

Acceptance Incident Form		Acceptance Incident Number (1) 211	
Acceptance Test Name (2)		Source (3) BSM	Date Observed (4) 05/04/99
Witness/Reviewer who observed Incident (Owner) (5) xaxax		Authority (6) POCL	
Incident Type (7)	Criterion Reference (8) (if criterion not met)	Incident Severity (9)	
<input checked="" type="radio"/> Criterion not met <input type="radio"/> Substantive fault <input type="radio"/> Other		High Medium Low <input checked="" type="radio"/> Pending None	
Description of Incident (10) Receipts and payments do not equal on the cash account. The receipts total is differnt from the payments total when printing off the cash account. This was originally thought to be a migration problem only however the fault has now been replicated on a cash account following the migration week.			
Signatures (11)			
Witness / Reviewer	Horizon Acceptance Test Manager	Pathway	AIM
Date:	Date:	Date:	Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
Entered in Acceptance Database			Date:

From John Dicks

12/08/99 10:04 P:\01public\Acceptance Incidents\wednesday 11 aug list.zip

Page 1
13 AUG 1999 - 859

Name	Modified	Size	Ratio	Packed	Path
410-08-11.xls	11/08/99 14:46	24,064	73%	6,395	
408-08-11.xls	11/08/99 18:10	23,040	75%	5,799	
395-08-11.xls	11/08/99 15:19	28,160	75%	7,020	
394-08-11.xls	11/08/99 14:53	21,504	76%	5,198	
391-08-11.xls	11/08/99 15:14	34,816	71%	9,943	
390-08-11.xls	11/08/99 15:13	22,528	75%	5,716	
378-08-11.xls	11/08/99 14:38	20,992	76%	5,134	
• 376-08-09.xls	09/08/99 19:12	25,600	73%	6,854	
372-08-11.xls	11/08/99 14:58	25,088	73%	6,779	
371-08-11.xls	11/08/99 18:40	23,552	74%	6,097	
• 369-08-11.xls	11/08/99 15:28	27,648	76%	6,717	
* 368-08-11.xls	11/08/99 15:02	22,016	76%	5,314	
361-08-11.xls	11/08/99 18:38	27,136	76%	6,627	
342-08-11.xls	11/08/99 14:09	29,184	72%	8,077	
314-08-11.xls	11/08/99 15:59	24,064	76%	5,746	
314-08-11.doc	11/08/99 16:31	27,136	81%	5,185	
301-08-11.xls	11/08/99 15:24	24,064	74%	6,294	
300-08-11.xls	11/08/99 15:22	23,040	75%	5,696	
• 298-08-11.xls	11/08/99 16:48	27,648	72%	7,619	
• 298-08-11.doc	11/08/99 18:19	24,576	85%	3,587	
• 218-08-11.xls	11/08/99 20:16	21,504	77%	5,027	
• 218-08-11.doc	11/08/99 20:10	29,696	80%	6,069	
211-08-11.xls	11/08/99 14:33	20,992	77%	4,886	
23 file(s)		578,048	75%	141,779	

Acceptance Incident Analysis Form		<i>To be completed by the ICL Pathway Acceptance Manager to be given to the Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager.</i>	
Acceptance Incident Number (1) 211		Analysis Sequence Number (2)	
Acceptance Test Name (3)			
Analysed Incident Severity (4) None		High / Medium / Low (4)	Authority (5) POCL
Analysis of Acceptance Incident (6) This incident, which we believe is related incident 315, has been fixed as part of the changes to the balancing process introduced, via several CRs, into LT2.			
Number of continuation pages			
Clearance Action (7) POCL to close			
Number of continuation pages			
Acceptance Incident Status (Open / Analysed Retest/Recommended for KPR (8))		Resolved	
Signatures:			
I propose the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above	P. John Pope	ICL Pathway Test Manager	Date 11/8
I accept / reject the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above		Horizon Acceptance Test Manager	Date:
Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager			Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
	Date:		Date:

Acceptance Incident Form		Acceptance Incident Number (1) 218	
Acceptance Test Name (2) Implementation A - User Training/Doc		Source (3) Trial	Date Observed (4) 19/05/99
Witness/Reviewer who observed Incident (Owner) (5) Graham Katon		Authority (6) POCL	
Incident Type (7)	Criterion Reference (8) (if criterion not met)	Incident Severity (9)	
<input checked="" type="radio"/> Criterion not met <input type="radio"/> Substantive fault <input type="radio"/> Other		High Medium Low <input checked="" type="radio"/> Pending None	
Description of Incident (10) The Managers Training Course is not acceptable due to deficiencies in the accounting modules. In the live environment the training given did not equip the users to perform the completion of office cash accounts. This is a basis POCL function that is central to running and accounting for the POCL network.			
Signatures (11)			
Witness / Reviewer	Horizon Acceptance Test Manager	Pathway	AIM
Date:	Date:	Date:	Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
Entered in Acceptance Database			Date:

Acceptance Incident Analysis Form		<i>To be completed by the ICL Pathway Acceptance Manager to be given to the Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager</i>	
Acceptance Incident Number (1) 218		Analysis Sequence Number (2)	
Acceptance Test Name (3) Implementation A - User Training/Doc			
Analysed Incident Severity (4) None		High / Medium / Low (4)	Authority (5) POCL
Analysis of Acceptance Incident (6) Please see accompanying text of letter to Bruce McNiven			
Number of continuation pages			
Clearance Action (7) All actions have now been completed satisfactorily and the review of the Acceptance Incident under cover of letter from Bruce McNiven of 10 August has been responded to. Pathway asks POCL to Close this incident.			
Number of continuation pages			
Acceptance Incident Status (Open/ Analysed/Retest/Recommended for KPR (8))		Resolved	
Signatures:			
I propose the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above	J C C Dicks	ICL Pathway Test Manager	11th August
I accept / reject the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above		Horizon Acceptance Test Manager	Date:
Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager			Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
	Date:		Date:

Mail - Received Mail

Sender.....: avila.smith GRO
Recipient.....: Coombs MJB fel0152
 john.meagher GRO
 ruth.holleran GRO
 bruce.mcniven GRO
 john.dicks GRO
 mike(u)coombs GRO
Subject.....: Review of Acceptance Incident 218 - Training
Sent.....: 10/08/1999 18:24
Attachments.....: Dicks
 Acceptance
Reply Requested.....: No
Folder.....: Inbox
In Reply To.....:
Read.....: 11/08/1999 08:39
Reply Sent.....:
Reply Requested by...:
Delivered.....: 10/08/1999 18:27
Priority.....: Normal
Sensitivity.....: None
Status.....: Read
Importance.....: Normal
Conversion Prohibited: No

Final

Apologies, but I incorrectly sent this mail to you initially as I meant to 'Save as Draft' and instead hit sent!

Please find attached, the final version of both documents which have been updated since I initially sent it to you.

Sorry for any confusion.

Avila

(See attached file: Dicks 1008.doc)
Incident 218.doc)

(See attached file: Acceptance

John Dicks
Director, Customer Enquiries
ICL Pathway Limited
Forest Road
Feltham
Middlesex TW13 7EJ

10th August 1999

Dear John

Re: Review of Acceptance Incident 218 - Training

An analysis of the evaluation against the business impacts identified in the Acceptance Incident is attached.

Although many of the criteria have been met, it is regarded as significant that the training and go-live process relies on the deployment of POCL HFSO resource. On the basis of this evaluation, we are not prepared to reduce the severity rating from 'high'.

POCLs view is that without this resource there would have to be a complete revision of the training approach in order to ensure helpdesks were not rendered ineffective by the high level of calls following the first and, to some extent, subsequent balances.

POCLs view is that HFSO resource was not deployed as an extension of training. The cost impact and diversion of resource which this requires must be addressed by ICL Pathway.

It is also POCLs view that the related adequacy of HSH support must be integrated with this Acceptance Incident and removed as an additional source of concern.

The training improvements identified as part of the qualitative research by Post Office Business Consultancy must also be addressed as part of a rectification plan.

Yours sincerely

GRO

Bruce McNiven
Director
Horizon Programme

c.c. Mike Coombs, Chris French, Ruth Holleran, John Meagher

Horizon Incident Number 218 - Evaluation

1. Criterion : 534/1

"Pathway's Training solution shall take account of users experience in terms of automated products and platforms (ECCO+, APT, ALPs) and their differing abilities to learn".

2. BUSINESS IMPACT	SUMMARY OF SUCCESS CRITERIA MEASURE	EVALUATION
<p>1. The Office Managers ability to undertake daily balancing and produce a cash account is adversely impacted resulting in a failure to support accurate POCL accounting. This is a high severity impact on POCL's ability to perform its normal business functions.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Reduction in the number of offices unable to complete the cash account balance process and produce a cash account balance (relative to the sample). ■ Continuing or better level of success in the pass rate of the Performance Standard Assessment (PSA) test. ■ Performance Standard Assessment (PSA) to reflect live operation and standard practices; Horizon users complete PSA again on day 10. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Data from BSM telephone survey for balance related to the 4th August contained the following; 22 offices produced an account, 1 office had a two week cash account. This criteria is therefore met. ■ Criteria met. ■ Criteria met.
<p>2. The consequential effect is that the amount of time taken to produce the cash accounts is excessive in relation to the time taken on the previous (manual) system and significantly in excess of POCLs expectations for the service.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Reduction in time taken to produce a stock unit balance , the office balance and finally produce a cash account (relative to the sample). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Balancing statistics for the 4th August Cash Account indicate an overall reduction in time taken to complete balances in both sub offices and ECCO offices. Even at the reduced level, concerns remain about overall balancing times.

BUSINESS IMPACT	SUMMARY OF SUCCESS CRITERIA MEASURE	EVALUATION
<p>3. The consequences are also that the number of cash account related incidents reported to POCL NBSC is considerably greater than expected. (About a third of the calls coming to NBSC Help Desk indicate a lack of understanding of the cash accounting and balancing process). HSH are responsible for resolving these service incidents but are unable to cope with the content and volume of calls which are therefore having to be dealt with by NBSC. As the Manger's training course is deficient, NBSC and presumably HSH staff who receive this training course, are also inadequately trained.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Reduction in demand on support - Measured through a reduction in the number of calls (at the peak time on Wednesday evening and Thursday morning) for advice and guidance to support stock unit balancing, office balancing and production of the cash account received at the HSH and/or at the NBSC. ■ Reduction in the length of calls from the additional 25 offices. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ The overall number of calls in weeks 1, 2 and 3 by the LT2 offices showed a reduction on the LT1 mirror offices for the equivalent three weeks. The average number of calls made by offices during the non-peak days also showed a reduction. However, it should be noted there is a significant increase in the 2nd week cash account for both LT1 and LT2 offices when there is no support at these outlets, suggesting that some of the outlet managers still do not have the confidence or ability to complete the process unsupported. ■ The evidence to analyse this criteria is limited and was regarded as indicative only. The broad conclusion is that the evidence is insufficient to make a substantive judgement regarding first cash accounts but there is overall evidence to suggest a reduction in call times for 2nd cash accounts. However, it again has to be noted that the length of calls for both LT1 and LT2 offices was significantly higher on 2nd cash accounts than the 1st cash account suggesting the critical requirement for training to be supported/delivered by HSH. It also underlines the necessity of the HFSO support to balancing in week 1.

BUSINESS IMPACT	SUMMARY OF SUCCESS CRITERIA MEASURE	EVALUATION
<p>4. The practical effect of the incident is also causing the HFSO's to devote a disproportionate amount of time to support the outlets on cash accounts. The number of HFSOs that would be required to support National Roll-Out would be significantly greater than currently envisaged (initial indications are that two to three times as many HFSOs as planned would be required. This compounds the major impact on POCLs resources.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ No specific success criteria was identified to address this business impact. Overall, POCL would wish to reduce the cost of extended training support at outlets through HFSOs. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ POCL are now planning for 100% support of first cash accounts and recognise that significant additional support may be required for second and subsequent balances at some offices. This is a cost and resource drain on POCL. It is also a change to the original HFSO role which was to support the KPI delivery for POCL and to accelerate the learning curve at outlets. POCL concerns on this impact remain.
<p>5. There is also an impact on TP who are having to process a significant increase in errors on Class and Pivot (up to 3 times as many weekly errors). This is having a significant impact on resources in TP during the live trial. These errors will also raise liability issues between the POCL and subpostmasters, and POCL and client organisations.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Reduction in both the number of incidents where Receipts do not equal Payments and Incidents where balance B/F does not equal balance due to PO on previous Cash Account. ■ Reduction in the number of errors reported by TP - both CLASS and PIVOT errors (relative to the sample). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Overall, the incidents of receipts not equal to payments have reduced and the residual causes are under investigation or have been resolved. Criteria met. ■ The level of CLASS errors between 26th May and 21st July has reduced. Without full information, the indications are that PIVOT errors have also reduced.

3. Qualitative Measures

3.1 Although the small sample size of 18 responses limits the validity of the findings, some significant improvements were found in comparison to Live Trial 1 (a sample of 102). Overall, attitudes towards Horizon are better at the LT2 offices compared to the LT1 experience. The key outstanding issues to emerge from research were as follows:

- The course is still considered to be too short and intensive. ICL have proposed a pre-training course but details are awaited.
- The need to further stream the training groups. This issue has not been addressed by Pathway beyond the streaming required by POCL for ECCO+ staff. Pathway's response is to do this wherever possible. There are impacts on the number of training places.
- Variation in trainer quality. Discussions taking place between POCL and ICL Pathway to look at how there can be a greater quality assurance for trainer ability and consistency of delivering the course specification.
- There are significant problems with technical and software faults in the training sessions. POCL regard these as significant issues which will require rectification.

