Message						
From:	Ron Warmington [
on behalf of	Ron Warmington <	GRO				
Sent:	11/06/2013 23:40:05					
To:	Steve Allchorn	GRO]; Simon Baker [GRO		
CC:	Lesley J Sewell	GRO]; Alwen Lyons	GRO]; Pete Newsome	
	GRO]; 'Ror	n Warmington' [GRO	GRO	; Susan Crichton	
		; 'lan	Henderson' GRO			
Subject:	RE: In Confidence - Spot Review 5 Response					
Sensitivity:	Company Confidential					

Some more input for tomorrow's call:

I'm afraid only two of the seven documents that you enclosed seem to be relevant to SR005 (and that's the 2-page Spot Review Response itself and the 8-page "Horizon Data Integrity Document"). The other five, (in themselves excellent) documents that were enclosed all relate to HNG-X (Horizon Online), which, as is explained in Gareth Jenkins 5th October 2009 Affidavit, was rolled out between January and September 2010. Those five documents are therefore irrelevant to SR005 which deals with a November 2008 event. Those documents may be useful in dealing with some of the other Spot Reviews but I must disregard them in dealing with SR005.

The five irrelevant documents you have submitted to 2nd Sight in answer to SR005 include:

- Horizon Online Data Integrity for Post Office Ltd 14 pages
- Gareth Jenkins 5th October 2009 Witness Statement 11 pages
- HNG-X Technical Network Architecture 144 pages
- Fujitsi Wide Area Network HLD document 84 pages
- Network Security High Level Design 68 pages

Luckily, we have picked up this basic error at this point and not while presenting our Interim Report to a roomful of MPs. It would have been most unfortunate were I to have paid heed to all those documents (which I have reviewed) and accepted them as part of POL's response, only to have that gross error picked up by one or more of the other interested parties in a high-profile meeting. Also, does anyone at POL seriously think that a one-page Spot Review should be answered by a 323 page response? What on earth are we to include as POL's "Official Response" to that Spot Review in the Interim or Final Report? Do you intend to have Ian and I summarise your 323 pages (or even your 10 pages, which anyway don't address the real issue) down to one?

I'm really looking forward to tomorrow's call. But we need to produce something that is crisp, easy-to-understand, and that absolutely NAILS this really serious allegation once and for all. What I've read here definitely doesn't do that.

Ron Warmington, CFE, FCA Director 2nd Siaht Support Services Ltd



Phone: Mobile:	GRO		
Email:		GRO]
Website	www.secondsightsu	pport.co.uk	

 From: Ron Warmington [mailto]
 GRO

 Sent: Tuesday, June 11, 2013 6:45 PM

 To: 'Steve Allchorn'; 'Ian Henderson'; 'Simon Baker'

 Cc: 'Lesley J Sewell'; 'Alwen Lyons'; 'Pete Newsome'

 Subject: RE: In Confidence - Spot Review 5 Response

 Sensitivity: Confidential

Steve/All:

I see the answers to SR05 are in the PRESENT tense ("There **IS** no Physical or Logical connection" and "The POL Bracknell Team have no access to the live system ..." etc.). The questions were asked about **the state of affairs on 19th August 2008** so we are relatively disinterested in the CURRENT situation. We need to know what the situation was back in 2008 please. Maybe it's me but I don't find the later statements, in POL's response to Question 3, completely clear. First it says that:

"As both the original Horizon and replacement HNGx test systems were available to the test teams in that period"... and then later in the same paragraph, it says: "As stated in response to question 1, the teams in the area of Bracknell concerned would have no access to the live system." Do I take it that the first statement (i.e. the reference to the Horizon and HGNx (and what does that mean by the way?) test systems) mean that both were TEST systems, not that the HNGx system was test data and live data from the old Horizon system **was** available?

In any event, the response needs to be re-worded to answer the questions about **the state of affairs at the time in question** rather than addressing the **current situation**. Also, wasn't there some sort of central inputting of TCs? If so, were any of those executed from Bracknell?

Also, the answer to Question 5 says: "On the old Horizon System (which was Live in 2008) and Data introduced to the system in the Data Centre would not be marked with any user ID." That sentence doesn't really make sense to me but in any event doesn't it infer that data COULD be introduced into the live Horizon system in the Data Centre? Could it? And if it could, what User IDs were attached to such data?

What we then need to do is get to an explanation of POL's side of the story of **what really happened when Rudkin went to that basement**. The current response sort of tells us **what could not have happened**... but it offers no explanation at all as to **what really DID happen**. Rudkin was quite specific about adjustments to branch foreign currency balances. We need to nail this. What WAS he hold (POL's side of the story please?). Absent that, I see virtually no chance of getting to closure (with Rudkin; with the JFSA; with the MPs; and ultimately with the media) on this weird situation.

Thanks and let's see if we can progress this tomorrow. Are we going to also go through the longer (26 item) list of questions in tomorrow's call?

