

Witness Name: Roderick Mark Ismay

Statement No: WITN04630100

Dated : 13 January 2023

POST OFFICE HORIZON IT INQUIRY

FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF RODERICK MARK ISMAY

I, Roderick Mark Ismay will say as follows:

Introduction

1. I understand that the purpose of this witness statement is to set out matters of fact of which I have personal knowledge.
2. This witness statement was drafted in my own words with my solicitor's assistance during a process including the preparation of successive drafts after communications between me and those advisers in writing, by telephone and by video conference.
3. The facts within this witness statement are either within my own knowledge, or derive from the records provided by the Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry. However, as it relates to events that occurred in some cases up to nineteen years ago, there are several areas that I do not recall. Where that is the case, I have said so.
4. This statement responds to the request for a written witness statement

pursuant to Rule 9 of the Inquiry Rules 2006 reference WITN0463R9 (1)/LD/20221007 dated 7 October 2022. My witness statement responds to the questions asked in Appendix 1 regarding the Post Office Horizon computer project.

Professional Background

5. I joined Post Office Ltd in September 2003 as Head of Risk and Control, in the Finance Directorate, having previously worked for Ernst & Young. I consider myself to be a finance professional, with a background in audit and accounting and positive experience of board reporting, staff engagement and process improvement.
6. The role began with just two internal control managers, but evolved to take on responsibility for the branch audit team
7. Initially, a large part of my time was involved in researching financial services regulatory compliance requirements. Post Office Ltd was developing a relationship with the Bank of Ireland to transform the range of financial services products available in branches and I was asked to be involved. My work led to clarification of Post Office Ltd's position as an appointed representative of the Bank of Ireland and to the initiation of further compliance workstreams.
8. I also oversaw the Anti-Money Laundering Team. This further dimension of compliance meant my role involved much cross business liaison and reporting, leading to the development of a Compliance Committee for Post Office Ltd.

9. My role also evolved to include the Investigations Team and to involve more working with the cash logistics team.
10. Network cash holdings were at such a level as to exacerbate working capital and security risks. I therefore became involved in a significant engagement project with supply chain and network teams to improve the targetry for individual branch cash holdings and to work with subpostmasters and branch managers to reassure them that their branches could serve customers reliably with lower cash holdings.
11. Several high value branch losses arose in this period. This type of matter would be followed up by Investigations, which had become part of my team. This led to further evolution of the role in prevention and compliance – focusing in particular on cash holdings and on cheque holding and dispatch. At the same time, my role developed more dialogue with the Product & Branch Accounting Team (P&BA). POL was preparing to deploy new central finance systems for accounting and for management information. This involved many workstreams with all areas of Finance including P&BA and took an increasing amount of my time.
12. As Post Office Ltd evolved and as teams changed, my work above led to a natural progression towards the P&BA team. I was asked to take over the role of Head of Product & Branch Accounting in June 2006, ceasing my previous role.
13. This role in P&BA evolved with various priorities in different years. These included major projects such as procurement tenders and consequent migration to new suppliers for cheque processing and card processing,

support for the deployment of new products for customers, entry into telephony, engagement in the cessation of products and continuous improvement of back office processes and support for branches.

14. Throughout all these changes and projects, my role and P&BA's role continued to have a keen focus on working collaboratively with teams across the organization to make it as easy as possible for transaction processing in branches and for the subsequent central processing, reporting and settlement with clients. By clients I mean third party organisations such as banks and government agencies who were owed money by, or owed money to, POL as a result of transactions with customers.
15. I prioritised constructive relationships with other teams in POL, with the NFSP, with CWU, with Multiple Partners and with clients and suppliers and promoted a culture of such relationships amongst Team Leaders in P&BA. We received positive feedback from such organisations, including about collaborative working, tone of voice and commitment to continuous improvement. This included many site visits and floor walks with such partners.
16. The whole Finance function underwent structural change over time, with several roles related to financial and management accounting moving from London to Chesterfield. Preparation for Royal Mail privatisation, and separation of Post Office Ltd, necessitated further changes such as creating an Accounts Payable team in POL. My role consequently evolved to recruit into and take responsibility for such new functions in Chesterfield. In doing so, the broader responsibilities for my team and myself led to P&BA

becoming the Finance Service Centre. This was central to my role evolution from 2012 to 2016.

