 10 Parcelforce, Royal Mail Holdings, the Royal Mail itself. 11 So it's not unusual at all to have a Group function at 12 Royal Mail Group, where that group function supports 13 those individual divisions. In fact, it's generally the 14 case in most companies were you have a group set-up. 15 So this structure is not unusual. And in that -- in 16 the Royal Mail Group Legal team, it would also not be 17 unusual for that -- a team of that -- a part of that 18 team to be dedicated to Post Office Limited, and for 19 that team to have a dotted line into Post Office 20 Limited. 21 So, you know, when I read these responses, they seem 22 to be quite confused but it's very clear: Royal Mail 23 Group had group functions. Those group functions 24 assisted the divisions that worked within Royal Mail, 25 and that included the Legal Team supporting POL with, 38 1 I think, people who were dedicated to POL in that Legal 2 Team. So this is not an unusual structure in any way, 3 shape or form. 4 Q. Did you not see there being a problem with the Chief 5 Executive Officer of Royal Mail Group not being aware of 6 precisely what the Legal team within Royal Mail was 7 doing, namely involved in the prosecution of 8 subpostmasters for Post Office Limited? 9 A. Well, I think that's a question you need to ask the CEO 10 of the Royal Mail. I mean -- if -- 11 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Gentlemen, I think I've got the general 12 structure quite a long time ago and I got Mr Crozier's 13 evidence that he didn't know about it. Whether he 14 should have known about it is quite another thing. 15 MR STEVENS: Mr Leighton, can I ask you this, then: why is 16 it that you didn't discuss Royal Mail Group's legal 17 responsibilities with Mr Crozier? 18 A. Because we -- he never -- we'd never raised it as 19 an issue -- 20 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Again, Mr Leighton, can I shortcut this: 21 the impression I get from you is that, rightly or 22 wrongly, you did not discuss these issues, either 23 formally in a Board or informally with anyone else, and 24 the reason you have given me is that because these 25 issues were never raised with you. Now, is that it, in 39 1 summary? 2 A. Yes, but also, sir, this point about -- obviously, 3 there's been some confusion with people as to -- the 4 first piece of confusion was, you know, did the -- 5 people not knowing that Royal Mail carried out these 6 prosecutions, which it's been doing for a long, long 7 period of time, and then, secondly, the structure of 8 where the Legal Team sat in Royal Mail and POL. And 9 what I'm saying to everybody is this structure is not 10 unusual in any way, shape or form, and it's slightly 11 surprising that people didn't know that this was the 12 structure and this is how it worked. 13 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Well, clearly you knew. 14 A. Absolutely. 15 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes. 16 MR STEVENS: I want to come back, Mr Leighton, to something 17 you said in your evidence last time, which I repeated 18 this morning, which was, in relation to the roles of 19 a Non-Executive Director or Chair, that the most 20 important thing is to have some set processes to make it 21 clear where the responsibility lies. 22 The Inquiry has also heard evidence from David Mills 23 and Alan Cook. For example, Alan Cook said he wasn't 24 aware of the prosecutorial decisions being made in-house 25 until 2009. Do you accept any responsibility for the 40 1 fact that key figures -- Adam Crozier, David Mills, Alan 2 Cook -- appear to be confused about the role of Royal 3 Mail Legal and the oversight of prosecutions? 4 A. None at all. 5 Q. Why not? 6 A. Because it's very -- to me, it's all been very clear 7 exactly what that structure is and these are executives 8 in the business working full time in the business and 9 I'm somewhat surprised that they didn't understand the 10 structure. 11 MR STEVENS: Sir, that's probably a good time to take the 12 morning break because we'll move on to a separate set of 13 topics thereafter. 14 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: I had assumed that Mr Leighton's evidence 15 would be completed reasonably quickly, since we dealt 16 with him for a couple of hours, and I'm anxious about 17 the timing for today altogether, if you see what I mean. 18 How much longer do you expect Mr Leighton to be giving 19 evidence? 20 MR STEVENS: Half an hour, sir, if that. 21 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Fine. Okay, fine. That's fine. 22 MR STEVENS: I think with the transcriber it would be better 23 to have the break now. 24 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, by all means. Sure. So what time 25 shall we resume? 41 1 MR STEVENS: If we could say 11.00, sir. 2 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Fine. 3 MR STEVENS: Thank you. 4 (10.51 am) 5 (A short break) 6 (11.00 am) 7 MR STEVENS: Sir, can you still see and hear us? 8 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, thank you. 9 MR STEVENS: I wanted to look at a topic about Board 10 composition. Would you agree that subpostmasters, as 11 individual businesses, invested significantly in the 12 Post Office Network? 13 A. Absolutely. 14 Q. Who, at Board level, was considering their interests? 15 A. The team that were -- the POL team, the MD of POL and 16 the Chair of POL, and all the other Board members of the 17 Royal Mail. 18 Q. Could we look, please, at POL00021487, so a meeting of 19 the Post Office Limited Board on 23 February 2005. We 20 see, third from the bottom, you're in attendance. On 21 "Appointment of Directors", at the bottom of this page, 22 please, it says the Chairman -- pausing there, I'm 23 assuming that's referring to Sir Michael Hodgkinson as 24 Chairman of the Committee, rather than you as Chairman 25 of Royal Mail? 42 1 A. I would imagine so, yes. 2 Q. "The Chairman reported that he had become aware that 3 a suggestion may have been made by a DTI Minister that 4 Mr Colin Baker, General Secretary of the NFSP, should 5 become a Non-Executive Director of Post Office Limited. 6 After careful consideration the Board agreed that it 7 would reject the proposal, if made, for the following 8 reasons ..." 9 Firstly, and we can summarise them: Colin Baker's 10 position with the union would be compromised by a closer 11 relationship; over the page, a Non-Executive Director 12 would need to be independent of the day-to-day executive 13 affairs; and then another matter about the Nolan rules. 14 Do you recall that discussion? 15 A. I don't recall the discussion but I can see what the 16 discussion was from this note, yeah. 17 Q. At any point, at this point or thereafter, do you recall 18 the Board considering whether there should be 19 a subpostmaster representative on the Board? 20 A. Not past this particular point, no. 21 Q. Do you know why that was? 22 A. I think, for the reasons that are given here. I think 23 it's -- I think these are good reasons why this couldn't 24 happen. There would be a big conflict of interest and 25 the other piece of this is the Nolan rules are quite 43 1 explicit on that you need to have a number of criteria, 2 of which part is quite a significant commercial 3 criteria. 4 So I think this was a -- the right decision, and 5 made sense. But, also, I think it's this point made 6 before: the interests of the subpostmasters was driven 7 by POL but also all the members of the Royal Mail Group 8 Board. Only this issue, and the significant tragedy, of 9 the Horizon issues and the systemic issues off the back 10 of that -- but in support of the Post Office and 11 subpostmasters, in my time at the Royal Mail, that was 12 always very significant across the Board, both boards. 13 Q. That can come down. Thank you. 14 I want to look at oversight of Horizon. I think you 15 agree, you say in your witness statement that the 16 transaction data recorded by Horizon was used to compile 17 Post Office Limited's management and statutory accounts? 18 A. I think so, yeah. 19 Q. A director of a company is required to prepare a set of 20 accounts that gives a true and fair view of the state of 21 affairs of the company; would you agree with that? 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. So the director must be able to have confidence in the 24 data being used to prepare those accounts? 25 A. Yes. 44 1 Q. So any allegation of a lack of integrity in the data 2 produced by Horizon would have been a significant issue 3 for both Post Office Limited and Royal Mail Group? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. Can we turn to your statement, please, page 18, 6 paragraph 35. You say: 7 "My main recollection of the Board's oversight of 8 the Horizon IT project is that a key focus, and repeated 9 discussion point within the Board of [Post Office 10 Limited], related to the timeline and headline content 11 of the project, the cost and its value for the UK 12 Government and by extension the taxpayer. This is 13 evident from the minutes provided to me by the Inquiry 14 but I also recall that, from the time I began working 15 with [Royal Mail Holdings] and [Post Office Limited], 16 [Post Office Limited] was in a difficult financial 17 position, and Horizon represented a significant cost. 18 I knew that projects of this nature often took 19 significantly more than the planned time and cost to 20 implement properly. This was therefore an area that was 21 tested by the Board -- the company needed a system which 22 was fit for purpose and represented value for money." 23 Do you recall being told anything about Horizon's 24 fitness for purpose when you served on the Board? 25 A. All of the time. I mean, the most significant thing 45 1 about this Horizon project, and it's reflected in 2 certainly all the documentation you've given me, there's 3 not a Board meeting that goes by where it's not talked 4 about, and that's very unusual for an IT system, even 5 an IT system of this scale. So the amount of oversight 6 on Horizon within the organisation as a whole was 7 extremely high. 8 Q. We won't go through them but would you accept that a lot 9 of the discussion at Board level was on the negotiation 10 of contracts relating to Horizon, rather than the 11 technical oversight of it? 12 A. No, I -- if you read -- certainly from the Board minutes 13 I've read, a lot of the discussion and a lot of the 14 documentation is absolutely about the enabling impacts 15 of Horizon. All of the new releases -- I mean, this is 16 a -- this is a massive IT system with multiple releases, 17 with millions of transactions, which -- as all these 18 systems have -- have problems and issues along the way, 19 and I feel very confident, having read all the papers 20 and reminded myself, that the oversight on this -- on 21 the project, the Horizon project, was probably more 22 significant than I'd ever seen on any IT project. 23 Q. You've referenced releases. The Inquiry has heard 24 evidence about the Callendar Square bug, the bug that 25 caused discrepancies in branch accounts, and the Inquiry 46 1 has heard evidence that Fujitsu thought this had been 2 resolved by the S90 release. 3 Can we look, please, at POL00032210. It's a Board 4 meeting on 20 April 2006. If we could please turn to 5 page 10. We can go down to the "Operations Report" 6 section, please. We see it says "Horizon S90 7 Release" -- firstly sorry, pausing there it says, "The 8 Board noted the report and in particular that"; where it 9 says "noted" does that mean that there was any 10 discussion on the report? 11 A. I can't recall it was such a long time ago, but I would 12 imagine there would have been some discussion on it. 13 Q. "The Horizon S90 release", number (iv): 14 "provide for a plethora of change requests across 15 a variety of existing capabilities." 16 Do you recall whether or not any questions were 17 asked as to what changes were made to the system or if 18 there were any bug fixes? 19 A. No, I can't but I do read: 20 "The release continued to make good progress. There 21 had been number of issues in the pilot but these had 22 been quickly diagnosed and resolved." 23 And that's what we'd expect to see. We'd expect to 24 see what's actually happening, what's the state of play, 25 if there are any issues, are they being resolved? And 47 1 that, I think, was the theme of Horizon for a long 2 period of time. 3 Q. So when you are referring to the oversight and the 4 detailed oversight you said, at Board level, this is the 5 type of thing? 6 A. This is the type of thing. "Network Resilience" is 7 a good example: 8 "... the software necessary to deploy ... for 2,000 9 large branches and ... solution to limit the period of 10 downtime for smaller branches", which was now ready for 11 implementation. 12 These are significant steps on the evolution of 13 Horizon. 14 Q. That can come down. Thank you. 15 At paragraph 36, we don't need to bring it up, you 16 refer to a visit to Chesterfield, which was where the 17 Product and Branch Accounting was based at Post Office 18 Limited, and you say: 19 "Although there appear to be some day-to-day issues 20 that the staff in the office were dealing with, I do not 21 recall there were complaints which indicated major 22 issues with the system." 23 What were the day-to-day issues you were told about? 24 A. Again, I can't recall what they were, it was such a long 25 time ago. But most of the day-to-day issues were about 48 1 slow running and some outages, and things like that. 2 The major point is, at no stage in any of the 3 documentation is there any clue that there's a systemic 4 issue with Horizon, and the opportunity for that to 5 arise is significant, because there's not a Board 6 meeting of the Royal Mail Group or the Post Office 7 Limited where that Horizon is not discussed. 8 Q. Can we look, please, at POL00107538. 9 This is a letter addressed to you from Sir Alan 10 Bates on 7 August 2003. Paragraph 51 of your statement, 11 we don't need to turn it up, it says: 12 "I do not recall receiving these letters and I do 13 not know if I did." 14 To be clear, is your evidence that you cannot 15 remember whether you did or did not receive them? 16 A. That's my evidence. But it's -- it looks more than 17 probable that I didn't because of what happened post. 18 So you can see that it's obviously been passed on to two 19 people -- in the top right-hand corner, that's not my 20 writing. And then in all the subsequent responses to 21 this, which went over quite a long period of time, about 22 six months, I'm not copied in on any of them. So 23 I would say the likelihood is I never saw this letter. 24 But I can't say for definite I didn't. 25 Q. We see at paragraph 3, it says: 49 1 "It is again trying to use what seems to be so often 2 described as its outdated 'Stalinistic' management 3 approach, in order to bludgeon its will onto the poor 4 subpostmaster, with an issue that could bankrupt every 5 sub post office in the country. Whilst I appreciate the 6 principle can be expensive, I cannot agree to any 7 position which would leave me (and every other 8 subpostmaster) liable for claims of millions of pounds 9 from the Post Office without any redress or access to 10 data to check such claims." 11 Then it goes on at page 3, paragraph 2 to say: 12 "My personal belief, based on my experiences and 13 from stories I hear, is that the Post Office are having 14 considerable problems with the Horizon software, and 15 that was especially true in the early days." 16 That effectively summarises the scandal, doesn't it, 17 or the problem that the subpostmasters were facing? 18 A. I think probably, yes. I mean it's hard to judge but 19 ... 20 Q. So this letter, who would be handling it on your behalf 21 if you say you didn't see it? 22 A. Well, I think it's the people on the -- if you look at 23 the top, I think there's a series of correspondence post 24 this from different people, who respond to Mr Bates, 25 I think there's a -- sorry, Sir Alan Bates. There's 50 1 different exchanges between that which go on for quite 2 a long period of time. Lots of different people engaged 3 in it. 4 Q. Obviously you worked at the company and with the people. 5 Do you have any insight or can you assist us with why 6 a letter like this wouldn't be passed up to you? 7 A. Lots of letters would not be passed up to me. You know, 8 I think other people have said the same: we would get 9 hundreds or thousands of letters and, often, they would 10 not come to us, they would be handled by one of the 11 Complaints Department or another department, and we 12 wouldn't necessarily see them. If we -- one thing's for 13 sure, if I'd have seen this letter, then I would have 14 been copied in on the correspondence post it. 15 Q. Could we please look at POL00161769. 16 A. I think it's a very important letter, I think it also -- 17 I want to say -- and I think you've seen, certainly in 18 the documentation, that the process -- there was 19 a process that was taken past this letter, which is the 20 process I'd expect to see, which is somebody responded 21 to it, another letter came back, there were more pieces 22 of dialogue. I think at one stage an MP got involved. 23 Then, to make sure there was not a biased response, 24 I think one of the -- 25 Q. Just pausing there, sorry, Mr Leighton, if your evidence 51 1 is that you were not involved in that process, we can 2 read the documents to see what happened. 3 A. No, okay, I'm just saying that if I'd -- the process 4 that was then taken on board post-this would be the 5 process I would expect. 6 Q. Please can we bring up POL00161769. If we could go to 7 page 8, please, you see there's an email from Karen 8 Arnold to Mr Hughes, 2 July 2006, asking for an update 9 about Hoylake: 10 "... is the [subpostmaster] still maintaining his 11 allegations about the Horizon system, I guess if this is 12 still the case then we won't be able to get it rolled 13 over ..." 14 If we turn to page 7, please we see the response: 15 "Karen, [ex-subpostmaster] still raises issues 16 around Horizon hence our inability to reopen." 17 Then it goes on: 18 "When I reopened Gaerwen late last year within 19 a couple of hours of audit, I had to close almost 20 immediately because of a similar scenario." 21 Could we then, please, go to page 5. Mark 22 Partington's email on 5 July: 23 "We need to weigh up the cost to the business of the 24 installation at short notice of a new kit and the 25 configuration of this by Fujitsu. Against this we have 52 1 a closed branch, and the loss to the business this is 2 resulting in, and the exceedingly bad PR we will receive 3 if we cannot open this branch in the next week or so." 4 Then, bottom of page 2, please. You see an email 5 from John Breeden there 6 July. Go over the page: 6 "As mentioned on the phone the Chief Executive of 7 the local council has written again seeking assurances 8 this branch will be opened by the start of the Open Golf 9 later this month. I am pleased to see progress is being 10 made with the recruit of an interim." 11 It's probably a matter of public record, that's the 12 Open Championship at Hoylake. If we go to page 2, 13 7 July: 14 "Just to advise you I have been made aware that 15 Allan Leighton has been asked to be kept informed on 16 progress on the reopening." 17 Do you recall what reasons you were given for the 18 Post Office being closed? 19 A. No. 20 Q. Presumably, whether or not a Post Office is open or 21 closed isn't something that you would, as Chair of the 22 Royal Mail Group, usually get involved in? 23 A. No, unless in this particular case, what -- and again 24 I can't recall this but what it seems to me, I'm asking 25 about the reopening, so I think somebody has asked 53 1 a question about will this post office be open for the 2 golf? 3 Q. Yes, there's a massive golf tournament going on, which 4 encourages a lot of tourism, and you're being asked when 5 it will reopen. 6 A. I think that's what it looks like, yeah. 7 Q. Surely, in those circumstances, would you not ask the 8 reasons as to why the post office closed? 9 A. Not necessarily, no. 10 Q. Why not? 11 A. I just wouldn't. I'd be asking the question here about 12 why -- you know, when will it be reopened? I will be 13 addressing the question. 14 Q. In order to address that question, you wouldn't have 15 thought it relevant to ask the reasons why it was 16 closed? 17 A. No. 18 Q. If we look, please, at POL00106867. 19 We see an email from Rob Wilson, Head of the 20 Criminal Law Team at Royal Mail; do you remember Rob 21 Wilson? 22 A. Not really, no. 23 Q. 3 March 2010, that's after you finished -- 24 A. Yeah. 25 Q. -- as Chair. It says: 54 1 "My understanding is that the integrity of the 2 Horizon data is sound and it is as a result of this that 3 persistent challenges that have been made in court have 4 always failed." 5 The Inquiry has heard evidence of the various 6 challenges that were made to Horizon. Again, is your 7 evidence that you were never informed of any of these 8 challenges in courts? 9 A. Absolutely. The systemic issues and some of the bugs 10 that came out since were never brought to either me or 11 the Board's attention. 12 Q. If the Board, or the system, was operating as you think 13 it should have done, who should have brought those 14 concerns to you, in terms of the challenges made in 15 courts? 16 A. That should have come up via the operation and the legal 17 functions. 18 Q. So the operation and legal functions? 19 A. Yeah. 20 Q. So that included the Company Secretary? 21 A. Who would be head -- if the company secretary at this 22 stage -- it's 2010 -- I don't know, was in charge of 23 Legal. I've not seen this document so this is after 24 I've gone, presumably, isn't it? 25 Q. Yes, yes. 55 1 A. Okay, yeah. 2 Q. That can come down, thank you. I've one more point 3 I want to ask you on, please. Could I please have 4 POL00120833. It's an Excel spreadsheet. If we could go 5 to the "Risk/Opps" tab, P5, it says at the bottom. The 6 Inquiry has seen this before. It's been described as 7 a register of risk within the IT Directorate for Post 8 Office Limited. Would you have seen a document like 9 this at the time? 10 A. No. 11 Q. If we look in the description, the first row, beneath 12 that, the description is: 13 "Damage to reputation of Post Office and potential 14 future financial losses if Post Office loses court case 15 relating to reliability of Horizon accounting data at 16 Cleveleys branch office." 17 Then "Action": 18 "Royal Mail Legal services have made an offer for 19 out-of-court settlement of the case. 20 "Review with Fujitsu of their processes to protect 21 against similar future cases." 22 We see the risk is put at £1 million. 23 From your perspective, should that have been raised 24 to the Royal Mail Group Board as a risk? 25 A. Which one? 56 1 Q. The damage to reputation -- the first risk which 2 I just -- 3 A. But is that being specific about that one branch office, 4 or -- I'm trying to -- 5 Q. Well, if we see, it says: 6 "Damage of reputation of Post Office and potential 7 future financial losses if Post Office loses court case 8 relating to the reliability of Horizon accounting data 9 at Cleveleys branch office." 10 So it's referring to one case, namely the Cleveleys 11 case, but would you accept that it's raising the risk of 12 potential future financial losses? 