Bruce McNiven
POCL
20-23 Greville Street
London
EC1N 8SS

11 August 1999

Dear Bruce

Thank you for your letter of 10 August.

Pathway is convinced that it has done everything that it can to improve the training and prepare users for Horizon, and that the essence of the remaining issues that you are seeking to address relate to POCL's own management of change. This was made clear to Bruce McNiven in correspondence from John Bennett (KP/99Jul339 dated 7th July '99) and a second letter to Bruce McNiven (dated 25th June '99).

Pathway has consistently maintained that user confidence in the system will be achieved only through managing the change in POCL business processes such that POCL's target standard approach is adopted across the Post Office network. Until this is achieved by POCL, it will be necessary for POCL to substitute additional support in one form or another. Increased use of the revised training, which is now a very suitable vehicle, is one such form. Another is the gradual dissemination of the target business process through POCL's own support, however provided, to the balancing business process.

For these reasons, Pathway believes the Acceptance Incident 218, which formally relates to training, should now be closed.

Pathway does not accept that any further revisions to the training courses, other than routine minor improvements already identified, are required, or indeed are now desirable in light of the commitments made by both parties to revised courses and collateral.

-2-

Pathway has made every effort to make changes to the training to POCL's satisfaction throughout live trial, such that every course has been significantly changed. Furthermore, an additional 24 outlets were installed in July, at POCL's request, to form a basis on which the effectiveness of the training improvements could be – and indeed have been – demonstrated. At every stage POCL has had complete approval authority for the changes being made and has registered its satisfaction with the results of these changes.

The narrative below details the extensive steps taken by Pathway, with POCL approval, to address the concerns expressed in AI 218.

Counter Manager & Counter Assistant courses revised

In response to feedback received from POCL and formally through CR R0052b, ICL Pathway has made a large number of detailed changes to both the Counter Manager and Counter Assistant training courses. Crucially, the Counter Manager (CM) course was much modified to improve coverage and an emphasis placed on the balancing business process and related issues. The CM course now devotes much of Day 2 (Workbook 10) to this process and considerable time is spent explaining the process and checking the understanding of the delegates.

Both the CM and CA courses have been observed and positively received by POCL and approved to go forward to National Rollout including routine minor improvements (Trevor Rollason's Email to Andy Barkham of 10/8/99) which Pathway are only too pleased to incorporate.

ICL Pathway believes that the improved CM training better prepares Outlet managers for the task of balancing when they return to the outlet. This improved training, coupled with changes to the way that Horizon now handles the balancing process, makes achieving a balance much easier than during Live Trial and the comparative success of the extra 24 outlets bears this out.

HFSO course revised

POCL requested several changes to the HFSO training programme in their CR R0060. This CR requested changes to the content of the course, the introduction of a new 4-day MiMAN course and a new 1-day MiECCO course. These new courses provide more opportunities to practice the migration processes and to work with different error detection/correction scenarios – all of which add value to the migration process.

Additionally, ICL Pathway retrained HFSOs during Live Trial to provide more training on balancing and related topics.

-3-

Since Live Trial, ICL Pathway has developed a new three-day course for HFSOs that runs after the POCL induction training and before the 4-5 day HFSO course. This extended course (previously it was a two-day event) provides in-depth coverage of balancing; the cash account; reversals; use of the suspense account and error detection and correction.

This new course has been very well received by POCL observers (Ann Cocker and Graham Young) and POCL HFSOs alike, who were pleased that their comments from Live Trial were taken onboard.

HFSO role positioning

The HFSO role has always been pivotal to the success of the programme. In addition to performing migration (a vital function which sets the scene for the first balance) the HFSO also provides help and support to the Outlet Manager at what can be a stressful and trying time. At the point of installation the Outlet Manager comes face to face with the Horizon system for the first time since training and will, naturally, be anxious, even apprehensive. It is important that the HFSO helps the Outlet Manager to complete the migration process effectively and in accordance with the defined processes.

Extra trainers for balancing support

On a weekly basis since Live Trial, ICL Pathway has been providing additional balancing support through the use of ICL TS trainers. ICL Pathway has borne this cost in recognition of the need to enhance support levels at the HSH and NBSC.

Extra Transition Executives (TEs)

The Transition Executive role exists primarily to provide expert help and support to the HFSOs. Since Live Trial, an extra TE has been added to each IP region bringing the total of TEs to eight – thus doubling the initial size of this team.

HSH & NBSC training

ICL Pathway has trained HSH and NBSC staff in the revised processes and systems embodied in LT2. This training was targeted at those topics most frequently calling for helpdesk assistance.

CRs/Balancing process changes

A number of changes to the Horizon system and the way that it deals with balancing were implemented in LT2. These changes sought to make balancing easier and to remove unnecessary steps from balancing processes and procedures.

-4-

QRGs and workbooks

The Quick Reference Guides and Training Workbooks have been revised to reflect the new courses and also best practice. These QRGs and Workbooks have been signed-off by POCL for use in NRO.

Yours sincerely

John Dicks

Director, Customer Requirements

Copies: Chris French, Ruth Holleran, John Meagher
Mike Coombs

Acceptance Incident Form		Acceptance Incident Number (1) 298	
Acceptance Test Name (2) POCL Infrastructure		Source (3) BSM	Date Observed (4) 01/07/99
Witness/Reviewer who observed Incident (Owner) (5) Jeremy Folkes			Authority (6)
Incident Type (7)	Criterion Reference (8) (if criterion not met)		Incident Severity (9)
<input checked="" type="radio"/> Criterion not met <input type="radio"/> Substantive fault <input type="radio"/> Other	536-01		<input type="radio"/> High <input type="radio"/> Medium <input type="radio"/> Low <input checked="" type="radio"/> Pending <input type="radio"/> None
Description of Incident (10) Evidence from the Live Trial shows that the counter system is subject to "lockups" and "screen freezes", where the system halts in mid-processing giving the user no opportunity to take any corrective action. This is either exhibited by the system hanging or presenting a blank blue screen. The user is forced to ring the HSH and is advised to reboot the system. The immediate effect of this problem is in terms of the reliability of the Service Infrastructure's input devices. However, once the underlying reasons for the problem are identified, this could change the perception. At least 25 such occurrences have been identified on the LTSC log between the start of the Core Observation Period on 31st May and the 28th June. However, as such problems should be reported directly to the HSH, it is likely that this number represents only a small proportion of the total in which case, this problem would be widespread. Consequently, POCL's initial assessment is that this incident is likely to be more than low severity.			
Signatures (11)			
Witness / Reviewer	Horizon Acceptance Test Manager	Pathway	AIM
Date:	Date:	Date:	Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
Entered in Acceptance Database			Date:

Acceptance Incident Analysis Form		<i>To be completed by the ICL Pathway Acceptance Manager to be given to the Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager</i>	
Acceptance Incident Number (1) <p style="text-align: center;">298</p>		Analysis Sequence Number (2)	
Acceptance Test Name (3) <p style="text-align: center;">POCL Infrastructure</p>			
Analysed Incident Severity (4)		High / Medium / Low (4) <p style="text-align: center;">Low</p>	Authority (5)
<p>Analysis of Acceptance Incident (6)</p> <p>System faults reported to the Horizon System Helpdesk on Wednesday/Thursdays for the past 12 weeks have been analysed. The reason for only reporting on Wed/Thurs figures is that these have been monitored over an extended period of time, and do represent the "worst case" figures. Figures for each day are now monitored (as from the end of July).</p> <p>The HSH calls analysed are provided on the Worksheet "HSH Call Analysis".</p> <p>These figures continue to be monitored but clearly show that the number of "lockouts" and frozen screens has fallen to the lowest figure for the past 12 weeks since the introduction of LT2.</p> <p>This will continue to be monitored, but should be reduced to Low severity on the basis of the progress shown.</p>			
Number of continuation pages			
<p>Clearance Action (7)</p> <p>Pathway will continue to investigate the root cause of residual occurrences and a further formal review undertaken on completion of the first three months of roll-out.</p> <p>On the basis of further information provided by POCL (the telephone survey) on 6 August and Pathway's selective re-survey conducted 9-10 August, Pathway has carried out further analysis and testing and has identified no fault conditions as at the 11/8/99. See separate document.</p> <p>On the basis of the significant progress to date Pathway expects this AI to be recategorised by both POCL and Pathway as Low, by Wednesday 11/8.</p> <p>Pathway points out that even if all offices were to reboot their counters prior to balancing every week the impact level would be that specified for a Medium severity incident. The time taken to reboot a gateway counter is typically no more than 15 minutes.</p> <p>Acceptance Incident Status (Open/ Resolved)</p> <p>Analysed Retest/Recommended for KPR (8)</p>			
Signatures:			
I propose the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above		John Dicks	ICL Pathway Test Manager 11th August 1999
I accept / reject the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above			Horizon Acceptance Test Manager Date:
Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager			Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
Date:			Date:

Criteria

Criteria Descriptions

536 - 01

Peripheral and input devices supplied as part of the elements of the Service Infrastructure on which OPS is provided shall be reliable, robust and easy to use

System Faults Identified from HSH call log: LT1 & LT2 - Analysis of Wednesday & Thursday HSH Calls received

Call analysis taken using Wednesday and Thursday calls from each week as received by HSH.

With effect from Friday 23.07.99, the call analysis at this level will be completed daily and reported weekly (Friday to Thursday calls)

LT2 sites shown as shaded

wed

Types of Fault	12/13 May	19/20 May	26/27 May	02/03 June	09/10 June	16/17 June	23/24 June	30/01 July	07/08 July	14/15 July	21/22 July	28/29 July
Lock Out: Clerks reports that they are unable to continue to operate the system	2	3	1	5	13	0	1	0	2	7	2	0
Frozen Screen: Clerks reports that they are unable to continue to operate system	9	10	9	34	17	23	12	26	13	16	12	5
Blue Screen: Screen goes blue preventing the clerk from continuing to operate the system	0	1	2	6	3	3	0	2	5	2	3	1
Blank screen: Screen goes blank preventing the clerk from continuing to operate the system	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	1	0	0	0
Totals	11	14	12	45	33	27	13	30	21	25	17	6
Numbers of Live Outlets	198	241	289	299	299	299	299	299	299	299	308	323
Faults per Live Outlet	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.16	0.12	0.1	0.05	0.11	0.08	0.09	0.06	0.02

Reboots without calling the HSHD

It is undoubtedly the case that outlets are rebooting their counters without calling the HSH.

Using the POCL telephone survey data supplied by POCL on 6/8 it was possible to re-survey more closely the outlets not calling the HSHD before rebooting and by inspection of the associated message stores seek to understand the reasons why outlet staff are habitually rebooting.

Pathway will also in the immediate future and on a random basis contact outlets that are rebooting so that a real fault unknown to us at present is not overlooked.

The question posed by POCL was not sufficiently specific to discriminate between several classes of problem. Pathway CS has asked POCL to make the questions used on the survey more specific and would ask that the comment reason field is completed if at all possible.

Why are outlets rebooting?

In general, rebooting is seen – incorrectly - as a “cure for all ills” and understandably outlet staff will not always be ready to expend time reporting to the HSHD a course of action they have already embarked upon.

The reboots that are recorded and that are not associated with a call to the HSHD do include cases where the system unit is being turned on after having been turned off overnight or in error during the day. Although instructions are clear not to turn off system units, it is clearly the case that staff do turn them off, as was evidenced by the difficulties Pathway had in upgrading counters to LT2.

Where a user has made a mistake, he may choose to reboot instead of Undo-ing an uncommitted transaction or Reversing a committed one. In the latter case a reversal would/will still be required, but it is possible that this may not be understood. It is not possible for Pathway to distinguish this case from the message store record.

A user may get into a thought “loop” whereby he cannot see how to return to a desired state and reboots to wipe the slate clean and have another try. There are several instances of the user having been coached through such a thought loop by the HSHD. Again, it is not possible for Pathway to distinguish this case from the message store record.

In some offices we believe the keyboard is being used as an auxiliary work surface with books and manuals being placed on it. It is possible that if a key or key is permanently pressed the counter will exhibit symptoms of being frozen, although it should be possible to unfreeze it after a short delay. Similarly it is not possible for Pathway to distinguish this case from the message store record.

It is possible that printers being replenished with paper are not responding to resume the printing for some seconds, although they will in fact resume when the user retries from the screen button.

Pathway's search for faults

Pathway, nevertheless accepts there are probably significant residual faults in the system that could present themselves as a "freeze" and is working hard to find them. At the time of preparing this report none has been found. Consideration is being given to increasing the swap file size, although testing has eliminated this as a specific cause.