17. I left Post Office Ltd in March 2016.
18. My qualification for the roles was as a Chartered Accountant

Training

19. I did not design the training delivered to subpostmasters. Members of my team would, however, have had input where business changes were being initiated which would impact on P&BA as well as on branches. I may also have been included as a reviewer on some of these. I felt that adequate training was very important in the function of the Horizon system and that this should be backed up by central support teams which colleagues in branches should feel comfortable to call if in doubt. I had no reason to believe that the training was not adequate. It is highly likely that the Post Office would have received feedback about training from Subpostmasters and I expect that this would have been addressed in the training where appropriate.
20. Document NFSP00000521 (National Federation of Subpostmasters: Report of a meeting of the NEC) refers to a crib sheet to assist in disputing Transaction Corrections. I cannot recall this crib sheet, nor why it would have been felt that such an addition was needed, over and above what guidance and support may already have been available at the time.

Advice and Assistance

21. The NBSC was a very important source of advice and assistance. I cannot

remember how it evolved over time.

22. Based on the quoted document, POL00029732 (internal emails re Subpostmaster concerns), and the file issue raised that day, I do agree something needed to change at that time. In this incident it appeared there had been file duplication and omission. They needed to be sent on time and once only.
23. Document POL00039228 (Branch Support Programme DRAID log) appears to be a programme action log covering a wide range of topics including training, compliance, customer complaints, new products, communications and project administration. The breadth of topics and number of actions suggests a strong commitment to advice and assistance, but with such a wide network, a wide product set and multiple programmes ongoing at any one time, I do not feel able to comment on the adequacy of advice and assistance based on this very detailed log.

Function of Horizon

24. The Ping Project was established to help sub-postmasters and to prevent the need for such large resource dedicated to administering the related errors in P&BA. I was an advocate for this project and believed it had clear benefits for branches and also for back office teams.
25. As FUJ00091215 (Interfacing Client Data into POL Systems) and FUJ00091234 (Ping Project Requirements Catalogue) set out, Ping related to standalone product terminals and had an initial focus on Camelot. It was intended to reduce the number of differences by eliminating the need for manual input. Without Ping, branches had to get a report from the Camelot

terminal and then key specific data from it into Horizon. In practice there were a lot of conformance errors including confusion about which data, which time period and also not entering the data at all.

26. The Camelot terminal was the prime source of transactional data. This was the device where the customer had been served, it was the source of data sent to Camelot and the source of the same data for branches to enter into Horizon.
27. Ping proposed to make the process easier by sending a Transaction Acceptance to the branch, based on the Camelot data, and prompting the branch to run a receipt from the Camelot terminal which would enable them to assure themselves that the data in the TA was correct and consistent with their own in branch Camelot terminal. Given that many branches had been unsure how to generate the data before and how to record it, this new opportunity seemed to be a very positive step to help branches
28. My teams primarily worked using a central SAP finance system, not Horizon, and so we would not have had direct user experience to inform views on Horizon except in so far as transaction corrections suggested opportunities for improvement at the counter, or to the limited extent that we actually worked in branch to help at Christmas or during strikes. Based on document FUJ00097480 (HNG-x Release 2 Implementation Plan), the ability to deploy "Ping" and the list of other changes appeared to be dependent on the progress of the Horizon releases. With the passage of time, however, I am afraid I cannot remember what I thought, nor what my level of awareness would have been, about Horizon Online and HNG-X Release 2 and how the

release functioned, other than that it would have enabled progress on Ping.

29. Regarding POL00029370 (Review of the Creation and Management of Transaction Corrections in POLFD to Correct Accounting Errors in Horizon), P&BA refers to Product & Branch Accounting which was my team at the time.
30. Transactions Corrections at the time were identified either from matching processes or from queries raised.
31. Matching processes were in place where there were two streams of data originating from the same transaction. One stream would be the Horizon file sent to the POLFS system in P&BA. The other stream might be a data file transmitted direct to a client, who in turn used it to send data back to P&BA. It might also be a summary derived from paperwork arising from a transaction.
32. Queries raised might come from clients, branches or cash centres as explained in the document.
33. There may have been scope for error in branch, at clients or in P&BA but mitigations against this included balancing routines in branch, batch controls in data transfers and the ability to request evidence to query the transaction corrections.
34. Regarding POL00001697 (Royal Mail Internal Information. Back Office Efficiency Programme-Stock Adjustments), and the work related to stock adjustments, my recollection is not that it was suggesting Horizon Online functionality was causing discrepancies through the way it processed the

user transaction, but rather that it created an opportunity for a sales icon on screen to be used for unintended purposes.