13 A. Well, it's certainly -- it is but the risk that it's got 14 attached to it is -- looks relatively low. So if you're 15 asking me would I expect that that particular -- that 16 particular point to come to the Royal Mail Group Board, 17 probably because the level of risk is so low, probably 18 not. 19 Q. Where are you saying that's a relatively low risk? 20 A. Well, 1 million. 21 Q. Sorry? 22 A. 1 million. 23 Q. I see. So because of the quantification of the risk? 24 A. Yes. So the level of risk plays a big part of what 25 comes into the risk thought process. 57 1 Q. But the fact that it says that the court case relating 2 to the reliability of the Horizon accounting data, that 3 wouldn't trigger it going higher, in your view? 4 A. I'd be guessing. 5 Q. I'm going to ask you a hypothetical. If you had seen 6 this at the time, what do you think you would have done? 7 A. Well, I saw in the papers the Cleveleys piece. So, if 8 I'd have seen the Cleveleys piece, then that would have 9 raised a real issue. 10 Q. When you say that, do you mean the advice -- 11 A. Yes, that would have raised a real issue. 12 Q. What would you have done, having read that advice? 13 A. I'd have had a massive dig into everything around it. 14 Q. That document can come down. Thank you. 15 Sir, those are the questions I have. Do you have 16 anything? 17 Questioned by SIR WYN WILLIAMS 18 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, I wasn't quite clear about that last 19 answer. Did you say of the Cleveleys piece, 20 Mr Leighton? 21 A. Yes, sir, in the -- 22 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: What do you mean by that, sorry? 23 A. In the documentation, there's a note on what happened at 24 Cleveleys -- 25 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes. 58 1 A. -- and that basically it was made clear that the 2 prosecution would not succeed because there was 3 a systemic issue in Horizon, and, for me, that would 4 have been a significant point. 5 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Right. So that I can understand this, in 6 the Cleveleys case -- and this may -- just to ensure 7 that we are not at cross purposes -- there had been 8 obtained a joint report, it was civil proceedings not 9 criminal proceedings, and there'd been a joint report 10 from an expert which suggested -- and I use the layman's 11 terms -- problems with Horizon, which had caused the 12 loss. As a result, that case was settled by the Post 13 Office. 14 Now, are you telling me that had you, not 15 necessarily in your capacity as Chair of our Royal Mail, 16 but as a senior Royal Mail or Post Office person, been 17 aware of an expert report which suggested problems with 18 Horizon, and, as a consequence, the Post Office were 19 proposing to settle the case, that that is something 20 which should have been taken very seriously and 21 investigated? 22 A. Absolutely. 23 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: So when earlier this morning Mr Stevens 24 took you to -- I'm now not quite sure whether it was 25 a policy or what, but let's call it a policy, whereby 59 1 litigation which was going to cause very substantial 2 financial loss or relate to important policies of the 3 Post Office, should be brought to the Board, then this 4 case would have fallen into that category, in your 5 opinion? 6 A. Absolutely. 7 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Fine. While we're on that, a couple of 8 years later Mr Castleton was sued, as you probably know 9 from press reports, by the Post Office for 10 a comparatively small sum of money, about £25,000. In 11 that case, he maintained that there were no losses to 12 the Post Office, that -- these are my words -- it was 13 all a figment of Horizon, rather than being a real loss. 14 That case was litigated in the High Court. Is that 15 also the sort of case, in your view, which should have 16 been raised to the level of the Board, given what was 17 involved in it? 18 A. I think the answer is yes, sir. I think the Cleveleys 19 one, in a strange way, more so because it meant that 20 a prosecution didn't take place. 21 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: All right. I take it that it's your 22 evidence that, at the time -- namely in 2004, Cleveleys; 23 2006, Mr Castleton -- you and/or the Board knew nothing 24 about them? 25 A. Absolutely, sir. 60 1 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Fine. Sorry, Mr Stevens, but I wanted to 2 be clear about that. 3 MR STEVENS: Yes. Not at all, sir. 4 In fact I think I should clear one thing up, because 5 I can see the list of documents sent to Mr Leighton and 6 can we just bring on screen POL00118229. When you were 7 earlier referring to a document on Cleveleys, was it 8 this document? 9 A. I think so, yes. 10 MR STEVENS: So that being the advice. Thank you. That can 11 come down. 12 Sir, I believe Mr Stein has two minutes' of 13 questions. I think that's it: Mr Stein with two 14 minutes' of questions. 15 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Right. Over to you, Mr Stein. 16 Questioned by MR STEIN 17 MR STEIN: Mr Leighton, one area whereby information should 18 have been relayed to a board -- we'll talk about which 19 board in a moment -- could have been via company 20 accounts? So if we think about the situation that was 21 ongoing, as we know it, within the investigation and 22 prosecution of subpostmasters, somewhere within 23 accounting there should have been: the costs of that 24 system ongoing; costs including the costs of 25 Investigators; costs of the actual prosecutions; money 61 1 coming back another way, which is via the court process, 2 which would include any recovery of monies through those 3 processes; and then through the civil system of 4 investigations, the taking of individuals to the civil 5 courts, the same? 6 One other aspects of costs that we have been hearing 7 about within the Inquiry has of course been the costs 8 of, on occasions, when there was information requested 9 from Fujitsu to support prosecutions or civil actions, 10 those costs as well? 11 So, in that general area of costing, do you agree it 12 would have been somewhere in company accounts? 13 A. Not necessarily. 14 Q. Right. Help us understand why not. 15 A. Largely, when -- those types of issues would be picked 16 up with the auditors. So what tends to happen, you have 17 a discussion with the auditors about what you disclose, 18 what you don't disclose, what needs to be -- so I would 19 imagine if a -- and I don't know this -- a conversation 20 may well have taken place along that line, and the 21 auditors would probably have said that, you know, that 22 sort of disclosure is not necessary. It is -- we're in 23 a -- we're a unique organisation but it would be quite 24 unique to show that in a set of accounts, I think. 25 Q. Even though it's a unique situation or pretty -- well, 62 1 I suppose things can't be just pretty unique -- but even 2 though it is a very unusual situation for a company to 3 prosecute its own people, in other words subpostmasters, 4 you are saying that you don't think it is likely that it 5 would have had a separate accounting? 6 A. I think so, yes. 7 Q. All right. 8 On a slightly more granular level, there must have 9 somewhere been accounting for those costs within the 10 organisation. It must have existed at some level, do 11 you agree? 12 A. Yeah, but probably not in a joined-up way as you 13 described. 14 Q. Right. So in other words, the individual costs of 15 prosecutions, the number of prosecutions, it must have 16 been known about at some point within the accounting 17 department at -- 18 A. Yeah, in -- well, it would probably show in the 19 divisions where that money was taking place. I'm sort 20 of not 100 per cent, but based on what I would imagine, 21 what I know on what I see every day, I would imagine it 22 would show in each cost centre of the individual 23 division that was responsible for that particular piece 24 of activity. 25 MR STEIN: Right. Thank you, Mr Leighton. 63 1 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 2 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Is that it, Mr Stevens? 3 MR STEVENS: Yes, sir, that's it. 4 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Let me thank you, Mr Leighton, for 5 returning to give evidence before the Inquiry. There 6 was unfortunately a long delay between your two 7 appearances but, as I expect you'll have understood, we 8 have been busy hearing from a great number of people, 9 and we couldn't fit you in more quickly than we did. 10 But I'm very grateful to you for coming back and for 11 answering the further questions. 12 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 13 MR STEVENS: Thank you, sir. 14 I think it would be best to take a 10-minute break 15 now, more time efficient, and then we run until lunch. 16 So if I could say we come back at 11.45. 17 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Certainly. 18 MR STEVENS: Thank you, sir. 19 (11.35 am) 20 (A short break) 21 (11.45 am) 22 MR BLAKE: Good morning, sir. Can you see and hear me? 23 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, thank you very much. Yes. 24 MR BLAKE: Can I call Mr Edwards, please? 25 MARTIN ANTHONY EDWARDS (affirmed) 64 1 Questioned by MR BLAKE 2 MR BLAKE: Can you state your full name, please? 3 A. Martin Anthony Edwards. 4 Q. Thank you. Mr Edwards, you should have in front of you 5 a witness statement. 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. Can I ask you to have look at that witness statement. 8 Is it dated 18 April this year? 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. Could I ask you to turn to the final substantive page, 11 please, that's page 45. Can you confirm that that is 12 your signature? 13 A. It is. 14 Q. Can you confirm that that statement is true to the best 15 of your knowledge and belief? 16 A. It is. 17 Q. I believe there's one change that you would like to make 18 to that statement? 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. Can you assist us with what that is? 21 A. So, paragraph 23. 22 Q. Perhaps we could bring it up on the screen. It's 23 WITN09760100. 24 A. So the sentence beginning "The reports I refer to". 25 Q. It's page 8, paragraph 23, it's about halfway through. 65 1 A. So please could we delete "POL's prosecution process" 2 and replace that with "the Cartwright King review". 3 And to explain, at the time, in preparing my witness 4 statement, I hadn't seen the Altman advice and I was 5 relying on a secondhand summary of that advice, which 6 led me to believe the quote of "fundamentally sound" 7 referred to the prosecution process in general. 8 Having now seen the Altman advice, I understand he 9 was specifically referring to the Cartwright King 10 review. 11 Q. Thank you very much. That statement can come down, and 12 the statement will be uploaded onto the Inquiry's 13 website. 14 By way of background, after graduating university 15 you joined the Civil Service; is that right? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. Where you worked for about 11 years? 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. I think you worked in the Treasury, UK Financial 20 Investments, the Home Office and the Scottish 21 Government; is that right? 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. Can you assist us with what grade you reached in the 24 Civil Service? 25 A. It was what was known as a Grade 7 in Civil Service 66 1 terms, so middle management. 2 Q. You joined the Post Office in September 2012; is that 3 right? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. Did you know anybody at the Post Office when you joined? 6 A. No. 7 Q. I mean, we've heard from, for example, Patrick Bourke 8 and Mark Davies, both of them previously worked in the 9 Civil Service or as Special Advisers. You weren't aware 10 of them before? 11 A. No, I hadn't dealt with them in my previous life, no. 12 Q. In your role at the Post Office, you were Chief of Staff 13 to Paula Vennells; is that correct? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. If we could bring up your witness statement onto screen, 16 please, and if we could start paragraph 4. You've set 17 out your evidence as to the role that you played. It 18 begins at paragraph 4. About halfway down you say as 19 follows: 20 "A major part of the role involved coordinating and 21 editing numerous briefings, reports and correspondence, 22 either going to [Paula Vennells] (for example to prepare 23 her for meetings) or being issued from her, such as 24 letters to external stakeholders or updates to the [Post 25 Office] Board. The substance and technical detail for 67 1 these documents would typically come from the relevant 2 SMEs ..." 3 Is that Subject Matter Experts? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. "... for the topic in question, and my role was to edit 6 this information to ensure the end product was suitably 7 clear and succinct for the target audience." 8 If we move to paragraph 31, which can be found at 9 page 11, you say, in broadly similar terms: 10 "My role as part of [Paula Vennells'] office was to: 11 (a) ensure the briefing was provided on time to inform 12 the engagement; (b) edit the document to ensure that it 13 covered an appropriate amount of detail, taking into 14 account the target audiences's time constraints; and (c) 15 make sure that it was clear and succinct. When the 16 topic was not entirely familiar to me, I would prepare 17 the draft briefing paper and then send it to the 18 [Subject Matter Expert] to check that the important 19 messages had been captured correctly and comprehensively 20 in my summary." 21 Turning to paragraph 50, that's at page 22, you say: 22 "My involvement with [Post Office's] preparation 23 for, and response to the Second Sight Interim Report was 24 consistent with the responsibilities of my Chief of 25 Staff role. As noted above, my role was primarily one 68 1 of a conduit: to collate information from the relevant 2 business leads and SMEs, then to synthesise such 3 information into an accessible format for [Paula 4 Vennells], the Board or other audiences." 5 Moving on to paragraph 99, that's page 44, again, 6 similarly: 7 "I was not the [Subject Matter Expert] on any 8 particular issue, nor did I have any substantive 9 decision making accountabilities." 10 So it seems from your statement that your role was 11 principally one of a conduit, that you relied on Subject 12 Matter Experts and that you didn't have decision making 13 accountabilities; is that correct? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. Moving now -- that can come down, thank you -- to the 16 initial months in your post, you became aware of the 17 Computer Weekly interest in matters relating to Horizon 18 quite early on; is that correct? 19 A. Yes, very soon after I'd joined, I was asked to join 20 Paula in a meeting with James Arbuthnot and Alan Bates, 21 for an update on the Second Sight investigation. 22 I think that was within two weeks of me joining, so as 23 part of getting ready for that meeting, I was brought up 24 to speed on the issues. 25 Q. Thank you. Sorry, one matter I forgot to ask you about. 69 1 After your Chief of Staff position, you moved in 2014 2 and you became Group Strategy Director; is that right? 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. Then you have worked in various other roles since then 5 at the Post Office and you are still employed by the 6 Post Office? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. What role to you currently have? 9 A. Currently Network Strategy and Delivery Director. 10 Q. Does that involve liaising with subpostmasters? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. Thank you. I'm going to turn to my first document which 13 is relatively early on in your time at the Post Office. 14 It's a January 2013 email. Can we please turn to 15 POL00380018. 16 By this time, you've had a meeting with Second 17 Sight, James Arbuthnot and Alan Bates? 18 A. (No audible answer) 19 Q. Presumably you joined at a time when those kind of 20 issues, the Horizon issues, were rather prominent in the 21 company? 22 A. Yes, they were, yes. 23 Q. 29 January 2013. This is an email from Mark Davies, 24 Communications Director. He says as follows: 25 "As we move towards a greater degree of coordination 70 1 around stakeholder engagement and public affairs, we 2 need as a business to work more effectively at bringing 3 together our collective knowledge, particularly in the 4 Government space." 5 Were you aware of a greater degree of coordination 6 taking place in the business at this time, in respect of 7 the public responses to matters such as Horizon? 8 A. I think this email and the driver for it, it partly 9 related to the Horizon matters but I think it was 10 broader than that. There were lots of interactions 11 underway with Government at the time, funding 12 negotiations, seeking to win new business from 13 Government, discussions around the future of the 14 network. So I think the drive for greater coordination 15 was across all of those fronts. 16 Q. Was there a greater centralisation of company messaging? 17 A. There was certainly a desire for greater coordination, 18 lots of different bits of busy would come into contact 19 with the Government and I think there was desire from 20 the Communications Team to bring some more coordination 21 to that. 22 Q. "Key to this is a degree of discipline around planning 23 of meetings and coordination of messaging at such 24 meetings. Being more aware of what meetings are being 25 held and when will enable us to ensure that the right 71 1 messages are delivered, and that we can ensure clarity 2 of messaging. There is real reputational risk at play 3 when we don't have this oversight." 4 It then says, further down: 5 "Alongside this we are developing more disciplined 6 and coordinated approach to briefing materials", and it 7 sets out who is responsible for that. 8 Then it goes on to say: 9 "I will go into more detail on this when I update 10 [the Executive Committee] on the wider changes to our 11 communications approach. But as a first step I would be 12 grateful if you could ask your office and your team to 13 ensure: 14 "That all government ... and other stakeholder 15 meetings are communicated in advance ... 16 "The short readouts of all such meetings are sent to 17 [those two individuals] for appropriate cascade." 18 This was sent to you, presumably as part of Paula 19 Vennells' team at that time? 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. Could we please turn now to POL00097786. Moving now to 22 March of that year. This is an email from yourself to 23 Mr Davies and you say as follows: 24 "Would be good to have a quick word in the morning 25 about MP handling [regarding] the Horizon investigation. 72 1 Paula asked me on Friday morning whether I still thought 2 it was the right call that we should not attend the 3 meeting with Arbuthnot and co -- I said yes on balance, 4 but it might be sensible to get a separate opportunity 5 for her to engage directly with the relevant MPs, given 6 that she was persuasive and convincing in explaining 7 that we're taking this all seriously and are changing 8 culture of the Post Office ..." 9 So there was due to be a meeting of Members of 10 Parliament with James Arbuthnot and the decision had 11 been taken that Paula Vennells shouldn't attend that 12 meeting; is that right? 13 A. Yes, as I recall, yeah. 14 Q. "I said I'd discuss with you." 15 You say at the bottom: 16 "Looking at the list, Tessa Munt is obviously a good 17 friend of ours (and fan of Paula) -- I wondered if it 18 was worth Paula speaking to her before the meeting to 19 feed in our side of the story. Although not without 20 risk, so I'm unsure. Let's discuss." 21 Now, in this email, you're not synthesising, you're 22 not gathering the views of Subject Matter Experts; it 23 does seem as though you are playing a role in the 24 advising Paula Vennells about her attendance at 25 a meeting. Is that a fair summary? 73 1 A. Yes, that's a fair summary, yes. That would be part of 2 the role. 3 Q. Part of your role it seems, having been in the Civil 4 Service, I think you had a fair understanding of Members 5 of Parliament and perhaps that was an area in particular 6 that you considered you were able to advise on? 7 A. Yes, probably more so on the Government side than the 8 Parliamentary side. I think Mark Davies would have more 9 experience on the Parliamentary side but, yes, 10 I certainly brought experience of Government issues. 11 Q. So when we read your statement and those passages that 12 I've just been taking you to, where you set out your 13 role, can we add to that that did advise Paula Vennells 14 in respect of certain matters? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. Can we turn to POL00098777. If we could start with the 17 bottom email, please. This relates to the handling of 18 Second Sight before the Interim Report is published and 19 this is an email from Ms Vennells to you, and she says 20 as follows: 21 "Martin, I wondered if you had any further thoughts 22 on [James Arbuthnot]. 23 "You were looking thoughtful throughout the meeting. 24 Although I didn't get the sense you were holding back -- 25 you asked some good questions." 74 1 Can you assist us, what was the meeting that was 2 taking place at this time? 3 A. I think the meeting was particularly to discuss -- 4 I think it was about this time that the two bugs which 5 were disclosed to the Second Sight Report had been 6 shared with the Executive Team. As I recall, it was 7 a meeting with the likes of Lesley Sewell, Alwen Lyons, 8 Mark Davies and Paula. The primary purpose of the 9 meeting, as I recall, was to get more detail on those 10 bugs, and understand the detail behind them, but I think 11 it's the meeting then moved on to the wider progress of 12 the Second Sight investigation. 13 Q. If we scroll up, we can see your response. In the 14 second paragraph, you say: 15 "My only other concern at the meeting was around the 16 feasibility of some of the options/levers that [we] 17 raised. As discussed we need to think about a Plan B 18 given the likelihood that James wouldn't agree to delay 19 the meeting/report." 20 So at that point in time, there was discussion over 21 whether the Interim Report itself could be delayed or 22 not published; is that right? 23 A. Yes, certainly a range of options were raised at that 24 meeting. 25 Q. "We also need to be very careful not to overplay our 75 1 hand with [Second Sight] -- they could turn out to be 2 quite dangerous if we threaten them with legal action or 3 attempt to replace them with another firm. Easy for 4 this to be portrayed in the media as heavy-handed 5 tactics because we don't like their findings (it plays 6 directly into the existing perceptions we're trying to 7 counteract)." 8 So it seems as though you are also advising Paula 9 Vennells in relation to media handling? 10 A. I mean, less media handling -- handling of issues 11 generally, she would sometimes ask for my advice on, 12 yes. 13 Q. "So I think we're stuck with the softer option of 14 explaining to [James Arbuthnot] calmly but firmly why he 15 cannot allow Second Sight to disseminate a misleading 16 Interim Report -- it either needs to be delayed or 17 repositioned as a very neutral status update (with more 18 detail on the one case that has been resolved)." 