Jccd
11/8

Acceptance Incident Form		Acceptance Incident Number (1) 300	
Acceptance Test Name (2) POCL Infrastructure		Source (3) BSM	Date Observed (4) 01/07/99
Witness/Reviewer who observed Incident (Owner) (5) Jeremy Folkes		Authority (6)	
Incident Type (7)	Criterion Reference (8) (if criterion not met)	Incident Severity (9)	
<input checked="" type="radio"/> Criterion not met <input type="radio"/> Substantive fault <input type="radio"/> Other	536-01	<input type="radio"/> High <input type="radio"/> Medium <input type="radio"/> Low <input checked="" type="radio"/> Pending <input type="radio"/> None	
Description of Incident (10) Evidence from the Live Trial indicates that should the printer fail during operation, the system may lock up rather than handling the error normally. This has been observed even when the printer has only run out of paper. The immediate effect of this problem is in terms of the reliability of the Service Infrastructure's peripheral and input devices. However, once the underlying reasons for the problem are identified, this could change the perception. Several occurrences have been identified on the LTSC log between the start of the Core Observation Period on 31st May and the 28th June. As such problems should be reported directly to the HSH, it is likely that this represents only a small fraction of the total, in which case this problem would be widespread. Consequently, POCL's initial assessment is that this incident is likely to be more than low severity.			
Signatures (11)			
Witness / Reviewer	Horizon Acceptance Test Manager	Pathway	AIM
Date:	Date:	Date:	Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
Entered in Acceptance Database			Date:

Acceptance Incident Analysis Form		<i>To be completed by the ICL Pathway Acceptance Manager to be given to the Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager.</i>	
Acceptance Incident Number (1) <p style="text-align: center;">300</p>		Analysis Sequence Number (2)	
Acceptance Test Name (3) <p style="text-align: center;">POCL Infrastructure</p>			
Analysed Incident Severity (4)		High / Medium / Low (4) <p style="text-align: center;">None</p>	Authority (5)
Analysis of Acceptance Incident (6) Most of the wording on this incident is generic wording pasted into a number of incidents. Pathway are not aware of any incidents where physical printer failure (paper out, paper jam etc) has caused the system to lock. The procedures for dealing with routine printer failures are covered in the counter procedures documentation The topic was also covered at the Horizon Pathway Delivery Meeting held at Gavrelle House on 3rd August. The minutes to that meeting include a Pathway report on printer best practices.			
Number of continuation pages			
Clearance Action (7) We request that POCL close this AI by Wednesday 11/8 unless they can indicate particular incidents not covered by AI298. POCL has agreed to consider this.			
Number of continuation pages			
Acceptance Incident Status (Open/Analysed Retires/Recommended for KPR (8))		Resolved	
Signatures:			
I propose the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above	P. John Pope	ICL Pathway Test Manager	11th August 1999
I accept / reject the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above		Horizon Acceptance Test Manager	Date:
Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager			Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
	Date:		Date:

Criteria

Criteria Descriptions

536 - 01

Peripheral and input devices supplied as part of the elements of the Service Infrastructure on which OPS is provided shall be reliable, robust and easy to use

Acceptance Incident Form		Acceptance Incident Number (1) 301	
Acceptance Test Name (2) POCL Infrastructure		Source (3) BSM	Date Observed (4) 01/07/99
Witness/Reviewer who observed Incident (Owner) (5) Jeremy Folkes		Authority (6)	
Incident Type (7)	Criterion Reference (8) (if criterion not met)	Incident Severity (9)	
<input checked="" type="radio"/> Criterion not met <input type="radio"/> Substantive fault <input type="radio"/> Other	472-04, 820-03, 820-07, 820-08, 828-01, PS-43, 891-11	<input type="radio"/> High <input type="radio"/> Medium <input type="radio"/> Low <input checked="" type="radio"/> Pending <input type="radio"/> None	
Description of Incident (10) Evidence from the Live Trail indicates that if a process fails due to a printer failure, the accounting data within the office may suffer a loss of integrity. The principal effect is a loss of accounting data integrity. Other effects include: considerable extra work by the counter (and potentially support staff) to resolve problem; loss of confidence in the system; undermining of evidential quality of system outputs. Several occurrences have been identified on the LTSC log between the start of the Core Observation Period on 31st May and the 28th June. As such problems should be reported directly to the HSH, it is likely that this represents only a small fraction of the total, in which case this problem would be widespread. Consequently, POCL's initial assessment is that this incident is likely to be more than low severity.			
Signatures (11)			
Witness / Reviewer	Horizon Acceptance Test Manager	Pathway	AIM
Date:	Date:	Date:	Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
Entered in Acceptance Database			Date:

Acceptance Incident Analysis Form		<i>To be completed by the ICL Pathway Acceptance Manager to be given to the Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager</i>	
Acceptance Incident Number (1) <p style="text-align: center;">301</p>		Analysis Sequence Number (2)	
Acceptance Test Name (3) <p style="text-align: center;">POCL Infrastructure</p>			
Analysed Incident Severity (4)		High / Medium / Low (4) <p style="text-align: center;">None</p>	Authority (5)
Analysis of Acceptance Incident (6) <p>We are not aware of any process failures (associated with printer failure or otherwise) that would result in a loss of the integrity of the accounting data within an outlet.</p> <p>As this Incident was raised prior to the implementation of LT2 in the outlets, and as much of it is generic wording common to a number of Incidents, we suggest that this incident should be closed and, if it should prove necessary, a new incident citing specific instances of failure of the LT2 software should be raised.</p>			
Number of continuation pages			
Clearance Action (7) <p>Pathway expects POCL to close this incident by Wednesday 11/8.</p> <p>POCL has agreed to consider closing this incident by 11/8 as it is already covered by AI 211.</p>			
Number of continuation pages			
Acceptance Incident Status (Open / Analysed Retest/Recommended for KPR (8))		Resolved	
Signatures:			
I propose the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above	P. John Pope	ICL Pathway Test Manager	Date: 11th August 1999
I accept / reject the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above		Horizon Acceptance Test Manager	Date:
Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager			Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
	Date:		Date:

Criteria

Criteria Descriptions

472 - 04

The integrity and security of data held within OPS shall not be compromised by any Incident nor when OPS is re-established following any Incident.

820 - 03

EPOSS shall ensure that, following an Incident, or if operationally desirable for any other reason

- (a) the user can return to a complete and recent position
- (b) no corruption of secured data has occurred
- (c) a full recovery can be effected swiftly and in an auditable manner

820 - 07

EPOSS shall ensure that in the event of a failure of any part of the Service Infrastructure, Recovery can be performed to a known position and with the minimum of disruption to the User. Data re-entry shall be minimal where previously committed Transactions have to be re-entered

820 - 08

EPOSS shall warn the User where there is the possibility that data are corrupt

828 - 01

The confidentiality, integrity, validity and completeness of data shall be maintained throughout all storage, processes and transmissions, including during periods of Service Failure and recovery from Service Failure.

PS - 43

The confidentiality, integrity, validity and completeness of data shall be maintained throughout all storage, processes and transmissions, including during periods of Service Failure and recovery from Service Failure.

[R828]

891 - 11

Outlet accounting information shall reconcile, taking account of Stock and cash brought forward, carried forward, Transaction data and local suspense items (as defined in the EPOSS requirements). This shall also be sustained in fall-back and during Recovery after any Service Failure.

Acceptance Incident Form		Acceptance Incident Number (1) 314	
Acceptance Test Name (2) POCL Infrastructure		Source (3) Review	Date Observed (4) 15/06/99
Witness/Reviewer who observed Incident (Owner) (5) Bob Booth			Authority (6)
Incident Type (7)	Criterion Reference (8) (if criterion not met)		Incident Severity (9)
<input checked="" type="radio"/> Criterion not met <input type="radio"/> Substantive fault <input type="radio"/> Other	469-01, 469-02, 470-01, 470-02, 869-05		<input type="radio"/> High <input type="radio"/> Medium <input type="radio"/> Low <input checked="" type="radio"/> Pending <input type="radio"/> None
Description of Incident (10) <p>The above criteria refer to the requirement for Pathway to supply detailed technical documentation which will allow POCL to procure applications from a third party supplier.</p> <p>At the time the POCL Infrastructure Acceptance Specification was being agreed it was recognised that the technical documentation to support it did not exist. Therefore POCL agreed that Pathway could provide the documentation at a later date. Furthermore it was understood that Pathway were allowed to put forward their proposal as to how this criteria would be met in the future.</p> <p>The main document cited was the 'ICL Pathway External Applications Procurement Policy' which detailed an approach as to how they would work with a third party supplier. However this document still does not meet the criteria as they stand today.</p> <p>Furthermore the other cited references, 'Counter Hardware Design Specification', 'OPS Architecture Document' and 'TMS Architecture Document' do not meet the criteria as being clearly defined technical documentation.</p> <p>Providing third party documentation as with 'Riposte 32 API Specification' indicates that the documentation is not maintained by Pathway and therefore does not fully meet the criteria.</p> <p>In summary the documentation provided is not sufficiently detailed to allow POCL to procure applications from a third party supplier.</p>			
Signatures (11)			
Witness / Reviewer	Horizon Acceptance Test Manager	Pathway	AIM
Date:	Date:	Date:	Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
Entered in Acceptance Database			Date:

Acceptance Incident Analysis Form	To be completed by the IGL Pathway Acceptance Manager to be given to the Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager
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Acceptance Incident Number (1) 314	Analysis Sequence Number (2)
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Acceptance Test Name (3) POCL Infrastructure

Analysed Incident Severity (4) None/Low	Authority (5)
--------------------------------------------	---------------

Analysis of Acceptance Incident (6) Please see attached document.

Number of continuation pages

Clearance Action (7) POCL to review revised analysis and recategorise this incident.

Number of continuation pages			
Acceptance Incident Status (Open/ Analysed Retest/Recommended for KPR (8))			
Signatures:			
I propose the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above	J C C Dicks	ICE Pathway Test Manager	Date: 11/8/99
I accept / reject the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above		Horizon Acceptance Test Manager	Date:
Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager			Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
	Date:		Date:

Criteria

Criteria Descriptions

469 - 01

The technical documentation concerning OPS and the elements of the Service Infrastructure used to provide OPS shall be suitable to allow POCL to procure applications which utilise OPS or hardware which interfaces with OPS. These procurements shall not necessarily be from Pathway.

469 - 02

Pathway shall provide technical documentation concerning OPS and the elements of the Service Infrastructure used to provide OPS.

470 - 01

Pathway shall provide technical documentation concerning TMS and the elements of the Service Infrastructure used to provide TMS.

470 - 02

The technical documentation concerning TMS and the elements of the Service Infrastructure used to provide TMS shall be suitable to allow POCL to procure applications which utilise TMS. These procurements shall not necessarily be from Pathway

869 - 05

The CONTRACTOR shall maintain detailed technical documentation of the interfaces from TMS to PAS, CMS, OPS and all attachable elements of the Service Infrastructure.

AI 314 additional analysis

This additional analysis is in response to comments on Pathway document "ICL Pathway External Applications Procurement Policy", Version 0.1, 25/5/99, (CR/POL/004), which were received 6/8/99.

Criteria within scope

Criterion 869/5, though touching on similar aspects to Criteria 469/1-2 and 470/1-2, does not relate to the provision of technical documentation for application procurement support, (it relates to boundary performance assessment). It is included within the scope of this analysis on the basis of an agreement that it is a proper subset of Criteria 469/1 and 470/2

Provision of technical documentation

The specific technical documentation to be provided was defined in the associated Solutions 469 and 470 and has, in fact, been substantially provided. Moreover, additional material has also been provided as is shown in the POCL Infrastructure Acceptance Pack, see POCL Infrastructure Acceptance Pack – Segment 5, 28/5/99.

Under 469/2 Pathway undertook to provide:

OPS Architecture Document
OPS API Document
Counter Hardware Specification Document

Under 470/1 Pathway undertook to provide:

TMS Architecture Document
TMS API Document
TMS Hardware Specification

All of these documents, except the last listed, have already been provided. Nevertheless, the contents of the last mentioned is provided within the Asset Register under the Codified Agreement.

Two of these documents are substantially sourced from a supplier. Pathway affirms that it will maintain these as versions of ES/IFS/003, ES/IFS/004.

Therefore Criteria 469/2, 470/1 and 869/5 cannot be considered under this Acceptance Incident.

Pathway role in relation to application procurement

The burden of the comments provided on 6/8 is that POCL does not see a role for ICL Pathway to participate in the early stages of the introduction of a particular application.

This is, POCL believes, because it would constrain competition and give Pathway an unfair advantage if Pathway subsequently was asked to bid as a supplier in the procurement itself.

Attention is drawn to Clause 211 of the Codified Agreement. Probably the most important applications to be introduced will be the subject of Clause 211. Under this provision, POCL has committed to work with ICL Pathway to revive and continue the discussions with a view to developing a business strategy for the introduction of Network Banking and Modern Government applications. The comments provided appear to indicate that this provision has not been acknowledged by POCL in this context.

There is also the "normal" case of POCL procuring an application from Pathway via normal Change Control.

To the extent that Clause 211 does not apply, either because the applications under consideration are not those envisaged by Clause 211, or because the joint work does not come to a successful conclusion, then ICL Pathway believes that Requirements - and Solutions - 469 and 470 are intended to apply.

In preparing CR/POL/004, Version 0.1, ICL Pathway was addressing the need to ensure that ICL Pathway is able to accommodate the preparation, deployment and operation of an application on the ICL Pathway Service platform and that technical and operational integrity is not compromised by a third party application. The areas to be covered, be they hardware or software oriented, are:

Programme Management, Business Requirements, Systems Design, Application Design, Implementation, Application Test & Integration, Systems Integration, Systems Test, Type Approval, Business Acceptance, Manufacture, Distribution, Installation, Maintenance, Service Reporting, Invoicing.

Whether these activities are addressed with Pathway early or late in an application's business cycle is the fundamental point at issue. ICL Pathway had proceeded on the assumption that delays and nugatory work would be less if issues were addressed as early as possible. However, if POCL believes that addressing such issues early would confer an unfair advantage on ICL Pathway then ICL Pathway is content to leave such considerations to be addressed at a time and in such manner as may be determined by POCL.

Regardless of the point in time during the procurement cycle that ICL Pathway is notified of a procurement, ICL Pathway has a legitimate right to guaranteed participation and authority in certain of these activities if its Service commitments are not to be compromised. In other activities Pathway may or may not be involved, and in some others Pathway will not want to participate.

Accordingly Pathway will revise CR/POL/004 to this effect.