35. My recollection is that branches would sometimes select “other postage” as a fast way to process a more complex transaction, with the expectation that later in the day they would reverse the “other postage” transaction and put the correct transaction through. They might also correct it by way of stock adjustment. Horizon would accurately reflect the incorrect transaction they entered. It could in turn have issues for sales data where sales were based on stock movements.
36. My recollection is that the other issue in this area was in branches which had a separate retail business as well as a Post Office. Customers obviously only want to queue once and pay once, even if they were buying items from both the retail side and the Post Office side. Branches therefore sometimes used “other postage” as a way to process retail sales through the Post Office side, with the expectation that they would reverse it and align the Post Office and Retail tills later on. Again, Horizon would accurately record what the user keyed as “other postage” and if, and until, it was corrected it would be a “genuine error” in terms of genuine retail sales proceeds temporarily recorded in the wrong till system.
37. My recollection is that the stock adjustment project sought to resolve this. It was tackling a consequence of operational challenges for retail branches and customer service, not a functionality issue in terms of Horizon data processing.

Review of Horizon Integrity

38. Regarding POL00054371 (Emails regarding Horizon dispute cases), I don't recall that there were serious concerns within POL management about the integrity of the Horizon system at that time. However, it was clearly recognized that allegations were being made about the system and as one of the writers of the emails states it was "to confirm our belief in the robustness of the system." POL had a number of in-house technical experts and I do not recall a sense that the system was being doubted by these specialists. There was also an understanding that there had been independent technical reviews at deployment of the system, such as the Gartner report referred to in POL00026572 (Horizon Response to Challenges Regarding Systems Integrity). As a finance professional, I drew comfort from in-house IT experts as regards the function of the system, and the reference to reviews commissioned such as Gartner.
39. Regarding POL00026572, I confirm that I did write this report, after being asked by David Smith to conduct a review in light of the challenges being made about the system. It was a summary of existing conclusions, not a fresh investigation. The conclusions came from internal discussions with recipients of the document or with their team members that they recommended be consulted, including IT.
40. The report suggested that Post Office Ltd was justified to assume that the losses identified at audit were due to theft. This statement was based on the understanding that POL management still did not have serious concerns about the integrity of Horizon and so their view regarding the past cases would not have changed. It was also made in light of the range of controls and mitigations noted throughout the document. At that time, the belief was

that the overwhelming evidence pointed to human error with respect to shortfalls, that there was no independent expert evidence suggesting a serious problem with Horizon and that POL had invested considerably in mitigations including training and support.

41. The report was requested, and I wrote it, in an environment where challenges were made about Horizon, but there was no ready document available which pulled together reasons for assurance.
42. With the benefit of hindsight the report should have had a more formal scoping exercise and then included terms of reference and attribution of content. It should have had a more measured tone. However, my recollection is that the report was deemed fit for purpose by the Managing Director as a summary of existing understanding based on conclusions from expert and specialist teams in POL.
43. In hindsight, my own perception and wider management perception of the likely validity of allegations about Horizon may have been influenced by such things as understandings of feedback at audit and by a belief in the controls and mitigations which went on to be summarized in this 2010 paper. With the benefit of hindsight I would therefore have summarized the same lists of controls, but would not have made such an assertive executive summary. I should simply have stated that these were the mitigating factors noted from discussions with the report addressees or with their representatives, and allowed those to be considered by the recipients. At the time, however, the general belief amongst teams at POL, including IT, led to the tone of the executive summary in the report.

44. It may also have been helpful to have been able to reflect more about the individual cases and challenges made, in order to determine how the mitigations and Post Office understanding of each case compared against the specific elements of each branches challenge.
45. The report should have explained more about the phrase “compassionate”, in order to justify its use. In hindsight this word does read at odds with the subsequent comment about the role of a Prosecuting Authority.
46. Any comment that there were no errors within the system that could account for the losses was made in a context where it was understood that none of the issues narrated in the report had been identified at the branches in question.
47. Regarding the email POL00088956 (Emails: Follow up to BIS meeting on JFSA Suspension cases) , I do not remember that email or what may have happened subsequent to it, however, on the face of it it does beg a question as to how it arose, how it was resolved and how it could be assured that it hadn’t happened before or couldn’t happen again.
48. Regarding the Receipts and Payments Mismatch, the emails suggest that Fujitsu were investigating in detail. I cannot remember what information I would have had, nor the process I followed, but it looks like I had reviewed some data leading to a set of specific questions which were either answered or committed to be answered. On the face of these emails, in hindsight, it appears from Fujitsu’s comments and from POL’s Service Delivery Team comments that Fujitsu were focused on explaining and resolving the issue. I cannot recall how adequately I felt they ultimately dealt with it.

49. Regarding FUJ00084797 (Emails: Local Suspense Problem), I cannot recall what the local suspense problem was, what steps I may have taken nor any views on how Fujitsu dealt with it.
50. Regarding FUJ00081880 (Peak Incident Management System) and POL00029908 (Emails: Dalmellington Outreach Service-horizon transaction discrepancies) again I cannot recall this specific incident, however, the emails indicate that I would have been alerted on 20 October 2015 and I have no reason to doubt that.
51. I agree with Anne Allaker that Fujitsu should have provided an explanation for the four incidents. Within the email extracts there only appears to be detailed narrative about events in the branch for the one named branch, whereas the other four are referenced but with little content. The emails do, however, suggest that a common approach was used to resolve the records in three branches and that it may work for the fourth one.
52. With the passage of time I cannot say whether I would have felt this typical for Fujitsu
53. Finally on that particular issue, my feeling today is that Kendra Dickinson was right to be concerned about giving advice where the underlying circumstances were unclear. However, in hindsight, I wonder whether a file note could have been agreed with FSC and Cash Supply Chain to note the situation on the known branches, to script a process for tracking any further cases and to seek to agree a process and advice ahead of the branches next balancing period. It would therefore perhaps have been appropriate to log calls with all the affected branches with a view to explain that to them,

for their assurance too while the solution was being clarified

54. Regarding Changes in Branch Database in 2014, I cannot recall what changes were made, nor whether I would have known at the time. My recollection is that I had understood that Fujitsu could not “correct” or “inject” transactions whereas FUJ00087118 (Emails: Branch Database and Change Management Additional Questions) indicates that some form of entry was possible.
55. POL00031410 (Post Office Ltd Risk and Compliance Committee. Project Zebra Horizon review by Deloitte) explains that Deloitte had been commissioned by General Counsel and CIO to conduct a desktop review related to challenges that Horizon was defective. I cannot recall anything to cause me to suggest any other description for their involvement than is given in the introduction to that document

Audits

56. I did not personally carry out audits. I was, however, responsible early in my time at Post Office Ltd for the Branch Audit Team whose members carried out audits at branches. These involved physical audits of cash and stock as well as compliance audits of processes. The cash audit would involve a temporary closure of the post office while a full asset check was conducted, counting cash and stock at the counter and in the safes. Compliance audits would involve discussion and review of processes which might range from branch opening through Horizon password security and to product compliance.
57. Regarding document POL00047544 (Post Office branch auditing- Period 6

Report 2004/5), the findings were cash shortages and the issues appear to have included matters such personal cheques put in place of cash, cash potentially moved elsewhere and issues of accounting for bureau de change. Another issue was gaps in supervisory checks on stocks in Directly Managed Branches. I cannot recall more specific topics to add to this paper from 2004 nor what the conclusions of my report on Blackwood were. I would, however, have carried out the review by speaking to members of the Audit Team and Investigations Team who had been involved with this particular branch. I may also have spoken with Network colleagues.

58. Regarding document POL00032162 (Risk and Compliance Committee Minutes), it was the organisational stance that suspension was necessary. The Financial Investigator involved in a case would have given consideration to where money allegedly stolen may have gone to. There had been other cases where money was understood to have gone to pay off debts.

Policies

59. Regarding documents POL00030562 (Post Office Ltd. Losses Policy-Overarching (Branches)) and POL00087409 (Product and Branch Accounting: Write off Process) I cannot recall how I input to the policies. However, where the policy states that "in general, agents are liable for all losses, including counterfeits" I do remember being involved in a joint panel with the NFSP where we reviewed counterfeit benefit cheques and agreed to waive liability for many of them given the quality of the counterfeits that we examined. It also led to further help to branches through ultra-violet lights

as well as guidance material. I believe that the Post Office took hardship into account when applying the losses policy.

60. In hindsight there is a need for a policy but such policy should perhaps have allowed for more interventions to waive its deployment based on the circumstances of each situation.
61. POL00087409 was intended to deal with where the cost of a write off was borne within Post Office, as in should the cost be borne by the Network cost centre or was there some reason why P&BA should bear the cost of it.
62. I think the comment that it could not be applied to discrepancies visible to the branch is simply that such discrepancies would be a balancing issue in the local accounts of the post office branch and so need resolving there, whereas the purpose of this policy was about differences in the central finance system ledgers.

Prosecutions

63. Regarding POL00055100 (Emails: Regina v Seema Misra- Guildford Crown Court) and POL00055225 (Emails: West Byfleet-Mrs Seema Mirsa-access to operations request) I do not recall what conversations I may have had, however, given the description in the documents shared it suggests I may have asked a question to clarify exactly what was being asked and whether that was usual. It would not be appropriate for me to decline an appropriate request and I would certainly not have done so, but I would have expected Post Office legal team to confirm what an appropriate request was in order that I or my team could take it forward. I think I would have expected a more specific question and would then have been able to respond to that. I think

I felt that the request was too general.

64. Regarding POL00055418 (Emails: The Horizon Trial), given that the vast majority of post offices were understood not to have significant concerns about Horizon, and because of reassurance from audit risk modelling, feedback from audit, training, support and the perspective of internal IT specialists, I did not have serious concerns about the system myself, but I would have been equally keen to be aware of new concerns arising in case this would enable me and my team to positively support the resolution of something if it became a confirmed issue.
65. Regarding POL00029535 (Emails: Response to Mr Paul Pope Dunstan Branch) my recollection is that I didn't have input into prosecution cases, except in so far as my teams may be providing data in the routine support of a case. My interpretation of this letter with an ECT reference is that it was an Executive Correspondence Team matter and I may have been invited to comment on that. I think this would have been rare and, if this was a prosecution case, I don't know if I would have known that from an ECT letter. I do not therefore believe that isolated responses to such letters would necessarily have impacted on my job.

Civil Claims

66. I explained in paragraph 34 that I had been asked to write a report in 2010 which gathered together reasons for assurance as regards Horizon. I am afraid I cannot remember what cases I may have been approached about, nor the detail of what they involved, but my recollection is that it was historic cases included in the Second Sight review or preceding group claims, as

opposed to live or pending civil cases. I believe I would have been approached in light of my role as Head of P&BA or in light of the 2010 report. This, in conjunction with taking forward the development of the Finance Service Centre and supporting an organization undergoing transformation projects and efficiency targets in most areas, was very demanding.

Second Sight and Aftermath

67. As regards Second Sight, I was involved in responding to a number of questions that they asked but I cannot remember the details.
68. I did at this time lead P&BA and was responsible for various teams who issued transaction corrections to branches. Such transaction corrections might arise from reconciliation of branch data against client data, or as a result of a specific query from a branch or client. I could not, however, have been responsible for identifying whether there were disparities in all transactions.
69. I have been asked to comment on the Second Sight report. With the passage of time I regret that I cannot remember what questions they asked nor my responses.
70. I do not believe that I changed my view about Horizon and shortfalls as a result of this review.
71. Regarding the question of 42 days and data availability I cannot remember what data would have been available or what other records may have been available in branch, but I would have expected that the Transaction Correction would include some description of what it related to.

72. With the passage of time I cannot remember how I found working with Second Sight at the time.
73. I cannot remember how the discussions went regarding the suspense account, however, based on document POL00022297 (Emails: Suspense Accounts) it appears that I set out the breadth of scenarios that arise across different products and that it was not a short or simple thing to explain all those variations. The implication appears to be that I could not give a short answer.

Reflections

74. Throughout my time at POL my intention was to help to improve processes, to support business transformation and to improve general service and satisfaction for staff, agents and clients.
75. With the information that I now know, I would have escalated a risk around Horizon onto the agenda of the Compliance Committee early in my tenure at POL. At the time, however, I do not recall Horizon featuring as a risk on the IT risk register. My recollection is that the IT view was that the allegations at the time were unfounded.
76. Regarding report POL00026572, I would have tackled this differently; to have had clearer scoping and attribution of comments, to have substantiated or challenged the basis for describing “compassion” and to have had a more balanced tone. I have included further hindsight reflections in response to an earlier question in paragraphs 42 to 45. However, at the time, I was tasked by the Managing Director with summarising existing conclusions, not with challenging the basis for those conclusions. In

hindsight, it should perhaps have had a wider scope to challenge them.

77. I would also have challenged the capacity of myself and my team to deliver at sufficient pace the competing priorities of this matter, of daily operational processes and of engagement in a myriad of other transformational change projects. The cost pressures of the organisation meant that we were operating with continual headcount reduction targets, which itself required a lot of time. In hindsight it may have been helpful to have clearer lines of responsibility between the activities and further review of resourcing to address organisational priorities.

78. There are clearly very many facets to this sad chain of events. On reflection, going forwards, I would suggest more visibility of policies, for wider input and challenge, and clear ownership of major systems like Horizon in order that it would be clear who to escalate potential issues to and to have a clear tracker for their resolution. A review of the system could also have been considered earlier and a review of the actions that follow on when shortages are identified at audit.

Statement of Truth

I believe the content of this statement to be true.

Signed: _____  _____

Dated: _____ 13 / 01 / 2023 _____

Index to First Witness Statement of Roderick Mark Ismay

<u>No.</u>	<u>URN</u>	<u>Document Description</u>	<u>Control Number</u>
1.	NFSP00000521	National Federation of Subpostmasters: Report of a meeting of the NEC 10 May 2009	VIS00008979
2.	POL00029732	Internal emails: 04 June 2014 re Subpostmaster concerns including re NBSC	POL-0026214
3.	POL00039228	Branch Support Programme DRAID Log	POL-0035710
4.	FUJ00091215	Interfacing Client Data into POL Systems (Project Ping). Post Office Limited Feasibility Report. 25 March 2009	POINQ0097386F
5.	FUJ00091234	Ping Project. Requirements Catalogue. 26 May 2009	POINQ0097405F
6.	FUJ00097480	HNG-X Release 2 Implementation Plan. 21 July 2010	POINQ0103651F
7.	POL00029370	Review of the Creation and Management of Transaction Corrections in POLFS to Correct Accounting Errors in	POL-0025852

		Horizon. 10 February 2010	
8.	POL00001697	Royal Mail Internal Information. Back Office Efficiency Programme- Stock Adjustments. 25 March 2010	VIS00002711
9.	POL00054371	Emails regarding Horizon disputed cases. 8 March 2010	POL-0050850
10.	POL00026572	Horizon- Response to Challenges Regarding Systems Integrity. 2 August 2010	POL-0023213
11.	POL00088956	Emails: Follow up to BIS meeting on JFSA Suspension cases. 5 December 2010	POL-0080917
12.	FUJ00084797	Emails: Local Suspense Problem 14 May 2013	POINQ0090968F
13.	FUJ00081880	Peak Incident Management System October 2015	POINQ0088051F
14.	FUJ00029908	Emails: Dalmellington Outreach Service-Horizon transaction	POINQ0036079F

		discrepancies 20 October-3 November 2015	
15.	FUJ00087118	Emails: Branch Database and Change Management Additional Questions. 15 May 2014.	POINQ0093289F
16.	POL00031410	Post Office Ltd Risk and Compliance Committee. Project Zebra- Horizon review by Deloittes	POL-0028312
17.	POL00047544	Post Office branch auditing- Period 6 Report (2004/5) 29 October 2004	POL-0044023
18.	POL00032162	Risk and Compliance Committee minutes 29 September 2005	POL-0029097
19.	POL00030562	Post Office Ltd. Losses Policy- Overarching (Branches) April 2006 (Effective date)	POL-0027044
20.	POL00087409	Product and Branch Accounting: Write off Process 30 July 2009 (Revised)	POL-0084467
21.	POL00055100	Emails: Regina v Seema Misra- Guildford Crown Court 27 July 2010	POL-0051579

22.	POL00055225	Emails: West Byfleet- Mrs Seema Mirsa- access to operations request. 13 September 2010	POL-0051704
23.	POL00055418	Emails: The Horizon Trial 08 October 2010	POL-0051897
24.	POL00029535	Emails: Response to Mr Paul Pope Dunstan Branch 4/5 September 2012	POL-0026017
25.	POL00022297	Emails: Suspense accounts 27 January 2015	POL-0018776