19 He can't allow Second Sight to disseminate 20 a misleading Interim Report; what was misleading about 21 the Interim Report? 22 A. So we haven't seen the report at this stage but the team 23 which were working directly with Second Sight were 24 concerned about the direction it could go, there was -- 25 the impression conveyed by the team was that there was 76 1 a risk they might make statements before the evidence 2 had been gathered. There was a lot of pressure from 3 Parliamentary stakeholders to get a report out before 4 summer recess and there was a concern that that report 5 wasn't going to be fully evidence based. 6 Q. It seems as though you have formed the view, though, in 7 this email that it was going to be a misleading Interim 8 Report. If that's the case, where did you form that 9 view from? 10 A. So, I don't think -- I hadn't formed that view 11 independently. That was the concern being conveyed by 12 the team working with Second Sight. The team were 13 concerned about that risk and a range of options were 14 being discussed about how to handle that. I think I was 15 steering the conversation away from some of what felt to 16 be more overly aggressive options. 17 Q. What was your personal individual knowledge about what 18 the Interim Report was likely to say? 19 A. I was wholly dependent on what the team were briefing us 20 on this. I had no direct insight into the reports. 21 Q. Who was the team? 22 A. So the team closest to it is Susan Crichton, Simon 23 Baker, Lesley Sewell, Alwen Lyons. 24 Q. The passages I took you to in your witness statement 25 earlier, about the involvement of Subject Matter 77 1 Experts, this is you giving advice to Paula Vennells in 2 relation to handling James Arbuthnot, handling Second 3 Sight. There's no direct involvement here of any 4 Subject Matter Experts, is there? 5 A. Not -- no, not in this specific email, but it's 6 a follow-on from a meeting with the Subject Matter 7 Experts. 8 Q. Who would you consider the Subject Matter Experts, in 9 relation to the matters being discussed here, are? 10 A. So I think, on the contents of the Second Sight Report 11 itself, it was the team who were directly interfacing 12 with them. 13 Q. Who is that? The names you mentioned -- 14 A. The names I just mentioned before, yes. 15 Q. Can we please turn to POL00098778. Thank you. So 16 a very similar time. This is the day after that email 17 exchange. If we scroll down, we can see that Gareth 18 Jenkins emails Lesley Sewell, attaching his witness 19 statement from the earlier Seema Misra case. He says: 20 "This was heard in Guildford Crown Court in October 21 2010 and concerned West Byfleet Post Office. 22 "Page 14 covers my response to a problem that had 23 been identified in an earlier case, (that involving Lee 24 Castleton who took [Post Office] to court for unfair 25 dismissal which he lost). 78 1 "Do you need me to dig out any more on this? 2 I think the key point is that the fact that Horizon did 3 have bugs has been discussed in court and [the Post 4 Office] still won the case." 5 If we scroll up to the top, we can see that Lesley 6 Sewell emails a limited number of individuals: Alwen 7 Lyons, you and Mr Davies, on an FYI basis. Why that 8 small number of people? What did you, the three of you, 9 have in common that needed that information drawn to 10 your attention? 11 A. So, again, I think this was a follow-up to -- it was 12 about this time that the two bugs which were disclosed 13 in the Second Sight Report -- and I think what was known 14 as the Falkirk bug, the earlier bug, had been shared 15 with the Executive Team, and Lesley in particular was 16 tasked with getting more detail and background on these. 17 I think she reached out to Gareth Jenkins for -- 18 particularly on the Falkirk bug. So I think this was 19 a follow-up to that action and conversation. 20 Q. Why to you? 21 A. I was part of that -- I was part of that group 22 discussing how we respond to the Second Sight Report. 23 I'd been in that earlier meeting which Paula had asked 24 me to join. 25 Q. What did you know about Gareth Jenkins at that time? 79 1 A. Nothing at all at that time. 2 Q. Did you ask Lesley Sewell, "Who is this? What's this 3 all about?" 4 A. I don't recall any follow-up conversation to this. 5 I mean, I saw the -- I saw his role description at the 6 bottom of the email, described a Distinguished Engineer 7 at Fujitsu, and kind of took it from that that he was 8 the relevant expert on this topic. 9 Q. At this point in time, had you had any discussions with 10 Paula Vennells about Gareth Jenkins? 11 A. No. 12 Q. Could we please turn to POL00098806. This is the same 13 day. The top email is from Mark Davies, again, to the 14 small group. He says: 15 "This is massively important. 16 "Is there any possibility that all incidents -- 14 17 and 64 [those are the two bugs that you've mentioned] -- 18 have been referenced in court?" 19 So Mark Davies seems to have seen it as massively 20 important, possibly because it showed that the Post 21 Office had previously disclosed the existence of a bug 22 in a court case. What did you do to familiarise 23 yourself with those underlying issues? 24 A. I don't recall any specific action myself. I think 25 there'd already been action underway to get more detail 80 1 about the bugs themselves and, if I recall, off the back 2 of this, the Legal Team were tasked with understanding 3 what had been disclosed previously in court cases. 4 I don't recall seeing a follow-up to that. 5 Q. There is then a meeting with James Arbuthnot on 3 July. 6 So soon after. I'm just going to begin by taking you to 7 2 July. Can we please start with POL00190092. By this 8 stage, you are part of group who is drafting a briefing 9 for Paula Vennells and Alice Perkins, I think in 10 relation to a discussion with James Arbuthnot; do you 11 remember that brief? 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. Thank you. If we look at the bottom of the page, we can 14 see an email from Susan Crichton to you and to Mark 15 Davies as well, and it's sent from, it says, Alwen at 16 Susan. They say: 17 "Susan and I have pulled this together with help, so 18 it is now over to you, to work your magic and send on 19 the final document to Paula, Alice and me tonight." 20 So this, I think, the day before the meeting with 21 James Arbuthnot? 22 If we scroll up, we can see your first response, and 23 you say as follows: 24 "On the prosecution section of the brief there is 25 a half-finished sentence (see blow) -- what were you 81 1 planning to say?! Was this going to cover the issue 2 around previous convictions? If not, what is our best 3 possible defence against the suggestion that this 4 process had called into question the validity of 5 previous prosecutions? Think we definitely need a line 6 on this." 7 So, at this stage, you were aware that there was 8 a concern that had been raised that Second Sight's 9 findings could potentially call into question the 10 validity of previous prosecutions? 11 A. I was aware it was a question which James Arbuthnot had 12 raised in previous meetings with Paula, so it felt 13 necessary to ensure she had a position to take on that. 14 Q. Not just a position to take but a defence against that 15 suggestion? 16 A. Yes, informed by -- so, at this point, we hadn't seen 17 the final report but the preliminary view from Susan 18 Crichton and the Legal Team was there was nothing at 19 this stage to expect that it would change the safety of 20 previous convictions. 21 Q. It then says: 22 "On the first bullet below, presumably we should add 23 a sentence to state that where it is clear that the 24 Horizon system isn't the issue at stake, we have a duty 25 to protect public money by pursuing appropriate action 82 1 (and this is why some prosecutions are still happening)? 2 Presumably there is some kind of reasonableness test 3 here -- ie a [subpostmaster] can't just get off 4 scot-free by saying it's an Horizon issue, irrespective 5 of the circumstances?" 6 Then below that, it has a section that had been 7 drafted and that had been sent to you and that reads as 8 follows: 9 "Prosecutions 10 "Where cases have been preferred to [Second Sight] 11 via JFSA these are subjective to the immunity agreement. 12 Where we have investigated subpostmasters since the 13 start of the [Second Sight] work, and the subpostmaster 14 has said that the Horizon computer systems has been key 15 to the issues that have arisen in the branch we have not 16 taken action against the subpostmaster." 17 So the immunity agreement was, if a case was lodged 18 with Second Sight, there would not be a prosecution? 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. Then it continues: 21 "Where [the Post Office] takes legal action against 22 a ... " 23 Then if we scroll up, that hadn't been completed in 24 the draft that you received; is that right? 25 A. Yes. So that was the sentence I was querying with Susan 83 1 and asking her to complete it. 2 Q. Then if we scroll up, we can see Susan Crichton saying 3 to yourself and others: 4 "Hugh and I are just discussing will get back to you 5 shortly." 6 We can see a continuation of this issue at 7 POL00190132. 8 Thank you. Now, we have to be a bit careful reading 9 this email. If we scroll down, the best way to read it 10 is to begin with Susan Crichton's email, which is the 11 final substantive email on the page. Then she has made 12 comments below on the original email. So she says as 13 follows: 14 "Martin -- following your conversation with Hugh, he 15 and I have discussed and I think that this is the best 16 wording we can use (see below). The bottom line is that 17 this dialogue and resulting potential publicity -- could 18 increase the risk of appeals being made against previous 19 convictions, we have no reason to believe that those 20 appeals would be automatically successful we would have 21 to deal with each on a case-by-case basis. There would 22 be significant cost implications. 23 "It is interesting that neither of us can think of 24 one." 25 So it seems as though she is outlining there to you 84 1 that there is an increased risk of appeals and, although 2 they wouldn't be automatically successful, they'd have 3 to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. Then, if we scroll down, we can see how she has filled 6 in that prosecution section. It now reads: 7 "Where cases have been referred to [Second Sight] 8 via JFSA they are subject to the terms of the immunity 9 agreement, which allows non-MP generated cases to be put 10 before the JFSA and/or [Second Sight]. 11 "For criminal prosecutions we treat each matter on 12 a case-by-case basis, with an investigation and legal 13 review (generally involving external lawyers). We have 14 a duty to protect public money and take appropriate 15 action to safeguard such public money. 16 "In the event that any concern considers that there 17 has been a miscarriage of justice they have the right to 18 apply to the Court of Appeal to have their conviction 19 reviewed." 20 We can see your response on the first page. You 21 say: 22 "Thanks both. 23 "On the point about current investigations/ 24 prosecutions, that's a significant weakening of the 25 reassuring line we discussed earlier. Can we add 85 1 something along the lines of 'since start of 2 investigation we have not pursued action against 3 [subpostmasters] where it is apparent that Horizon 4 system may be involved'?" 5 Just pausing there, where did you get that 6 information from? 7 A. I think it had been conveyed to me by Susan and Hugh. 8 Q. The second paragraph says: 9 "And on past convictions, if pushed, can we say that 10 we're not aware of any cases where we believe an appeal 11 would now result in a different judgment (but clearly we 12 need to take these on a case-by-case basis)? Difficult 13 not to say something like this ..." 14 What research had you undertaken to be able to draft 15 both of those lines? 16 A. So these were -- as I referred to in the earlier emails, 17 there'd been conversations with Hugh and Susan about the 18 preliminary interpretation of the -- the implications of 19 this. So this wasn't based on personal research; this 20 was based on the messages I'd been given to them earlier 21 (sic). 22 Q. The message is below though, isn't it? The message is 23 from Susan Crichton below. If we scroll down, we can 24 see what she says. She says: 25 "The bottom line is that dialogue and resulting 86 1 publicity -- could increase the risk of appeals being 2 made against previous convictions, we have no reason to 3 believe that those appeals would be automatically 4 successful. We would have to deal with them on 5 a case-by-case basis". 6 She has amended the wording with some more balanced 7 and neutral wording over the page. Your comment there, 8 if we scroll up slightly, for example, on the past 9 convictions: 10 "... can we say that we're not aware of any cases 11 there we believe an appeal would now result in 12 a different judgment ..." 13 Where did you get that information from? You said 14 you spoke to Subject Matter Experts and that you relied 15 on Subject Matter Experts. Susan Crichton is a Subject 16 Matter Expert. You're proposing amending wording. 17 Where did that come from? 18 A. Well, I am asking her the question. In her covering 19 email, I think the -- if we could scroll back up to 20 it -- 21 Q. Down, I think. 22 A. Sorry. 23 Q. Yes. 24 A. I think I took this -- this covering email and the 25 previous dialogue as quite reassuring. She includes the 87 1 words "We have no reason to believe that those appeals 2 would be automatically successful", and goes on to say, 3 "It's interesting that neither of us can think of one", 4 which I interpreted to mean that neither of us can think 5 of grounds for a successful appeal. So that covering 6 email was reassuring and all of my dialogue which -- 7 with Susan and Hugh, which preceded this email 8 exchange -- had been quite reassuring and strong on this 9 point, and it felt that Paula was clearly going to be 10 pushed quite hard on this point in the meeting with 11 James Arbuthnot, so I want to -- I'm basically asking 12 the team to give us the best line they felt comfortable 13 with. 14 Q. But you're changing the line that she has provided you 15 with? 16 A. I'm asking "Can we say what you've said elsewhere and in 17 your covering email?" 18 Q. If we scroll up, we can see you you're also 19 communicating thoughts from Mark Davies. You say: 20 "Mark just raised a similar point (with slightly 21 different suggestion on language)." 22 Are you quoting below from Mark Davies or is this -- 23 A. Yes, I think that text in the darker font is a cut and 24 paste from an email from Mark. 25 Q. So it seems as though Mark Davies had said: 88 1 "Do they need an if pressed line on miscarriages of 2 justice? 'Nothing has emerged in this report to suggest 3 a wrongful conviction. Cases have been through the 4 judicial process and we have never relied entirely on 5 Horizon in any court case'." 6 Your witness statement refers throughout to reliance 7 on Subject Matter Experts but it does seem as though we 8 have the Head of Communications here and the Chief of 9 Staff, drafting quite significant lines to take. Do you 10 agree with that? 11 A. I'd agree we're absolutely reiterating the lines to take 12 with the subject matter experts, I personally wouldn't 13 have put anything into a brief. I wouldn't have amended 14 something as significant as this in a brief without 15 checking back with the relevant Subject Matter Experts 16 and ensuring they were comfortable with this. 17 Q. Okay, so -- 18 A. So we are -- 19 Q. Before the final version is agreed, you would go back to 20 the Subject Matter Expert and consult them and ensure 21 that it's accurate and fair? 22 A. Yes, absolutely. I mean, all of this, as you can see, 23 is unfolding quite late at night, the day before the 24 meeting. So it's kind of very much happening in real 25 time. But what I'm not doing is unilaterally altering 89 1 the brief and putting it direct to Paula; I'm iterating 2 it with the input of the Legal Team. 3 Q. So Susan Crichton there being the Subject Matter 4 Expert -- 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. -- and you're relying on her to ensure that the changes 7 you're making are accurate? 8 A. Yes, and that they are comfortable with the position 9 we're taking. And to reiterate, I'm not -- on any of 10 those suggestions on wording, they're not things which 11 I have invented; they're things which have come either 12 from the preceding emails from Susan or the preceding 13 dialogue. 14 Q. We can continue this chain. There's a separate chain, 15 I think, with Mr Davies. Can we please turn to 16 POL00297040. 17 So this email, the top one, I think 10.41 at night, 18 so this is a late-night discussion. 19 If we could turn to the third page, please, of 20 POL00297040. Page 3, we have an email from you, just 21 above one from Mark Davies. Thank you. So you write 22 here: 23 "Thanks -- questions/comments below. Current draft 24 attached (so far I've only reworked the summary box, but 25 that's the key section I think)." 90 1 So now we're at 11.00 at night, we have below Mark 2 Davies email but, again, we'll have to read that a bit 3 carefully because that's his email but with your 4 comments within it. So if we scroll down, he says: 5 "Current version is pretty weak. 6 "The speaking note needs to be firmer -- we want to 7 make clear our position and underline our view that no 8 evidence to support the systemic failures. 9 "It should specifically address the BBC point." 10 I think this is your wording in capitals, is it? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. "WHAT POINT SHOULD WE MAKE. GRATEFUL FOR SOME WORDS. 13 "A really key point is that we should not guarantee 14 to agree our media lines with [James Arbuthnot]. If he 15 comes out strongly as it sounds as though he will, we 16 will have no choice but to come back strongly. So am 17 concerned about the line where it talks about agreeing 18 media statements." 19 You say: 20 "SO SHOULD WE REMOVE THIS ALTOGETHER? DIFFICULT TO 21 ASK FOR HIS MEDIA STATEMENT WITHOUT OFFERING TO SHARE 22 OURS ..." 23 He then says: 24 "There needs to be a line in there about Fujitsu if 25 there isn't currently." 91 1 Your response "WHAT LINE?" 2 He says: 3 "I think it needs to be upfront in addressing the 4 issue where [James Arbuthnot] is said to be angry -- the 5 prosecutions and the new evidence. 6 "On training we need to be very careful about 7 language -- the current version is too loose -- this is 8 your point about not leaving any glimmer which suggests 9 that cases might need to be reopened." 10 So he says "this is your point about not leaving any 11 glimmer which suggests that cases might need to be 12 reopened". What was your point there about not leaving 13 a glimmer? 14 A. I mean, I don't recall specifically saying that but 15 I guess the general concern at the time, this was 16 clearly a major question for James Arbuthnot. He had 17 raised the question of past convictions. The emerging 18 advice we were getting from the Legal Team at the time 19 was, as we've seen that they didn't see grounds for -- 20 yes, there may be more appeals but they didn't see 21 grounds for, let's say, successful appeals and I guess 22 what we're anxious to do is to avoid raising 23 expectations externally on the basis of the Interim 24 Report hadn't even been published yet so it's about -- 25 Q. So -- 92 1 A. -- managing expectations. 2 Q. -- "not leaving a glimmer" is about managing 3 expectations, is it? 4 A. Managing expectations on the basis of the evidence we 5 had at that point and the emerging interpretation of 6 what that evidence meant. 7 Q. He says: 8 "So we need to acknowledge that training can always 9 be improved (rather than our training must be 10 improved -- important difference) and need to follow 11 that with further statement that there is no evidence of 12 systemic failures. 13 "The brief needs to make clear that none of the 14 14 or the 62 [those are the two bugs mentioned in the 15 Interim Report] impact on the spot reviews on the 16 Interim Report and are therefore not relevant to the 17 Interim Report." 18 "We shouldn't call the user group a 'Horizon' user 19 group -- makes it clear we are acknowledging issue with 20 Horizon -- branch management user group?" 21 You say: 22 "CAN WE CALL IT A HORIZON SUPPORT USER GROUP?" 23 So you're there discussing how to rename the group 24 so that it didn't sound like it affected the computer 25 system; is that right? 93 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. "Can you send final version to me before it goes wider 3 so I can go through one more time? Will look back on 4 notes to see what missed? 5 "Overall it didn't feel to me that it captured 6 Alice's views and I think she was right to be so clear. 7 "It may be worth setting out three overall 'rocks' 8 for the two of them to return to: 9 "[The first rock being] there is no evidence in the 10 Interim Report to support any suggestion of systemic 11 failures. 12 "[Second] this is a system which deals with six 13 million transactions a day or more than 40 million 14 a week [et cetera]. 15 "we must be satisfied that when the report is 16 released it truly reflects the position -- the Post 17 Office business is too important to too many people for 18 faith to be questioned unfairly. 19 "Another point which needs bringing out is the 20 public money point ..." 21 Then a further paragraph, and this is the kinds of 22 figures that we've seen in a number of lines over the 23 years: 24 "... many convictions over what period compared with 25 [what number of] transactions in 11,800 branches etc 94 1 ..." 2 If we scroll back up now to the previous page -- in 3 fact, if we start on the second page -- Mr Davies has 4 seen a further rewrite from yourself. We're now at 5 11.38 at night. He says: 6 "I think in the main body we really need to 7 emphasise more that there is no connection between the 8 14 in the 64 and the spot review ..." 9 Is that possibly "to prosecutions", so no link to 10 the prosecutions? 11 A. I think so, yes. 12 Q. "Do they need an if pressed line on miscarriage of 13 justice? 'Nothing has emerged in this report to suggest 14 a wrongful conviction. Cases have been through the 15 judicial process and we have never relied entirely on 16 Horizon in any court case'." 17 That's the comment I think you made in the other 18 chain, isn't it? 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. "I'd like to use the bit at the bottom of my email, 21 reproduced here for ease of reading." 22 And he has repeated -- if we scroll down, there's 23 another email from him that was slightly earlier. 24 Can we please now turn to page 1., and the bottom 25 email there is from you. You say: 95 1 "Many thanks, I will integrate your language below, 2 which is spot on. 3 "Exchanging phone calls/emails with Susan and Hugh 4 to try to pin them down on the prosecutions point ... 5 I agree we need something fairly clear if pressed on 6 miscarriages of justice ... 7 "The whole brief needs rewriting, infuriating!" 