Suitability and sufficiency of technical documentation

Pathway contends that the documents provided are suitable for use by a reasonably competent IT services provider in relation to designing and implementing an application utilising the Services in question.

Therefore Criteria 469/1 and 470/2 cannot be considered under this Acceptance Incident.

In addition to the formal conformance with the Criteria, there is also the practical point as to whether these documents are sufficient for procuring applications that make use of Services other than OPS and TMS, scope which is outside of the contracted Requirement. Pathway's contention here is that the needs of a third party supplier cannot be known except with reference to nature of the particular application.

This can be illustrated through consideration of a hypothetical application that is exactly the same as APS. The service provider would also require a good deal of technical and other information that is application specific: AP Client Specifications, Token Technology Specifications, HAPS Interface Specification, business rules in relation to EPOSS, and any interfaces it may need outside of TMS and APS. ICL Pathway cannot meet certain of these needs because it is not the owner of such information, and could possibly meet others, particularly in relation to Services other than OPS and TMS.

In the cases of other hypothetical applications it is possible that Pathway could be the information authority. For example the third party application might need specific information about the way in which Service Level and Remedy information is collected within the Pathway system because it may be agreed that the application will rely on Pathway Invoicing and SLAM systems. In fact the service provider might require more than documentary information, for example test data.

Accordingly ICL Pathway will revise CR/POL/004 such that Pathway will not be responsible to the procurement authority for the Programme Management activity but will be guaranteed participation in the Programme Management activity (at a point in time determined by POCL) and will provide suitable representation at Programme meetings. The Programme Management activity will be defined to contain the definition of additional documentation or services to be provided by Pathway.

Jccd
10/8

Acceptance Incident Form		Acceptance Incident Number (1) 342	
Acceptance Test Name (2) TIP Interface		Source (3) Trial	Date Observed (4) 02/06/99
Witness/Reviewer who observed Incident (Owner) (5) Martin Box		Authority (6)	
Incident Type (7)	Criterion Reference (8) (if criterion not met)	Incident Severity (9)	
<input type="radio"/> Criterion not met <input type="radio"/> Substantive fault <input type="radio"/> Other		<input type="radio"/> High <input type="radio"/> Medium <input type="radio"/> Low <input checked="" type="radio"/> Pending <input type="radio"/> None	
Description of Incident (10)			
<p>Incidents have been raised by TIP re. the late delivery of transactions files and cash accounts into TIP, i.e. after Day D. These constitute 30+ transaction files from various Organisational Units and 2 cash account files. The main concern here is that it is POCL/TIP who are doing the chasing and not Pathway. We would have expected Pathway to be more proactive in the late file delivery area. Late delivery means that various POCL back end processes cannot be completed to agreed timescales. POCL/TIP/Transaction Processing needs to understand why this situation was allowed to happen. POCL/TIP needs to be presented with the processes, procedures and any software fixes that are to be put in place to eradicate this problem.</p> <p>Incidents have been raised by TIP in respect of Transaction Files and Client Transmission Summary files not being received at all on the expected dates. This is significant as the daily time slot for the TIP operation was missed and the files in question had to be processed when received. This meant that TIP had to play "catch up" and also meant that certain deadlines within the back end operation had to be extended to accommodate Pathway's failure to deliver. POCL/TIP/Transaction Processing/Settlement needs to understand why this situation was allowed to happen. POCL/TIP needs to be presented with the processes, procedures and any software fixes that are to be put in place to eradicate this problem.</p> <p>An incident has been raised by TIP in relation to all files for a day not being delivered until after the agreed processing time, i.e. placed on the server by Pathway at 03:44. This is significant as the daily time slot for the TIP operation was missed and that days files had to be processed the following evening. This meant that TIP had to play "catch up" and also meant that certain deadlines within the back end operation had to be extended to accommodate Pathway's failure. POCL/TIP/Transaction Processing/Settlement needs to understand why this situation was allowed to happen. POCL/TIP needs to be presented with the processes, procedures and any software fixes that are to be put in place to eradicate this problem.</p>			
Signatures (11)			
Witness / Reviewer	Horizon Acceptance Test Manager	Pathway	AIM
Date:	Date:	Date:	Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
Entered in Acceptance Database			Date:

Acceptance Incident Analysis Form		<i>To be completed by the ICL Pathway Acceptance Manager to be given to the Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager.</i>	
Acceptance Incident Number (1) <p style="text-align: center;">342</p>		Analysis Sequence Number (2)	
Acceptance Test Name (3) <p style="text-align: center;">TIP Interface</p>			
Analysed Incident Severity (4)		High / Medium / Low (4) <p style="text-align: center;">Low</p>	Authority (5)
<p>Analysis of Acceptance Incident (6) All incidents identified by TIP relating to file and/or transaction delivery were reviewed at Chesterfield (29/7/99); a further incident (TIP889 – 3/8) is under investigation. Incidents fall into two categories, plus a further question relating to FTMS gateway file housekeeping.</p> <p>1. Delayed transaction delivery from outlets. Transactions are not harvested from Outlets in the following circumstances:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. One or more Counter PCs cannot be synchronised with the Gateway PC at the post office. This may be because they have a fault, or because they have been switched off. 2. At a single counter post office, there is a fault with the mirror disk 3. Failure of the Gateway PC 4. Failure to communicate via the ISDN line <p>These conditions are characterised by there not being an End of Day marker in the central journal file for the Outlet concerned ("non-pollled post office").</p> <p>The facility to monitor and report on non-pollled outlets was part of the BES harvesting suite, removed following DSS withdrawal. Since then an ad-hoc database analysis has been in place to identify such outlets and a new ongoing reporting system is in the process of introduction (CP2078) to produce an automatic report which is emailed daily to the Business Support Unit who log an incident with the HSH for immediate investigation.</p> <p>2. Files delivered late from the TPS Hosts to TIP This can happen if a fault has occurred during the processing cycle such that the delays incurred mean that the production and transmission of the files for TIP is not in line with the SLAs.</p> <p>The majority of incidents reported under this category have occurred during failover testing between Wigan and Bootle sites, which represent exceptional circumstances and are not representative of normal systems operation.</p> <p>3. File Housekeeping on FTMS gateway servers The housekeeping in the FTMS servers has been corrected (PINICL 27537) to ensure that files for each Service (e.g. TIP) are only held for the period set out in the corresponding AIS. This is documented in "Pathway to Post Office Technical Specification" ref. TI/IFS/008 section 6.2.3. Details of the parameters for the file retention period are given in the internal design document "FTMS Configurations for Pathway TPS and POCL TIP Links at Release 2" (ref. TD/ION/005).</p>			
Number of continuation pages			
<p>Clearance Action (7) This is essentially the same as that proposed for AI371, relating to HAPS SLA.</p> <p>Procedures Required Procedures are required to cover the following.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. An incident to be raised with the Horizon System Helpdesk at the earliest appropriate time when an Outlet is not polled. 2. Pathway to produce daily (internal) reports monitoring the transmission of the TIP files, the numbers of files and the times of transmission and receipt acknowledgement. 			

2. Pathway to produce daily (internal) reports monitoring the transmission of the TIP files, the numbers of files and the times of transmission and receipt acknowledgement.

Program Changes Required

1. An automatic report to be produced overnight to detect instances of non-polled post offices, and an email report automatically sent to the Business Support Unit (BSU). This daily report will list:

- Date of report
- FAD code
- Date since the Outlet was last polled

This will be implemented during CSR as an urgent development.

[Note - This facility has been developed and is expected to be Released shortly.]

The BSU will follow the new procedure set out in the "New Procedures" section below.

New Procedures

a. Non-Polled Outlets

1. The BSU have implemented a new procedure whereby they report incidents of non-polled post offices to the HSH. This is currently done on receipt of a manually produced report of non-polled post offices. This report is due to be produced automatically (see item 2 in "Program Changes Required").

Status: This procedure has been implemented. It is possible to email a copy of this manually produced report to a central POCL Service Management function as an interim measure before the procedure set out in item 2 below is available.

2. Customer Services require a procedure whereby they update the "On-Line Problem Management Database" Web Page. This is an existing Web Page, which is accessible to POCL Service Management, and lists various problem issues. This will enable the TIP team to enquire on non-polled post offices.

Status: This procedure has been agreed and will be implemented when the automatically produced non-polled report is available (see item 2 Program Changes Required).

b. Central Processing Delays

1. A draft copy of the Interim Transaction Information Processing System ICL Pathway Operating Level dated 15/03/99) has been sent to POCL for review. In discussions, TIP have indicated that they do not require advance warning of potential delays in TIP files being sent to TIP. There are contractual remedies if Pathway fail to meet the SLA timescales.

Status: The Operating Level Agreement is in draft form and Pathway is waiting on POCL for comments. The draft OLA does not include provision for Pathway Operations to inform TIP Operations of likely delays in the transmission of TIP files.

2. Pathway OSD have implemented a new procedure whereby they produce a daily Operations Service Management Report.

Status: This is for internal Service Management only, but does show the transmission of the TIP files, the numbers of files and the times of transmission and receipt acknowledgement.

Pathway believes that the actions put in place provide adequate assurance that appropriate procedures exist for dealing with potential service delivery problems on an ongoing basis. If SLAs are not met, for any reason, remedies will apply as per G10 Schedule. Specific ongoing monitoring of non-polled outlets can be continued via the mechanism described above, if desired by TIP.

On this basis Pathway believes the incident is, in effect, resolved, but are prepared to accept ongoing monitoring for an agreed period under a severity categorisation of "low".

POCL committed to review this AI on 12/8/99.

Number of continuation pages

Acceptance Incident Status (Open/

Resolved

Analysed/Reles/Recommended for KPR (8)

Signatures:

I propose the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above	D.Hollingsworth for John Pope	ICL Pathway Test Manager	Date: 11/8/99
I accept / reject the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above		Horizon Acceptance Test Manager	
Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager			Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
	Date:		Date:

Acceptance Incident Form		Acceptance Incident Number (1) 361	
Acceptance Test Name (2) TIP Interface		Source (3) BSM	Date Observed (4) 30/06/99
Witness/Reviewer who observed Incident (Owner) (5) Martin Box		Authority (6)	
Incident Type (7)	Criterion Reference (8) (if criterion not met)	Incident Severity (9)	
<input checked="" type="radio"/> Criterion not met <input type="radio"/> Substantive fault <input type="radio"/> Other	831-01	<input type="radio"/> High <input type="radio"/> Medium <input type="radio"/> Low <input type="radio"/> Pending <input checked="" type="radio"/> None	
Description of Incident (10) New Description: Incidents have been raised by TIP in respect of duplicate records / files sent across the interface from Pathway to TIP. TIP correctly rejects the files in these instances. It is concerning that the Pathway solution allows duplicate transaction records to be generated. Pathway are aware that duplicate records contravene the AIS protocol. Other incidents relate to the fallback / contingency arrangements within the Pathway domain where duplicate files were generated. This has caused numerous hours of investigation by TIP and would become unmanageable at National Rollout levels. Severity: POCL - medium - many hours to investigate each problem. POCL to monitor when fix is in place. PWY - accept the problem exists. Don't really argue with the medium rating. Rectification: Steve Warwick to provide rectification of this issue. A fix for this is in the Pathway domain. Steve to provide details as to dates for download to the outlets.			
Signatures (11)			
Witness / Reviewer	Horizon Acceptance Test Manager	Pathway	AIM
Date:	Date:	Date:	Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
Entered in Acceptance Database			Date:

Acceptance Incident Analysis Form		To be completed by the ICL Pathway Acceptance Manager to be given to the Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager.	
Acceptance Incident Number (1) 361		Analysis Sequence Number (2)	
Acceptance Test Name (3) TIP Interface			
Analysed Incident Severity (4)		High / Medium / Low (4) Low	Authority (5)
<p>Analysis of Acceptance Incident (6)</p> <p>This incident now excludes duplicate AP sequence numbers, which are now covered by 395.</p> <p>The remaining incidents are already closed within Horizon except for the one concerning multiple identical events, where the issue is not that the software has erroneously created duplicate records for a single event, but that there are multiple separate events producing identical records - an example was caused by thousands of log on attempts due to a permanently depressed enter key giving rise to events so close together as to have identical time stamps.</p> <p>Pathway have now agreed to enhance the system to filter out such identical events to avoid TIP erroneously categorizing them as duplicates and consequently rejecting files.</p>			
Number of continuation pages			
<p>Clearance Action (7)</p> <p>Pathway argue that the residual issue was not in fact a fault, and so the incident should be CLOSED.</p> <p>Pathway would in any case argue that the impact of the residual issue were it to be deemed a fault would be Low.</p> <p>The agreed system enhancement has been tested within Pathway and was delivered to live on 3rd August. We are not aware of any further incidents.</p>			
Number of continuation pages			
Acceptance Incident Status (Open/Analysed Re-test/Recommended for KPR (8))		Resolved	
Signatures:			
I propose the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above	P. John Pope	ICL Pathway Test Manager	11th August 1999
I accept / reject the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above		Horizon Acceptance Test Manager	Date:
Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager			Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
	Date:		Date:

Acceptance Incident Analysis Form		To be completed by the ICL Pathway Acceptance Manager to be given to the Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager	
Acceptance Incident Number (1) 361		Analysis Sequence Number (2) 1	
Acceptance Test Name (3) TIP Interface			
Analysed Incident Severity (4)		High / Medium / Low (4) None	Authority (5)
<p>Analysis of Acceptance Incident (6) This incident concerns duplicates. There are a number of causes which have been rectified.</p> <p>Incident 9905110226 was software error, now fixed. 9905210206 was duplicate events when issuing order books, now fixed. 9905280170 was software error now fixed. 9906220033 (APS sequence nos.) was a software error now fixed. 9906280140 was software error now fixed. 9906280141 & 9906290187 were errors associated with a one off situation of switching Bootle/Wigan (in this case also in conjunction with a problem within TIP concerning the treatment of previously received files).</p> <p>The underlying root cause PINICLs have all been closed with fixes applied 25086 (OBCS - LT1), 25348 (duplicate cash a/c lines - LT2), 27012/26835/26752 (all duplicates relating to Duplicate APS sequence nos - LT2). The sole exception is 26928 (which relates to the occurrence and treatment of potentially repeating / duplicate events) which required resolution with TIP over how they wished repeated events to be treated. TIP have indicated they want these screened out (this confirmation was required since repeated events can legitimately occur) and a fix to introduce this screening has ben produced, tested and the release note is currently in preparation.</p>			
Number of continuation pages			
Clearance Action (7) Closure			
Number of continuation pages			
Acceptance Incident Status (Open / Analysed / Retest / Recommended for KPR (8))		Resolved	
Signatures:			
I propose the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above		ICL Pathway Test Manager	Date:
I accept / reject the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above		Horizon Acceptance Test Manager	Date:
Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager			Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
	Date:		Date:

Acceptance Incident Form		Acceptance Incident Number (1) 368	
Acceptance Test Name (2) Security		Source (3) BSM	Date Observed (4) 20/07/99
Witness/Reviewer who observed Incident (Owner) (5) Jeremy Folkes		Authority (6)	
Incident Type (7)	Criterion Reference (8) (if criterion not met)	Incident Severity (9)	
<input checked="" type="radio"/> Criterion not met <input type="radio"/> Substantive fault <input type="radio"/> Other	PS-22, 698-03, 698-02	High Medium Low <input checked="" type="radio"/> Pending None	
Description of Incident (10) The computer room at Lytham St Annes, supporting the ICL Outsourcing Tivoli operation, is not physically secure. In particular, the air conditioning arrangements for the room are based on leaving the window open, and even when closed, the window offers inadequate security for the nature of the contents. Note: We understand that steps are now being taken to rectify this defect, with the installation of security mesh over the window, however we are told that this work will not be completed until after the end of the Core Observation Period."			
Signatures (11)			
Witness / Reviewer	Horizon Acceptance Test Manager	Pathway	AIM
Date:	Date:	Date:	Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
Entered in Acceptance Database			Date:

Acceptance Incident Analysis Form		<i>To be completed by the ICL Pathway Acceptance Manager to be given to the Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager</i>	
Acceptance Incident Number (1) <p style="text-align: center;">368</p>		Analysis Sequence Number (2)	
Acceptance Test Name (3) <p style="text-align: center;">Security</p>			
Analysed Incident Severity (4)		High / Medium / Low (4)	Authority (5)
Analysis of Acceptance Incident (6) The analysis is contained in the incident description on page 1. The area of concern is the external windows in J Block in the quadrangle area on the Lytham site. The requirement is to have security grills fitted to the external windows.			
Number of continuation pages:			
Clearance Action (7) It has been confirmed by Martine Bowes of the Lytham Estate Services Group that the grills are expected to be delivered and fitted by 12/8/99. Pathway will notify POCL when the work is complete and will Close the incident.			
Number of continuation pages:		0	
Acceptance Incident Status (Open / Analysed / Retest / Recommended for KPR (8))		Open	
Signatures:			
I propose the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above	Dave Jones	ICL Pathway Test Manager	Date: 11/8/99
I accept / reject the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above		Horizon Acceptance Test Manager	Date:
Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager			Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
	Date:		Date:

Acceptance Incident Form		Acceptance Incident Number (1) 369	
Acceptance Test Name (2) POCL Infrastructure		Source (3) BSM	Date Observed (4) 20/07/99
Witness/Reviewer who observed Incident (Owner) (5) David McLaughlin		Authority (6)	
Incident Type (7)	Criterion Reference (8) (if criterion not met)	Incident Severity (9)	
<input checked="" type="radio"/> Criterion not met <input type="radio"/> Substantive fault <input type="radio"/> Other	536-01	<input type="radio"/> High <input type="radio"/> Medium <input type="radio"/> Low <input checked="" type="radio"/> Pending <input type="radio"/> None	
Description of Incident (10) The scanner reliability is questionable in relation to OBCS transactions where there has been a high number of rejections of pension and allowance books.			
Signatures (11)			
Witness / Reviewer	Horizon Acceptance Test Manager	Pathway	AIM
Date:	Date:	Date:	Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
Entered in Acceptance Database			Date:

Acceptance Incident Analysis Form	To be completed by the ICL Pathway Acceptance Manager to be given to the Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager
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Acceptance Incident Number (1) 369	Analysis Sequence Number (2)
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Acceptance Test Name (3) POCL Infrastructure

Analysed Incident Severity (4) None	High / Medium / Low (4)	Authority (5)
--------------------------------------------	-------------------------	---------------

Analysis of Acceptance Incident (6)

A problem with scanning OBCS bar codes was first notified in November 1998 by HSH following an increase in calls from PMs regarding impounded order books. The books concerned had a new type of printed bar code and so the problem was initially attributed to the new method of printing adopted by BA.

Although problems were originally believed to be confined to one print run in November and calls relating to problem did cease by mid-December, calls re-emerged in late December. Further tests in early January revealed that the problem could be caused by a change to the paper.

In mid-January, PIRA examined the paper supplies and concluded that the relative humidity levels of paper were 7% when the acceptable industry level is 5.3%. In addition, it was found that the necessary ink-hardening agent was not present in the paper. Arrangements were made for the immediate replacement of the hardening agent and for new supplies of paper to be tested.

In early February, a temporary procedure was introduced by POCL that involved treating the order book as a non bar-coded book. This procedure is still in place. Tests undertaken by Welch Allyn on behalf of ICL Pathway in mid-February concluded that the problems resulted from the poor print quality of the bar codes.

In March, BA received new supplies of paper. However, in mid-April, it was confirmed that these provided little improvement in paper quality. Further paper was ordered from another supplier. In late-May it was advised that more positive results had been obtained using this paper.

In early June, BA provided the view that the ESNS scanner used by ALPS had greater tolerance than Horizon scanner. In late June, BA provided evidence that some bar codes could be read with the ESNS scanner but not with the Horizon scanner. However, it was confirmed that the Horizon scanner did accord with the agreed specification and those problems did not occur before November 1998.

Tests of bar codes continue to be undertaken by both BA and Pathway. Pathway is currently awaiting confirmation from POCL that the tests carried out earlier this year by BA were compliant to 'Code 3 of 9' standard bar codes and that their tests have included the original paper and ink combination. Currently, ICL Pathway is beginning tests on a batch of 90 barcodes received from BA via POCL. The majority is being tested at BRA01 using both the ESNS and OBCS scanner, but two have been forwarded to Welch Allyn (via the Implementation team at KID01) for verification/ validation of the bar codes compliance with the agreed standard.

Number of continuation pages	
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Clearance Action (7)

At present ICL Pathway does not believe that sufficient evidence has been provided that the bar code scanner is operating out of specification and request that this Incident is closed.

ICL Pathway and POCL are continuing to investigate DSS's concerns, and ongoing management of these issues will continue via our respective Service Management groups.

Number of continuation pages			
Acceptance Incident Status (Open/Analysed Retest/Recommended for KPR (8))			
Signatures:			
I propose the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above	D.Cooke	ICL Pathway Test Manager	Date: 29/7/99
I accept / reject the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above		Horizon Acceptance Test Manager	Date:
Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager			Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
	Date:		Date:

3 - A
A.S. 1 3 -

Acceptance Incident Analysis Form		<i>To be completed by the ICL Pathway Acceptance Manager to be given to the Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager.</i>	
Acceptance Incident Number (1) 369		Analysis Sequence Number (2)	
Acceptance Test Name (3) POCL Infrastructure			
Analysed Incident Severity (4)		High / Medium / Low (4) None	Authority (5)
Analysis of Acceptance Incident (6) We have carried out the test on 90 books referred to in the previous analysis, and found the scanner to be reliable. A brief report is attached			
Number of continuation pages		2	
Clearance Action (7) POCL to reconsider severity in the light of the satisfactory Pathway report by 11/8.			
Number of continuation pages			
Acceptance Incident Status (Open/Analysed Retes/Recommended for KPR (8))		Resolved	
Signatures:			
I propose the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above	P. John Pope	ICL Pathway Test Manager	11th August 1999
I accept / reject the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above		Horizon Acceptance Test Manager	Date:
Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager			Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
	Date:		Date:

ICL Pathway

Testing of alternative scanners with new foils.

Ref: OTT/TST2/0063
Version: 0.1
Author: KSAU
Date: 08/12/99

Title : Testing of both Pathway scanner and ALPS scanner against a batch of new OBCS foils.

Release Note :	N/A	PinICL / ChangeProposal :	N/A
Pre Fix Test Completed Date :	N/A	Tested By :	N/A
Post Fix Test Completed Date :	30/7/99	Tested By :	KSAU
Result of Testing :	Scanning new foils : PASS	Tested By :	KSAU
	Use of ALPS scanners : FAIL		

Problem description

Apparently, there have been problems scanning some of the newer OBCS foils. POCL believe that the scanners used on the ALPS counters are more tolerant. It is therefore necessary to carry out some comparative testing using both types of scanner against a batch of new foils.

Test script

originally sent

1. Connect ALPS

The cable supplied
This is totally diff
piggyback plug to
for the Touch Scre

nal power supply.
trd and a
counter is used

Although the cable
cable and plug me
to 'modify' a Path

ling around the
, it was possible

Unfortunately, alt
a bar code, no data

ose proximity to

It was not therefor

2. Scan new foils using old and new Pathway scanners.

The terms old and new do not refer to different types of scanners, only different aged ones.
One off Serial No. M-50, with S/W rev level 5.1.1=*D=1.2, and one off Serial No. N-15 with S/W rev. level 5.1.1=*F=1.2.

Using the M-50 Pathway scanner, each of the 90 supplied foils a MINIMUM of five times, this resulted in 450+ successful scans, no fails.

The above operation was then repeated using scanner N-15, again 450+ successful scans with no fails.

3. Test scanners on mutilated foils.

Five of the new foils were damaged in various ways; folding, screwing up, rolling into a tube, soaking in coffee and soft drink.

It was necessary to flatten out the worst of the creases in some of the foils but all could be read without significant difficulty.

ICL Pathway

Testing of alternative scanners with new foils.

Ref: OTT/TST2/0063
Version: 0.1
Author: KSAU
Date: 08/12/99

Conclusion

Based on the testing carried out, there is no evidence to suggest that the existing scanners cannot read the new types of OBCS foil either when they are brand new and shiny or after they have been subjected to various degrees of abuse.

ICL Pathway

Testing of alternative scanners with new foils.

Ref: OTT TST2-0063
Version: 0.1
Author: KSAU
Date: 08/12/99

Title : Reliability test of Pathway scanner against a batch of new OBCS foils.

Release Note :	N/A	PinICL / ChangeProposal :	N/A
Pre Fix Test Completed Date :	N/A	Tested By :	N/A
Post Fix Test Completed Date :	30/7/99	Tested By :	KSAU
Result of Testing :	Scanning new foils : PASS	Tested By :	KSAU

Summary

Pathway have tested both old and new scanners on a batch of new OBCS foils. Even after degradation of the foils by coffee, cola and physical abuse the scanners read all foils successfully. We conclude that the Pathway scanner is therefore at least as reliable as the APS scanner.

Background

1. Scan new foil

The terms old and
One off Serial N
5.1.1=*F=1.2.

reworked by PJP & result.

level

Using the M-501
scans, no fails.

450+ successful

The above operat

2. Test scanners

Five of the new fi
drink.

...ing, ...ing up, rolling into a tube, soaking in coffee and soft

It was necessary to flatten out the worst of the creases in some of the foils but all could be read without significant difficulty.

Conclusion

Based on the testing carried out, there is no evidence to suggest that the existing scanners cannot read the new types of OBCS foil either when they are brand new and shiny or after they have been subjected to various degrees of abuse.

Acceptance Incident Form		Acceptance Incident Number (1) 371	
Acceptance Test Name (2) APS		Source (3) BSM	Date Observed (4) 13/07/99
Witness/Reviewer who observed Incident (Owner) (5) Bob Cragg		Authority (6)	
Incident Type (7)	Criterion Reference (8) (if criterion not met)	Incident Severity (9)	
<input checked="" type="radio"/> Criterion not met <input type="radio"/> Substantive fault <input type="radio"/> Other	891-02, 891-09, 890-02, 890-01	<input type="radio"/> High <input type="radio"/> Medium <input type="radio"/> Low <input checked="" type="radio"/> Pending <input type="radio"/> None	
Description of Incident (10) Late transactions Transactions have been identified in the HAPS system as being more than 9 days old. NB investigations into the cause have been ongoing for some time. There appear to be a number of short falls in exception reporting. It was not reported that transactions were not being retrieved from an outlet for over a week. It was not reported that the system was processing transactions outside the service levels in schedule E08. It was not identified that an outlet had hardware problems outside maintenance agreements. 26/06/99 For 23/06 transactions were harvested that were older than day D. (OSG: I26 HSH: E-9906240223) This shows that ICL Pathway are delivering transactions that are more than 10 days old. This contravenes SLA Schedule E08. Same for 02/07/99 OSG: I31 HSH: E-9907050027 Same for 13/07/99 OSG: I36 HSH: E-9907140067			
Signatures (11)			
Witness / Reviewer	Horizon Acceptance Test Manager	Pathway	AIM
Date:	Date:	Date:	Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
Entered in Acceptance Database			Date:

Acceptance Incident Analysis Form		<i>To be completed by the ICL Pathway Acceptance Manager to be given to the Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager</i>	
Acceptance Incident Number (1) 371		Analysis Sequence Number (2)	
Acceptance Test Name (3) APS			
Analysed Incident Severity (4)		High / Medium / Low (4) Low	Authority (5)

Analysis of Acceptance Incident (6)

ICL Pathway acknowledge that there have been a number of situations where an Outlets transactions have not been sent to HAPS for greater then 9 days, and that the reporting of these occurences has not been satisfactory.