Ron


From: Steve Allchorn [mailto] GRO Sent: Thursday, June 06, 2013 11:49 PM To: Ian Henderson; 'Ron Warmington' Cc: Simon Baker; Lesley J Sewell; Alwen Lyons; Pete Newsome Subject: In Confidence - Spot Review 5 Response Importance: High Sensitivity: Confidential

lan/Ron

Please see attached formal responses to Horizon Spot Review 5 and a series of attachments supporting the response document.

If you have any further lines of enquiry then please contact me.

Many thanks to Pete Newsome for co-ordinating the Fujitsu response in good time.



From: Ian Henderson [mailto GRO] Sent: 03 June 2013 17:36 To: Steve Allchorn Cc: Simon Baker; 'Ron Warmington' Subject: RE: Follow up from call Sensitivity: Confidential

Steve

I'm sorry for the delay in replying. There's a lot going on at the moment....

I attach a copy of Spot Review 5 which describes the allegations that have been made.

The emails that have been forwarded to you appear to describe matters that may be relevant to the allegation. Please note that we are primarily interested in finding out the following:

- 1. What capabilities did the POL Bracknell team have? (As far as TC or Rem Out type transactions or Journal adjustments are concerned)
- 2. What were the PHYSICAL or LOGICAL controls over their use of the systems available to them?
- 3. What audit trail is available to show the extent that they posted TC or Rem Out type transactions, or Journal adjustments?
- 4. Can we reply of the COMPLETENESS of the audit trail? i.e. does it record all transactions or just transactions meeting certain criteria? Is it protected from user manipulation?
- 5. What USER ID was used if TC type transactions or journal adjustments were posted?
- 6. Could the POL Bracknell team log on with either super user or SMPR credentials?
- 7. How would TC, Rem Out or Journal Adjustment type transactions executed by the POL Bracknell team be seen by SPMR of Branches affected by those actions?

There are probably other questions / issues that will arise after you have had a preliminary look at this.

Please note that we're not really interested in what the procedures manual says about any of this. We need to look at whether it would be possible for a rogue employee to do what is alleged and what log files would be generated to record that activity. Please note that I have now been provided with a second batch of employee email and I may find other emails that are potentially relevant to this matter.

Thank you for your help with this

With best wishes

Ian R Henderson CCE CISA FCA Advanced Forensics - London, UK

Forensic computing expert witness and electronic disclosure specialist

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 From: Steve Allchorn [mailto:
 GRO

 Sent: 30 May 2013 12:43
 To: Ian Hendersor

 To: Ian Hendersor
 GRO

 Subject: FW: Follow up from call
 Sensitivity: Confidential

Hi lan

I've been forwarded the email stream below however having not been party to prior conversations or spoken to Susan as she is formally off-work I just need to understand the context of the enquiry as the email pdf's attached are a collection of individual instances rather than a clear line.

My perception of what I think you need is;

- 1) A clear documentation/articulation of the end-to-end Transaction Corrections process, how it is applied and the sign-off authorities that are in place (e.g. subpostmaster acceptance etc.).
- 2) An understanding of how the attached email instances relate to that process and authorities.

Let me know if I'm on the right lines or not.

Thanks

Steve Allchorn I IT & Change Lead CPMO Manager

2nd Flr, Central Wing, 148 Old Street, LONDON, EC1V 9HQ
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From: Susan Crichton
Sent: 28 May 2013 15:00
To: Steve Allchorn
Cc: Alwen Lyons
Subject: FW: Follow up from call
Sensitivity: Confidential

Steve - copy of some of the emails as extracted by Ian Henderson, please can you forward to FJ as appropriate.

Susan

 From: Ian Hendersor
 GRO

 Sent: 28 May 2013 09:35
 To: Susan Crichton; Alwen Lyons

 Cc:
 GRO

 Subject: RE: Follow up from call

 Sensitivity: Confidential

Susan

I attach 11 emails from our preliminary review of the Bracknell data. Please note that I only received the second batch of Bracknell data on Friday and it will take 3 or 4 days to process.

With best wishes

Ian R Henderson CCE CISA FCA Advanced Forensics - London, UK

Forensic computing expert witness and electronic disclosure specialist

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 GRO
 GRO</th

Ian - thanks could you also send the details of the relevant emails to help us move forward this work next week. Thanks

Susan

From: Ian Henderson [mailto] GRO Sent: Friday, May 24, 2013 09:35 AM To: Alwen Lyons; Susan Crichton Cc: 'Ron Warmington' GRO Subject: Follow up from call

As requested, please find attached the letter from JA to JFSA received by us on 19 April

I also attach the Rudkin Spot Review sent to POL on 10 May

With best wishes

Ian R Henderson CCE CISA FCA Advanced Forensics - London, UK

Forensic computing expert witness and electronic disclosure specialist

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