8 If you scroll up we can see there's a discussion 9 about whether you're doing it now -- sorry, if we scroll 10 down, slightly, mark Davies emails you to say: 11 "Are you doing it now? Doesn't seem right! I am 12 happy to have a go if you prefer." 13 So this is almost at midnight. The two of you are 14 together rewording it, and your response: 15 "Sorry, just saw this, not ignoring you! Yes, I'm 16 doing it now." 17 You're after midnight now, it's 12.17: 18 "Not right that either of us should have to rewrite 19 so significantly at this time of night!" 20 So it seems as though between the two of you, you 21 are significantly rewriting the wording that was sent to 22 you by the Subject Matter Experts; is that a fair 23 summary? 24 A. I think that's fair, yes. 25 Q. As it happened, on this particular day -- the Inquiry 96 1 has seen evidence, I don't need to take you to it, the 2 reference is POL00380985 -- this was a day where there 3 is another email distribution relating to non-emotive 4 language for the use of bugs and the response from 5 Ms Vennells is exception or anomaly; do you recall that 6 exchange? 7 A. I do, having seen it come up in other hearings, yes. 8 Q. Yes, and you are a recipient of that email? 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. So quite a lot to is going on at this particular day 11 before the James Arbuthnot meeting? 12 A. There is, yes. 13 Q. Can we please turn to POL00145089. 14 Did you sleep at all that night? It seems as though 15 it was a particularly late night. 16 A. It was a late night, yes. 17 Q. So I think the actual final lines that were circulated 18 quite early -- in fact, if we look at POL00145089, and 19 we look at page 2, we can see that you send it through 20 at 2.04 in the morning: 21 "Alice, Paula 22 "With many thanks to Susan, Alwen, Mark and everyone 23 else involved, here's the briefing note for the meeting 24 with [James Arbuthnot]." 25 If we scroll down we can see the speaking notes. So 97 1 it's been sent in a Word document but also a PDF and 2 it's copied below, "Brief for meeting with James 3 Arbuthnot, 3 July". 4 If we scroll down, we can see speaking notes. If we 5 carry on down to the fourth page, we see there, there's 6 a section on current prosecutions. There we go. I'm 7 just going to read a few passages out from that 8 briefing, so this is the final version that is sent to 9 Paula Vennells: 10 "Current prosecutions 11 "Since the start of the [Second Sight] investigation 12 we have not pursued a criminal conviction which relies 13 solely on Horizon computer system evidence. We have 14 also put on hold civil recovery proceedings in certain 15 cases while we await final report. 16 "As you know, we had prepared an 'immunity 17 agreement' with the JFSA to provide reassurance to 18 [subpostmasters] thinking of submitting evidence to the 19 process." 20 So those are the kinds of lines that we saw earlier 21 in that earlier draft about the immunity agreement: 22 "But in cases where it is clear that the Horizon 23 system isn't the issue, we have a duty to take 24 appropriate action to safeguard public money. For 25 criminal prosecutions we treat each matter on 98 1 a case-by-case basis, with a detailed investigation and 2 legal review (generally involving external lawyers)." 3 Then there's a section on "Historical convictions", 4 and it's this passage, I think, that formed the final 5 version of what was being discussed. It says: 6 "Nothing has emerged from the interim findings given 7 to us by [Second Sight] which would point to specific 8 convictions being unsafe. Cases have been through the 9 judicial process and the Court considers all relevant 10 evidence not just that relating to the Horizon computer 11 system. 12 "In the event that any person considers that there 13 has been a miscarriage of justice they have the right to 14 apply to the Court of Appeal to have their conviction 15 reviewed." 16 Over the page, we have a heading "System 17 exceptions", so that is in line with that email 18 correspondence about, we see here, exceptions and then, 19 in brackets, anomalies: 20 "... under the current Horizon system [we know of 21 two of them]. 22 "Key point to note is that in both cases our 23 processes picked up these issues, appropriate remedial 24 action has been taken and they did not lead to any 25 disciplinary action against the affect [subpostmasters]. 99 1 "Absolutely no reason to believe that there are 2 other undiscovered issues." 3 Could we please turn to the first page. If we 4 scroll down to the middle email, please, Paula Vennells 5 has thanked you for it, and you say: 6 "I think sharing with BIS [the Department for 7 Business] would be helpful -- I know they would 8 certainly appreciate it. I'll just re-read to check for 9 any issues which could be misinterpreted or unhelpful to 10 our position, but otherwise I'll forward ... unless 11 anyone objects ..." 12 Just pausing there, "unhelpful to our position", the 13 Department for Business were your sole shareholder, what 14 might it be that would be unhelpful to your position? 15 A. I'm not sure, I think I was making the -- Paula had 16 said -- suggested that we forward it on to the BIS team. 17 I'm not sure I was referring to any specific risks, 18 I think I was just conscious this was a brief which had 19 been prepared for an internal audience, rather than the 20 BIS audience because, obviously, I would want to check 21 it was also suitable for the BIS audience. 22 The types of issues which -- I mean, there were 23 concerns at the time around the progress of the 24 investigation, how long it was going to -- how long it 25 had taken, how long it was going to take going forwards, 100 1 the costs involved. So I think I would have wanted to 2 check that everything that was in the brief was 3 consistent with what we had briefed with the BIS team 4 on -- or, you know, was there anything in particular 5 which we need to explain to them. 6 Q. What was the position? Why might it be unhelpful to 7 your position; did you have a particular position in 8 respect of the Department for Business? 9 A. I'm not sure what I was referring to specifically there, 10 I think it was the whole conduct of the investigation, 11 what we had found from it so far, what the next steps 12 were. 13 Q. You then say that you'll send it to the Executive 14 Committee on behalf of Paula. 15 Now, can we turn to the top email, please. This is 16 a response from Susan Crichton, she says: 17 "Hi there -- so I have not read the reworked 18 document, are you happy that there are no hostages to 19 fortune? We shouldn't send Rod's note as there is 20 updating required." 21 So earlier your evidence was that you would have 22 consulted with the Subject Matter Experts before 23 finalising. It's clear here, the lawyer who is, to some 24 extent a Subject Matter Expert, hasn't in fact read the 25 briefing. Now, it's been drafted very late at night 101 1 between yourself and the Head of Communications, and 2 sent to the CEO, potentially going to the Department for 3 Business and the Executive Committee. 4 That's problematic, isn't it? 5 A. I mean, I think it's fair to say clearly the whole 6 last-minute construction of this brief was very far from 7 ideal. It's not the right way to be constructing briefs 8 on such important topics. What you saw in the earlier 9 email exchange was the iteration of specific topics. 10 I know alongside the email exchange, there are also 11 telephone calls, and I think I refer to them in my 12 email, particularly with Hugh, and I think we saw in the 13 final briefing that the wording on -- particularly on 14 past prosecutions, had evolved from the suggestion/ 15 questions in my email exchange. So I can't recall the 16 exact sequence but I think there clearly had been 17 iteration and input from a combination of Susan and 18 Hugh. 19 So I would completely admit this was a far from 20 ideal way of constructing a brief and getting it 21 properly signed off. It was far too last minute but 22 they had been involved in the process. 23 Q. It's not just the timing though, is it? It's the people 24 as well. I mean, in your witness statement, you've been 25 very careful to set out that you were a conduit, that 102 1 you edited things for clarity. But here we have, late 2 at night between yourself and the Head of 3 Communications, a significant reworking of a briefing, 4 and it's very clear here that it hadn't been seen by the 5 Subject Matter Experts, the final version; is that 6 right? 7 A. Yes, I mean, she clearly hadn't re-read the whole 8 reworked document. 9 Q. Are we to read into your witness statement an additional 10 line that is that your role also involved deep 11 involvement in briefing Paula Vennells in relation to 12 matters affecting the Horizon system? 13 A. So, I was absolutely at points in time involved in 14 pulling together and editing briefs which went to Paula 15 on the Horizon system. I don't believe -- whilst it 16 involved a significant rewrite, I think a lot of that 17 would have been around how the brief was structured, the 18 clarity of the messaging, how the key points were 19 highlighted in the brief. I don't believe I would have 20 been unilaterally changing the substance of what was 21 contained in the brief without that being signed off by 22 the Subject Matter Experts. 23 Q. But we saw the communications with Mark Davies, 24 complaints about how weak it was in certain points -- 25 "needs to be firmer". You were strengthening up the 103 1 wording, weren't you, not just making it clearer, but 2 also strengthening it and had -- 3 A. Yes, there was -- 4 Q. -- to (unclear) -- 5 A. Yes, there was clearly some substantial input from Mark 6 on the wording. 7 Q. Mark and yourself? 8 A. I'm -- yes, I mean, I'm holding the pen on the overall 9 brief. I think a lot of the specific wording changes 10 came from Mark. 11 Q. Would you describe Mark as a Subject Matter Expert? 12 A. Clearly not on legal affairs and IT affairs. 13 Q. Was it appropriate for somebody with expertise in 14 communications to be so heavily involved in drafting 15 such a brief? 16 A. I think it was appropriate for the Communications 17 Director to be involved in the iteration of the brief. 18 It wouldn't be appropriate for the Communications 19 Director to fundamentally change the message of the 20 brief without the Subject Matter Experts being 21 comfortable with that. 22 Q. I'm going to move on to Second Sight, and the report and 23 the response. Could we please turn to POL00099021, 24 please. 25 We're now on 5 July. If we could turn to the second 104 1 page, Paula Vennells has circulated: 2 "... a brief email to update [the recipients] on 3 where we are with the Second Sight investigation." 4 If we turn to the first page, you have drafted, 5 presumably from what she sent you but also from 6 discussions -- if we scroll up to the top -- a suggested 7 draft email to the Board. 8 Do you recall how you came about drafting this email 9 to the Board? 10 A. Well, I mean, it was -- consistent with part of my role 11 would be to draft correspondence on behalf of Paula. 12 I think it would have been the synthesis of 13 conversations with her and with others on the team 14 working on this, and it was pulling that together into 15 a draft. 16 Q. If you say there: 17 "Obviously the points about the ombudsman and past 18 prosecutions could set hares running, but equally we 19 probably do need to register these issues with the Board 20 at this stage. Obviously feel free to change or expand 21 the drafting." 22 What do you mean by "set hares running"? 23 A. I assume what I meant -- at this point I'm not sure 24 there had been much conversation with the Board about 25 the implications of the Second Sight Report for past 105 1 prosecutions, and I think what the email's raising 2 possibly for the first time is it could result in more 3 appeals being made. So it's kind of recognising that 4 that maybe new news or going further than some of the 5 previous briefings to the Board. 6 Q. Are the hares running from the Board, so is the 7 suggestion that it could get the Board asking questions 8 about past prosecutions, and that was something of 9 concern? 10 A. Yes, I mean, I think it must have meant -- I think I was 11 absolutely referring to the potential reaction of the 12 Board. 13 Q. Why would that be a concern? 14 A. Why would -- why would what be a concern? 15 Q. Isn't the Board's purpose to ask questions, to 16 scrutinise; what would be wrong with setting hares 17 running at Board level in relation to past prosecutions? 18 A. I don't think I'm saying there's anything wrong with 19 them asking questions. I think, clearly, that would be 20 their role too. I think I'm just highlighting that 21 this, as I understood it, was perhaps going further than 22 Paula had briefed the Board on previously. So, you 23 know, be aware this may well provoke questions. I don't 24 think I was suggesting there was anything inappropriate 25 about that. 106 1 Q. Doesn't "set the hares running" suggest some sort of 2 negative implication: things that shouldn't be taking 3 place, things that -- 4 A. I don't think I would have -- no, I don't think that's 5 what I meant by that phrase. I don't think I'd be 6 suggesting it would be inappropriate for the Board to be 7 asking questions about that. Not at all. 8 Q. If we could scroll down, please, we can have a look at 9 the penultimate bullet point. This is a draft brief to 10 the Board. It says as follows: 11 "One of the main reputational and potentially 12 financial risks arising from the review relates to 13 possible attempts to reopen past prosecutions based on 14 the findings. James Arbuthnot was certainly focused on 15 this point. Susan and the Legal Team are working with 16 our external lawyers to consider whether there are any 17 implications arising from the report for past cases, and 18 we can provide a further update on this work next week." 19 This is, in particular, the paragraph that you were 20 concerned about setting hares running, was it? 21 A. Yes, as I say, I think this was probably going further 22 than had been briefed to the Board previously. 23 Q. "One of the main reputational and potentially financial 24 risks"; how about human impact, impact on individual's 25 lives, possible attempts to reopen past prosecutions? 107 1 I mean, might have been an impact for the Board that 2 people had been wrongly prosecuted? 3 A. Absolutely, and clearly, in hindsight and everything we 4 know now, it absolutely should have been the top 5 concern. At the time, the view of the business wasn't 6 that the previous prosecutions had been unsound. 7 Q. But that's what James Arbuthnot was saying, wasn't he? 8 He was concerned -- 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. -- about actual humans, individuals being prosecuted -- 11 A. (The witness nodded) 12 Q. -- and having been prosecuted when they should not have 13 been. 14 A. Yes, yeah. I think it's completely fair to say this 15 email reflects the mindset of the business at the time, 16 and there wasn't a -- there clearly wasn't enough focus 17 on the actual safety of those prosecutions and the human 18 impact. 19 Q. The second half of that sentence -- of that paragraph, 20 sorry: 21 "Susan and the Legal Team are working with our 22 external lawyers to consider whether there are any 23 implications arising from the report for past cases ..." 24 So we're here at 5 July, you were aware that Susan 25 Crichton was working with an external law firm to 108 1 consider the implications; is that right? 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. The Second Sight Report itself was dated 8 July. Can we 4 have a look at that day. Can we turn to POL00381077, 5 and could we start by looking at the bottom email on 6 that page, please. 7 So the Head of Public Relations has emailed about 8 BBC News. So this is on the day of Second Sight's 9 publication: 10 "Just to let you know that BBC News has carried 11 a news in brief piece with accompanying branch footage 12 which lasted about 20 seconds. 13 "Ran along the lines of 'Around 100 [subpostmasters] 14 are embroiled in a bitter dispute with the Post Office 15 over a computer system they claim is losing them money 16 every year'. Not ideal but probably the next best thing 17 to nothing appearing at all. We'll circulate the clip 18 once we receive it. 19 "Nothing on BBC Online yet. Expecting two 20 human-interest style regional TV pieces from BBC Look 21 North and BBC Look South." 22 You respond to say, "Hi" -- this is to Mark Davies: 23 "... assume you've seen completely erroneous 24 headline on BBC website and are on to them?" 25 Can you recall what the headline was at all? 109 1 A. I think it was long the lines of what Nina Arnott quotes 2 in her email. 3 Q. If we scroll down, let's have a look at that. What's 4 wrong with that? 5 A. I think the specific bit I was reacting to was the end 6 of that statement, that it's the computer system is 7 losing them money every year. So I think the bit which 8 felt to me at the time a misrepresentation of the 9 position, misrepresentation of the allegations being 10 made against Horizon, was it had been changed from 11 a historical issue to there was ongoing problems with 12 the computer system and that's losing postmasters money 13 every year. 14 Now, in hindsight, we may -- we might give more 15 credence to that but, at the time, that felt a very 16 different representation to the allegations we were 17 dealing with. 18 Q. But all it's saying is 100 people are claiming that it 19 is losing them money every year; it's not presenting it 20 as fact, is it? 21 A. No, but I think I was very conscious of -- we're all 22 very conscious of what impact headlines could have on 23 postmaster confidence, public confidence, client 24 confidence, in the computer system, and I think we all 25 knew it was quite easy for headlines to undermine 110 1 confidence in possibly an unfair way. 2 Q. If we scroll up, Mark Davies says: 3 "Hugely yes." 4 Your response is: 5 "Thought you would be. Arseholes." 6 Who are the "arseholes"? 7 A. I'm referring to the BBC coverage there. 8 Q. Was it part of your job to seek to control the narrative 9 of the press? 10 A. No. I mean, not specifically. That was Mark's job. 11 I think there are very limited numbers of occasions 12 where I would comment on this, but this came to my 13 attention -- as I describe, the reaction I had at the 14 time is it felt like it was a -- wasn't entirely 15 appropriate for the BBC to be reporting on allegations 16 against Horizon. It felt like it had misrepresented it 17 and turned it into a different story, which had far 18 greater ongoing implications for the safety of Horizon. 19 So I was reacting emotionally to that and issuing 20 what was probably a bit of an uncharacteristic email for 21 me. 22 Q. But, again, we saw that brief to the Board in which you 23 describe some sort of corporate mindset. Is this 24 another display of that corporate mindset at the time, 25 an "us versus them" attitude? 111 1 A. The mindset I was referring to earlier was there was 2 absolutely a mindset that -- clearly a strong conviction 3 at the time of the integrity of Horizon. That was the 4 mindset I was referring to. I don't think at the time 5 I would particularly have recognised a them versus us 6 mindset. I don't think -- I wouldn't describe that 7 email as part of that. As I say, I was reacting to 8 a specific aspect of that headline. 9 Q. It's quite a strong reaction to have to something that 10 simply states an allegation from subpostmasters, isn't 11 it? 12 A. It is a strong -- our reaction, it's clearly one of 13 those emails you regret. I think it was an over-the-top 14 reaction. 15 Q. But does it display something wider than just your own 16 personal reaction, a corporate reaction to a BBC report? 17 A. As I say, I don't think it does at the time. And 18 maybe -- maybe this is unfounded but at the time there 19 was a lot of concern around what the -- would 20 allegations and headlines about Horizon undermine wider 21 public confidence in the system? At the time, the 22 financial crisis was still recent memory. We all know 23 media headlines provoked and undermined public 24 confidence in systems back then. So that type of 25 experience was front of mind, and we were concerned 112 1 about what impact media statements could have on the 2 wider market position of Post Office. 3 In hindsight, I agree, it was an overreaction, but 4 I think it was -- I think what it represents was anxiety 5 around what statements about Horizon could have for 6 wider client and customer confidence and postmaster 7 confidence in Horizon. 8 Q. Just customer confidence or potential flotation business 9 interests? 10 A. I didn't -- I wasn't -- that wasn't drawing anything 11 whatsoever to the Royal Mail flotation. That absolutely 12 wasn't in my mind at the time. 13 Q. In terms of timing, that was 8 July. 15 July was the 14 date, we know, of the Simon Clarke Advice. You also 15 mentioned in your briefing to the Board about Susan 16 Crichton meeting with lawyers. She's given us evidence 17 on that. She said that there was a meeting on 3 July. 18 There was also a meeting on 10 July addressing the 19 Gareth Jenkins issue? 20 At this stage, were you aware of the Gareth Jenkins 21 issue? 22 A. No, I wasn't. 23 Q. Could we please look at the final document before the 24 lunch break. POL00297915. Page 3, please. If we 25 scroll down, sorry, page 3, over the page, please. The 113 1 bottom email of page 3, thank you. A solicitor Rosie 2 Gaisford, from Bond Dickinson, has emailed you and she 3 says as follows: 4 "A later from the CCRC dated 12 July 2013 addressed 5 to Paula Vennells is attached above. We have drafted 6 a holding response to the CCRC's letter, to be sent 7 auditor tomorrow morning ... The holding response is 8 currently in Paula's name. Are you happy for this to be 9 sent out in Paula's name or would you rather it was sent 10 out in your name, Susan Crichton's name, or the name of 11 another individual? 12 "A substantive response has also been drafted to the 13 CCRC's letter. Once this substantive response has been 14 discussed with Brian Altman QC, a leading criminal 15 barrister and former First Treasury Counsel, it will be 16 sent out, by the end of the week." 17 If we look above, it's a response from you, and you 18 say: 19 "Thanks Rosie -- I think both this and the 20 substantive response should come from Susan." 21 Did you discuss this with Paula Vennells? 22 A. I mean, I think, at the time, Paula had already given 23 a steer to Susan that it should come from her, so I was 24 conscious of that. As you see in the next sentence, 25 I asked Susan if -- give her the opportunity to disagree 114 1 with that view. 2 Q. It isn't every day that the Criminal Cases Review 3 Commission writes to the CEO of a company. What kinds 4 of discussions did you have with Paula Vennells about 5 the CCRC's interest at that time? 6 A. I don't recall any conversations with Paula on this. 7 Q. None at all? 8 A. No. No. 9 Q. Would you have discussed with her who should send the 10 letter? 11 A. As I say, I was aware, I think she had already -- what 12 I'd already seen was she had -- if recall correctly, she 13 had forwarded on the original letter to Susan and asked 14 her to respond. So I kind of was conscious she'd 15 already given that steer. 