Of the incidents quoted :-

OSG 126 - This was caused by a Hardware failure resolved on 1/7, which resulted in End of Day not being set.

OSG - 131 - This was caused by intermittent comms failure resolved on 2/7 which resulted in End of Day not being receivd.

OSG - 136 - This was caused by a combination of the LT2 upgrade causing late HAPS harvesting and two outlets experiencng network problems. Information provided to POCL on these issues and this was closed on 29/7/99.

In all of the above the HAPS harvesting operation and transmission operated correctly. Outlet transactions were missing from these transmissions due either to End of Day markers not being set or not being received in the Data Centre.

Concerning the reporting of these incidents, ICL Customer Services will shortly have access to a daily report advising those outlets whose End of Day marker has not been received, and therefore whose transactions will not be forwarded to HAPS. This information will be discussed with POCL.

In the interim, the End of Day status is being determined by manual analysis of the message store and this is proving satisfactory.

Number of continuation pages**Clearance Action (7)**

ICL Pathway propose this incident is closed based on the satisfactory interim procedures, and the planned introduction of a daily report.

See report dated 6/8/99 updating incident, describing new procedures including production of daily report.

As agreed and actioned at the Acceptance review 10/8 Pathway has provided reports for the last five working days. POCL are actioned to correlate their reports with these and to Close this incident.

Number of continuation pages			
Acceptance Incident Status (Open/ Analysed Retest/Recommended for KPR (8))			
Signatures:			
I propose the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above	D. Cooke update by Tony Hayward (pp D Cooke)	ICL Pathway Test Manager	Date: 29/7/99 updated on 6/08/99
I accept / reject the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above		Horizon Acceptance Test Manager	updated on 11/8/99
Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager			Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
	Date:		Date:

Acceptance Incident Form		Acceptance Incident Number (1) 372	
Acceptance Test Name (2) POCL Infrastructure		Source (3) BSM	Date Observed (4) 20/07/99
Witness/Reviewer who observed Incident (Owner) (5) Rod Stocker		Authority (6)	
Incident Type (7)	Criterion Reference (8) (if criterion not met)	Incident Severity (9)	
<input checked="" type="radio"/> Criterion not met <input type="radio"/> Substantive fault <input type="radio"/> Other	537-01	<input type="radio"/> High <input type="radio"/> Medium <input type="radio"/> Low <input checked="" type="radio"/> Pending <input type="radio"/> None	
Description of Incident (10) The contractor shall carry out system management of all the Services in a consistent and coherent manner to ensure the following: b) changes to the Services can be made speedily and accurately. Upgrade of 299 offices was planned to be done on 10th/11th July such that all offices were able to offer an LT2 service at start of business on Monday 12 July. Success criteria were identified (see Pathway Report dated 16/7/99 version 2). Release contents for LT2 were identified in Pathway Report CS/REP/043 version 1.0 dated 9/7/99). Not all 299 offices were successfully upgraded to LT2 by 0900 hours Monday 12 July. by 1030 hours 288 had been upgraded leaving 11 offices still operating LT1. The following incidents are demonstrations of the failure to meet the criteria. A number of errors caused by corruptions to .dll files: - outlets unable to declare stamps, stock and cash (Pathway problem reference PC0027742) - receipts not equal to payment errors (FAD codes: 390329, 8523, 13523, 166328) Approximately 35 outlets made calls to the HSH with the following problem - appearance of a No Entry sign on the desktop preventing continuation (Pathway problem reference PC0027743) An LT2 change was to the font size for the cash account. TP report that 8 offices (FAD 252329, 205329, 407329, 258523, 188504, 156523, 166328, 461329) produced cash accounts with the old font size.			
Signatures (11)			
Witness / Reviewer	Horizon Acceptance Test Manager	Pathway	AIM
Date:	Date:	Date:	Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
Entered in Acceptance Database			Date:

Acceptance Incident Analysis Form		To be completed by the ICL Pathway Acceptance Manager to be given to the Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager	
Acceptance Incident Number (1)	Analysis Sequence Number (2)		
372			
Acceptance Test Name (3)			
POCL Infrastructure			
Analysed Incident Severity (4)	High / Medium / Low (4)	Authority (5)	
	None		
Analysis of Acceptance Incident (6)			
For each of the individual points made in the AI, the Pathway analysis is provided following (in italic font)			
1. A number of errors were caused by corruptions to .dll files:			
<i>This was not an error of the software distribution process itself, but a problem during the transfer of the distributed files to the Windows NT operational directory, and was apparent on 3 counters. The underlying cause of this remains under investigation; to date the characteristics have not been reproducible. From a systems management perspective the consequences were correctly handled – the counters were successfully regressed and recommitted.</i>			
2. Approximately 35 outlets made calls to the HSH with the problem of appearance of a No Entry sign on the desktop preventing continuation (Pathway problem reference PC0027743).			
<i>This problem is entirely unconnected with the software distribution process and is not a systems management issue. A fix to this has been implemented in WP 5138; this will be distributed to the live estate in the immediate future.</i>			
3. An LT2 change was to the font size for the cash account. TP report that 8 offices (FAD 252329, 205329, 407329, 258523, 188504, 156523, 166328, 461329) produced cash accounts with the old font size.			
<i>Pathway is not aware of any reported incidents relating to the font size used in cash account printing following the LT1 to LT2 upgrade.</i>			
The upgrade was achieved in line with the general requirements of R537 in terms of both speed and accuracy, with the vast majority of outlets updated within the Pathway target timescale of Monday morning, and all within the critical timescale of the following Wednesday to support operation of the revised cash account procedures (with the exception of one part-time office which does not open on Wednesdays).			
The LT1 to LT2 upgrade report and supplementary information has been supplied to POCL covering the incidents described and others. POCL observations on this report have been received and comments on these observations are provided in a separate response document.			
Clearance Action (7)			
Number of continuation pages ICL Pathway request closure of this Incident based on the upgrade reports provided and that all outlets are now running on LT2.			
Comments on the observations supplied by POCL on 7/8 are in preparation at this time (9/8). Ongoing monitoring as requested in the observations will be provided. POCL already has access to the Systems Management Monitoring reports published on the Pathway website. This provides details of software distribution actions (fixes etc.) covering the start date for distribution, 95% complete and 100% complete. Any issues arising from such monitoring should be raised by POCL at the Service Review Forum.			
Subject to POCL assessment of the comments supplied, Pathway anticipates that this AI will be Closed or recategorised by Thursday 12/8.			

Number of continuation pages:			
Acceptance Incident Status (Open / Analysed / Retest / Recommended for KPR (8))		Resolved	
Signatures:			
I propose the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above	Dave Hollingsworth	ICL Pathway Test Manager	11th August 1999
I accept / reject the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above		Horizon Acceptance Test Manager	Date:
Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager			Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
	Date:		Date:

Acceptance Incident Form		Acceptance Incident Number (1) 376	
Acceptance Test Name (2) TIP Interface		Source (3) BSM	Date Observed (4) 19/07/99
Witness/Reviewer who observed Incident (Owner) (5) Martin Box			Authority (6)
Incident Type (7)	Criterion Reference (8) (if criterion not met)	Incident Severity (9)	
<input checked="" type="radio"/> Criterion not met <input type="radio"/> Substantive fault <input type="radio"/> Other	831-01	<input type="radio"/> High <input type="radio"/> Medium <input type="radio"/> Low <input checked="" type="radio"/> Pending <input type="radio"/> None	
Description of Incident (10) New Description: AIS contravention/ Data integrity - derived cash account not equal to the electronic cash account. Incidents (TIP 821, 822, 846, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 864, 965, 866, 868, 869, 870, 873, 874) have been raised by TIP in respect of all transactions that constitute a cash account have not been received by TIP or when electronic cash accounts received where transactions that have been conducted and received by TIP are missing from the respective cash account lines. These issues have come to light when comparing a TIP derived cash account with the electronic cash account sent by Pathway. Not all instances of similar occurrences have been logged by TIP as the physical resource to check each occurrence of a difference within the derived versus the electronic is not available. It was expected that this facility would by now be comparing like with like. This is very significant. Missing transactions and missing cash account line entries cause reconciliation failures within POCL back end systems and error resolution is invoked. The cash account produced by the Organisational Unit in these instances must be in doubt and is not a fair reflection of the business undertaken at each Organisational Unit. A subpostmaster may be asked to bring to account an error, but the error was produced via system failure rather than human failure. Many hours of investigation at both the front end and back end have taken place to help resolve these problems. The benefits assigned to POCL back end system in respect of an automated cash account are being questioned. Severity: POCL - high - would effect POCL's ability to produce an accurate cash account. PWY - accept the problem exists. Would argue about the severity - would it genuinely effect the accounting integrity as it currently exists? Rectification: Steve Warwick to provide rectification of this issue. PWY understand the problem and are currently working on the fix. Steve Warwick to provide details.			
Signatures (11)			
Witness / Reviewer	Horizon Acceptance Test Manager	Pathway	AIM
Date:	Date:	Date:	Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
Entered in Acceptance Database			Date:

Acceptance Incident Analysis Form		To be completed by the ICL Pathway Acceptance Manager to be given to the Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager	
Acceptance Incident Number (1)	376	Analysis Sequence Number (2)	
Acceptance Test Name (3) TIP Interface			
Analysed Incident Severity (4)	High / Medium / Low (4) Low	Authority (5)	
<p>Analysis of Acceptance Incident (6) Pathway has analysed all occurrences where the (TIP) derived cash account does not equal the actual cash account (up to TIP 883). There is no suggestion or indication that there is a fault in the calculation or reporting of the Cash Account; the incidents relate to an occasional missing transaction when reporting to TIP. This had a rate of occurrence of c. 1% of outlets per week based on an analysis of the reported TIP incidents. It is agreed this would have been unsustainably high when considered against a target population of 20,000 outlets.</p> <p>The agent modification referred to in previous analyses has been operational since 3/8 and is operating successfully.</p> <p>An updated summary of TIP incidents was supplied 11/8 as actioned. As noted the root problem has been diagnosed in all non "serve customer" transactions leaving one further problem under diagnosis relating to occasional scales transactions, which are all in serve customer mode and are corrected by the agent modification noted above.</p> <p>In addition Pathway has established routine monitoring for all harvesting exceptions and should any occur will notify them to TIP in advance and has agreed a suitable procedure with TIP, thereby substantially reducing the TIP effort in handling any exceptions.</p> <p>POCL has removed the aspect concerning the reference data change from core to non core from this AI and re-raised it as AI 410 (TIP Incident 866). In this case there is no fault within the Pathway system. Pathway has proposed an approach to POCL to avoid this problem through the use of product types within RD.</p>			
<p>Clearance Action (7) The fix to reconstitute missing transaction attributes was introduced 3/8. Pathway confirms that at the time of completing this analysis no further missing transactions have been noted to date by Pathway internal monitoring.</p> <p>Subject to satisfactory processing by TIP of the cash account for week 19 in line with the reduced incident rate proposed by Pathway, and with the above procedures in place to notify any exceptions, Pathway assess the severity of the incident as "low".</p> <p>Ongoing monitoring for the next three months should progressively reduce occurrence to a maximum of 0.1% at which point the incident be closed.</p>			
Number of continuation pages			
Acceptance Incident Status (Open/Analysed/Retest/Recommended for KPR (8))		Resolved	
Signatures:			
I propose the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above	John Pope	ICL Pathway Test Manager	11th August 1999
I accept / reject the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above		Horizon Acceptance Test Manager	Date:
Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager			Date:

1, 2, 3
6, 7, 8

DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
Date:		Date:	

Acceptance Incident Form		Acceptance Incident Number (1) 378	
Acceptance Test Name (2) TIP Interface		Source (3) BSM	Date Observed (4) 19/07/99
Witness/Reviewer who observed Incident (Owner) (5) Martin Box			Authority (6)
Incident Type (7)	Criterion Reference (8) (if criterion not met)	Incident Severity (9)	
<input checked="" type="radio"/> Criterion not met <input type="radio"/> Substantive fault <input type="radio"/> Other	831-01	<input type="radio"/> High <input type="radio"/> Medium <input type="radio"/> Low <input checked="" type="radio"/> Pending <input type="radio"/> None	
Description of Incident (10) New Description: Incidents (TIP 806, 867) have been raised in respect of a cash account sub file containing only stock holding records and not a cash account record as expected. This held up the processing of the cash account within POCL's back end systems. This was correctly rejected by TIP. Severity: POCL - medium - due to time taken to investigate each problem and knock on impact on POCL back end systems. PWY - accept the problem exists. Dispute medium rating. Rectification: Steve Warwick to provide rectification of this issue. A fix exists - Steve to provide details of dates for download to outlets so TIP can monitor the rectification.			
Signatures (11)			
Witness / Reviewer	Horizon Acceptance Test Manager	Pathway	AIM
Date:	Date:	Date:	Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
Entered in Acceptance Database			Date:

Acceptance Incident Analysis Form		To be completed by the ICL Pathway Acceptance Manager to be given to the Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager	
Acceptance Incident Number (1) 378		Analysis Sequence Number (2)	
Acceptance Test Name (3) TIP Interface			
Analysed Incident Severity (4)		High / Medium / Low (4) None/Low	Authority (5)
Analysis of Acceptance Incident (6) Fix applied 9-10/8			
Number of continuation pages			
Clearance Action (7) POCL to monitor for Cash Accounts prepraed 11-12/8 and close (or recategorise).			
Number of continuation pages			
Acceptance Incident Status (Open/ Analysed Retest/Recommended for KPR (8))		Resolved	
Signatures:			
I propose the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above	P. John Pope	ICL Pathway Test Manager	11th August 1999
I accept / reject the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above		Horizon Acceptance Test Manager	Date:
Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager			Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
	Date:		Date:

Acceptance Incident Form		Acceptance Incident Number (1) 390	
Acceptance Test Name (2) APS		Source (3) Review	Date Observed (4) 09/07/99
Witness/Reviewer who observed Incident (Owner) (5) Bob Cragg			Authority (6)
Incident Type (7)	Criterion Reference (8) (if criterion not met)		Incident Severity (9)
<input checked="" type="radio"/> Criterion not met <input type="radio"/> Substantive fault <input type="radio"/> Other	549-02		<input type="radio"/> High <input type="radio"/> Medium <input type="radio"/> Low <input checked="" type="radio"/> Pending <input type="radio"/> None
Description of Incident (10) Recovery facilities are inadequate for the recovery of transactions. They fail criterion 32, 549/2 This area of functionality is weak and requires the operator to declare the reversal as a lost transaction and then at a later point reverse the recovered transaction. This procedure is difficult to operate and does not provide full audit trail for reversed transactions. When declaring the transactions that have been missed the range is referred to as the "gap". It has come to light that the NR2 system only supports one gap. Due to the business need to continue trading by delaying the recovery, it is possible that additional failures will create further "gaps". Since the system does not support this there is a shortfall in process / procedures.			
Signatures (11)			
Witness / Reviewer	Horizon Acceptance Test Manager	Pathway	AIM
Date:	Date:	Date:	Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
Entered in Acceptance Database			Date:

Acceptance Incident Analysis Form		<i>To be completed by the ICL Pathway Acceptance Manager to be given to the Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager.</i>	
Acceptance Incident Number (1) 390		Analysis Sequence Number (2)	
Acceptance Test Name (3) APS			
Analysed Incident Severity (4)		High / Medium / Low (4) Low	Authority (5)
<p>Analysis of Acceptance Incident (6)</p> <p>POCL will be aware that ICL Pathway are changing the recovery processes of APS for CSR+. This includes providing support for recovery of reversals. At CSR+ APS will automatically write recovery transactions for all AP transactions. In the event of a Session failure these recovery transactions will be used to automatically recover their original AP transaction.</p> <p>In the event of a Disaster recovery at CSR +, the concept of gaps is removed. In this situation the message store is being reinstated from a remote node and the recovery transactions are not available. APS simply asks the clerk for details of any receipts which he has which have a date/time more recent than the latest known APS transaction message. If the clerk chooses not to recover all receipts in this category then the clerk must retain these receipts for later processing. The data entry process will also use check digits on each data item being entered from the receipt.</p>			
Number of continuation pages			
<p>Clearance Action (7)</p> <p>None.</p>			
Number of continuation pages			
Acceptance Incident Status (Open / Analysed / Retest / Recommended for KPR (8))			
Signatures:			
I propose the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above	D.Cooke	ICL Pathway Test Manager	Date: 11/8/99
I accept / reject the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above		Horizon Acceptance Test Manager	Date:
Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager			Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
	Date:		Date:

Acceptance Incident Form		Acceptance Incident Number (1) 391	
Acceptance Test Name (2) Security		Source (3) BSM	Date Observed (4) 22/07/99
Witness/Reviewer who observed Incident (Owner) (5) Jeremy Folkes			Authority (6)
Incident Type (7)	Criterion Reference (8) (if criterion not met)	Incident Severity (9)	
<input checked="" type="radio"/> Criterion not met <input type="radio"/> Substantive fault <input type="radio"/> Other	PS-22, PS-39, PS-40, PS-41, 698-03, 698-02, 698-01	High Medium Low <input checked="" type="radio"/> Pending None	
Description of Incident (10) <p>The physical security controls in force at the two main Pathway data centres at Bootle and Wigan are deficient in a number of areas, when measured against best practice, relevant standards (BS7799, as required by 698.03 and PS41, DITSS as required by PS22) and Pathway's own Security Management Procedures (RS/PRO/028 1.0 10.5.99), which form part of Pathway's Security Policy (RS/POL/002 4.0 30.4.99), which is in turn the response to Requirement 698.02.</p> <p>The data centres are a critical element of the Pathway service provided to POCL, and should be protected to an adequate standard to control the risks and liabilities of both Pathway and POCL (as per 698.01 and PS39).</p> <p>Recent inspections of the Data Centres show that the quoted criteria are not met. Detailed comments have been passed to ICL Pathway on a number of occasions, including following the last site visit on the 22nd July. However, these include:</p> <p>Bootle</p> <p>1. The Data Centre is located within 2m of a car park used by staff from a number of other organisations over which ICL Pathway have no control, and to which visitors cars have largely unrestricted access. The DITSS recommends a 25m vehicle exclusion zone. There are no physical restrictions on pedestrian access up to within 2m of the Data Centre, with the outer site fence claimed purely to be a delimiter and not intended as a physical control. CCTV coverage of the car park close to the Data Centre does not appear good, and POCL have been denied permission to view the CCTV coverage. Pathway's previous stated mitigations to the proximity of the car park, based on CCTV tracking, control of visitors cars, etc do not appear to be effective.</p> <p>2. The fence protecting the Data Centre itself is in such a poor state as to offer only a low level of protection against intrusion - at various points tensioning wires are missing, the fence is not secured to the ground, locks are missing or</p>			
Signatures (11)			
Witness / Reviewer	Horizon Acceptance Test Manager	Pathway	AIM
Date:	Date:	Date:	Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
Entered in Acceptance Database			Date:

Acceptance Incident Analysis Form		<i>To be completed by the ICL Pathway Acceptance Manager to be given to the Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager.</i>	
Acceptance Incident Number (1) <p style="text-align: center;">391</p>		Analysis Sequence Number (2)	
Acceptance Test Name (3) <p style="text-align: center;">Security</p>			
Analysed Incident Severity (4)		High / Medium / Low (4) <p style="text-align: center;">LOW</p>	Authority (5)
Analysis of Acceptance Incident (6) BOOTLE The points raised at 1 & 2 are well understood by Pathway and were fully covered in the Bootle Data Centre Threat Assessment document (RS/REP/007). A copy of Version 1 was provided to Horizon together with other documents on 23/2/99. (Document now at version 2.0 dated 11/5/99). These items have been discussed at length between Pathway and Horizon in the past. It should be noted in addition that the levels of threat analysed in this document also related to the Benefit Payment workload. At the 22/7/99 visit, only one element of the control procedures described in earlier discussion and agreements was not demonstrable. This being, access to the CCTV monitoring. Pathway was unable on the day to arrange access to the CCTV monitoring facility because the officers with appropriate authority were not available. (Action point 1). (Continued on a further page)			
Number of continuation pages		ONE	
Clearance Action (7) 1. Pathway will arrange for a further visit to Bootle to be scheduled on or before 10th August 1999 for nominated Pathway and Horizon staff (if required) to view the CCTV coverage. ACTION B Procter by 30/7/99 2. A meeting is being arranged for week commencing 2nd August with Graham Hooper (A & L Corporate Security) and Colin Jones (A & L Property Services Manager). The actual date will be confirmed by 30th July 1999 ACTION B Procter			
Number of continuation pages			
Acceptance Incident Status (Open/Analysed Retes/Recommended for KPR (8))			
Signatures:			
I propose the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above	Dave Jones	ICL Pathway Test Manager	Date: 29/07/99
I accept / reject the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above		Horizon Acceptance Test Manager	Date:
Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager			Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
	Date:		Date:

Analysis of Acceptance Incident #391 (6) (Continued from previous page)

Specific points raised in the Acceptance Incident together with the associated Threat Assessment and Recommendations references

1. Car park Proximity & Pedestrian access - Covered in RS/REP/007 Section 3 No. 2, 4 & 7
 - Fence delimiter - Covered in RS/REP/007 Section 3 No. 2, 4 & 7
 - Previous mitigation statement - Covered in RS/REP/007 Section 3 No. 1
- 2 Fence around Data Centre
 - Following previous visits and Horizon recommendations, improvements were made to the fence; E.G. Ducting made more secure, gate bolts protected by metal plates, "V" shaped barbed wire installed on top of the fence.
 - It is accepted that some problems remain with the upkeep. The issues quoted were raised with A & L Group Property Services Manager (North) and further specific action requested to improve matters on 27/7/99.
 - An urgent meeting has also been requested with A&L Corporate Security Manager to confirm that the necessary actions have been carried out or have been planned. (Action point 2)
 - Quick denial of service attack - Covered in RS/REP/007 Section 3 No. 1, 2, 4 & 7

WIGAN

The points raised are well understood by Pathway and have been discussed at length between Pathway and Horizon in the past.

The recommendations made on previous visits required the erection of a new palisade fence to protect the Data Centre exterior wall and modifications to the security guard procedures. Both of these have been completed and this has been acknowledged by Horizon. The details were confirmed in the Girobank letter dated 15/2/99, copied to Ian Stevenson on 23/2/99. The palisade fence was erected in accordance with Pathway specification.

The only outstanding action on these works is to provide Horizon with a copy of an updated Wigan site plan recording the location of the palisade fence. Pathway will provide a copy when it is available from A & L.

Specific points raised in the Acceptance Incident:

- 1 Pedestrian access - The site perimeter fence is intended to act only as a boundary marker. Accordingly, and in response to agreed requirements, Pathway/A &L have clearly defined and installed a robust security perimeter for the Data Centre building.
 - CCTV monitoring - There is intruder detection on the new palisade fence. During the day the CCTV is centred on the palisade fence, at night the CCTV is centred on the perimeter fence but if the palisade Sabrephonic guard wire is triggered the CCTV will revert back to the palisade fence area. Standing instructions exist for the response to any alarm on the site.
 - Missing camera/CCTV upgrade - As stated above a CCTV camera covers the palisade fence and the perimeter fence and is specific for the area under surveillance.

DOCUMENT REFERENCES

The AI quotes Pathway's Security Management Procedures. Pathway considers that the security on the sites is commensurate with threats to the services.

The security within the inner fence area described in RS/REP/007 for Bootle, which is also covered in the A & L letter of 15/12/98, is further evidence of appropriate provision. (e.g. Moat, motion detection, CCTV, active infrared beam, building construction - concrete floors, double glazed and shatterproof film lined windows).

It should also be noted that should denial of access or availability of service arise for whatever reason, the ultimate mitigation is the invocation of the site failover.

With regards to the provisions of BS7799 s5 and DITSS s13, these are adequately covered in the notes above and were also dealt with in earlier correspondence (in particular the letter to Ian Stevenson from Barry Procter dated 8/2/99.)

Analysis of Acceptance Incident #391 (6) Update following meetings on 5th & 6th August

Actions and points of note discussed and agreed between POCL (Bob Booth) and Pathway :

BOOTLE

1. Repairs to the fence, highlighted under Bootle item 2 in the initial Incident description, are to be carried out by A & L by the end of August.
2. Pathway have asked OSD to specifically include a report on security aspects at the monthly Service Review Forum rather than cover them on an exception basis. Any actions arising will be included in the minutes for the meeting, which will be available for viewing if required.
3. Pathway will provide POCL with dates for Phases 2 & 3 of the perimeter fence upgrade. Phase one is complete.
4. Bob Booth is to visit the site in early September with Barry Procter.

NOTE. The CCTV facilities had recently been upgraded to give automatic camera movement to any area where a sensor has been triggered.

As previously indicated, directly as a result of the Threat Analysis and regular Pathway reviews, actions were placed by Pathway on A & L to improve the security at the site.

WIGAN

1. Pathway will discuss the installation of a card access protection on the pedestrian access gate (adjacent to the canal), with Alliance & Leicester.
2. Pathway will establish that Security Guards respond to alarms to their pager within a 'reasonable' time period and, if they are unable to respond what back-up arrangements exist.
3. Pathway to provide more details on the planned new CCTV camera installation.

GENERAL

Pathway will discuss with A & L the inclusion of disaster recovery invocation [and resultant single site operation] as one of the events which triggers the state of alert change to RED. In such an event, the vehicle exclusion zone in Bootle would need to extend to 25 metres, or additional site security staff would be needed in Wigan.