16 Q. Were you aware of Mr Clarke's advice or concerns about 17 the use of Gareth Jenkins at that time? 18 A. No, I wasn't. 19 Q. You were aware that Susan Crichton was liaising with 20 external lawyers during that period, and the brief to 21 the Board said something along the lines of, "We can 22 provide a further update on this work next week". 23 That was 5 July. What investigations or enquiries 24 did you make into the discussions that Susan Crichton 25 was having? 115 1 A. I think the next step in the chronology -- and we might 2 come on to this -- if I recall correctly, there was then 3 a broader Board update note prepared, I think, on 4 26 July, which included updates on all of the 5 workstreams relate to this matter, including where Susan 6 had got to with the external lawyers. So I think that 7 was the next step, and that was based on input from 8 Susan and a number of others. 9 Q. Did that refer to, for example, Mr Jenkins -- 10 A. No, it didn't. 11 Q. -- and who drafted that brief? 12 A. So, it's in another document which I coordinated. 13 I held the pen on it but it was based on input from 14 Susan on the legal side, Alwen -- I think the network 15 side on the branch improvement workstream. It was based 16 on input from number of different workstream leads 17 across the business. 18 MR BLAKE: Thank you. 19 Sir, that may be an appropriate moment to take our 20 lunch break. 21 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes. 22 MR BLAKE: Can we come back at 1.50, please? 23 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, certainly. 24 MR BLAKE: Thank you very much. 25 (1.00 pm) 116 1 (The Short Adjournment) 2 (1.50 pm) 3 MR BLAKE: Good afternoon, sir, can you see and hear me? 4 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, thank you. 5 MR BLAKE: Thank you very much. 6 Mr Edwards, before the break you mentioned the Board 7 briefing of 26 July. I'm just going to bring that up on 8 to screen, so you can confirm this is the document you 9 were talking about. It's POL00006590. 10 Is this the document you were referring to? 11 A. Yes, it is. 12 Q. Were you involved in the drafting of this document? 13 A. I was, yes. I kind of coordinated the preparation of 14 this. 15 Q. Is it at this point in time where there seems to be 16 a movement towards restricting the involvement of Second 17 Sight or limiting their involvement going forwards? 18 A. I think the discussion around Second Sight's ongoing 19 role had probably been iterating for a number of weeks 20 leading up to this and beyond it, so I'm not sure it 21 was -- particularly the development of this report, 22 I think it was about this time. 23 Q. That individuals' thoughts are gathering as to the 24 future for Second Sight and limiting their input? 25 A. The question I recall at the time was: there was clearly 117 1 a cohort of cases which had been submitted as part of 2 the first phase of the Second Sight investigation. 3 I think it was about 47, and I think the debate is do 4 they -- just focused on them, is their role beyond that? 5 Those were the types of questions being raised. 6 Q. I think in your document pack, there's a reference to 7 just keeping it at 47; do you recall that? 8 A. Yes, I recall that being a suggestion from some of the 9 business. 10 Q. Thank you, that can come down, I'm going to move to 11 a different topic and that is the flotation prospectus 12 and I think you said you weren't involved in the 13 flotation of Royal Mail itself? 14 A. Not itself but, as I'm sure we'll come on to, I was 15 involved at one point in providing some comments on 16 specific references to the Post Office in the 17 prospectus. 18 Q. Can we please turn to UKGI00001916. If we look at the 19 second email on the page it's an email from Mr Davies to 20 Will Gibson at ShEx and he says: 21 "Just wanted to touch base on prospectus which 22 I know you have talked to Susan about. [Royal Mail] 23 described it to me as a BIS document [that's 24 a Department for Business document] but I think you 25 don't share view? Anyway the unvarnished risk section 118 1 is very problematic -- it highlights all the risks which 2 NFSP and others claim, and therefore supports the 3 campaign. I don't suggest such risks should not be 4 discussed but it does so [badly] without mitigation and 5 is poorly drafted in places -- specifically on Horizon." 6 Then if we scroll up Mr Gibson has responded. 7 You're copied in on correspondence, he says: 8 "Hi Mark, I share your concerns and we've gone to 9 [Royal Mail] on them. I sent the comments we sent over 10 to Susan so feel free to have a look. 11 "The [Royal Mail] suggestion it's our document is 12 nonsense -- Slaughters are holding the pen and [Royal 13 Mail] directors are responsible for it. That said, we 14 can certainly influence its drafting as I'd be keen to 15 ensure in this case." 16 So the complaint there from Mr Davies, if we scroll 17 down, is about the risk section. We can then see what 18 happens to that risk section. Can we please turn to 19 POL00381531. There is an email from Mark Davies on the 20 second page, to Paula Vennells, and she has inserted 21 some words in capitals. So if we scroll up slightly we 22 can see her response -- a little bit more, thank you. 23 She's responded to Mr Davies, and said: 24 "Mark, thank you this is very helpful. I have made 25 some comments below in caps (nb, if someone can show me 119 1 how to change the colour -- that would be far more 2 effective ..." 3 If we scroll down, we can see Mr Davies' email to 4 Paula Vennells and also her response, and it's the 5 bottom of that page that I'd just like to take you to. 6 He says: 7 "RMG prospectus: We are working with legal on this. 8 The section on risk is very problematic for [the Post 9 Office]. The PR team are across it and I have asked 10 Mike to also work on it from his perspective." 11 Then that's the response from Paula Vennells in 12 capitals "AM AWARE [THANKS]". 13 What was the purpose of the prospectus? 14 A. So it was clearly Royal Mail's documents to inform 15 prospective buyers for their shares. 16 Q. Thank you. Can we please turn to POL00299534. If we 17 could start on the second page, please. So this is your 18 involvement, if we look at the bottom of page 2, 19 an email from Tim McInnes from ShEx. He says: 20 "Martin ..." 21 That's a reference to you: 22 "Can you let me know the time/status of [Post 23 Office's] most recent conversations with [Royal Mail] on 24 the prospectus. We think someone on the other side 25 might be saying that [the Post Office] has signed off, 120 1 and to bat this away (which we will) it will be useful 2 to understand comms channels and what has been 3 said/agreed. 4 "And further to our chat a few minutes ago it would 5 be good if you can leave this with us for the moment. 6 We will keep you updated on progress in real time but 7 there are some weapons we want to keep in the arsenal 8 and only use if they are absolutely necessary. We have 9 a couple of avenues to try still so let's see where we 10 get to with those." 11 Why is Tim McInnes contacting you specifically? 12 A. Part of my role as Chief of Staff, and I think I have 13 referred to this in my witness statement, was to be part 14 of an informal line of communication into the ShEx and 15 BIS teams, so they were in contact with lots of people 16 in the Post Office but, if they weren't sure where to 17 go, they could pick up the phone to me and I could help 18 them out and direct them to the right place. So that 19 was part of my role. 20 Q. Were there others assigned to that role or was that 21 a role you specifically held? 22 A. I'd say the Comms Team had primary accountability for 23 Government relations. I think my role was particularly 24 to help -- an additional line of communication into the 25 BIS and ShEx teams. 121 1 Q. Because it's not just communications that you need that 2 relationship with ShEx; it's also because they have 3 a seat on the Board, and there is a direct line of 4 accountability of some sort, isn't there? 5 A. Yes, yeah. It clearly had interests across the full 6 span of the business. 7 Q. If we scroll up, the response from yourself: 8 "Tim -- the only other channel of communication with 9 [Royal Mail] on the prospectus has been between our 10 Legal Team (Susan and Hugh, who I have copied) and 11 a lawyer at Slaughters. Hugh can confirm, but as far as 12 I'm aware the last communication with them was 1-2 weeks 13 ago, and focused on narrower points of legal/factual 14 detail rather than the reputational/PR issues that 15 I flagged to you". 16 What were those issues that you had flagged? 17 A. I think the context for this, there was a huge amount of 18 anxiety at the time about the separation of Royal Mail 19 and Post Office: a lot of anxiety from the network, from 20 the NFSP, from the CWU about what repercussions this 21 would have for the long-term relationship between Post 22 Office and the Royal Mail. And so I think the 23 particular concerns were, as you'd expect in a risk 24 statement, there were lots of quite extensive 25 description of risk about the relationship between Post 122 1 Office and Royal Mail, raising the possibility that 2 relationship could break and raising risks about our 3 operational dependability. 4 And I think our concern was, whilst we recognised 5 prospectus, by definition, needs to be clear to 6 investors about prospective risks, we were concerned 7 that without the right context, that would kind of play 8 into some of these anxieties of the network about what 9 impact separation would have. 10 Q. But, of course, a risk section in a prospectus has to be 11 absolutely accurate about the risks that the company 12 faces? 13 A. Yes, yeah and obviously what we're trying to finding the 14 right balance here, is factual description of risk but 15 making sure they're understood in the right context. 16 Q. Thank you. Can we turn to the first page, please. At 17 the bottom of the first page, you email Susan Crichton 18 and Hugh Flemington: 19 "... would you be able to ask Slaughters to send 20 across the latest extracts on [Post Office] from the 21 prospectus please? Just spoke to Will G for an update 22 from their perspective -- he said the main sticking 23 point was the sentence on Horizon/Second Sight in the IT 24 risks section, which they're still pushing to have 25 removed but are facing some resistance. 123 1 "I asked if that meant the other issues had been 2 resolved (on MDA language etc) ..." 3 What was MDA? 4 A. MDA that was the Master Distribution Agreement, so that 5 was the long-term agreement between Post Office and 6 Royal Mail so that governed our ongoing relationship 7 post-separation. 8 Q. "... he said he didn't think there was any pushback 9 there but wasn't able to confirm whether our comments 10 had been taken on board. He said he would do some 11 digging -- but it might just be quicker to get hold of 12 the latest language direct from Slaughters." 13 So at this point there was issues principally with 14 the prospectus. One of them, relating to Horizon/Second 15 Sight, and the other was on the MDA language, is at 16 right? 17 A. Yes, the MDA language, that broader ongoing relationship 18 between Post Office and Royal Mail. 19 Q. The response from Susan Crichton: 20 "We cannot go direct to Slaughters they would have 21 to ask RMG to approve giving us the information, so 22 I will ask [Royal Mail] but as I understand it the 23 Horizon/IT reference was taken directly from our press 24 release." 25 You say: 124 1 "Thanks Susan. Looks like none of our changes have 2 been taken on board ..." 3 Susan Crichton responds: 4 "So are you going back to BIS -- not sure our 5 protesting about this will make any difference?" 6 You say: 7 "Yes, I will pick up with BIS and keep you posted." 8 Could we please turn to UKGI00002065. If we scroll 9 down slightly, an email from Mr McInnes to Mr Gibson at 10 ShEx and also to yourself. He says: 11 "Will, Martin, 12 "See below an extract from an email just received 13 from Freshfields related to the Horizon disclosure. 14 "Martin, I want to wait for the fat lady to sing, 15 but it looks like you managed to make more progress (or 16 rather progress) than we could at this end. Many thanks 17 for taking the baton." 18 The extract from the email is: 19 "The Horizon language is still in the draft, but 20 I spoke to Alex Dunn just now and he says that all of 21 the Horizon disclosure will be taken out today -- which 22 is good news." 23 If we scroll up, we can see your response: 24 "Thanks, Tim, that's very good to hear. We 25 intervened with Jon M last night ..." 125 1 Is that Jon Millidge? 2 A. Yes, I believe so. 3 Q. He was the Company Secretary of Royal Mail? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. "... last night and he said he would pick this up with 6 the team." 7 Now, we can see how that occurred, and I'm going to 8 take you to correspondence between Paula Vennells and 9 Mr Millidge that is referred to there. Could we please 10 turn to POL00146462, and can we start at the bottom of 11 page 2, please. Thank you. 12 So this is a Friday night email from Ms Vennells to 13 Mr Millidge, and she says: 14 "Hi Jon, I realise this is ridiculously late and for 15 that my sincere apologies. However, I have just seen 16 an email that our team in BIS appear to have hit a brick 17 wall on one particular para in the prospectus. And I'm 18 told it has to be lodged with UKLA by 8.00 am on 19 Monday." 20 This is the passage that has been objected to from 21 the prospectus: 22 "In July 2013, an Interim Report was published into 23 alleged problems with [Post Office's] 'Horizon' computer 24 system, which is used to record transactions in its 25 branch network. The report confirmed that no system 126 1 wide problems had been founding in relation to the 2 'Horizon' software, but suggests that [Post Office] 3 should examine its support and training processes for 4 subpostmasters." 5 That was accurate, as a statement, wasn't it? 6 A. Yes, I think the statement itself was accurate and, as 7 we saw in the earlier exchanges, I think it had been 8 lifted from a Post Office press notice. 9 Q. Ms Vennells says below: 10 "Our challenge is that this is not a risk to [Royal 11 Mail] and is particularly misleading in the IT risks 12 section. As your paragraph states, the findings of the 13 Interim Report related to [subpostmaster] training and 14 support not IT faults." 15 Do you agree with that final distinction? 16 A. I mean, yes, it's -- we didn't see this as a risk to 17 Royal Mail at that point and, as was described in the 18 email, the key finding from the Second Sight Interim 19 Report was around postmaster training and support. We 20 didn't, at that point, see it as an IT system; it was 21 the broader process of support and training. So yes, it 22 felt like a -- that was the right summing-up in Paula's 23 email. 24 Q. So in your view, the Second Sight report was not 25 addressing IT issues; it was relating simply to the 127 1 subpostmaster training and support? 2 A. No, it clearly addressed both but the major finding, 3 major focus was particularly around training and 4 support. 5 Q. Was that training and support generally or training and 6 support in relation to the Horizon system? 7 A. In relation to use of the Horizon system, yes. 8 Q. Therefore, is it inappropriate for that to have been 9 included in a section under IT? 10 A. I think it was felt to be inappropriate in a section on 11 Royal Mail IT risks. That felt like kind of 12 an inappropriate place to be talking about this risk. 13 Q. We can read here the feeling that it's inappropriate, as 14 expressed by Ms Vennells, but what is your personal 15 view? Is there an issue with what was in a press line 16 relating to the Second Sight Report, which was 17 an investigation into the Horizon IT System, being in 18 a section in a prospectus under the IT section? 19 A. I think I -- I mean, I think I would agree with the 20 assessment that repeating language about the findings of 21 the Second Sight Reports in a section on Royal Mail IT 22 risks doesn't accurately describe the nature of that 23 risk. So it does feel to me like a fair concern. 24 Q. Was it a risk, the matters that were identified by 25 Second Sight were they a risk more broadly to the Royal 128 1 Mail? 2 A. Not as we understood them to be at the time, no. 3 Q. So they are not risks that would have affected the Royal 4 Mail Group? 5 A. We didn't perceive them to be. I think clearly the 6 chief concern at this stage was reputational risks for 7 Post Office. 8 Q. It says: 9 "Can you get this paragraph removed? Alice had 10 offered to contact Donald if necessary but I don't want 11 to disturb her this weekend. 12 "So sorry to bother you with this. And I recognise 13 that the para makes it clear that there isn't an IT 14 fault. But its presence in an IT risk section 15 potentially opens up a sensitive and politically high 16 profile situation." 17 How would the inclusion of a line that is your own 18 press line potentially open up a sensitive and 19 politically high-profile situation? 20 A. I think our feeling was we'd obviously -- the Second 21 Sight Report had been published. We had published our 22 response to that Second Sight Report. All of that had 23 been disclosed, re-airing that particular information in 24 the context of a Royal Mail prospectus and a section 25 talking about Royal Mail IT risks. Clearly the concern 129 1 was that, yes, it was raising attention to that issue 2 and, again, in the wrong context and that was causing us 3 some anxiety. 4 Q. If we scroll up on page 2, we can see Mr Millidge's 5 response: 6 "I thought that this risk only repeated the press 7 release and that your team were ok with it. 8 "Evidently not! So let me check with the team. 9 I will get back to you." 10 If we scroll up, Ms Vennells says: 11 "It is. Just odd therefore that it features in 12 an IT risk section." 13 If we continue scrolling up, please. The response 14 from Mr Millidge, if we scroll up to the bottom of the 15 next page -- oh, yes, its just there, at the bottom of 16 this page: 17 "And that is the point I have just raised with the 18 team -- maybe better under contracts." 19 So Mr Millidge is saying, "Okay, I get the point 20 about it not going under IT, it should maybe be better 21 under the contract section". 22 Is that what you understand his email to suggest? 23 A. Yes, yes. 24 Q. Then Ms Vennells says: 25 "No Jon, the request is to remove it. 130 1 "This is not a [Royal Mail] contract risk either." 2 Then if we control up above he says: 3 "Okay. I think we should be able to remove but I 4 will need to confirm on Monday." 5 Then if we look at the top email, Paula Vennells to 6 Alice Perkins: 7 "Not sure how much you want keeping in the loop. 8 But hoping it goes through, I have earned my keep on 9 this one. Unusually BIS misjudged it: they were unable 10 get the changes through and seemed to be unclear(?) on 11 how much time we had before the deadline. So we were 12 told our luck and time that run out of Friday." 13 "Read bottom up. I hope it is now resolved." 14 This seems to suggest quite a lot of micromanaging 15 of information relating to the Second Sight Report; 16 would you agree with that? 17 A. I think I'd agree it reflects a high degree of anxiety 18 of that information being recirculated, in what we felt 19 to be out of context and clearly an extraordinary 20 high-profile context. So yes, I think it reflects 21 a high degree of anxiety about that. 22 Q. We saw before lunch your comment on the BBC article and 23 their report on the Interim Report. 24 Similar approach here, trying to clamp down on 25 references to the Second Sight Report and their 131 1 findings; would you agree with that? 2 A. I'm not sure I'd quite agree with that characterisation. 3 As we discussed before lunch, the concern about that 4 report wasn't referenced to the Second Sight Report; it 5 was the way it had been described to be an ongoing 6 problem of Horizon. That was the specific concern here. 7 We had published the Second Sight Report, we had 8 published our response to it. So I don't think it was 9 an issue per se with that being in the public domain. 10 I think it was an anxiety about how that information 11 might be represented in the wrong context. 12 Q. Can we please look at POL00299535, this is an email from 13 yourself, 25th September. You're emailing Mark Davies 14 and others. You say: 15 "Mark, Ruth and team. 16 "Here is the latest (and I understand final) draft 17 of the [Post Office] extracts from the [Royal Mail] 18 prospectus. It's certainly much better than it was, and 19 we managed to get the sentences on the Second Sight 20 review deleted. But the risks section is still, 21 inevitably, negative in tone -- whilst the standard 22 audience for such documents (ie investors) would expect 23 this and not take it out of context, clearly journalists 24 and unions may seek to misuse it. So I guess over to 25 you guys to work with BIS and [Royal Mail] comms on the 132 1 defensive lines! Let me know if there is anything to do 2 to help. I've asked BIS to see if they can get hold of 3 the wider marketing materials for the IPO, which will 4 hopefully include some more positive statements on the 5 [Post Office-Royal Mail] relationship -- but probably 6 worth asking your counterparts in [Royal Mail] too as 7 they may be a quicker route." 8 So significant efforts have been put into getting 9 the Second Sight review deleted from that report? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. Do you consider the actions that took place in relation 12 to that prospectus to have been appropriate? 13 A. I think they do clearly reflect a very high degree of 14 anxiety around the positioning of the Second Sight 15 Report and how that was reflected, but -- and as we see 16 in this email, they also reflect broader anxiety about 17 the whole separation process, which -- I mean, this was 18 one of the most seismic events to impact the Post Office 19 in its history, so the whole process of Post Office 20 separation and privatisation was intensely sensitive to 21 the business. 22 Q. It's editing a section on risks to investors. Surely it 23 has been shown to be quite right that it is and was 24 a very significant risk to investors; do you agree with 25 that? 133 1 A. I'm not sure, to be honest, whether, even in hindsight, 2 this whole affair has represented a risk to Royal Mail, 3 per se. I'm not sure. I don't feel well placed to 4 qualify that. That wasn't my understanding. 5 Q. In relation to the Post Office, though, it's been 6 a significant risk; would you agree with that? 7 A. Yes, it's been a monumental risk to the Post Office, 8 yes. 9 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Just so I can understand this, 10 Mr Edwards, in the emails we've been going through, 11 especially from Ms Vennells, as I read them at least, 12 she was making it clear that the risk was to the Post 13 Office; it was a Post Office risk, not a Royal Mail 14 risk, and that was at least one of the reasons which was 15 motivating her to ask that the risk be removed. Have 16 I got that right? 17 A. Yes, I think that's absolutely correct, sir. Yes. That 18 was the key concern. We understood it to be a risk to 19 the Post Office. It wasn't necessarily a risk to Royal 20 Mail, which is why it felt inappropriate to be in 21 a Royal Mail prospectus. 22 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: That debate about whether it should be 23 under IT risks or contract risks, the point is made 24 explicitly, "It's not a risk to you", in effect, "it's 25 a risk to us". 134 1 A. Correct, yes. 2 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Okay. So from your personal perspective, 3 at the time, were you looking at this as a risk to Post 4 Office alone or were you thinking that there may be 5 wider implications with there being a risk to Royal 6 Mail? 7 A. I think I and everyone working on this was very much 8 focused on the risk to Post Office. I really don't 9 think the -- the driver for this wasn't concerns around 10 Royal Mail, per se. We were very much looking to 11 protect Post Office's reputation on the range of issues 12 raised by separation. 13 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: So that I'm not -- because I don't claim 14 to have any expertise in what happens when companies 15 separate but the actual separation had taken place 16 a year before, had it not? 17 A. In terms of corporate separation, I'm not quite sure 18 when, corporately, the two companies separated. I think 19 you may be right and then, obviously operationally, it 20 was an ongoing process. 21 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes. I think I'm right in saying that 22 the act which enabled the separation -- 23 A. Yes. 24 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: -- was January 2012 and the actual 25 separation was April 2012? 135 1 A. Yes, I think you're correct. 2 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: So this is a process, in effect, to sell 3 shares in Royal Mail? 4 A. Correct, yes. 5 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Right. Okay, thank you. 6 MR BLAKE: I'm going to go back slightly in time to 7 POL00112856, to 9 September. This is the insurance 8 notification that the Inquiry has seen. If we scroll 9 over the page, we can see that it was communicated via 10 a note on Bond Dickinson headed paper and, if we scroll 11 down, and over the page, to page 3, we can see the 12 section there on risk to the Post Office, and we have 13 dealt with other witnesses on how this came to be 14 formulated. 15 Were you involved in this at all? 16 A. No. 17 Q. Were you aware of concerns about the provision of 18 information to the Post Office's insurers around this 19 time? 20 A. I was aware that the -- I think at the July Board, 21 questions had been raised by some of the board of 22 directors about the insurance position. I think that's 23 referenced in the 26th July paper which we looked at 24 earlier. So I was aware of it to that extent and, 25 obviously, was aware of what was covered in that paper. 136 1 I wasn't close to what happened to that discussion after 2 the 26th July. 3 Q. You say in relation to the prospectus that you were 4 aware of a general concern around insensitivity to the 5 overall issues in the business. Were you aware of those 6 concerns and sensitivities when it came to the type of 7 information that was provided to Post Office's insurers? 8 A. No, I really wasn't close to that process at all. It 9 was being led by, I think, our CFO at the time. 10 Q. Thank you. Can we please turn to POL00382001, and the 11 bottom of the page, please. 12 This is the email that the Inquiry has seen several 13 times, it's at the bottom of the page from Paula 14 Vennells to Alice Perkins: 15 "Hi Alice, don't worry about the lateness of this 16 not -- I'm clearing the tray before signing out." 17 Then it's the bottom of this page, it says: 18 "My concern re Sparrow currently is our obligations 19 of disclosure regarding an unsafe witness (the 20 representative from Fujitsu made statements about no 21 bugs, which later could be seen to have been undermined 22 by the [Second Sight] report.) we do not think it 23 material but it could be high profile. Martin E is 24 briefed if you want more detail." 25 Who had you been briefed by? 137 1 A. As far as I recollect, it was by Paula herself. 2 Q. And what did she say? 3 A. So my recollection is hazy. It was a verbal 4 conversation. I think she'd been updated by the Legal 5 Team. I assume Susan, but I can only remember broad -- 6 similar details to what she gave us in this email, that 7 there was a concern that a Fujitsu witness hadn't 8 disclosed the bugs which became apparent, which were 9 disclosed in the Second Sight Report, that would most 10 likely need to be disclosed to previous prosecutions. 11 As I understood it, that had been put into the 12 Cartwright King review process. 13 My recollection, the general impression I got from 14 that conversation kind of accords with what we've got 15 here, which -- it was sensitive, it clearly wasn't 16 helpful, but it wasn't viewed to be material to the 17 outcome of those prosecutions. That was the general -- 18 that's the best of my recollection. 19 Q. So "we do not think the material", is that yourself and 20 Ms Vennells? 21 A. No, certainly not my opinion. I think my impression, my 22 recollection, is that that was the opinion that Paula 23 had formed, having discussed this with the Legal Team. 24 And just for -- I mean, I think the reason I was brought 25 into the loop at this point, as the Inquiry is probably 138 1 aware, this is a period where Susan Crichton was in the 2 process of leaving the business. As I recall, Paula 3 brought me into the loop. She wanted to let Alice know 4 but she also wanted to give Alice a point of contact 5 that she could reach to whilst Paula was away and, for 6 obvious reasons, Susan probably wasn't the appropriate 7 point of contact, so she brought me into other loop so 8 Alice could reach at to me if she wanted further 9 information. 10 Q. So your briefing there was only from Paula Vennells? 11 A. I can't recall being briefed on this directly by the 12 Legal Team. I can't recall anything verbally. 13 I haven't seen anything in the documentation. 14 Q. Had you seen the review by Brian Altman? 15 A. No. I'd seen it being referred to and brief bits of it 16 summarised but no, I hadn't seen the review itself. 17 Q. Summarised by who? 18 A. I think Rodric Williams. It may have been -- it was 19 around this time, particularly as part of the drafting 20 of the CO's report, Rodric sent me some contributions to 21 that and included brief summaries of what Brian Altman 22 was concluding. 23 Q. So Mr Altman's review is dated 15 October. Perhaps we 24 can very briefly go to that, that's POL00006803. If we 25 turn to page 18. If we scroll down, he addresses the 139 1 issue of Gareth Jenkins. He then addresses the issue 2 over the page of the Helen Rose Report. He says at 3 paragraph 50: 4 "The draft report is based on an exchange ... 5 between Gareth Jenkins and Helen Rose ..." 6 If we perhaps move on to page 44, Mr Altman had 7 addressed Gareth Jenkins and the impact on possible 8 appeals. Perhaps we could turn to paragraph 142, he 9 said: 10 "Of grave concern is that Mr Jenkins informed the 11 [Second Sight] inquiry of the two defects, which they 12 reported at section 6 of the report, suggesting that he 13 knew of them in a period Mr Clarke argues in his 15 July 14 2013 Advice to be between 5 October 2012 and 3 April 15 2013, which are the dates of essentially five Jenkins 16 witness statements Mr Clarke sampled. Yet in none of 17 them is there to be found any reference to these two 18 system defects. On the contrary, his reports speak to 19 the general integrity of the system." 20 Had this kind of information been brought to your 21 attention? 22 A. No. Not -- no, not in this level of detail or candour. 23 The only bit which resonates is some of the -- which 24 resonates from the conversation I had with Paula was 25 around the number of past cases which might be impacted. 140 1 So the figure of five sounds familiar but none of this 2 detail I'd seen before. 3 Q. So you think around this time you were aware that around 4 five cases had been impacted by, what, the provision of 5 evidence by Mr Jenkins? 6 A. What I recall, in Paula's description of what impacts 7 the Gareth Jenkins issue might have, I recognise 8 a figure of five being described here as one of the 9 reasons why she or the Legal team didn't view this to be 10 highly material. 11 Q. Because of the small number of people that it directly 12 involved? 13 A. I think the combination of the small number of people 14 and, I guess, a question -- the impression I was given 15 is that it was clearly deeply unhelpful and deeply 16 inappropriate but didn't necessarily add to the 17 disclosure of the two bugs themselves, which had been 18 disclosed to past prosecutions with the Second Sight 19 Report. It wasn't conveyed to me that it added very 20 much to that. 21 Q. Conveyed to you by who? 22 A. As I say, I'm basing this on the briefing -- the verbal 23 briefing I was given by Paula. 24 Q. So Paula Vennells had sent an email to Alice Perkins, 25 she was about to go away, you were the person who had 141 1 been briefed on the issue. Do you think that you were 2 sufficiently briefed? 3 A. No, and I think, in practice, what she was expecting me 4 to do -- she wanted me to give Alice the name of someone 5 she could contact in her absence. Susan Crichton, 6 I think, if she hadn't formally left the business was 7 effectively left. I think, from memory, Chris Aujard 8 had only just started, so it wasn't really appropriate 9 to give his name. I don't think Alice would have known 10 the names of the people who sat below Susan, so she was 11 giving Alice my name to reaching out to and I would then 12 liaise with the likes of Rodric Williams if further 13 information was needed. 14 Q. If we scroll down, we can see further sections 15 addressing the Gareth Jenkins issue, and something we're 16 going to come to in a moment, if we turn to page 54, 17 paragraph 173, Mr Altman has said: 18 "The Helen Rose Report adds very little, it seems to 19 me, other than to point to a particular issue at Lepton, 20 and the implications from the report that as early as 21 February 2013 Gareth Jenkins was aware of integrity 22 issues with Horizon, none of which he revealed. The 23 [Second Sight] report and the Rose Report are the limit 24 of the current disclosure recovered. I am unaware of 25 anyone being provided with anything more than this." 142 1 Could we please turn to POL00407608. Now, this is 2 going slightly back in time and nearly two months before 3 that email from Paula Vennells to Alice Perkins. If we 4 scroll down to the bottom, we can see an email from 5 Susan Crichton, and she says: 6 "Paula 7 "Further to our conversation this afternoon." 8 This is 3 September: 9 "There are two issues that we need to obtain JA's 10 view on our approach." 11 That must be James Arbuthnot. 12 If we keep on scrolling, there's a section in that 13 email entitled "Legal and Adjudication of future case", 14 and it's the bullet points below that that I would like 15 to draw to your attention. 16 "Meeting was held with our external law firm who 17 have been completing the criminal case review. 18 "The issues that we want Brian Altman QC to advise 19 on were agreed, final sign off of review process; 20 options re appointment of independent expert witness 21 (paper to follow); advice on prosecutions going forward. 22 "Following this discussion [terms of reference] for 23 his review to be finalised." 24 It's the reference there to the appointment of 25 an independent expert witness. 143 1 Were you aware at that time, September 2013, that 2 there was an issue with the expert witness? 3 A. I'm not sure I was. The clearest first recollection 4 I've got of this was in October, in relation to the 5 exchange we've been just discussing. I don't recall 6 picking up on this point or particularly understanding 7 it. I certainly don't think I'd linked this to what 8 I now understand to be the Gareth Jenkins issue. 9 Q. Because, if we scroll up, we can see that Paula Vennells 10 has sent this email to you. If we scroll up slightly, 11 can you see there? 12 But that's not something that sunk in at all about 13 a concern regarding an expert witness, or the 14 appointment of a new expert witness? 15 A. It's not something which I -- no, I certainly didn't 16 pick up on that. I think the main reason I was being 17 copied in -- at that point I think I was supporting on 18 some of the preparations for the appointment of the 19 chair of the Working Group, obviously, what ultimately 20 became Sir Anthony Hooper. So I think that's why Paula 21 Vennells added me to the copy list. 22 I certainly don't recall reading this email and 23 picking up on that specific bullet point. 24 Q. But by the time of that Paula Vennells email to Alice 25 Perkins, saying that you had been briefed, you were 144 1 aware of that concern? 2 A. Yes, yes. 3 Q. I said I'd move on to the issue of the Helen Rose 4 Report, and I'm going to do that now. Could we please 5 turn to POL00196707, and if we could start on page 5, 6 please. Thank you. There's an email here from you to 7 Rodric Williams and the subject is "CEO's report text on 8 criminal cases review". 9 So this was going to be a report from Paula 10 Vennells. Is that to the Board? 11 A. Yes, this was part of -- as part of each Board meeting 12 there would be what's known as the CEO's report, which 13 is a four or five-page summary of issues going on across 14 the business and part of my job was to collate the 15 production of that report. 16 Q. You say: 17 "Hi Rodric -- as discussed, here's the text. 18 Grateful if you could amend as appropriate ..." 19 The text as drafted at that point was as follows: 20 "Our criminal barrister, Brian Altman, has now 21 completed his review of the approach we are taking to 22 reviewing cases that have been subject to prosecution, 23 in particular looking at whether we are complying with 24 our duty to disclose the findings of the Second Sight 25 Report to the defence team in cases where it is 145 1 appropriate to do so." 2 Just pausing there had you, by this stage, read 3 Mr Altman's report? 4 A. No, I don't believe I ever received the Brian Altman 5 report. The first time I saw the actual report was when 6 it was disclosed to me a few weeks back. 7 Q. You say: 8 "His conclusion is that our approach is 9 'fundamentally sound' ..." 10 That's in quotation marks. 11 "... providing us with strong grounds to resist any 12 formal review of our historic prosecutions (for example 13 by the Criminal Cases Review Commission). To date, 14 following several sifts our external firm of solicitors 15 has identified 11 cases where disclosure is required. 16 It is now a matter for the defence in those particular 17 cases to determine what action (if any) they might take 18 in light of this additional information." 19 How did you draft that if you hadn't read 20 Mr Altman's report? 21 A. So this drafting was based on -- I think there was 22 a first draft produced by Andy Holt who was then the 23 Programme Manager for what was now known as the Sparrow 24 process. I'd raised some questions on that, I think 25 that had then been farmed out to Andy Parsons who had 146 1 provided some input. So, in short, this text was 2 a synthesis of what I'd been given from the team. So 3 this is basically their substance which I then edited 4 down into a short paragraph. 5 Q. Can we scroll up, please. Mr Williams responds. He 6 says: 7 "... I have highlighted my amendments in bold below. 8 "Please note [and there are two points]: 9 "I have left in 'fundamentally sound' as Brian uses 10 it in his report ..." 11 But then he says: 12 "Brian's view on the CCRC is that we have 'responded 13 to the Criminal Cases Review Commission appropriately 14 ... but should the Commission continue to show interest 15 in these cases there might have to come a time when Post 16 Office considers sharing Cartwright King's review 17 findings with the Commission, and cooperating with the 18 Commission'." 19 So Mr Williams is highlighting there that the 20 section on the Criminal Cases Review Commission needs to 21 be a little bit more nuanced because it might be that 22 the Post Office do have to, in due course, cooperate 23 with them? 24 A. Yes, yeah, and I mean to explain, part of -- the CEO's 25 report itself tended to be very concise but it was 147 1 accompanied bid Chief Executive, who would then deliver 2 it in the Board, alongside a verbal briefing. So part 3 of the process of this was, alongside the report itself 4 giving Paula background notes, so she could voice over 5 more detail. So this might be the type of thing which 6 fed into her background briefing. 7 Q. But this was the actual wording which went directly to 8 the Board -- I mean, not this particular wording, we'll 9 come to the wording, but the ultimate CEO report text 10 would go to the Board? 11 A. Yes, yes. 12 Q. He has added after "Second Sight" regarding disclosure 13 of the Helen Rose Report, and he has amended the wording 14 regarding the Criminal Cases Review Commission to say 15 that Mr Altman's review has enabled us to assert to the 16 Criminal Cases Review Commission that: 17 "... insofar as our historic prosecutions are 18 concerned, we responded to the Second Sight Report in 19 a prudent and responsible manner." 20 So it's watered down in light of that caveat from 21 Mr Altman, it seems? 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. If we scroll up, we can see your response. You say: 24 "Hi Rodric -- thanks for this. Is the Helen Rose 25 Report a key part of the disclosure? If so I think 148 1 we'll need to include a reference to it in square 2 brackets below. But we'll also need a sentence to 3 explain what it is, as Paula and the Board won't have 4 heard of it. Please could you suggest some wording?" 5 If we scroll up, we can see Mr Williams' response. 6 He says: 7 "Cartwright King advised that the Helen Rose Report 8 meets the test for disclosure (ie it might undermine the 9 prosecution's case or assist the accused's), and is 10 therefore being disclosed where appropriate. 11 "I have added a very high level sentence to address 12 this (again in bold). I have quite a bit of further 13 information on the Helen Rose Report, so can go into it 14 in more detail if required. Please let me know if you 15 would like me to do so, or if you would like to See any 16 of the underlying documents (eg the report itself, or 17 Cartwright King's or Brian Altman's advice on it)." 18 He has there inserted a summary of the Helen Rose 19 Report, and says: 20 "The Helen Rose Report was prepared in June 2013 by 21 a member of the Post Office Security Team, and refers to 22 emails with Fujitsu from January and February 2013 23 suggestive of there being issues with Horizon, training 24 and support." 25 It's worded slightly strangely there at the end, 149 1 isn't it, with the comma? It was your reading of that 2 it was suggestive of there being issues with Horizon and 3 issues with training and support, or that it identified 4 issues with Horizon training and support? 5 A. I think candidly I wasn't sure, and this wording begged 6 lots of questions to me, and it felt like we were 7 getting into territory which needed much more 8 explanation and you'll probably going to come on to 9 it -- 10 Q. Because -- 11 A. To be honest, I wasn't -- this raised more questions to 12 me than it answered. I don't think it particularly 13 helped explain the full implications of the Helen Rose 14 Report. 15 Q. No, but not just questions but also presumably concerns, 16 because there appears to be a report which is suggestive 17 of there being issues with Horizon. 18 A. Yes, yeah, it was -- yes, absolutely, and it was the 19 first I'd heard of this and I was pretty sure it wasn't 20 something which had been briefed to Paula or the Board 21 at that point. 22 Q. If we look above, you say: 23 "Thanks very much Rodric. Unfortunately I think 24 I probably do need to give Paula more information on 25 this, as this is going to raise all sorts of questions 150 1 from her and the Board! Please could you send me the 2 report and any associated advice, etc?" 3 If we scroll up, he said: 4 "I thought as much! 5 "Can I suggest we take 10-15 minutes tomorrow 6 morning to go over what we have and where it goes to 7 help me tailor the response?" 8 Then above you say: 9 "... yes, agree a quick catch-up tomorrow ... 10 "As you'll see from the text I've just 11 re-articulated, I've decided it's probably better not to 12 mention the Helen Rose Report specifically, as it will 13 only serve to confuse things with the Board (although 14 I will still need to give Paula background notes on the 15 issue). 16 "I've also cut back the text review of past cases -- 17 hope this still works." 18 Now, having seen that there are still issues with 19 Horizon, rather than removing reference to that report, 20 wouldn't you want to find out quite a bit more about it 21 at that stage? 22 A. Yes, and I think as we'll hopefully come on to, part of 23 the follow-up actions was to arrange a proper briefing 24 for the team to pull on these issues. I think my 25 concern at this point -- and this is another late-night 151 1 email -- I think I was concerned that this 2 potentially -- I didn't know what to make of this 3 reference to the Helen Rose Report. All I did know was 4 it was new news and Rodric's explanation in the 5 preceding text, as I say, raised more questions than it 6 answered. Candidly, I was quite concerned about putting 7 in information into a report going out in Paula's name 8 when she wasn't familiar with this issue. It felt 9 inappropriate to put something in a report in her name 10 before she'd been properly briefed. 11 So I took the judgement call, late at night, to take 12 it out and instead arranged for a briefing for her and 13 then she could decide what to do with that information. 14 So it was a kind of judgement late at night, based on 15 limited information. I think that the key thing, which 16 we'll come on to, is I then arranged a briefing -- the 17 team to give Paula a briefing on the topics so she could 18 take a view. 19 Q. Were you present at the briefing? 20 A. No, I was just about to go on leave, so I commissioned 21 Belinda Crowe to coordinate that briefing and give it to 22 Paula. 23 Q. Yes. We'll come and look at that document but, before 24 we do, can we please turn to the first page. Rodric 25 Williams has responded to you, the next morning: 152 1 "Thanks, Martin -- I'll comment separately on your 2 revised text (which read well), as amended by Andy Holt. 3 "I attach a Briefing Note from Cartwright King 4 addressing the issue we discussed yesterday, namely: 5 "i. Update on the criminal case reviews to date ... 6 "ii. A summary of the appeal steps a defendant can 7 take in those (few) cases where further disclosure had 8 been made ... 9 "iii. Whether the 'Helen Rose Report' is in the 10 public domain (it's not) (copy attached along with 11 covering letter). 12 "I think it is sensible to keep references to the 13 Helen Rose Report at a minimum as it may not be a live 14 issue going forward. You will see from the final 15 paragraph of the Briefing Note that it is 'unlikely to 16 require disclosure in any further cases and will not be 17 disclosed in any pending or future prosecution'. Brian 18 Altman QC was also of the view that it 'added very 19 little'." 20 We can see the attachments that Mr Williams sent 21 alongside that email. The first is the Helen Rose 22 Report. Can we turn to POL00196708. The document I'm 23 taking you to is known as a family document, so we are 24 sure that those are the actual attachments to this 25 email, though other versions exist. But if we look at 153 1 this document, this is the Helen Rose Report, but it is 2 the redacted version of the Helen Rose Report. And, if 3 we scroll down, over the page, we can see this is the 4 one where in fact Gareth Jenkins' name has been 5 redacted. 6 What we do see, though, on page 3, about three 7 quarters of the way down, is the part of the Helen Rose 8 Report where it says: 9 "I know you are aware of all the Horizon integrity 10 issues." 11 Did you read this at the time? 12 A. I think I may have skim read it. I'm not sure I'd have 13 known what to make of it. It's obviously a relatively 14 operational and technical report. I think I skim read 15 it and I didn't come away from it thinking, "Oh, I see 16 what the key issue is here". 17 Q. So we had Mr Williams suggest the form of words in that 18 briefing to the Board that said, "Suggestive of there 19 being issues with Horizon". 20 That particular paragraph suggests perhaps that 21 there are issues with Horizon. But that wasn't 22 something that you thought of at the time? 23 A. I'm not sure if -- so this particular paragraph doesn't 24 jump out, clearly wrongly in hindsight. I probably put 25 more weight on some of the text in Rodric's covering 154 1 email where he quotes Brian Altman and generally gives 2 quite a lot of reassurance that it isn't a material 3 issue and doesn't add very much. So I think, at that 4 point in time, I was probably reassured that, actually, 5 maybe this isn't such a material part of the disclosure, 6 but, I mean, what I would emphasise is I did still 7 arrange for the team to give a briefing to Paula and to 8 follow up on it, and -- 9 Q. If we look at the second attachment, that's POL00196709, 10 this is the briefing note that was produced by 11 Cartwright King that's referred to in Mr Williams's 12 email. If we scroll over the page, please, we can see 13 there's reference -- one of the purposes of this was to 14 provide a short explanation of the status of the Helen 15 Rose Report. If we look at paragraph 4 on that page, we 16 see there it says: 17 "The Helen Rose Report is not in the public domain 18 and should not be placed in the public domain. 19 Nevertheless it is subject to the disclosure rules ... 20 "As a matter of law, a defendant to whom any 21 material ... is disclosed is constrained from using that 22 material ..." 23 If we scroll down, it says there: 24 "Because this report goes only to the apparent 25 knowledge of [Gareth Jenkins] at the time of his writing 155 1 of his expert court reports, its status as a disclosable 2 document ends where he no longer provides such reports. 3 Accordingly, it's unlikely to require disclosure in any 4 further cases and will not be disclosed any pending or 5 future prosecution." 6 There is also another attachment to that email it's 7 POL00196710, and that's an example covering letter that 8 was sent out regarding disclosure, and it's the second 9 paragraph that refers to the Second Sight Report and the 10 Helen Rose Report. 11 I'd like to take you to the final report to the 12 Board, that's POL00196706. So this is the ultimate 13 briefing that was produced, presumably finalised after 14 you had received those documents? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. If we have a look at the third bullet point, it's dated 17 24 October: 18 "Our external firm of criminal solicitors, 19 Cartwright King, has now completed a review of 301 cases 20 subject to past prosecution to identify whether we have 21 a duty to disclose the findings of the Second Sight 22 Report and associated issues." 23 So now the Helen Rose Report is now referred to as 24 "associated issues"; is that right? 25 A. Yes. 156 1 Q. "[Cartwright King] has concluded that disclosure is 2 appropriate in 10 of these cases, and a short letter has 3 therefore been sent to each of the dense teams to bring 4 their attention to the report. It is now a matter for 5 the defence in each case to determine what action, if 6 any, they might take in light of this additional 7 information. We are also awaiting an unknown number of 8 further historical prosecution files from Royal Mail, 9 although at this stage we have no reason to believe 10 these will subsequently increase the number of actual 11 disclosures. In view of the potential interest from the 12 Criminal Cases Review Commission, we have also asked our 13 criminal barrister, Brian Altman QC, to conduct 14 an independent review of the overall process we have 15 taken to review past cases, reaching the conclusion that 16 our approach is 'fundamentally sound'." 17 So that was the ultimate summary of the passage that 18 we have been looking at. Perhaps we could bring it up 19 on to screen alongside POL00196707, page 4 of that 20 document, if that's possible. Thank you. So if we 21 scroll down slightly on the left-hand side we can see, 22 it was that second passage that I took you to, earlier, 23 the slightly more nuanced approach to references to the 24 Criminal Cases Review Commission, and it seems as though 25 that, to some extent, has been lost in the final 157 1 briefing; would you agree with that? 2 A. Yes, it's clearly gone through further editing, yes, I'd 3 agree with that. 4 Q. Can we please turn to POL00196705, and this is the 5 reference to the briefing that you have mentioned. It's 6 28 October 2013. One of those attachments is the email 7 chain that we've been looking at with those various 8 attachments, and you say as follows: 9 "Hi Belinda, here's the final text on Sparrow [so 10 that's the final text that I just took you to, the 11 separate attachment] which went into the CEO's report. 12 As discussed earlier, very grateful if you could 13 coordinate the briefing which Paula will need ahead of 14 the Board to bring her up to speed on the issues and 15 prepare her for any difficult questions from the 16 [Non-Executive Directors]. It now looks highly likely 17 that Paula won't be able to attend tomorrow's steering 18 group -- if we can fit in a separate short catch-up for 19 you, Chris and her, we will but this might not be 20 possible." 21 Then there are various bullet points, one is "Update 22 on any mediation/Working Group process", including 23 feedback from Tony Hooper's first meeting in the Working 24 Group: 25 "Linked to this, an explanation of [Second Sight's] 158 1 expected role going forwards (bearing in mind that 2 certain Board members will have a strong expectation 3 that they should be out of the process by the end of 4 December -- so we may have to manage these 5 expectations)." 6 This is a separate issue but it's something we 7 discussed earlier about moves to limit or end Second 8 Sight's involvement. 9 Then: 10 "Any additional detail on the settlement policy 11 which we're in the process of developing ..." 12 I think it's the final bullet point here: 13 "Any explanation of the issues around the review of 14 past criminal cases, which Rodric can help provide, 15 covering: a) what exactly has been disclosed so far; and 16 b) our best guess of the implications of these 17 disclosures (ie explaining that at this stage we have no 18 reason to believe that this means past cases will be 19 found to be unsafe)." 20 Just pausing there, how had you formed that view? 21 A. I think that had been informed by the emails we'd seen 22 earlier from Rodric and others, including some fairly 23 reassuring quotations from the Brian Altman reports. 24 Q. "I've attached an email from Rodric, which contains some 25 of the answers to these questions, but would be useful 159 1 to have this together in one place." 2 Then if we look at the bottom of that email, it 3 says: 4 "The Board is on Thursday, so it would be useful for 5 her to have this by tomorrow evening or Wednesday 6 morning. As you know, I'm on leave after today -- I may 7 have an opportunity to log on in the evenings to look at 8 things, but if not then I suggest you send directly to 9 Paula copied to me." 10 So the work that you had been carrying out in the 11 previous days on the CEO's report to the Board and the 12 information that you had gathered from Rodric Williams 13 has now just been handed over Belinda Crowe to summarise 14 for Paula Vennells; is that right? 15 A. Yes, essentially. 16 Q. Did you keep tabs on what form the briefing ultimately 17 took? 18 A. I don't believe I did. I think I followed it up -- by 19 the time I returned, the Board meeting had already 20 happened, so the kind of the moment had passed but 21 I recall -- I remember seeing confirmation that 22 a briefing had been sent. 23 Q. But you don't recall reading the briefing? 24 A. No, by then I was on leave. 25 Q. We saw those discussions about the Helen Rose Report and 160 1 its implications, and your view was to leave it out of 2 the Board -- the paper that went to the Board but 3 I think you had confidence that it would be raised by 4 Ms Vennells at the Board. Did you take any steps to 5 make sure that there was a proper briefing in that 6 respect? 7 A. I think I relied on -- I clearly here have passed the 8 baton to Belinda to coordinate with input from Rodric, 9 I've relied on that process and that input to Paula to 10 get to the right answer. 11 Q. What was Belinda Crowe's role? 12 A. I think by now she had just taken over as Programme 13 Manager for what was then called the Sparrow process, so 14 coordinating all of these workstreams. 15 Q. I think you said that you didn't have a good knowledge, 16 or any knowledge, of the contents of the Helen Rose 17 Report before you had seen it, or even the Brian Altman 18 report up until very recently. Were you aware of her 19 state of knowledge of the underlying issues when you 20 sent this email? 21 A. I was aware she was -- she was also new to these topics 22 and would be heavily reliant on input from Rodric to get 23 to the right information. I think Rodric was copied 24 into this email. 25 Q. Thank you. Can we please turn to POL00029707. This is 161 1 a much later email, and I don't think you're involved in 2 this correspondence, but it's a document that I took 3 Mr Parsons to, where he talks about the Helen Rose 4 Report. If we scroll down to the penultimate paragraph, 5 he says as follows: 6 "Putting this issue aside, the real (and 7 confidential) reason that the report was disclosed was 8 because Helen's comment at the bottom of page 3 suggests 9 that it was widely known that there were problems with 10 Horizon. This statement (regardless of whether it is 11 correct) could have been used to attack Gareth Jenkins' 12 credibility as [Post Office's] Horizon expert as he had 13 previously stated that there were no problems with 14 Horizon." 15 Is that something that you were aware of? 16 A. No, no. This very clear explanation of the implication 17 of the Helen Rose Report wasn't apparent to me until 18 I read -- until this document was disclosed to me and 19 I have followed some of the other evidence. So 20 candidly, the penny only dropped very recently on 21 exactly why the Helen Rose Report was significant. That 22 wasn't apparent to me in this very clear way at the 23 time. 24 Q. Thank you. I have two very brief topics to address 25 before I hand over to others. 162 1 The first is ShEx, and your involvement and 2 relationship with them. Could we please turn to 3 UKGI00001852. 4 I think you said you were the main liaison when it 5 came to non-communications matters; is that right? 6 A. I think -- yeah, I provided an informal channel of 7 communication, if they needed to pick up the phone to 8 someone, I was a point of contact they could use, yes. 9 Q. If we look at the bottom of page 2, we see 10 correspondence between Mr Batten and Rodric Williams, 11 and you're copied in to this email. This is an email 12 that we saw with Jo Swinson because she was going to be 13 making an announcement to Parliament and they were 14 seeking information about numbers of convictions. If we 15 look above, there's a series of questions that have been 16 posed by Mr Gibson of the Shareholder Executive. 17 If we go to the first page, at the bottom of the 18 page, Susan Crichton has said, "On to it". So they're 19 on to finding out the questions, and also "we are 20 working on this". 21 Then if we scroll up slightly, Mr Batten said -- and 22 this is 16 July, so a week later: 23 "Did Susan, Rodric or Martin ever come back to 24 either of you on this? (I know [Post Office] often drop 25 me off their copy lists -- I try not to take it 163 1 personally)." 2 Then above we have Mr Whitehead saying: 3 "Sadly they have a habit of dropping everybody off 4 when we seek 'awkward' data. I have not seen anything 5 and my guess is that without a chaser, they'll 6 unilaterally decide we don't need it!" 7 Was that typical of your relationship with UKGI? 8 A. I don't think -- I think what it probably does reflect 9 is a bit of mutual frustration on the way information 10 was requested and shared between the business and UKGI 11 and there were two perspectives on that. Clearly what 12 we've seen here is a frustration from the ShEx team, not 13 getting the information they need. On the other side, 14 the frustration from the business is requests appear to 15 come in quite -- in an unstructured way at short notice, 16 and there were frustrations on both sides and it clearly 17 wasn't always working very well. 18 I think over time, we moved on to a more structured 19 basis, to the benefit of both sights, but I think this 20 does absolutely reflect a bit of a kind of teething 21 problem on the early relationship between the business 22 and the shareholder, post-separation. 23 Q. Could we please turn to POL00373845, and this relates to 24 Mr Callard becoming a new Non-Executive Director of the 25 Post Office. So we're moving on now to February 2014. 164 1 If we look at the bottom email, Ms Vennells sends 2 an email to a group, and if we look slightly below that, 3 just at the top of the next page, she says: 4 "Richard's scope has not yet picked up Sparrow or 5 Business Transformation. It will as he is attending 6 next week's Board meeting. But as this is the case, 7 I suggest that we leave him off the ShEx review agenda 8 as he will be well briefed by then." 9 If we scroll up, please, to your response, you say 10 as follows: 11 "On a separate but related topic, it's just struck 12 me this evening (belatedly) that I, Alwen or Chris D (or 13 a combination of all three) need to get into the 14 discipline of reading the draft Board papers with 15 a specific focus on checking for ShEx sensitivities, now 16 that [Mr Callard] will be receiving them. There are 17 numerous small points we need to watch out for. I'll 18 read through the ones I haven't checked in the morning, 19 kids permitting." 20 Can you assist us, why would you need to redraft 21 papers with a specific focus on checking for ShEx 22 sensitivities? 23 A. So I think this would have been a general point. It was 24 recognising -- whilst it was quite right that we moved 25 to the position of ShEx having a representative on the 165 1 Board that was new for the business, and there were 2 sometimes tensions and conflicts of interest, 3 particularly part of our relationship between ShEx and 4 the Board of ShEx was our funder, so for example we 5 might be putting papers to the business which are 6 relevant to our funding position. 7 Previously, the business could have drafted papers 8 without worrying about ShEx seeing that paper. So 9 clearly there were, I think, it's -- there was 10 a potential for sensitivities across the piece, as 11 I say, numerous small sensitivities. It just felt like 12 good discipline to make sure there is a kind of filter 13 on the papers, that we are reviewing the papers for any 14 watch outs. 15 Q. "NB on your point below about Sparrow, Belinda and I met 16 [Richard Callard] yesterday afternoon so he's now fully 17 up to speed (and understands why this was high on your 18 list of things that keep you awake at night!)." 19 What did you mean there? 20 A. I think really it was clearly it was a major issue for 21 the business and major issue for the Chief Executive, 22 and Richard Callard was now briefed on that. 23 Q. "He now has a good understanding often the handling 24 issues around Second Sight and the scenarios in which we 25 may need further support/cover from ministers." 166 1 Was about that removing Second Sight or limiting 2 their involvement? 3 A. I think that may well have been -- that's probably what 4 it was referring to. I think, by then, there had been 5 some ongoing debates with the business about Second 6 Sight's role, so yes, that's highly likely to be that -- 7 what I was referring to. 8 Q. Thank you. That can come down. 9 We've spoken today about one particular role you 10 had. How do you consider that role as Chief of Staff 11 prepared you for your subsequent roles at the Post 12 Office? 13 A. Well, it clearly gave me a broad insight across the 14 business. A lot of my time as Chief of Staff was 15 actually spent more on the strategy and funding side and 16 that was kind of very squarely what I worked on in the 17 next job. 18 Q. Is that as Group Strategy Director? 19 A. Yes, yes, and, I mean, more generally, this whole 20 experience has, I think, given me lots of lessons for 21 subsequent roles in the Post Office. 22 Q. Have you taken part in any lessons learned exercises? 23 A. I mean, I think it's fair to say the whole business has 24 been going through a lessons learned process over the 25 past few years. I think it's kind of built into the 167 1 business now. 2 Q. For you personally, what have you particularly 3 identified as your own lessons to be learnt from the 4 role that you played? 5 A. So I think there's a number. I think the first one, 6 it's very apparent in hindsight that I had been -- the 7 business was caught up in groupthink and I was part of 8 that, and at no point do I see myself properly stepping 9 outside that and challenging it. And I deeply regret 10 that and I think that's been a hugely important lesson 11 to me. 12 I think a second lesson which links to that, at that 13 point in my career, I would have taken advice from legal 14 experts or IT experts at face value and I'm now far more 15 aware that advice from experts needs to be properly 16 challenged and scrutinised. Everyone has biases in the 17 advice they need to provide and that needs appropriate 18 scrutiny. 19 And I think the third lesson is the important, 20 particularly for the roles which I do, which tend to be 21 working at the centre of the business working on 22 high-level strategy is balancing that with 23 an understanding of individual perspectives. 24 MR BLAKE: Thank you. 25 Sir, it's now time for some questions from Core 168 1 Participants. Are you happy for us to proceed with 2 Mr Henry, and then perhaps take a short break. We have 3 a very small number of questions from Mr Jacobs, 4 Mr Moloney and Ms Watt, which shouldn't be too long. 5 I think Mr Henry has the larger number of questions. 6 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Well, I'll do whatever suits the 7 transcriber best on this occasion. So we've been going 8 for -- 9 MR BLAKE: 1 hour 10 minutes. 10 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: I don't want to necessarily circumscribe 11 Mr Henry but if he's going to be ten minutes we'll do as 12 you say, if he's going to be 20 minutes, I think it's 13 probably appropriate to have a break. 14 MR HENRY: Sir, I think the shorthand writer would like 15 a break. 16 MR BLAKE: Yes. So perhaps we could take a ten-minute break 17 now. 18 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Fine. All right. 19 (3.06 pm) 20 (A short break) 21 (3.16 pm) 22 MR BLAKE: Thank you, sir. We have Mr Henry, followed by 23 Ms Watt, followed by Mr Moloney. 24 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Fine. 25 MR BLAKE: Thank you. 169 1 Questioned by MR HENRY 2 MR HENRY: Mr Edwards, you were part of an Executive Team 3 that used all its guile and skill to suppress the 4 reputational and financial risk of historical 5 prosecutions being reopened, weren't you? 6 A. I think I was clearly part of an Executive Team which 7 didn't do enough to put this right at that stage. 8 Q. You did precisely the opposite of furthering the right; 9 you were actually involved in suppressing the matter, 10 weren't you? 11 A. I'm not sure I'd agree with that. 12 Q. You were even complicit in a cover-up concerning the 13 unsafe witness, were you not? 14 A. I certainly wasn't, no. 15 Q. Now, you do not mention the issue of the unsafe witness 16 at any stage in your witness statement of the 18 April 17 2024, nor in that witness statement do you mention any 18 conversation you had with Paula Vennells in respect of 19 that issue of the unsafe witness; do you accept that? 20 A. Yes, it's not in my witness statement. 21 Q. Yet when Mr Blake asked you about this very significant 22 conversation, you offered an account that the unsafe 23 witness, so you were told by Ms Vennells, was implicated 24 in five cases; is that correct? 25 A. I recollected that being a small number, yes. 170 1 Q. You recall that from as long ago as 2013 but you did not 2 mention it once in your witness statement. You were 3 holding it back, weren't you? 4 A. I focused my witness statements on the questions posed 5 to me as part of my Rule 9 Request there. There was 6 nothing on this specific topic. 7 Q. But it was a very significant matter and you did not 8 volunteer it, did you? 9 A. Candidly, I certainly didn't appreciate the significance 10 of this matter at the time. I didn't appreciate it when 11 I constructed my witness statements. Everything I've 12 heard since then, I do understand its important but it 13 was certainly not a deliberate withholding of that. 14 Q. You are telling the Inquiry Chairman that you did not 15 appreciate its significance at the time. You obviously 16 appreciated its significance at the time when you were 17 told it. Correct? 18 A. In the terms I described earlier. 19 Q. You know the purpose of this Inquiry, it's a highly 20 material issue, an issue of extraordinary importance. 21 I suggest that you were hoping it would not be 22 discovered. 23 A. No, that's not the case. 24 Q. You knew that the Inquiry was not aware of the issue at 25 the time and hadn't unearthed the email from Paula 171 1 Vennells to Alice Perkins, but you were aware of the 2 issue, Mr Edwards, and you didn't volunteer it. That's 3 the truth, isn't it? 4 A. No, that's not the case. I didn't recollect that email, 5 I didn't particularly have a strong recollection of this 6 issue. I didn't -- my appreciation of the significance 7 of this issue has been very recent. I certainly did not 8 appreciate the significance of this issue at the time. 9 Q. I suggest that that cannot be right. At the very least, 10 from what you knew at the time, back in 2013, was the 11 risk that five people may have been convicted on the 12 back of evidence from an unsafe witness. That surely 13 would have been obvious to you? 14 A. As I described, the account I was given of this was it 15 was clearly important. My understanding at the time was 16 that was going to be disclosed to the past prosecutions 17 but I was not led to believe at the time that it was 18 highly material on top of other information which had 19 been disclosed. I completely did not appreciate the 20 significance of this at the time. 21 Q. So when you say that your understanding at the time was 22 that it was going to be disclosed to the past 23 prosecutions, was that something that just floated into 24 your head or were you told that by Paula Vennells? 25 A. That was my under -- 172 1 Q. Where did you get the understanding from? 2 A. That was the nature of the conversation, indeed, I think 3 in the email we looked at from Ms Vennells to (unclear) 4 it talks about the disclosure of this information. 5 Q. On the contrary, that email reads -- and there's no need 6 to get it up on screen: 7 "My concern re Sparrow currently is our obligations 8 of disclosure re an unsafe witness. The representative 9 from Fujitsu made statements about no bugs which could 10 later to have been seen to be undermined by the Second 11 Sight Report. We do not think it material, but it could 12 be high profile. Martin E is briefed if you want more 13 detail. This is just in case." 14 Do you want to reflect on the answer you've just 15 given? 16 A. I think what that email refers to, it talks about 17 obligations re disclosure. My -- as I said my 18 recollection of this conversation is hazy, but as 19 I understood it, Cartwright King, as our external 20 lawyers, were reviewing the disclosure of this 21 information to the past cases and, as Paula goes on to 22 describe, it wasn't viewed to be material. That is 23 consistent with my recollection and understanding at the 24 time. 25 Q. Well, I'll come back to that. I want to go quickly to 173 1 your statement, no need to get it up on the screen I'll 2 read it verbatim, paragraph 13. 3 "I believe I first became aware of concerns raised 4 about bugs, errors or defects with Horizon due to the 5 campaigning work of Alan Bates and the Justice for 6 Subpostmasters Alliance. On 4 October 2012, a couple of 7 weeks after I joined the Post Office, I attended 8 a meeting with Paula Vennells, James Arbuthnot and Alan 9 Bates of the JFSA in relation to the Second Sight 10 investigation. I attended the meeting in a note-taking 11 capacity only. During the meeting, alleged Horizon 12 errors were raised by Alan Bates." 13 I don't need to take you to the document but your 14 notes of that meeting are recorded at POL00295635, notes 15 which are dated 5 October 2012. Amongst those notes: 16 "Meeting with JA and AB. Paula said it was 17 absolutely essential that the judicial process was 18 flawless and, therefore, would consider this point which 19 had been raised by [Sir Alan Bates] in detail." 20 That was about unfairness to subpostmasters. 21 If it is absolutely essential, Mr Edwards, that the 22 judicial process is flawless, would you agree that that 23 would mandate disclosing to the defence any wrongdoing 24 by an expert who had secured a conviction for the Post 25 Office against a hapless defendant? 174 1 A. Yes, I'd agree with that. 2 Q. You were told, you claim by Ms Vennells, that the unsafe 3 witness concerned five cases. Five, 50 or one case: 4 an unsafe witness had given evidence against 5 subpostmasters and people had been convicted, hadn't 6 they; you knew that? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. Right. Now, you were the Chief Executive Officer's 9 Chief of Staff and yet you claim you hadn't read the 10 Altman General Review of 15 October 2013, before 11 drafting her report to the Board? 12 A. I hadn't -- no, I hadn't been given that document. 13 Q. You stand by that? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. You're admitting negligence, aren't you? It would be 16 negligent to draft a Chief Executive Officer's report to 17 the Board on a very serious matter, without having read 18 the Altman General Review? 19 A. In the role I was performing -- so in that Chief 20 Executive's report, I'd been covering maybe a dozen 21 major topics on the business, I was heavily dependent, 22 completely dependent on the input from Subject Matter 23 Experts. I didn't have the capacity to read every 24 document and do everything they were doing. I think in 25 hindsight, I would agree there was not enough scrutiny 175 1 by the Executive Team of, as we've heard, there wasn't 2 enough sharing of legal advice. I didn't see that at 3 the time. 4 Q. But this is totally contrary to your role. A top, 5 politically astute and well-connected Queen's Counsel 6 has been appointed to do a general review and yet are 7 you telling the Chairman that nobody in the Executive 8 Team read the general review by Brian Altman QC? 9 A. I can only comment on -- I didn't see it. 10 Q. It's totally contrary to your role because, when you 11 were suggesting, at an early stage in your evidence -- 12 but I think you've resiled from it -- that you were 13 a mere conduit, nevertheless you were digesting and 14 appraising material that was directed to the CEO, so you 15 could apprise her of the contents. You must had read 16 the Altman General Review? 17 A. I did not read the Altman General Review. I did not see 18 it. 19 Q. Right, well we see in the email that I have quoted, 20 already, that Paula Vennells used the term "material" 21 when she was writing her email to Alice Perkins. In the 22 Altman General Review, the term "material" is mentioned 23 35 times. Were you familiar with the term "material"? 24 A. Not specifically, no. 25 Q. Yet, according to your boss, "Martin E is briefed if you 176 1 want more detail" -- and I emphasise "more detail" -- 2 "this is just in case". 3 Are you telling the truth, Mr Edwards? 4 A. I am absolutely. I gave my evidence on that earlier. 5 I was given as a point of contact for Alice, if she 6 needed more detail. In practice, I'd clearly be reliant 7 on the legal teams to provide that. 8 Q. So, although you were briefed on the issue, again, 9 you're merely saying that you're just, as it were, 10 a conduit, that she'll contact you and then you'll put 11 her in touch with who: Rodric Williams, Hugh Flemington, 12 et cetera, et cetera? 13 A. Yes, I think it would have been more appropriate for her 14 to be in contact with the General Counsel but, as you're 15 aware at that point in time, one General Counsel was 16 leaving and another one was just about to join. So 17 I was there as a point of contact for Alice but, yes, 18 I would have been reliant on getting answers to the 19 questions from the Legal team. 20 Q. Now, you knew why General Counsel was leaving, 21 presumably: because you were the Chief of Staff to Paula 22 Vennells. What had she told you about the departure of 23 Susan Crichton? 24 A. I was aware that there had been tensions between Susan 25 and Alice and the broader Board. I wasn't party to all 177 1 of the detail which the Inquiry has now seen. 2 Q. Did Paula Vennells say that Susan Crichton's loyalties 3 were misplaced and that she was ascribing too much 4 loyalty to her professional obligations? 5 A. No, that wouldn't be the type of conversation we'd 6 have -- she would have with me. 7 Q. Yet you were her Chief of Staff? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. I want to go now to POL00372558, and I want to enquire 10 with you about why you took certain decisions in respect 11 of this exchange between you and Rodric Williams. 12 Again, it's in the context of the report of the CEO to 13 the Board. Just dealing with that: 14 "As you'll see from the text I've just 15 re-articulated, I've decided it's probably better not to 16 mention the Helen Rose Report specifically, as it will 17 only serve to confuse things with the Board (although 18 I will still need to give Paula background notes on the 19 issue)." 20 How were you going to do that, if you hadn't read 21 Altman? 22 A. Well, as we covered earlier, the practical step I took 23 was to arrange for the team to give Paula a briefing on 24 this. 25 Q. "... I will still need to give Paula background notes on 178 1 the issue." 2 Not, "I will get Flemington, Williams -- God 3 forbid -- Singh to give background notes on the issue; 4 I will still need to give Paula background notes on the 5 issue". 6 How were you going to do that, if you hadn't read 7 Altman? 8 A. When I say "I will need to give Paula background notes", 9 that doesn't mean I will need to be responsible for 10 drafting them. My role was to make sure Paula had the 11 briefing she needed. I was heavily dependent on Subject 12 Matter Experts to provide that and I therefore arranged 13 for that to be provided. 14 Q. I suggest that the Helen Rose Report -- and we can deal 15 with this very quickly -- would reveal that Gareth 16 Jenkins had a credibility problem, that he'd not been 17 frank about bugs, errors and defects, and Mr Blake took 18 you to paragraph 173 of the Altman General Review, which 19 says just that. You were making sure the Board were not 20 told about a document which might have brought up the 21 potentially high-profile issue of the unsafe witness; 22 isn't that right? 23 A. No, absolutely not. 24 Q. If, as the Helen Rose Report suggested, it was widely 25 known that there were problems with Horizon, that could 179 1 have been used to attack Gareth Jenkins' credibility. 2 You can't deny that, can you? 3 A. Sorry, can you repeat the question? 4 Q. It's not a coincidence that you decided it's probably 5 better not to mention the Helen Rose Report because the 6 Helen Rose Report was welded together with the issue of 7 Gareth Jenkins' credibility; you knew that? 8 A. No, I didn't, and I think it's evident from my email 9 exchange with Rodric that I'm none the wiser on the 10 significance of the Helen Rose Reports. I absolutely 11 didn't understand its significance and, as I described 12 earlier, I didn't understand its significance until 13 extremely recently, and I've seen other disclosures 14 which spell it out very clearly. I did not have that 15 awareness at the time. 16 Q. You're presenting yourself as some naïf, and yet you're 17 the Chief of Staff to the CEO. I suggest that your 18 response there is dissembling. 19 A. No, it's not. It's become apparent to me that there 20 were a number of topics which, candidly, I was naive 21 about, so I didn't understand the full details. The 22 nature of the Chief of Staff role: I was spread across 23 dozens of major topics across the business. It simply 24 wasn't possible to understand the detail of everyone 25 but, yes, candidly, I was naive on some of these topics. 180 1 Q. Let me go to page 4 of that document, please. This was 2 your first stab at a précis, and I want to go through it 3 very, very quickly: 4 "Our criminal barrister, Brian Altman, has now 5 completed his review [et cetera, et cetera, et cetera] 6 our approach is 'fundamentally sound', providing us with 7 strong grounds to resist any formal review of our 8 historic prosecutions (for example by the Criminal Cases 9 Review Commission)." 10 Who had suggested that the Altman Review would 11 justify stonewalling the Criminal Cases Review 12 Commission? 13 A. I think, as I described earlier, this text was the 14 synthesis of some contributions from Andy Holt, which 15 I then asked some questions on, and I think it was then 16 farmed out to Andy Parsons to provide input. I took 17 that input and crafted this sentence, and sent it to 18 Rodric to check. 19 Q. Of course, he moderates it, to some extent, but was this 20 reflecting the views of Paula Vennells that had already 21 been disseminated, or were the people that you say are 22 responsible for this text quite confident that this 23 pre-packed approach would be accepted by the CEO; this 24 obdurate opposition to the appeals would be accepted, 25 without demur, by the CEO? 181 1 A. I don't know and I think, in hindsight, the CEO's report 2 was the wrong place to be -- the CEO's report covers 3 a number of major topics in very brief detail, as you 4 see, in really short paragraphs. It's really clear, in 5 hindsight, that this wasn't appropriate to be covering 6 this information. I wasn't the right person to be the 7 intermediary of this. In hindsight, this warranted 8 a separate, full briefing note from the Legal Team, and 9 that's what should have gone to the Board. 10 Q. I want to deal with the unsafe witness in conclusion one 11 final time. The evidence base, by 23 October, 12 I suggest, was that Paula Vennells knew that Gareth 13 Jenkins was unsafe. She knew that he had given evidence 14 against Seema Misra and she decided not to disclose that 15 to the CCRC or Mrs Misra's lawyers; you knew that, 16 didn't you? 17 A. No. 18 Q. In June 2013 -- because there is a run-up to this -- in 19 June 2013 it had become apparent, had it not, that 20 Gareth Jenkins had disclosed to Second Sight the 21 existence of bugs, errors and defects in the Horizon 22 system, and you were aware of that? 23 A. What I was briefed on at the time is those bugs had been 24 passed on by the Post Office team. That was what's kind 25 of contained in the briefings at the time. 182 1 Q. Well, we've gone through this already at great length 2 with Mr Blake but there was, if not consternation or 3 near panic, there was great anxiety in the Executive 4 Team. Mr Blake has taken you, for example, to 5 POL00098778, 28 June 2013, where Gareth Jenkins writes 6 the email saying: 7 "Lesley, attached is my final witness statement for 8 the Misra case. This was heard in Guildford Crown Court 9 in October 2010 and concerned the West Byfleet Post 10 Office." 11 You get a copy of that email; it's forwarded to you; 12 it's 28 June. So you know that Gareth Jenkins has given 13 evidence against Seema Misra and you also know that 14 Gareth Jenkins has caused a problem in the disclosure, 15 or rather non-disclosure, of bugs, don't you? 16 A. No. The second half of that is not correct. 17 Q. Well, you knew that he was the person who had spoken to 18 Second Sight? 19 A. I did not know that, no. 20 Q. I suggest that's all in the context of him suppressing 21 the evidence of bugs, errors and defects, as confided to 22 Second Sight, and that you were well aware of that? 23 A. That's not correct. 24 Q. Then on 1 July, there's a high-level briefing for the 25 Board, POL00060587. Mrs Misra is mentioned in the 183 1 context of her trial. Then we've seen again, with 2 Mr Blake taking you to it, the strapline is "Re PV and 3 AP brief". It's POL00190092. 4 The Board had to have a line on historic 5 prosecutions. Do you remember that this morning: that 6 you needed to have a line on historic prosecutions? 7 That, again, is connected to Gareth Jenkins because he 8 was the flawed expert who had failed to disclose bugs, 9 errors and defects; you must accept that? 10 A. I'm afraid I didn't follow all of that. Can you break 11 that down: which specific document and point in time are 12 we referring to? I'm afraid -- 13 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Well, I think Mr Henry is right in the 14 sense we did go through that this morning, so I don't 15 think I need to have it again, Mr Henry. 16 MR HENRY: Right. Certainly, sir. 17 You knew, because you drafted the briefing for Paula 18 Vennells, that Gareth Jenkins had given evidence against 19 Seema Misra; you must accept that? 20 A. I saw that, that witness statement which Lesley Sewell 21 forwarded, yes. 22 Q. Also you actually drafted it, as well, on 1 July for -- 23 forgive me, no need to take you to it -- POL00113367. 24 It's a document you've seen but at page 1 of 13 you 25 raise the issue of James Arbuthnot perhaps reviving 184 1 historic prosecutions, and at page 5 of 13 you raise the 2 issue that Gareth Jenkins had given evidence against 3 Seema Misra. 4 A. I'm sorry, I don't -- 5 Q. You don't -- 6 A. I don't recognise that, sorry. 7 Q. Let's quickly go to that document, then. POL00113367. 8 A. This isn't a document I produced. 9 Q. But you certainly saw it? 10 A. I saw it, yes. 11 Q. Yes, and you read it? 12 A. I believe so, yes. 13 Q. Let's scroll up, please, on page 1. Do you see 14 paragraph 8? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. Clear risk identified. 17 Could we go to page 5, please. We can see 18 paragraph 30: 19 "The Falkirk Anomaly", et cetera, et cetera. 20 (b): 21 "The prosecution expert (Gareth Jenkins from 22 Fujitsu)", et cetera, et cetera. 23 So what I'm trying to establish, through you, is 24 that both your state of mind and Paula Vennells' state 25 of mind is that Gareth Jenkins was the expert and Gareth 185 1 Jenkins had given evidence against Seema Misra. 2 A. I think, yes, that's evident from this. 3 Q. And that you, therefore, both of you, were aware of that 4 at the time of the conversation on 21 October 2013, 5 which was about a week after the Altman General Review. 6 You were both aware of the significance of the unsafe 7 witness in relation to not five cases, but that one 8 specific case concerning Seema Misra. 9 A. Candidly, I don't recall drawing a specific link back to 10 this document, which I saw four or five months earlier. 11 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Is that it, Mr Henry? 12 MR HENRY: That's it, sir. 13 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Thank you. 14 Before we get the next one, could you just, 15 Mr Henry, confirm the reference you gave for the note of 16 the meeting which is described at paragraph 13 of the 17 witness statement? I wasn't sure whether I got it down 18 accurately. 19 MR HENRY: Certainly, sir. Do you want me to give it to you 20 now? 21 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yes, I'll read it to you. It's 22 POL00295635, is what I've written. 23 MR HENRY: That's correct, sir. 24 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: That's correct. Fine. 25 MR HENRY: Thank you so much, sir. 186 1 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Yeah, fine. 2 While we're waiting for the next set of questions, 3 can I ask you, Mr Edwards, in the email of October when 4 Ms Vennells told Ms Perkins that you were briefed if she 5 needed any more information, nobody has asked you the 6 direct question but, just in case: did Ms Perkins ask 7 you any questions or ask you to explain anything further 8 following that email? 9 A. No, sir. I don't recall any follow-up from Alice 10 Perkins. 11 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Right. Fine. Thanks. 12 Yes, who's next? 13 MR BLAKE: It's Ms Watt. 14 MS WATT: Thank you, sir. 15 Questioned by MS WATT 16 MS WATT: Good afternoon, Mr Edwards. I ask questions on 17 behalf of the NFSP. 18 I think it's fair to say that there are few 19 survivors at the Post Office today from what we might 20 term the "Paula Vennells era", and I think you and 21 Rodric Williams are among the main ones; is that 22 correct? 23 A. I'm one of the few people from that era, yes. 24 Q. You're currently the Network Strategy and Delivery 25 Director and you advised Mr Blake this morning that this 187 1 involves working with the Subpostmaster Network; is that 2 correct? 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. I think it's the case that you currently have a senior 5 role in a wide range of business decisions that affect 6 subpostmasters, broadly including things such as, for 7 instance, the number of sub post office branches in the 8 network, the number of subpostmasters in the network, 9 financial packages, decisions on closure of branches, 10 compensation in the Hard to Place scheme, and generally 11 just a great deal of what affects postmasters today; 12 would that be fair? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. So thinking about that, taking account of that, and 15 given the evidence that we've heard from you today about 16 your knowledge and role in working with the former Chief 17 Executive, Paula Vennells, and Horizon-related issues, 18 including some things that we saw, comments you had 19 made, such as "making sure subpostmasters don't get off 20 scot-free" -- in other words, escape deserved punishment 21 and suchlike -- would you accept that it is -- should be 22 and can be -- a significant concern to the subpostmaster 23 network of today, and those representing them, that you 24 should be in a role now that affects their working and 25 financial relationships? 188 1 A. I think that is a question for others to judge. As 2 I mentioned in my evidence earlier, I fully accept I was 3 caught up in part of the groupthink back in 2013 and 4 I didn't -- I don't believe I provided enough challenge, 5 I didn't step outside of the mindset at the time, and 6 I deeply regret that. I think I have learnt a huge 7 amount from that and I think I am still able to do 8 a good job for the business and for postmasters but it's 9 ultimately for others to judge that question. 10 MS WATT: Thank you. 11 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Thank you, Ms Watt. 12 Is it Mr Moloney now? 13 MR BLAKE: It is, yes. 14 Questioned by MR MOLONEY 15 MR MOLONEY: Mr Edwards, I simply want to ask you very 16 briefly about Project Zebra and the Deloitte report. 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. In 2013/2014 you were aware that there was an issue 19 around remote access? 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. Yeah, and the Deloitte report for Project Zebra was 22 delivered in mid-2014? 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. Did you read that report, Mr Edwards? 25 A. I didn't, no. 189 1 Q. Did you read the Board's summary? 2 A. No. All I recall reading on this -- I wasn't 3 particularly closely involved with the matters at this 4 point. So I recall reading a summary email from Chris 5 Aujard to the Board but I didn't read the report itself. 6 Q. Did you discuss the findings of the report with 7 Mrs Vennells? 8 A. No, I was very -- I wasn't closely involved with matters 9 at this time. 10 MR MOLONEY: Thank you very much, Mr Edwards. 11 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Is that it, Mr Blake? 12 MR BLAKE: That is, yes, sir. 13 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Well, thank you, Mr Edwards, for making 14 your witness statement and for giving evidence orally 15 before me today. I'm grateful to you. 16 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 17 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Right. Two days next week, starting on 18 Monday, Mr Blake? 19 MR BLAKE: That's correct. 20 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: All right, 9.45. It's one witness on 21 Monday. I take it we still want to start at 9.45, do 22 we? 23 MR BLAKE: Yes. Thank you, sir. 24 SIR WYN WILLIAMS: Fine. All right. 25 (3.50 pm) 190 1 (The hearing adjourned until 9.45 am 2 on Monday, 29 July 2024) 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 191 I N D E X ALLAN LESLIE LEIGHTON (re-sworn) ..............1 Questioned by MR STEVENS ......................1 Questioned by SIR WYN WILLIAMS ...............58 Questioned by MR STEIN .......................61 MARTIN ANTHONY EDWARDS (affirmed) ............64 Questioned by MR BLAKE .......................65 Questioned by MR HENRY ......................170 Questioned by MS WATT .......................187 Questioned by MR MOLONEY ....................189 192