Acceptance Incident Form		Acceptance Incident Number (1) 394	
Acceptance Test Name (2) APS		Source (3) BSM	Date Observed (4) 23/06/99
Witness/Reviewer who observed Incident (Owner) (5) Calum Craig		Authority (6)	
Incident Type (7)	Criterion Reference (8) (if criterion not met)	Incident Severity (9)	
Criterion not met Substantive fault Other		High Medium Low Pending None	
Description of Incident (10) A number of instances have been recorded by TP where re-prints of the Cash Account report show differences from the original report which cannot be explained by additional transactions.			
Signatures (11)			
Witness / Reviewer	Horizon Acceptance Test Manager	Pathway	AIM
Date:	Date:	Date:	Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
Entered in Acceptance Database			Date:

Acceptance Incident Analysis Form		<i>To be completed by the ICL Pathway Acceptance Manager to be given to the Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager</i>	
Acceptance Incident Number (1) 394		Analysis Sequence Number (2)	
Acceptance Test Name (3) APS			
Analysed Incident/Severity (4)		High / Medium / Low (4) None	Authority (5)
Analysis of Acceptance Incident (6) These incidents are all duplicates of E-9905250160 (PINICL 26066 - now closed). The original problem was caused by postmasters failing to complete one c/a report before starting the next; completing the report (via the complete button) required to reset variables prior to printing the next report.. To avoid problems of this type a modification to the Report Broker (WP_4931) was introduced at LT2 to support the printing of consecutive reports without the need to select "complete" and re-enter the report screen. There have been no notified re-occurrences of problems of this type.			
Number of continuation pages			
Clearance Action (7) Cleared as described above. POCL to close if no occurrences have been reported.			
Number of continuation pages			
Acceptance Incident Status (Open/Analysed Retes/Recommended for KPR (8))		Resolved	
Signatures:			
I propose the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above	John Pope	ICL Pathway Test Manager	Date: 11/8/99
I accept / reject the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above		Horizon Acceptance Test Manager	Date:
Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager			Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
	Date:		Date:

Acceptance Incident Form		Acceptance Incident Number (1) 395	
Acceptance Test Name (2) APS		Source (3) BSM	Date Observed (4) 23/06/99
Witness/Reviewer who observed Incident (Owner) (5) Calum Craig			Authority (6)
Incident Type (7)	Criterion Reference (8) (if criterion not met)	Incident Severity (9)	
Criterion not met Substantive fault Other		High Medium Low Pending None	
Description of Incident (10) TP have detected a number of incidents over the Live Trial period where duplicate AP transaction reference numbers have been issued and where unmatched AP transaction reversals have appeared. PinICLs 26752, 26835 and 27012 refer. It was anticipated that this problem would be cleared with the introduction of the LT2 software, however instances continue to be reported by both TP and TIP.			
Signatures (11)			
Witness / Reviewer	Horizon Acceptance Test Manager	Pathway	AIM
Date:	Date:	Date:	Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
Entered in Acceptance Database			Date:

Acceptance Incident Analysis Form		To be completed by the ICL Pathway Acceptance Manager to be given to the Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager	
Acceptance Incident Number (1) 395		Analysis Sequence Number (2)	
Acceptance Test Name (3) APS			
Analysed Incident Severity (4)		High / Medium / Low (4) Medium	Authority (5)
<p>Analysis of Acceptance Incident (6)</p> <p>This analysis is copied from AI 361, which discusses the PinICLs cited:</p> <p>This incident concerns duplicates. There are a number of causes which have been rectified. Incident 9905110226 was software error, now fixed. 9905210206 was duplicate events when issuing order books, now fixed. 9905280170 was software error now fixed. 9906220033 (APS sequence nos.) was a software error now fixed. 9906280140 was software error now fixed. 9906280141 & 9906290187 were errors associated with a one off situation of switching Bootle/Wigan (in this case also in conjunction with a problem within TIP concerning the treatment of previously received files).</p> <p>The underlying root cause PINICLs have all been closed with fixes applied 25086 (OBCS - LT1), 25348 (duplicate cash a/c lines - LT2), 27012/26835/26752 (all duplicates relating to Duplicate APS sequence nos - LT2). The sole exception is 26928 (which relates to the occurrence and treatment of potentially repeating / duplicate events) which required resolution with TIP over how they wished repeated events to be treated. TIP have indicated they want these screened out (this confirmation was required since repeated events can legitimately occur) and a fix to introduce this screening has been produced, tested and the release note is currently in preparation.</p> <p>There is a software fix to filter out duplicates. Fix waiting to be applied.</p> <p>Note that sometimes duplicate "events" are caused by users holding down the key too long. Duplicate records for EPOSS_Events and Book_Events will not be written to the TIP output files.</p>			
Number of continuation pages			
Clearance Action (7) POCL to close after further monitoring, or supply specific references to further incidents.			
Number of continuation pages			
Acceptance Incident Status (Open/ Analysed Retest/Recommended for KPR (8))		Resolved	
Signatures:			
I propose the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above	P. John Pope	ICL Pathway Test Manager	4th August 1999
I accept / reject the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above		Horizon Acceptance Test Manager	Date:
Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager			Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
	Date:		Date:

Acceptance Incident Analysis Form		To be completed by the ICL Pathway Acceptance Manager to be given to the Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager	
Acceptance Incident Number (1)	Analysis Sequence Number (2)		
395			
Acceptance Test Name (3)			
APS			
Analysed Incident Severity (4)	High / Medium / Low (4)	Authority (5)	
	None/Low		
<p>Analysis of Acceptance Incident (6)</p> <p>All instances of APS duplicate records and unmatched reversals have arisen from the same APS recovery situations. (Incidents up to and including TIP 876 & 881) There was a fault in the LT1 software which resulted in the allocation of a duplicate sequence number in certain circumstances even if the clerk had followed correct recovery procedures. This was fixed was fixed at LT2.</p> <p>Since LT2 there have been a small number of occurrences of a related incident which has arisen through failure at the outlet to follow correct procedures during recovery. In these situations APS has been forced into crash recovery (apparently by clerks not logging out and/or powering off PCs) and during the recovery, the incorrect APS sequence number has been entered. (See below.)</p> <p>On the basis that the root error has been eliminated and the incident rate consequentially reduced Pathway rate this incident as low severity.</p> <p>In addition we are adding a validation check to APS recovery to prevent a clerk entering as the last transaction a number lower than the last transaction known to the system. This will further reduce the occurrence of duplicate transaction numbers. This fix will be released soon, probably during August.</p>			
Number of continuation pages			
Clearance Action (7)			
POCL to close or recategorise after further monitoring, noting that AI 390 provides an enhancement path.			
Number of continuation pages			
Acceptance Incident Status (Open/Analysed Retest/Recommended for KPR (8))		Resolved	
Signatures:			
I propose the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above	P. John Pope	ICL Pathway Test Manager	11th August 1999
I accept / reject the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above		Horizon Acceptance Test Manager	Date:
Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager			Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	

Acceptance Incident Form		Acceptance Incident Number (1) 408	
Acceptance Test Name (2) Service Levels		Source (3) BSM	Date Observed (4) 23/07/99
Witness/Reviewer who observed Incident (Owner) (5) David McLaughlin			Authority (6)
Incident Type (7)	Criterion Reference (8) (if criterion not met)	Incident Severity (9)	
Criterion not met Substantive fault Other		High Medium Low Pending None	
Description of Incident (10) Failure of the Horizon System helpdesk to support the network. there were six service level failures in the last reporting period and are listed below. Calls answered within 40s Calls abandoned through ring off Level 1 calls resolved within 5 mins Level 1 calls resolved within 10 mins Level 2 calls resolved within 30 mins Level 2 calls resolved within 45 mins All of these failures will have an impact on the network and customers.			
Signatures (11)			
Witness / Reviewer	Horizon Acceptance Test Manager	Pathway	AIM
Date:	Date:	Date:	Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
Entered in Acceptance Database			Date:

Acceptance Incident Analysis Form		To be completed by the ICL Pathway Acceptance Manager to be given to the Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager	
Acceptance Incident Number (1) 408		Analysis Sequence Number (2)	
Acceptance Test Name (3) Service Levels			
Analysed Incident Severity (4)		High / Medium / Low (4) None/Low	Authority (5)
<p>Analysis of Acceptance Incident (6)</p> <p>The roll out of LT1 and impact of the Wednesday CA activity has affected the SLA's identified. The influx of "expert domain" staff on to the HSH initially meant that average call duration rose substantially as all callers were trapped on the front line. This initially impacted all the named SLA targets. The expert domain was relocated to second line and we have introduced call scripts into HSH.</p> <p>The HSH has also introduced new staff in preparation for roll out. We identified that the new staff were not operating the call management procedures properly (ie call suspend) and call times were not being managed. New staff have been retrained the issue has now been removed.</p> <p>Call coding has been analysed an we have identified many calls classified as L1 (5 & 10 minutes) that are clearly L2 (30 - 45 min target). After manually reviewing and recoding these calls to L2 the SLA performance track has improved considerably. . Changes to the coding structure on HSH are being progressed.</p>			
Number of continuation pages		1	
<p>Clearance Action (7)</p> <p>The SLA targets are subject to the monthly Horizon Service Performance review process and POCL will be presented with the re-worked figures as described above.</p> <p>Given this situation I have given this incident a LOW severity.</p> <p>Letter confirming actions to date, SLA perfomance track and planned activites was sent to David McLaughlin 11/08/99 as actioned. I have confirmed David has recieved the letter, awaiting confrimation its is acceptable. Paul 11/08/99</p> <p>POCL to Close or recategorise as Low.</p>			
Number of continuation pages			
Acceptance Incident Status (Open/ Analysed/Retest/Recommended for KPR (8))		Analysed	
Signatures:			
I propose the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above	Paul Curley	ICL Pathway Test Manager	11/08/99
I accept / reject the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above		Horizon Acceptance Test Manager	Date:
Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager			Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
	Date:		Date:

Acceptance Incident Form		Acceptance Incident Number (1) 410	
Acceptance Test Name (2) TIP Interface		Source (3)	Date Observed (4) 15-Jul-99
Witness/Reviewer who observed Incident (Owner) (5) Mark Burley			Authority (6)
Incident Type (7)	Criterion Reference (8) (if criterion not met)		Incident Severity (9)
<input checked="" type="radio"/> Criterion not met <input type="radio"/> Substantive fault <input type="radio"/> Other	818/8		<input type="radio"/> High <input type="radio"/> Medium <input type="radio"/> Low <input type="radio"/> Pending <input type="radio"/> None
Description of Incident (10)			
<p>TIP have detected an instance where transactions received in the daily transaction file are not represented on the electronic cash account at the week end.</p> <p>The transactions missing from the cash account are associated with a product changing from core to non-core.</p> <p>TIP reference 866 HSH reference E9907150220</p>			
Signatures (11)			
Witness / Reviewer	Horizon Acceptance Test Manager	Pathway	AIM
Date:	Date:	Date:	Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
Entered in Acceptance Database			Date:

Acceptance Incident Analysis Form		To be completed by the IGL Pathway Acceptance Manager to be given to the Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager	
Acceptance Incident Number (1)	Analysis Sequence Number (2)		
410			
Acceptance Test Name (3)			
TIP Interface			
Analysed Incident Severity (4)	High / Medium / Low (4)	Authority (5)	
	None/Low		
Analysis of Acceptance Incident (6)			
<p>This incident was caused by POCL effectively ceasing a product at an outlet by changing it from core to noncore. The effect of this was to end date the current reference data for the product at all outlets, but to provide replacement reference data only to the sub-set of offices which were to handle the noncore product. At the end of the week any office which had transacted the product while it was core and was not designated to transact the product locally would fail to include such transactions on its cash account.</p> <p>It is well understood (and provided for in agreed procedures) that products must not be ceased - i.e. the item reference data must not be end-dated. Because of this the OBC procedures provide for the change of a product from noncore to core, but do NOT provide for the change of a product from core to noncore.</p> <p>At the Chesterfield Review of TIP Incidents on 29/7 POCL and Pathway agreed that this eventuality was not a Pathway fault and was classed as a "Category 2" operational incident. It is still Pathways view that this is no-fault, but we have taken the actions set out below to make explicit the prohibition on changing core items to non-core already implied by the prohibition on deleting items, and will as we already do for core item deletions, police attempted reference data changes to ensure that future errors by POCL are prevented.</p>			
Number of continuation pages			
Clearance Action (7)			
<p>We have suggested to POCL a method of working which would enable them to achieve the same business objective without doing an illegal reference data change: remove the core product using the agreed procedures (in which the product ref data is not end dated), and introduce a new noncore product at the required outlets.</p> <p>A new version (version 2.1) of the Reference Data Change Catalogue has been produced. The changes between versions 2.0 and 2.1 have been agreed with POCL (Andy Corbett, BSM OSG and Ijaz Bhatti, Automation Process Manager). The changes are:</p> <p>A statement that the change "core product becomes non core" is not available at CSR [section 6.5.5]. The amendment of "changing non-core product availability" to show that removal of outlets is not available at CSR [section 6.5.2].</p> <p>These changes are to remove the issue that arises when an outlet can no longer sell a product (which either used to be core, or was non-core and the availability has reduced) but has transacted it before the cash account has been produced, or still holds stock for the product (where applicable).</p> <p>OSG BSM will reject any requests from the Business which are identified as removing the availability of a product from outlets, in line with the RDCC, before it reaches ICL Pathway.</p> <p>ICL Pathway will impact changes from POCL against the RDCC, and any new requests to end the availability of a product at outlets (unless part of a permanent outlet closure) will be rejected, as is already done for attempts to delete core items.</p> <p>Pathway expects that this AI will be recategorised by POCL as Closed.</p> <p>If POCL cannot agree to close this incident by 12/8 then Pathway asks that it should be recategorised as Low on the grounds that POCL has confirmed that this class of change is now explicitly excluded from agreed Business Change procedures.</p>			

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Number of continuation pages			
Acceptance Incident Status (Open/Analysed/Retes/Recommended for KPR (8))		Resolved	
Signatures			
I propose the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above	P. John Pope	IGL Pathway Test Manager	Date: 11th August 1999
I accept / reject the Clearance Action and Incident Status described above		Horizon Acceptance Test Manager	Date:
Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager			Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
	Date:		Date:

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Number of continuation pages			
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Horizon Acceptance Incident Manager			Date:
DSS Acceptance Manager		POCL Business Assurance	
	Date:		Date: